FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 14, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
JERRY WAYNE SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-3253
(D.C. No. 5:05-CV-03447-MLB)
DAVID R. MCKUNE, Warden; (D. Kan.)
JOHN R. COOLING; ROBERT
ARNOLD; T. ROGERS; BILL
CUMMINGS; CHARLES SIMMONS;
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; LISA MEYRICK;
JANE DOES; JOHN DOES,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, PORFILIO, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Jerry Wayne Smith appeals pro se from an
August 20, 2008, order of the district court dismissing with prejudice his pro se
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
civil rights lawsuit against various Kansas prison officials as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 37
sanction for, among other things, twice failing to appear for a scheduled
deposition. 1 He also appeals from a January 17, 2008, order of the district court
dismissing defendant Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC), upon finding
the KDOC a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
As accurately set forth in the district court’s August 2008 order,
The long and tortured history of this case is reflected in the
court file, which now spans three volumes. . . . Plaintiff failed to
appear on May 20, 2008 for his deposition, which prompted
defendants’ second motion to impose sanctions. By order of
July 18, 2008, the court reluctantly granted plaintiff’s motion for
additional time to respond to defendants’ motion to impose sanctions
and, in addition, directed that defendants re-notice plaintiff’s
deposition to be taken at the U.S. Courthouse in Wichita, Kansas.
The order expressly stated “If plaintiff fails to appear for and fully
participate in his deposition on the date and time noticed, this case
will be dismissed, with prejudice.” (Doc. 163). By letter of July
29, 2008, plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the court’s July 18 order
and claimed that he was hospitalized. (Doc. 165). Plaintiff’s
deposition was noticed for August 18 at 9:30 a.m. On August 8,
plaintiff left a voice mail with defendants’ counsel stating that he
would appear for his deposition but as of noon, August 18, plaintiff
had not appeared and had not been in contact with defendants’
counsel. (Doc. 166).
R. Doc. 167 at 1-2. The court acknowledged its familiarity with plaintiff’s claims
of illness and “other excuses such as equipment failure,” which it said it
1
Rule 37(d)(1)(A)(i) authorizes a district court to impose sanctions if a party
fails to appear for his deposition after being served with proper notice. Sanctions
for failure to appear “may include any of the orders listed in Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi),” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3), which includes dismissing the
action in whole, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v).
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“accepted . . . albeit with reservation and skepticism because plaintiff’s problems,
whether real, manufactured or imagined, have not prevented him from filling the
file with prolix pleadings, submissions, correspondence and exhibits.” Id., Doc.
167 at 3. The court also found that “[a]fter almost three years, it is apparent that
plaintiff, for whatever reason, will not follow the rules unless they suit his
schedule and his one-sided view regarding how the case should proceed.” Id. As
such, the court applied the factors set forth in Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d
916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992), found the equities weighed in defendants’ favor, and
dismissed plaintiff’s lawsuit with prejudice. This appeal followed.
Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the imposition
of a Rule 37 sanction for an abuse of discretion. Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro.
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976); Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 920.
Because “dismissal of an action with prejudice is a drastic sanction that should be
employed only as a last resort,” Davis v. Miller, 571 F.3d 1058, 1061 (10th Cir.
2009), it is “appropriate only in cases of willful misconduct,” Ehrenhaus,
965 F.2d at 920. Thus, before dismissing a case under Rule 37, the district court
should ordinarily consider a number of factors, including: (1) the
degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2) the amount of
interference with the judicial process; . . . (3) the culpability of the
litigant; (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that
dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for noncompliance;
and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions.
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Id. at 921 (citations and quotation omitted). Further, when a party appears pro se,
“the court should carefully assess whether it might . . . impose some sanction
other than dismissal, so that the party does not unknowingly lose its right of
access to the courts because of a technical violation.” Id. at 920 n.3. “Only when
the aggravating factors outweigh the judicial system’s strong predisposition to
resolve cases on their merits is dismissal an appropriate sanction.” Id. at 921
(quotation omitted).
Mindful that plaintiff is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe his
appellate brief. Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1998). He
contends the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his case with
prejudice because he suffers from serious mental illnesses, including major
depression and post traumatic stress disorder, and that his hospitalization for
these illnesses prevented him from attending his August 18 deposition. He claims
the district court was wrong to characterize his illnesses as “real, manufactured or
imagined,” because medical documentation demonstrates that he suffers from
severe disorders. Likewise, he takes issue with the court’s characterization of his
printer’s failure as an “excuse,” apparently because he views such a failure as
commonplace. In answer to the district court’s finding that he does not follow the
rules, he asserts that he “has followed the rules to the extent it is humanly
possible on [his] part.” Aplt. Br. at 22.
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Defendants counter that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing plaintiff’s case with prejudice because it properly considered the
applicable Ehrenhaus factors, and its findings are supported by competent
evidence.
The district court found the following with regard to the Ehrenhaus factors:
[D]efendants have been prejudiced by plaintiff’s persistent failure to
prosecute this case in an orderly and timely fashion and to comply
with orders of this court. Defendants will continue to be prejudiced
by plaintiff’s conduct. Plaintiff has not merely interfered with the
judicial process; he has continually obstructed and manipulated it and
there is no reason to believe that his conduct will cease. Plaintiff is
fully culpable for the failure of this case to move forward. The court
previously has warned plaintiff regarding dismissal. (Doc. 55).
Finally, lesser sanctions are not just lacking in efficacy. Monetary
sanctions are meaningless to a plaintiff who has been allowed to
proceed in forma pauperis and the sanctions set out in Fed. R. Civ. P.
37 will not substitute for plaintiff’s failure to appear–twice–for his
deposition.
R. Doc. 167 at 3-4.
Having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law pursuant to
the above-mentioned standards, we agree with the district court’s decision to
grant defendants’ motions for sanctions and dismiss plaintiff’s case with
prejudice. See Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 918 (“It is within a court’s discretion to
dismiss a case if, after considering all the relevant factors, it concludes that
dismissal alone would satisfy the interests of justice.”).
Plaintiff next contends that the district court erroneously dismissed
defendant KDOC on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Having conducted a de novo
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review of that determination, Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250,
1253 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that “Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question
of federal law and our review is de novo”), we conclude that plaintiff has not
identified any reversible error in the district court’s decision.
Finally, plaintiff contends that the district court erred by not ruling on his
request for appointment of counsel. We see no merit in this contention. 2
We AFFIRM the challenged decisions for substantially the same reasons as
stated in the orders dated August 20, 2008, and January 17, 2008. Plaintiff’s
motion to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
2
Plaintiff’s notice of appeal identifies two other orders of the district court
that he claims to be appealing, one dated October 10, 2007, and another dated
July 18, 2008. But because his opening brief contains no argument regarding
these orders (even though it mentions them) we deem waived any challenge he
may have brought. Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 954 (10th Cir. 1992)
(observing that “even issues designated for review are lost if they are not actually
argued in the party’s brief”).
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