FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 10, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
DANNY MANZANARES,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
No. 07-2156
SEAN HIGDON, an officer of the
Albuquerque Police
Department, in his individual capacity,
Defendant–Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. 1:05-CV-00095-WJ/LFG)
Dennis W. Montoya, Montoya Law, Inc., Rio Rancho, New Mexico, for
Plaintiff–Appellant.
Kathryn Levy, Deputy City Attorney, City of Albuquerque Legal Department,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before TACHA, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
We are asked to decide whether law enforcement officers may remain in a
home absent probable cause when consent to enter is granted but later revoked.
We also consider whether the Fourth Amendment permits detention of an
individual for the duration of an investigation based on a police hunch that the
individual may provide aid to a suspect if allowed to leave police custody. Our
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand for the
district court to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of Danny Manzanares
on both of his substantive claims and hold a new trial on damages.
I
A
In the early morning hours of March 16, 2002, Officer Sean Higdon of the
Albuquerque Police Department (“APD”) received a call from an Albuquerque
Police dispatcher regarding an alleged rape. 1 Another APD Officer, Jason
Morales, had spoken with a Danny Manzanares earlier in the night, and Morales
had relayed his belief that Manzanares could help police contact an alleged
suspect in the rape, later determined to be Miguel “Rick” Maestas. Officers
Higdon and David Saladin went to the Manzanares home to investigate Morales’
suspicion. Manzanares himself was not suspected of any crime at that point.
1
Because we are reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter
of law, “[w]e consider the evidence, and any inferences drawn therefrom, in favor
of the non-moving party,” in this case, Higdon. Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278,
1285 (10th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we recite the facts as recounted by Higdon
at trial unless otherwise noted.
-2-
Higdon and Saladin arrived at the Manzanares home at approximately 5:50
a.m. 2 They found Manzanares to be polite and cooperative. On answering the
door, he promptly invited the officers inside. Manzanares told the officers that he
and the suspect, Maestas, worked together and proceeded to provide police the
name of the suspect’s supervisor. Manzanares confirmed descriptions of the
suspect’s vehicle and home but told the officers that he did not know the
suspect’s last name or address. Eventually, Manzanares decided to end the
interview and asked the officers to leave his home. When the officers refused,
Manzanares became agitated. In response, Higdon handcuffed him. At the later
trial, Higdon testified that he did so for safety reasons and out of concern that
Manzanares might warn the suspect if released. Higdon could not precisely recall
how long Manzanares was handcuffed in his home but estimated that it was a
matter of minutes.
Officer Higdon was also asked whether he had an articulable basis to
believe Manzanares needed to be handcuffed. Higdon replied, “I was in
somebody’s house. I don’t know anything about this person or what weapons he
may have accessible to him in his own house.” He further explained, “I felt the
2
At trial, the parties hotly disputed the timing of a number of events,
including the time at which the officers first arrived at the Manzanares home.
Manzanares testified that the officers arrived much earlier than 5:50 a.m.—the
time Higdon provided after his recollection was refreshed by a police report.
Because we must take the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,
see Brown, 227 F.3d at 1285, we accept the latest time of arrival.
-3-
need to put him in handcuffs, so I mean, I wouldn’t have just put him in
handcuffs for no reason.” Higdon acknowledged that Manzanares was not
suspected of a crime.
After learning that additional investigators were en route to the Manzanares
home, Higdon asked Manzanares whether he would prefer to remain in his home
until the investigators arrived or wait in the back of a police vehicle. Manzanares
opted to remain in the home with the officers, and Higdon removed his handcuffs.
Following Sergeant Christine Chester’s arrival on the scene, at approximately
8:00 a.m., Manzanares admitted that he knew the suspect’s name to be Miguel
Maestas, and agreed to guide police to his home. He had at least twice previously
denied knowing the suspect’s last name or address.
For his cooperation, Manzanares was repaid many times over. Higdon and
Saladin handcuffed him again, locking him in the rear seat of their squad car.
