FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 1, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 09-2080
(D. N.M.)
JOSE FRANCISCO DIAZ, (D.Ct. Nos. 1:08-CV-00344-MV-LFG
& 1:03-CR-02112-MV-7)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
& DISMISSING APPEAL
Before HARTZ, EBEL, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Jose Francisco Diaz, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, 1 seeks a certificate
of appealability (COA) to appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion to
vacate, set aside or correct sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because
he has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28
U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2), we deny a COA.
I. BACKGROUND
Diaz was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to
1
We construe pro se pleadings liberally. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318
F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
distribute 1,000 kilograms and more of marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school
and within 1,000 feet of a truck stop in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A), 846, 849 and 860. The probation department prepared a presentence
report (PSR). It calculated Diaz’s total offense level as 39, which included a 2-
level upward adjustment for his role in the offense, see USSG §3B1.1(c), and a 2-
level upward adjustment for the use of a minor, see USSG §3B1.4. 2 It also
determined Diaz had three criminal history points, resulting in a Criminal History
Category of II. Based on an offense level of 39 and a Criminal History Category
of II, Diaz’s advisory guideline range was 292 to 365 months.
Diaz objected to the PSR. He argued the evidence at trial did not support
the role in the offense adjustment nor the adjustment for the use of a minor. He
also sought a downward variance of four levels to 120 months (the mandatory
minimum) under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) based on the disparity of sentences which
would otherwise result between himself and his codefendants, in particular, the
leader of the conspiracy.
The district court held two sentencing hearings. At the first hearing, the
court sustained Diaz’s objections to the two adjustments. This reduced Diaz’s
base offense level to 35, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 188 to 235
months. Concerned, however, that Diaz still faced a minimum sentence of 188
2
Because Diaz was sentenced pursuant to the 2004 edition of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual, all guideline citations refer to the 2004 edition.
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months while the leader of the conspiracy was sentenced to 240 months, the court
took a recess. During the recess, the probation department suggested Criminal
History Category II may substantially overrepresent the seriousness of Diaz’s
criminal history. See USSG §4A1.3. The court determined this was an issue
worthy of further briefing. Accordingly, it continued sentencing to allow the
government an opportunity to respond. At the second hearing, over the
government’s objection, the court concluded Criminal History Category II
substantially overrepresented the seriousness of Diaz’s criminal history. It noted
Diaz “had three minor misdemeanor convictions close to ten years prior to the
instant offense, and no other evidence of prior criminal behavior in the
intervening period.” (R. Vol. I at 114.) Thus, the court reduced his Criminal
History Category to I under USSG §4A1.3. Based on an offense level of 31 and a
Criminal History Category of I, the advisory guideline range was 168 to 210
months. The court sentenced Diaz to 168 months imprisonment. It also imposed
a 120-month term of supervised release. We affirmed Diaz’s conviction and
sentence on direct appeal. See United States v. Diaz, 213 Fed. Appx. 647 (10th
Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
Diaz filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing based
on counsel’s failure to (1) argue he was eligible for safety valve relief after the
district court reduced his criminal history category under USSG §4A1.3(b); (2)
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move for a reduction in his sentence under the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a); (3) allege Criminal History Category II substantially overrepresented the
seriousness of his criminal history under USSG §4A1.3(b); and (4) contend his
sentence was illegal because his 168-month sentence and his 120-month term of
supervised release exceeded the top of the guideline range (210 months). Diaz
separately argued his sentence was illegal because his sentence and supervised
release term resulted in a sentence exceeding the top of the advisory guideline
range.
The magistrate judge issued a report recommending Diaz’s § 2255 motion
be denied. He rejected Diaz’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). According to the magistrate the
reduction in Diaz’s Criminal History Category from II to I under USSG
§4A1.3(b) did not render him eligible for safety-valve relief. A defendant does
not qualify for safety-valve relief if he has more than one criminal history point
and the number of criminal history points is determined before application of
§4A1.3(b). See USSG §5C1.2; see also United States v. Owensby, 188 F.3d 1244,
1246 (10th Cir. 1999) (downward departure under §4A1.3(b) “does not alter the
original assessment of the defendant’s criminal history points”). Because Diaz
had three criminal history points prior to the court reducing his criminal history
category under USSG § 4A1.3(b), he was not eligible for safety-valve relief and
his attorney was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless argument. The
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magistrate judge also determined counsel was not ineffective for failing to move
for a reduction in his sentence under the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
because counsel had in fact moved for such reduction. As to counsel’s failure to
allege Criminal History Category II substantially overrepresented the seriousness
of Diaz’s criminal history under USSG §4A1.3(b), the judge concluded Diaz
could not show prejudice as Diaz’s criminal history category was reduced under
USSG §4A1.3(b). He rejected Diaz’s argument that prejudice was presumed.
Finally, the magistrate judge said counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue
Diaz received an illegal sentence because the argument was futile. Imposition of
a supervised release term does not extend a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum or otherwise render it illegal. See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d
1282, 1284-86 (10th Cir. 1995). For this same reason, the magistrate judge
rejected Diaz’s illegal sentence claim.
Diaz objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The
district court overruled his objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and denied Diaz’s § 2255 motion. 3
II. DISCUSSION
3
Diaz did not file a request for a COA with the district court but did file a notice of
appeal, which is construed as a request for a COA. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). The district
court did not rule on the COA issue. We deem the district court’s failure to issue a COA
within thirty days of the filing of the notice of appeal as a denial of the certificate. 10th
Cir. R. 22.1(C).
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A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). We will issue
a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, an
applicant must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations
omitted). In evaluating whether an applicant has satisfied this burden, we
undertake “a preliminary, though not definitive, consideration of the [legal]
framework” applicable to each of his claims. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.
In his COA application and proposed opening brief, Diaz reiterates his
ineffective assistance of counsel and illegal sentence claims. 4 The magistrate
judge and district court properly disposed of these claims. Because no jurist of
reason could debate the correctness of the district court’s decision, we DENY his
request for a COA and DISMISS this nascent appeal. We DENY Diaz’s motion
4
In his COA application, Diaz argues, without citation to any authority, that our
requirement that he file a COA application and an opening brief within forty days or face
dismissal of the appeal is discriminatory, illegal and violates his due process rights. “We
need not address [such] unsupported, conclusory arguments.” See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 562 F.3d 1116, 1130 (10th Cir. 2009).
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to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. He is directed to remit the full amount of
the filing fee.
Entered by the Court:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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