FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 16, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ROGER SCOTT BLACKBURN,
Petitioner–Appellant,
v.
No. 09-1077
COLORADO BOARD OF PAROLE,
(D.C. No. 1:08-CV-02688-ZLW)
(Exec. Dir.) Chairman; Board
(D. Colo.)
Member, WAGGNER; Board Member,
C DEBACA; and COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
Respondents–Appellees.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before LUCERO, MURPHY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Roger Scott Blackburn filed a pro se complaint in the district court seeking
release from state prison. Construing his pleadings liberally, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), we recharacterize his claim as brought
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 rather than as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. Because he is in
state custody, Blackburn must obtain a certificate of appealability (“COA”) before
we may reach the merits of his appeal. For substantially the same reasons
provided by the district court, we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
I
While in state custody, Blackburn filed a pro se complaint, ostensibly under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sought release from prison, arguing that the Colorado
Board of Parole unlawfully denied him parole. Blackburn also filed a motion and
supporting documentation for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) before
the district court, which the district court granted. In granting IFP status, the
district court explained that Blackburn would be required to pay a $350 filing fee
in partial payments. Blackburn was ordered to pay an initial fee of $5 within 30
days or demonstrate inability to pay that fee. The order cautioned that failure to
comply would lead to dismissal of his complaint without prejudice. After thirty
days had passed and Blackburn neither paid the $5 nor showed cause to excuse
the fee, the district court dismissed his case without prejudice. Blackburn then
filed what we construe as a notice of appeal in the district court.
II
On appeal, Blackburn contends that he submitted paperwork explaining that
he could not pay the $5 fee. He also advances several arguments that were not
raised before the district court. Because Blackburn challenges the duration of his
confinement and requests discharge from state custody rather than monetary
damages, his claim cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but must be
brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See
McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997). We
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accordingly recharacterize Blackburn’s claim as such. In order to appeal the
district court’s adverse determination of his § 2241 petition, Blackburn must
obtain a COA because he is in state, rather than federal, custody. Montez v.
McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 868-69 (10th Cir. 2000). We thus construe his appeal, at
this point, as an application for a COA.
To obtain a COA, Blackburn must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies a
habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying
constitutional claims, as it did here, a petitioner is not entitled to a COA unless he
can show both that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). An appellate court has
discretion to resolve either the procedural or the substantive issue first. Id. at
485.
We conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate that the district court
permissibly dismissed this case for Blackburn’s failure to pay the $5 filing fee or
to show cause that he could not. Despite Blackburn’s contention that he
submitted evidence demonstrating his inability to pay the $5 fee in response to the
district court’s order, we see no such evidence in the record. Although the district
court should have recharacterized this case as a § 2241 petition rather than a
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§ 1983 suit, that it did not do so was harmless. Blackburn, proceeding IFP, was
properly ordered to pay $5 or demonstrate his inability to do so regardless of
recharacterization. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because the district court’s order
was permissible, so too was dismissal—following reasonable notice—for failure
to follow it.
Accordingly, we DENY Blackburn’s application for a COA and DISMISS
the appeal. We DISMISS all pending motions for lack of jurisdiction because
Blackburn has not obtained a COA. Given that Blackburn proceeded IFP before
the district court and his case properly sounds in habeas, he is entitled to proceed
IFP on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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