The officers, with Manzanares in tow, arrived at Maestas’ home at 9:11 a.m. 3
They left Manzanares handcuffed in the backseat and exited the vehicle. Higdon
testified that he did so in the interest of safety and because Manzanares was
trying to help his friend, Maestas. 4 When Maestas did not answer his door, some
3
By Manzanares’ account, he was taken from his home to Maestas’ home
at 5:00 a.m.
4
The only basis we discern for asserting that Manzanares would help
Maestas is Manzanares’ initial refusal to share detail with police. That Higdon
continued to fear that Manzanares would help Maestas seems odd, given that by
(continued...)
-4-
officers sought a warrant while others secured the perimeter.
Police remained outside Maestas’ home for several hours. All the while,
Manzanares was handcuffed and locked in the backseat of the squad car. Police
sought no further information from him, and Higdon explained that he continued
to detain Manzanares only because he feared that Manzanares might impede the
investigation if freed. When Maestas finally exited his house and was taken into
custody, Higdon returned Manzanares to his home—around 12:25 p.m.
According to Higdon’s timeline, Manzanares was detained in handcuffs in the
squad car for more than three hours. 5
4
(...continued)
this time Manzanares had provided the requested information and led police to
Maestas’ home. Nonetheless, because of the procedural posture of the case, we
do not question the credibility of his explanation. Brown, 227 F.3d at 1285.
5
Manzanares testified that the conditions in the car were oppressive, with
the officers intentionally blasting the heat and music while he was alone in the
car. According to Manzanares, when he asked to be taken home, Higdon yelled in
response, “Your rapist friend is not cooperating. You’re going to have to wait
with us.” Each time the officers returned to the car after that, Manzanares
knocked on the plexiglass barrier between the front and back seats to try to get
their attention. At one point, Saladin opened the back door, and Mazanares dry
heaved. Saladin apologized but refused to allow Manzanares to leave and again
closed the door. Manzanares testified that he suffered headaches, stomachaches,
dry heaves, and dehydration.
After police made contact with Maestas, Higdon and Saladin returned to the
vehicle but did not release Manzanares until after they had completed writing
their reports. Throughout this time, Manzanares remained handcuffed in the back
seat of the car. By Manazanares’ timeline, he was detained in the car for
approximately seven hours, from 5 a.m. to 12 p.m.
-5-
B
Following this encounter, Manzanares brought suit against Higdon under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting two claims based on violations of the Fourth
Amendment and a third claim for punitive damages. At the conclusion of
Manzanares’ case in chief, Higdon moved for judgment as a matter of law, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, arguing that his actions were objectively reasonable. The
court took Higdon’s motion under advisement. On the conclusion of the
presentation of his case, Higdon renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of
law. Manzanares moved for judgment as a matter of law on all three of his
claims. The district court again took the motions under advisement and submitted
the case to the jury.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Higdon on all claims. Manzanares
then renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law. Concluding that
reasonable inferences could be drawn to support Higdon’s theory of the case and
the jury verdict, the district court denied Manzanares’ motion. Because the jury’s
verdict for Higdon was undisturbed, the district court denied Higdon’s motion as
moot. After entry of judgment, Manzanares again renewed his motion for
judgment as a matter of law and moved for a new trial, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a),
on the basis of his contention that the jury was erroneously instructed. Both
motions were summarily denied. Manzanares appeals.
-6-
II
Because a motion for judgment as a matter of law presents purely legal
arguments, we review a district court’s disposition of such a motion de novo.
Herrera v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 474 F.3d 675, 685 (10th Cir. 2007). Judgment as a
matter of law is appropriate only when the evidence presented at trial does not
permit a reasonable jury to find for the non-movant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). It is “warranted only
if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences
which may support the opposing party’s position.” Herrera, 474 F.3d at 685
(quotation omitted). “[W]e will not weigh evidence, judge witness credibility, or
challenge the factual conclusions of the jury.” Brown, 227 F.3d at 1285
(quotation omitted).
