FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 26, 2009
PUBLISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JONATHAN SCHMIER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 09-1036
MCDONALD’S LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 1:08-CV-02471-ZLW)
Jonathan Schmier, pro se.
Before HARTZ, McKAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
This appeal raises an interesting issue concerning the authority of a district
court to consider a plaintiff’s motion to set aside his own voluntary dismissal of
his complaint. Jonathan Schmier, proceeding pro se, sued McDonald’s LLC for
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, and disability, and also alleged
retaliation. He submitted the complaint to the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado on November 6, 2008, and it was filed on November 13,
when a magistrate judge granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and
directed the clerk to commence the action. On November 25, however,
Mr. Schmier filed a notice that he was voluntarily dismissing his suit with
prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). On December 3
the district court filed an order recognizing the effective date of the dismissal as
November 25. See Janssen v. Harris, 321 F.3d 998, 1000–01 (10th Cir. 2003)
(dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(i) (restyled in 2007 as Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)) does
not require an order of the court and is effective on the date it is filed).
Mr. Schmier then sought to change course. On December 18 he moved to
vacate the voluntary dismissal, complaining about the behavior of McDonald’s
with respect to an apparent settlement agreement that led to the dismissal. The
district court denied the motion. Next, Mr. Schmier filed a motion requesting the
court to set a hearing on the motion to vacate the voluntary dismissal, but his
request was denied. Finally, he filed a motion requesting that his case be
reassigned to a magistrate judge, and the district court again denied his motion.
Mr. Schmier appeals the court’s denial of his motion to vacate the voluntary
dismissal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
As we understand Mr. Schmier’s brief, he asserts that between the day that
he filed suit and the day that he dismissed the suit with prejudice, he entered a
settlement agreement with McDonald’s. We assume that the agreement included
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a provision requiring Mr. Schmier to dismiss his suit with prejudice, although he
never expressly says so. He does, however, assert that the agreement “[h]as no
Legal and Bi[n]ding Effect.” Aplt. Br. at 2. He alleges (1) that although the
agreement states that McDonald’s advised him to consult legal counsel before
signing, McDonald’s did not so advise him; (2) that although the agreement states
that he had a reasonable amount of time to consider the agreement and consult an
attorney before signing it, he did not have enough time; and (3) that the
agreement prohibits him from discussing or disclosing its terms, which prevented
him from discussing the agreement with legal counsel.
Under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) a plaintiff may dismiss an action voluntarily
before the defendant files an answer or a motion for summary judgment. The
dismissal is without prejudice, unless the notice of dismissal states otherwise.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). Mr. Schmier’s notice stated that his dismissal
was with prejudice. “A voluntary dismissal with prejudice operates as a final
adjudication on the merits,” Warfield v. AlliedSignal TBS Holdings, Inc., 267
F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2001), and is thus a “final judgment,” Randall v. Merrill
Lynch, 820 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see 8 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 41.33[6][c] at 41-84
(“A dismissal by notice made with prejudice operates as an adjudication on the
merits.”).
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Like other final judgments, a dismissal with prejudice under Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(i) can be set aside or modified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). See Warfield, 267 F.3d at 542; Randall, 820 F.2d at 1320; see also Smith
v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n unconditional dismissal [by
stipulation of the parties] terminates federal jurisdiction except for the limited
purpose of reopening and setting aside the judgment of dismissal within the scope
allowed by [Rule] 60(b).” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We have recognized only a narrow exception to this general rule. In
Netwig v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 375 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 2004), we held that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants’ motion to reinstate a
claim that had been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice by the plaintiff under
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). In that case the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint
in Kansas federal district court once he realized that he had failed to serve the
defendants within Kansas’s two-year limitations period. See id. at 1009. He
promptly filed a new complaint against the same defendants in federal district
court in Minnesota, which had a more generous limitations period. See id. at
1010. The defendants, however, successfully moved in the Minnesota court to
have the case transferred back to Kansas. See id. The Kansas federal district
court disposed of the case by proceeding through the following steps: (1) Over
plaintiff’s objection, it applied Rule 60(b) to reinstate the original case that the
plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed. (2) It consolidated the original suit and the
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transferred case. (3) It dismissed the original suit as untimely. (4) Based on that
dismissal, it dismissed the Minnesota case on res judicata grounds. See id. We
reversed because the first step in the sequence was faulty. We held that the
Kansas court had lost jurisdiction over the dismissed claim once the plaintiff’s
voluntary dismissal had been filed, see id. at 1011, so “the attempted
reinstatement of the Kansas case [was] a nullity,” id. The defendants had relied
on Noland v. Flohr Metal Fabricators, Inc., 104 F.R.D. 83 (D. Alaska 1984), but
we distinguished that decision on the ground that Rule 60(b) had been invoked by
the plaintiff who had filed the notice of dismissal. See Netwig, 375 F.3d at 1010.
Here, as in Noland, a plaintiff is seeking to set aside his own voluntary
dismissal. We know of no reason to deny jurisdiction to a district court to
consider granting a dismissing plaintiff relief under Rule 60(b). We therefore
embrace the proposition that a plaintiff who has dismissed his claim by filing
notice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) “may move before the district court to vacate the
notice on any of the grounds specified in Rule 60(b).” 8 Moore’s, supra
§ 41.33[6][f] at 41-87; see id. § 41.33[6][j] at 41-92; Warfield, 267 F.3d at 542;
Randall, 820 F.2d at 1320.
Thus, the district court had jurisdiction under Rule 60(b) to consider
Mr. Schmier’s motion to set aside his dismissal. But the merit of the motion is
another matter. “Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary and may only be granted in
exceptional circumstances.” Beugler v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 490
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F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule
provides in pertinent part:
[T]he court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . . for the
following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it
is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Mr. Schmier has not shown entitlement to relief under any
provision of Rule 60(b). On appeal he cites several alleged problems with his
agreement with McDonald’s. But those problems would have been obvious to
him when he signed the agreement, and he does not argue otherwise.
Accordingly, there is no basis to reverse the district court’s denial of his motion
to set aside his voluntary dismissal. See Warfield, 267 F.3d at 543 (affirming
denial of Rule 60(b) motion to vacate dismissal with prejudice because movant
failed to show that dismissal was involuntary).
We AFFIRM the order of the district court. Mr. Schmier’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
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