FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 22, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JEREMY EBY,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 09-2098
v. (Case No. 08-CV-01105-BB-RHS)
JAMES JANECKA, Warden; (D.N.M.)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER *
Before LUCERO, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Pro se Petitioner, Jeremy Eby, a state inmate, seeks a Certificate of
Appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
habeas petition. Petitioner was convicted in a New Mexico state court of second
degree murder and evidence tampering. On September 23, 2005, the court
sentenced Petitioner to fifteen years of imprisonment, after finding him to be a
serious violent offender. Petitioner appealed. On June 30, 2006, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence. Petitioner
filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the New Mexico Supreme Court. The
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
court denied this petition on September 19, 2006, and issued its mandate on
November 20, 2006. Then, in February 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in state court which was denied on February 25, 2008.
Petitioner again petitioned for writ of certiorari on June, 20, 2008. The New
Mexico Supreme Court denied his petition on July 10, 2008. Finally, Petitioner
filed the federal habeas corpus petition at issue on November 17, 2008. The
federal district court dismissed Petitioner’s habeas petition as untimely and
denied him a COA.
To obtain a COA, Petitioner must make a “substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this burden, he must
demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter,
agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).
Petitioner has not met this burden because his petition is time-barred. The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) establishes a one-year
statute of limitations period for § 2254 petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This
period generally runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
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review.” 1 Id. In Petitioner’s case, the limitations period began to run on
December 20, 2006—after the time expired in which Petitioner could have
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari to review his direct
appeal. See Locke v. Saffle, 237 F.3d 1269, 1271–73 (10th Cir. 2001). To be
timely, Petitioner needed to file his federal habeas petition within a year of this
date. However, he first filed it on November 17, 2008—nearly eleven months too
late.
Although the limitations period is tolled while a petitioner seeks habeas
relief in state court, in this case, Petitioner did not seek state habeas relief until
after the limitations period under § 2244 had already run. Accordingly,
Petitioner’s state habeas petition had no tolling effect on the limitations period.
See Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Only state petitions
for post-conviction relief filed within the one year allowed by AEDPA will toll
the statute of limitations.”). Moreover, as the federal magistrate court observed,
Petitioner’s federal habeas petition would still be ten months too late even if the
limitations period were tolled during the pendency of Petitioner’s state habeas
case.
1
Although other provisions dictate the limitations period in particular
circumstances, see § 2244(d)(1)(B–D), Petitioner has not asserted any of these
provisions apply to his case, nor do they appear to apply.
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Further, while the limitations period can be equitably tolled, such tolling is
only available in “rare and exceptional circumstances” where the petitioner
“diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was
caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.” Garcia v. Shanks,
351 F.3d 468, 473 n.2 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). In this case,
Petitioner has not established that extraordinary circumstances prevented his
timely filing nor that he diligently pursued his claims.
Finally, Petitioner makes an argument of actual innocence. “A claim of
actual innocence may toll the AEDPA statute of limitations.” Laurson v. Leyba,
507 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir. 2007). To effectively make this claim, the
petitioner must establish that, in light of “reliable evidence not presented at trial,”
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998), “no juror, acting reasonably,
would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995). While Petitioner claims the trial evidence shows he
did not kill the victim, his allegations are conclusory and were already heard and
rejected by the New Mexico Court of Appeals. He offers no new, reliable
evidence to support his contention.
In sum, no reasonable jurist could dispute that the district court was correct
to dismiss Petitioner’s application as time-barred. Therefore, we DENY
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Petitioner’s request for a COA and DISMISS the appeal. All other pending
motions are DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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