A
We consider Manzanares’ contention that he is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on his claim that Higdon violated the Fourth Amendment by
refusing to exit the Manzanares home. In doing so, we apply the traditional two-
part qualified immunity framework, considering first the existence of a
constitutional violation and next whether the law as to that violation was clearly
established. 6 Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008).
6
The Supreme Court made this “order of battle” discretionary in Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). Because we conclude that both inquiries
(continued...)
-7-
Our analysis centers on the critical fact that the encounter at issue occurred
in the Manzanares home. Although the Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,” its foremost concern is the home.
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006); United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). Warrantless searches and seizures in the home are
presumptively unreasonable. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004); United
States v. Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2008). “[E]ven when a
felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that
incriminating evidence will be found within” a home, police may not enter
without a warrant absent exigent circumstances. Groh, 540 U.S. at 559 (quoting
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1980)). The sphere of “exigent
circumstances” is highly circumscribed. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 117 n.6
(collecting cases).
Despite its fundamental nature, the warrant requirement for entry into a
home has a few carefully established exceptions. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). One such exception, the consensual encounter, does
not require a warrant because it is not a search or seizure for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1115 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
6
(...continued)
are necessary to our analysis, we adhere to the traditional order of battle.
-8-
Such encounters are limited by the scope of consent given. Gates v. Tex. Dep’t
of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 426 (5th Cir. 2008); United
States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s
consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what
would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the
officer and the suspect?”). Thus, as soon as an individual has “an objective
reason to believe that he is not free to terminate [an encounter],” he is “seized,”
and the Fourth Amendment is implicated. United States v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190,
1194 (10th Cir. 1999). As an exception to the warrant requirement, we take care
to “jealously and carefully draw[]” the boundaries of consent, lest the warrant
requirement be subsumed by the exception. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109 (quoting
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)).
There is no question that Higdon’s original entry into the Manzanares home
was consensual. Nor can there be a legitimate dispute that consent was later
withdrawn. Manzanares unequivocally asked Higdon and Saladin to leave. In
Higdon’s words, “He didn’t want us there anymore.” See Gates, 537 F.3d at 426
(“[C]onsent which waives Fourth Amendment rights may be limited, qualified, or
withdrawn.” (quotation omitted)); Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 567 (6th
Cir. 1999) (“[T]he consenting party may limit the scope of that search, and hence
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at any moment may retract his consent.” (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52)
(additional citations omitted)).
When Manzanares asked the officers to leave, the consensual encounter
ended; Manzanares was “seized,” and Higdon’s continued presence was permitted
only if it comported with the Fourth Amendment. Gates, 537 F.3d at 426 (“[I]f . .
. [one of the plaintiffs] revoked that consent upon his return home, the defendants
violated the [plaintiffs’] Fourth Amendment rights by remaining in the house,
absent a court order or exigent circumstances.”); Painter, 185 F.3d at 567 (“Th[e]
search should have terminated instantly upon Painter’s revocation of consent, and
the officers should have promptly departed the premises (assuming they possessed
no independent legal authority to remain).”); see also West, 219 F.3d at 1178
(noting that it was unnecessary to decide when the defendant revoked consent
because the officer had earlier established probable cause).
Higdon advances two justifications for his continued detention of
Manzanares: (1) investigative detention of Manzanares was supported by
reasonable suspicion that he was obstructing an officer and (2) detention of
Manzanares as a witness was permissible. We address each proffered
justification.
1
“[L]abeling an encounter in the home as either an investigatory stop or an
arrest is meaningless because Payton’s requirements apply to all [such] seizures.”
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United States v. Reeves, 524 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2008). That is because
“at the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”
Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90 (alteration omitted). Thus, Higdon’s attempt to label
the encounter an “investigative detention” is of no consequence. Reeves, 524
F.3d at 1166; see Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 (“In terms that apply equally to seizures
of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm
line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold
may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”). Our inquiry begins with
whether the officers had probable cause as Payton requires. 445 U.S. at 590.
