FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 29, 2009
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 08-6265
v. Western District of Oklahoma
RAYMOND LADELL SLOAN, (D.C. No. 5:93-CR-00133-W-3)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, MURPHY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Raymond Ladell Sloan, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his sentence modification request under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is
therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.
App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Procedural Background
In November 1993, a jury convicted Mr. Sloan of manufacturing, possessing,
and distributing cocaine base, also known as crack cocaine, a Schedule II controlled
substance, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). A federal probation officer prepared a
presentence report with the then-current Guidelines to determine Mr. Sloan’s
sentence. The 4.8 kilograms of cocaine base attributed to Mr. Sloan corresponded
with a base offense level of 38. The probation officer then enhanced his base
offense by four levels for his role in the offenses. His total offense level of 42,
combined with his criminal history of III, resulted in a Guideline sentence range of
360 months’ to life imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (1993). Mr. Sloan
objected to the offense level calculation, the four level enhancement, and his
criminal history category.
At his sentencing hearing on February 9, 1994, the district court sustained
Mr. Sloan’s objection to the four-level enhancement, finding that a two-level
enhancement was more appropriate. Mr. Sloan’s total offense level was
recalculated at 40; however, the Guideline range remained the same. Id. The
district court sentenced Mr. Sloan to 360 months’ imprisonment followed by ten
years of supervised release. On direct appeal, we affirmed Mr. Sloan’s conviction
and sentence. United States v. Sloan, 65 F.3d 861 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1097 (1996).
Mr. Sloan filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court
denied. Mr. Sloan then sought a certificate of appealability from this Court, which
-2-
we denied. See United States v. Sloan, No. 97-6375 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 1998). Mr.
Sloan then filed a request with this Court for authorization to file a successive 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court. We denied that request, as well. See
Sloan v. United States, No. 01-6255 (10th Cir. Jul. 25, 2001).
On August 6, 2008, Mr. Sloan filed the instant motion to modify his prison
term under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) based on Amendment 706 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c),
which lowered the Drug Quantity Table two levels for crack cocaine. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1 (Nov. 1, 2007); U.S.S.G. Supp. to App’x C, Amend. 706. The district
court determined Mr. Sloan did not qualify for a reduction in his sentence because
the 4.8 kilograms of crack cocaine attributable to him still exceeded the revised
quantity amount of 4.5 kilograms for crack cocaine. Thus, the amendment would
still not change his Guideline range. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1).
II. Discussion
Mr. Sloan now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to modify his
term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), claiming the district court failed
to apply Amendment 706 or 715 retroactively to his sentence. Mr. Sloan also
argues he should be resentenced under Booker for the purpose of applying the
Guidelines to his sentence in an advisory manner and redetermining the drug
quantity used to assess his base offense level, which he claims the district court
improperly found by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard.
“We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of a statute or the
sentencing guidelines.” United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 540 (10th Cir. 1997)
-3-
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “We review for an abuse of discretion a
district court’s decision to deny a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2).” United States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008).
When a “motion for sentence reduction is not a direct appeal or a collateral attack
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the viability of [the] motion depends entirely on 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c).” Smartt, 129 F.3d at 540 (internal quotation, citation, and alteration
omitted).
Section 3582(c)(2) allows a sentence reduction “in the case of a defendant
who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that
has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . .” 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2). In such a case, “the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. (emphasis added).
The applicable policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, provides that where “the
guideline range applicable to [a] defendant has subsequently been lowered as a
result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual listed in subsection (c) below, the
court may reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment as provided by 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a) (2008). Subsection (c) includes Amendments
706 and 715 among the enumerated amendments. Id. § 1B1.10(c). In
determining the extent of any reduction under § 3582(c)(2), “the court shall
determine the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the
-4-
defendant if the amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) had been in
effect at the time the defendant was sentenced.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1). The
policy statement further provides that: “A reduction in the defendant’s term of
imprisonment is not consistent with [the] policy statement and therefore is not
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if . . . [a]n amendment listed in subsection
(c) does not have the effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guideline range.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
Amendment 706 modified “the drug quantity thresholds” in U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(c) and the Drug Quantity Table, “so as to assign, for crack cocaine offenses,
base offense levels corresponding to guideline ranges that include the statutory
mandatory minimum penalties.” U.S.S.G. Supp. to App’x C, Amend. 706 (Reason
for Amend.). Consequently, the current highest offense level of 38 would require a
quantity of 4.5 kilograms or more of cocaine, rather than the 1.5 kilograms
previously required for level 38. See id.
On December 11, 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission voted to
make Amendment 706 retroactive, through Amendments 712 and 713. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(a) and (c); U.S.S.G. Supp. to App’x C, Amends. 712 and 713.
Specifically, Amendment 713 changed U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10—the policy statement for
amended Guideline ranges, by listing Amendment 706 as one of the retroactive
amendments. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c), Amend. 713.
Amendment 715 changes the provisions in offenses involving cocaine base
coupled with other controlled substances. The pertinent part states:
-5-
Exceptions to 2-level Reduction.–The 2-level reduction provided in
subdivision (i) shall not apply in a case in which:
(I) the offense involved 4.5 kg or more, or less than 250 mg, of cocaine
base;
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 Amend. 715 (D)(ii) (emphasis added).
At Mr. Sloan’s sentencing, the base offense level for the 4.8 kilograms of
cocaine base attributable to him was 38. Under Amendments 706 and 715, the
crack cocaine quantity for a base offense level of 38 is 4.5 kilograms. “A
reduction” in Mr. Sloan’s term of imprisonment “is not consistent with” the policy
statement in § 1B1.10 “and therefore is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2)” because a two-level reduction in the offense level “does not have the
effect of lowering [his] applicable guideline range.” See U.S.S.G. §
1B1.10(a)(2)(B).
We also reject Mr. Sloan’s claim that he is entitled to resentencing under
Booker for the purpose of applying the Guidelines in an advisory manner or
redetermining his base drug offense level. We have held § 3582(c)(2) motions may
not be employed to present Booker claims, as Ҥ 3582(c)(2) only expressly allows a
reduction where the Sentencing Commission, not the Supreme Court, has lowered
the [sentencing] range.” United States v. Price, 438 F.3d 1005, 1007 & n. 2 (10th
Cir. 2006). Furthermore, with respect to his base drug offense level, the policy
statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 provides:
In determining whether, and to what extent, a reduction in the defendant’s term
of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement is
warranted, the court . . . shall substitute only the amendments listed in
-6-
subsection (c) for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when
the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application
decisions unaffected.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b) (Nov. 1, 2007). Thus, under § 3582, we may only consider
whether Mr. Sloan is entitled to a two-level offense reduction under Amendment
706, and not whether another reduction of his sentence is warranted under the
Guidelines.
Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
his § 3582 motion.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons provided, we AFFIRM the United States District Court’s
order denying Mr. Sloan’s motion filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
Appellant’s Motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court,
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
-7-