FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 23, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
LEON BATES,
Petitioner–Appellant,
v. No. 09-1092
(D.C. No. 1:08-CV-02734-ZLW)
MIKE ARELLANO; ATTORNEY (D. Colo.)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
COLORADO,
Respondents–Appellees.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before LUCERO, MURPHY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Leon Bates requests a certificate of appealability (“COA”) 1 following the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as time barred
under § 2244(d)(1). For substantially the same reasons as the district court, we
deny Bates’ request for a COA and dismiss his appeal.
1
Because Bates proceeds pro se on appeal, we construe his filings liberally.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
I
Bates was convicted of felony menacing on February 4, 2000, and
sentenced to life in prison under Colorado’s Habitual Criminal Act. On
December 19, 2002, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
Certiorari was denied by the Colorado Supreme Court on July 28, 2003. On
March 25, 2004, Bates filed a motion for post-conviction relief in state court,
which was denied on August 11, 2005. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed
that ruling on August 23, 2007, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied Bates’
petition for certiorari on January 14, 2008.
On May 7, 2008, Bates filed a § 2254 habeas petition in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado, asserting ten claims for relief. The
district court entered a show cause order informing Bates that his was a mixed
petition and that he must either voluntarily dismiss his unexhausted claims and
proceed immediately with his exhausted claims or have the entire petition
dismissed without prejudice. Bates was specifically warned that dismissal of the
unexhausted claims would likely preclude him from asserting them in a second or
successive petition. He was also advised that if he dismissed the entire action
without prejudice, the one-year statute of limitations would apply when he refiled,
and that the limitations period would not be tolled during the time that his § 2254
petition had been pending in the federal district court.
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In response, Bates merely asked the district court to stay his habeas petition
while he exhausted several claims in state court. Because Bates did not
demonstrate good cause for a stay, the district court dismissed the entire action
without prejudice on October 24, 2008.
Roughly two months later, Bates filed a second habeas petition, this time
asserting eight claims for relief. It was received by the district court on
December 11, 2008. On February 13, 2009, the district court dismissed Bates’
petition as time barred under § 2244(d)(1). Bates then filed notice of appeal,
which the district court construed as a request for a COA. He also requested
leave to proceed IFP on appeal. The district court denied both requests.
II
Because the district court denied his habeas petition as well as his request
for a COA, Bates may not appeal the district court’s decision absent a grant of a
COA by this court. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To obtain a COA, Bates must make a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). When
the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching
the underlying constitutional claims, as it did here, a petitioner is not entitled to a
COA unless he can show both that “jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). An
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appellate court has discretion to resolve either the procedural or the substantive
issue first. Id. at 485.
The one-year statute of limitations for § 2254 habeas claims generally
begins to run from “the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”
§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bates’ direct
criminal appeal on July 28, 2003, and Bates did not seek review in the United
States Supreme Court. Thus, his conviction became final on October 27, 2003.
See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. Bates filed a motion for post-conviction relief in state court
on March 25, 2004, depleting 149 days of the limitations period. See
§ 2244(d)(2). The period began to run again on January 15, 2008, when the
denial of Bates’ post-conviction motion became final and continued through
December 10, 2008, the day before he filed his instant habeas petition. That
amounts to an additional 331 days, for a total of 480 days. Accordingly, Bates’
habeas petition is time barred absent 115 days of equitable tolling. 2
Bates argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he was mislead
by the district court’s September 8, 2008 show cause order. He claims that the
2
As the district court recognized, and as Bates was informed, Bates is not
entitled to tolling for the days during which his initial federal habeas petition was
pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001) (holding that “an
application for federal habeas corpus review is not an ‘application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(2)”).
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order indicated he would be able to refile his habeas petition at a later date and
that it did not inform him that he could have dismissed only his unexhausted
claims. We are not persuaded. The district court’s order specifically and clearly
informed Bates that he could choose to dismiss only his unexhausted claims or the
entire action, and that if he chose the latter course, he would not be entitled to
tolling for the days during which his initial federal habeas petition was pending.
Because the district court’s show cause order properly informed Bates of the
consequences of dismissal, it does not provide a basis for equitable tolling.
III
Accordingly, jurists of reason would not find debatable the district court’s
conclusion that Bates’ habeas petition is time barred. Bates’ request for a COA is
DENIED and his appeal is DISMISSED. Because we agree with the district
court that this appeal is not taken in good faith, his motion to proceed IFP on
appeal is DENIED. See § 1915(a)(3).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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