Before this court, Higdon argues that he reasonably suspected Manzanares
was obstructing an officer. Although he argues under the incorrect standard, we
consider his position under the proper standard as a possible alternative ground
for affirmance. 7
“Probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances, and requires
reasonably trustworthy information that would lead a reasonable officer to believe
that the person about to be [seized] has committed or is about to commit a crime.”
Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1116; see also York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205,
7
Higdon made this argument below in passing, asserting that he had
“reasonable suspicion and probable cause to believe [Manzanares] was
committing or had committed the offense of obstructing an officer under state
statute or city ordinance.” (Emphasis added).
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1210 (10th Cir. 2008). We consider information relayed by one officer to
another, but such information must be based on personal knowledge. See Fogarty
v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1157 n.10 (10th Cir. 2008). Neither the officer’s
subjective beliefs nor information gleaned post-hoc bear on this inquiry. Buck v.
City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 2008).
Considering the facts known to Officer Higdon, we conclude that he could
not have reasonably believed that Manzanares had resisted, evaded, obstructed, or
refused to obey an officer within the meaning of either of the relevant provisions
of New Mexico law. See N.M. Stat. § 30-22-1 (resisting, evading, or obstructing
an officer); Albuquerque, N.M., Revised Ordinances § 12-2-19(D) (resisting,
obstructing, or refusing to obey an officer). At the time Manzanares asked him to
leave, Higdon knew only that Manzanares was a co-worker and friend of Maestas
and that Manzanares and Maestas had socialized together earlier that night.
Higdon testified that both he and Officer Morales believed Manzanares “knew
more than he was willing to say,” but that conjecture was not anchored in any
factual observation.
An officer in Higdon’s position would not reasonably believe that
Manzanares was resisting or obstructing an officer under New Mexico law. New
Mexico Statute § 30-22-1(D) provides that “resisting, evading or obstructing an
officer” consists of “resisting or abusing any judge, magistrate or peace officer in
the lawful discharge of his duties.” Albuquerque has a city ordinance that
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prohibits “resisting, obstructing or refusing to obey an officer,” with language
similar to the state statute on “[i]nterfering with, obstructing or opposing any
officer in the lawful discharge of his regular and affixed duties.” Albuquerque,
N.M., Revised Ordinances § 12-2-19(D). Higdon’s sole basis for guessing that
Manzanares was violating either provision was the pure speculation that
Manzanares could have been more cooperative and shared more information. 8 An
unsubstantiated hunch cannot constitute probable cause. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1114
n.4, 1116. Thus, Higdon did not have probable cause to believe that Manzanares
had violated either of the relevant provisions. 9
8
When asked on cross-examination whether he “w[as] obstructing the
police investigation,” Manzanares answered, “I guess in a small way.” On
redirect examination, however, Manzanares said that he did not know the legal
definition of obstruction, testified that he never physically impeded the
investigation, and said that he only “obstructed” the investigation by not
disclosing information. Higdon acknowledged on cross that Manzanares did not
physically resist, fight, or spit on an officer.
9
At trial, Higdon obtained jury instructions regarding accessory in the
commission of a crime, see N.M. Stat. § 30-1-13, and aiding a felon to avoid
arrest, see N.M. Stat. § 30-22-4. Higdon lacked probable cause for these crimes
as well. New Mexico’s accessory statute requires that Manzanares “helped,
encouraged, or caused the [sexual assault] to be committed” and that
“[Manzanares] intended that the [sexual assault] be committed.” State v.
Johnson, 98 P.3d 998, 1007 (N.M. 2004). That Manzanares socialized with
Maestas the night of the alleged assault could not have supplied the requisite
probable cause to believe that Manzanares “helped, encouraged, or caused” a rape
or that he intended for a rape to occur. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91
(1979).
Similarly, aiding a felon requires that Manzanares “knew that the alleged
felon had committed a felony and . . . had the intent that the alleged felon escape
or avoid arrest, trial, conviction or punishment.” State v. Gardner, 814 P.2d 458,
(continued...)
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2
Higdon also claims that he could detain Manzanares as a witness to
prevent him from alerting Maestas. Two distinct legal theories are entwined in
this justification: (1) detention of a witness for information, see Illinois v.
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004), and (2) prevention of interference in an ongoing
investigation. Neither theory permitted Higdon to remain in the Manzanares
home.
Witness detentions are confined to the type of brief stops that “interfere[]
only minimally with liberty.” Id. at 427. Neither the Supreme Court nor this
court has countenanced such a detention in a home. See Reeves, 524 F.3d at
1166. In Lidster, the Court explicitly distinguished the circumstances of that
case—a traffic checkpoint—from situations, such as the one here, in which “a
presumptive rule of unconstitutionality” applies. 540 U.S. at 426. In the absence
of this presumption, Lidster employed ad hoc balancing of public concern and
intrusiveness of the stop. Id. at 427. While such balancing may obviate the
probable cause requirement in certain brief public encounters, in the home,
probable cause remains a categorical requirement. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at
9
(...continued)
461 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). By Higdon’s own testimony, his only basis to suspect
anything along these lines was his hunch that Manzanares “knew more than he
was willing to say.” He had no objective basis for that belief, let alone for the
belief that Manzanares knew Maestas had committed a felony and that he
intended to help Maestas escape arrest. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could
have found for Higdon on the basis of either of these statutes.
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115. Because the detention here occurred inside a home, it was unquestionably
unconstitutional unless supported by probable cause. Reeves, 524 F.3d at 1166.
As explained above, this seizure was not supported by probable cause.
As to Higdon’s protection-of-investigation rationale, we must consider
whether Higdon had probable cause to believe that Manzanares was about to
commit the crime of obstruction. As discussed above, Higdon’s only objective
reasons for suspicion were that Manzanares and Maestas were friends and co-
workers who had spent time together earlier that evening. These facts fall well
short of supplying probable cause.
Further, to the extent that Higdon’s argument can be read as seeking an
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s strictures on seizures in the home, we
decline his invitation. We will not lower the drawbridge to invite police into a
home without a warrant or an established substitute therefor whenever officers
“feel” that a resident might impede an ongoing investigation. Such an exception
would stand the Fourth Amendment on its head. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109
(exceptions to the warrant requirement must be “jealously and carefully drawn”
(quoting Jones, 357 U.S. at 499)).
We accordingly reject both of Higdon’s purported justifications for
remaining in the Manzanares home. Given the absence of probable cause, Higdon
was constitutionally compelled to leave the home when Manzanares withdrew
consent. Thus, a reasonable jury was compelled to find that Manzanares’
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constitutional rights were violated when Higdon remained in his home without a
warrant or valid exception to the warrant requirement after consent was revoked.
B
Having concluded that Higdon violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing
to exit, we must determine whether his conduct was objectively reasonable in
light of clearly established law at the time it occurred. 10 Weigel, 544 F.3d at
1151. Officers are immune from suit unless the contours of the right in question
are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotation
omitted). This is an objective legal question. Keylon v. City of Albuquerque,
535 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008).
It has been clear for nearly thirty years that a warrantless entry into a home
is presumptively unreasonable. Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-86. The Supreme Court
has consistently reiterated the famous refrain that a man’s home is his castle and
has preserved the home as the center of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. See
10
Although the district court did not reach this issue, it is a purely legal
determination that was argued below and that we may decide on the record. See
Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1133, 1136 (10th Cir. 2006); cf. United States v.
Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1199 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[R]emand for further
proceedings is unnecessary because no additional fact-finding is needed to resolve
the ultimate legal issues involved”). Moreover, the parties briefed this issue,
providing us the benefit of the adversarial process. Pittsburg & Midway Coal
Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1539 (10th Cir. 1995), abrogated on
other grounds as recognized by United States v. Arrieta, 436 F.3d 1246, 1250 n.2
(10th Cir. 2006).
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Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115; Payton, 445 U.S. at 601 n.54; Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475
(1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914), overruled on other
grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Similarly, the Court has clearly
established that the scope of a consensual encounter is controlled by the
consenting person. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. Thus, an objectively reasonable
officer would have known that Higdon’s continued presence in the Manzanares
home became a seizure when Manzanares withdrew his consent. See Gates, 537
F.3d at 426; West, 219 F.3d at 1178; Painter, 185 F.3d at 567.
Any reasonable officer would also have known that probable cause was
indispensable to justify remaining in the Manzanares home. The Court made
clear in Payton that, at a bare minimum, all in-home seizures require the existence
of probable cause. Reeves, 524 F.3d at 1166. Similarly, there can be no
reasonable dispute that probable requires “reasonably trustworthy information,”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991), or that an inchoate hunch does not
satisfy this standard, see Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1114-16 & n.4. By his own
admission, Higdon’s beliefs that Manzanares was committing or was about to
commit a crime were based on the mere speculation that he “knew more than he
was willing to say.”
That Higdon could not remain in a home to detain a witness who might
impede an investigation if freed was similarly clearly established. Higdon’s
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argument that Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006), holds
otherwise is a non-starter. Walker addressed a situation in which officers
required individuals known to be witnesses to remain in their home. Id. at 1144-
45. Although the court held the detention unconstitutional, id. at 1150, it held
also that the contours of witness detention were not clearly established at the
time, id. at 1151.
Our present case differs in several fundamental respects. First, Manzanares
was not a “witness” in any traditional sense. In contrast to the officers in Walker,
Higdon had no reason to believe that Manzanares observed the alleged crime.
Second, while the witnesses in Walker were in their home, the officers detaining
them were not. Id. at 1145. Higdon, however, remained in the Manzanares home.
This distinction places Higdon on entirely different footing than the officers in
Walker and squarely within a clearly established line of cases. See Payton, 445
U.S. at 585-86; Reeves, 524 F.3d at 1166.
These cases unanimously require probable cause (as well as a warrant or
exigent circumstances) to seize an individual in his home. See Groh, 540 U.S. at
559. “Because not a word in any of our cases would suggest to a reasonable
officer that this case fits within any exception to that fundamental tenet, [Higdon]
is asking us, in effect, to craft a new exception. Absent any support for such an
exception in our cases, he cannot reasonably have relied on an expectation that we
would do so.” Id. at 565. Accordingly, we conclude that Higdon violated
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Manzanares’ clearly established constitutional rights by remaining in his home
after consent was withdrawn without probable cause.
III
A
We proceed to consider whether Higdon unlawfully detained Manzanares in
the squad car after Manzanares agreed to help APD officers locate Maestas’
home. Higdon acknowledges that holding Manzanares in the car constituted a
seizure. Because this detention occurred outside the home, we must decide
whether this seizure constituted an arrest or an investigative detention in order to
ascertain Fourth Amendment requirements. 11 See United States v. Brown, 496
F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2007). An investigative detention is
a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment but, unlike an
arrest, it need not be supported by probable cause. . . . An officer can
stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the
officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that
criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable
cause.
Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115 (quotations omitted). An investigative detention evolves
into an arrest when the scope of police conduct is no longer reasonably related to
the circumstances initially justifying the seizure. United States v. Melendez-
11
Higdon does not argue that because Manzanares agreed to show police
the location of the Maestas home, Manzanares’ presence in the squad car was
consensual at the outset. Presumably, this is because such agreement may well
have been the product of involuntary consent deriving from the unconstitutional
seizure in the Manzanares home. See United States v. Chavez, 534 F.3d 1338,
1348 n.14 (10th Cir. 2008).
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Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir. 1994). “An arrest is distinguished by the
involuntary, highly intrusive nature of the encounter.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115
(quotation omitted).
“The allowable scope of an investigative detention cannot be determined by
reference to a bright line rule.” United States v. Neff, 300 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th
Cir. 2002); accord United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). Although
there is no rigid time limit on an investigative detention, “it is clear that the
brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an
important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to
be justifiable on reasonable suspicion.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 (quotation
omitted). The Supreme Court has “emphasized the need to consider the law
enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably
needed to effectuate those purposes.” Id. (citation omitted). Forceful methods
may be used during an investigative detention short of arrest only when such
methods are necessary for officer protection. Neff, 300 F.3d at 1220. “The use
of firearms, handcuffs, and other forceful techniques generally exceed the scope
of an investigative detention and enter the realm of an arrest.” Cortez, 478 F.3d
at 1115-16 (quoting Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1052) (quotation marks
omitted).
As the Supreme Court has noted, it has never held a detention of 90
minutes or longer to be anything short of an arrest. United States v. Place, 462
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U.S. 696, 709-710 (1983). Higdon points us to no case, and our independent
research reveals none, construing a detention of 90 minutes or longer as an
investigative detention. 12 See, e.g., Walker, 451 F.3d at 1150 (90 minute
detention constituted an arrest); United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 93 (10th
Cir. 1996) (45 minute detention constituted an arrest); United States v. Shareef,
100 F.3d 1491, 1501-02 (10th Cir. 1996) (30 and 45 minute detentions did not
constitute arrests).
Viewing the facts in Higdon’s favor, i.e., minimizing the length of the
detention, Manzanares was held in the back of the squad car for more than three
hours—more than twice as long as the reference point established by the Supreme
Court in Place. The duration of detention alone provides strong evidence that
Manzanares was under arrest rather than merely subject to an investigative
detention.
Moreover, Manzanares was handcuffed and locked in a confined space for
the entirety of the detention. The record does not provide a particularized reason
to suspect he was dangerous so as to justify such forceful measures. See Neff,
300 F.3d at 1220. Higdon argues that APD standard procedure calls for
handcuffing those who ride in the back of squad cars, but police policy cannot
12
Cases such as Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001), and United
States v. Cantu, 405 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2005), present a different
issue—permissible detention while obtaining a search warrant relating to the
detained individual—and thus have no relevance here.
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control our analysis of Higdon’s liability for a constitutional violation. Cf. Anaya
v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., Inc., 195 F.3d 584, 592 (10th Cir. 1999).
Higdon claims that the detention did not become an arrest because “actions
were being taken” for the duration of Manzanares’ detention, apparently referring
to the fact that Maestas had yet to be apprehended. Enmeshed in this argument is
the notion that Manzanares might have alerted Maestas to the police investigation
if freed. Considering the purpose of a detention is appropriate in determining
whether it was an arrest. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685. We have also recognized that
brief detention of witnesses may be permissible if reasonable. Walker, 451 F.3d
at 1148 (citing Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426-27). Reasonableness in the witness
detention context requires us to balance “the gravity of the public concerns served
by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and
the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
In weighing these factors, we begin by noting that “police have less
authority to detain those who have witnessed a crime for investigatory purposes
than to detain criminal suspects.” Walker, 451 F.3d at 1148. We further recall
that Higdon did not have a reasonable basis to believe Manzanares had witnessed
the alleged crime. Rather, Manzanares knew only identifying information about
the suspect, which he had already shared with police. This case does not require
us to delineate the precise definition of “witness” or address the impact of a
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detained individual’s quantum of knowledge on the arrest analysis. Manzanares’
detention in the squad car was so far beyond any conceivable line delineating the
scope of a non-arrest detention that his knowledge is essentially irrelevant.
Once Manzanares led Higdon to Maestas’ residence, the purpose of the
detention was satisfied. At least under the facts of this case, the mere possibility
that Manzanares might have tipped off Maestas cannot transform a forceful, three-
hour detention from an arrest into something less. A contrary holding would
marginalize established precedent holding that investigative and witness
detentions are brief and carefully limited in scope. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427-
28 (collecting cases); Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115 (“An officer can stop and briefly
detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion
supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the
officer lacks probable cause.” (emphasis added and quotation omitted)). We
cannot permit law enforcement to detain individuals in police vehicles
indefinitely absent probable cause without eviscerating these long-standing
constitutional requirements. Thus, based both on the duration of the detention
and the use of forceful measures, we hold that Manzanares was arrested when he
was handcuffed and confined in the back of a squad car for more than three hours.
Higdon does not identify any basis for this arrest other than the factors he
advanced in support of Manzanares’ in-home detention, and we discern none in
the record. As explained above, these factors do not establish probable cause,
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see Part II.A.1, supra, as required for an arrest, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 700 (1981). Thus, we conclude that Manzanares was arrested without
probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Given that we reach this
conclusion viewing the record in the light most favorable to Higdon, no
reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise.
B
Lastly, we consider whether Manzanares’ squad car detention violated
clearly established law. Whether an investigative detention has evolved into an
arrest is always a case-specific inquiry, but it has been clear for some time that
the use of handcuffs generally converts a detention into an arrest. See Melendez-
Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1052. We have also clearly required a particularized suspicion
that a detainee is dangerous in order to justify handcuffs or other forceful
techniques in an investigative detention. See id. at 1052-53 (mere suspicion that
suspects possess drugs insufficient to justify use of handcuffs and display of
firearms); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1993) (police use
of firearms did not turn an investigative detention into an arrest when the officers
knew that guns were found on the premises).
Based on these cases, any reasonable officer would understand that it is
unconstitutional to handcuff someone absent probable cause or an articulable
basis to suspect a threat to officer safety combined with reasonable suspicion.
Moreover, Higdon’s suggestion that an ongoing investigation provides blanket
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license for investigative detention is a novel one wholly without support in our
case law. Accordingly, this theory cannot call into question our clearly-
established law on point. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 565 (“Absent any support for
such an exception in our cases, he cannot reasonably have relied on an
expectation that we would [create one].”).
As with Manzanares’ in-home detention, Higdon argues that Walker is
dispositive of the clearly established inquiry. We are unpersuaded. He is correct
that Walker reiterates the absence of a bright-line delineation between arrest and
mere detention. 451 F.3d at 1149. Yet, Walker does not control this case both
because the detention here lasted more than twice as long as that in Walker and
because Manzanares, unlike the plaintiffs in Walker, was not reasonably believed
to have witnessed a crime. Id. at 1145, 1147-48. Higdon cannot escape liability
by labeling Manzanares a “witness.”
Moreover, we cannot accept Higdon’s broader proposition that the
existence of a grey area between arrests and investigative detentions means that
no reasonable officer can ever understand that he has arrested a suspect.
Although the lack of bright-line rule may merit somewhat greater leeway in
determining whether the law on a particular point is clearly established, Higdon’s
argument ignores that precedent creates meaningful standards even when it does
not draw bright lines. See, e.g., Buck, 549 F.3d at 1290-91; Weigel, 544 F.3d at
1153-55. No reasonable officer could divine from our precedent the notion that a
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three-hour, handcuffed detention without any basis for the use of force was
anything short of an arrest. We further conclude that a reasonable officer could
not have believed that there was probable cause to arrest to Manzanares, see Part
II.B, supra, as required by clearly established law, Summers, 452 U.S. at 700.
Thus, Higdon violated Manzanares’ clearly established constitutional rights when
he handcuffed and detained Manzanares in a squad car for more than three
hours. 13
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment below and
REMAND with instructions that the district court enter judgment as a matter of
law in favor of Manzanares on his Fourth Amendment claims and hold a new trial
on damages.
13
Because we reverse the judgment below and remand for entry of
judgment as a matter of law on both claims, a new trial will be held on damages
but not on liability. Thus, we need not determine whether the jury was properly
instructed as to liability.
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