Harman v. Pollock

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

November 18, 2009
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

MELISSA HARMAN and JUSTIN
OVERTON,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 08-4068

BRENT POLLOCK, Officer,
Department of Public Safety, State
Bureau of Investigations, City of Salt
Lake, State of Utah; SCOTT
BARNETT, Officer, Department of
Public Safety, State Bureau of
Investigations, City of Salt Lake, State
of Utah,

Defendants - Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 2:03-CV-558-DAK)

Robert B. Sykes and Alyson E. Carter, (with Scott R. Edgar on the brief), Robert
B. Sykes & Associates, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

J. Clifford Petersen, (with Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, on the
briefs), Assistant Utah Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-
Appellees.

Before HENRY, Chief Judge, BRISCOE and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Chief Judge.

In this ongoing action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a previous panel of this court

determined that various material factual disputes remained regarding the

constitutionality of the near two-hour early morning detention of Melissa Harman

and Justin Overton (or the “Plaintiffs”), and the corresponding after-midnight

searches of their garage apartment conducted by officers who worked for the Utah

Department of Safety. After the panel’s remand, the district court allowed further

discovery, and, after reviewing the parties’ motions for summary judgment,

granted summary judgment to the defendant officers. With a satisfactorily

comprehensive record before us, but with some pause and a few clarifications, we

agree with the district court’s conclusions that the defendants’ discovery of

marijuana ultimately gave them reason to detain the couple, to seize the marijuana,

and to perform two more searches of the apartment. We thus affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to the officer defendants, but we utilize some

different reasoning.

I. BACKGROUND

We need not recount all of the facts that are set out in detail in Harman v.

Pollock, 446 F.3d 1069, 1072-76 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Harman I”), except as they are

relevant to this appeal.

2
 A. Harman I

In February 2003, the Plaintiffs rented and resided in the garage apartment

at 44 ½ West 2700 South in South Salt Lake, Utah. Defendant Brent Pollock, a

narcotics agent with the Utah Department of Public Safety’s Bureau of Criminal

Investigations, had suspected the residents of the adjacent 44 West 2700 South

home of drug dealing and had been investigating and observing them over a period

of seven months. Plaintiffs moved in approximately six weeks before the night in

question. Agent Pollock was the case agent for the investigation and he performed

a search of the garage apartment after the initial entry. Agent Pollock also

directed another officer to conduct a “K-9” search of the apartment.

Defendant Scott Barnett (together with Agent Pollock, the “Officers”) was a

Sergeant with the Utah Department of Public Safety, to whom the investigating

team answered. After the initial entry and the garage apartment was secured,

Sergeant Barnett entered the apartment, and detained and questioned the Plaintiffs.

After some time surveilling the suspected drug activity of Ignacio Ascention

(known as “Pawoo”) and Conception Rodriguez (known as “Isabel”), who resided

at 44 West 2700 South, Agent Pollock completed an affidavit in support of an

application for a search warrant. The search warrant included “any and all

outbuildings . . . of the property,” and included a “detached garage,” which was

the Plaintiffs’ residence:

the premises known as: 44 West 2700 South, South Salt Lake City, Utah,

3
 a white house, brown roof, front door faces south, small wood fence to
the west of the door across the front, # 44 on the wall to the right of the
front door, a detached garage to the rear of the house on the east side.

Aplts’ App. vol. I, at 210, 211. Utah’s State Bureau of Investigations coordinated

entry with its internal SWAT team unit known as a SERT (Special Emergency

Response Team). On a cold February 13, 2003, after a 12:46 a.m. raid, the

handcuffed Plaintiffs were placed in a van; the SERT officers quickly secured the

scene; Sergeant Barnett interviewed the Plaintiffs; Agent Pollock searched the

apartment and authorized a K-9 search; and finally, the Plaintiffs were cited for

marijuana possession and released after 2:35 a.m.

In their § 1983 complaint, the Plaintiffs maintained that the post-midnight

raid and the subsequent searches of their apartment and the accompanying

detention violated their Fourth Amendment rights. In our prior decision in this

case, we rejected the Plaintiffs’ contention that the warrant did not sufficiently

describe the area to be searched. Relying on Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79,

87 (1987), we acknowledged that the search warrant’s description of the property

to be searched was overbroad, and constituted more than a clerical error. Harman

I, 446 F.3d at 1078. But, despite some inconsistencies in the legal title research,

and with some admonitions regarding the sanctity of the home, we concluded that

the warrant described the premises with adequate particularity. Id.

Next, we rejected Plaintiffs’ suggestion that Agent Pollock intentionally

omitted and misstated material information in his affidavit in support of the search

4
warrant. Id. We then concluded that the Officers were reasonably mistaken when

they shattered windows and broke down the front door during the initial entry into

Plaintiffs’ garage apartment. Id. at 1081-82. Again citing Garrison, we reasoned

that “‘the objective facts available to the officers at the time suggested no

distinction between [the targeted house and the garage apartment.]’” See id. at

1082 (quoting 480 U.S. at 88) (alterations supplied). Despite various factors that

might suggest the existence of two separate residences, 1 “[g]iven the facial validity

of the warrant, the officers permissibly entered the separate residence.” Id.

When we considered the reasonableness of the subsequent search and

detention of the Plaintiffs, however, we concluded that material facts remained in

dispute as to (1) the reasonableness of the Officers’ delay in realizing they were in

a separate residence; (2) whether the subsequent search took place after this

realization; and (3) the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs’ lengthy detention. In

1
These factors included (1) the simultaneous raids of “residence # 1” and
“residence # 2,” (2) the three separate mailboxes (two on 44 West 2700 South and
one on 44 ½ West 2700 South), (3) the deed of trust, which indicated the property
encompassed two separate lots, (4) the U.S. Postal Service records, which listed
44 ½ 2700 South as a separate address, (5) the gas bill for 44 West 2700 South in
Ms. Harman’s name, (6) the scout team’s inspection of the front door hinges, and
presumably, the residential type front door and the porch, porch light, rug etc., on
44 ½ West 2700 South, (7) the residential windows on 44 ½ West 2700 South, (8)
the New Mexico license plates on Ms. Harman’s car, (9) the cement walkway and
landscaping, and (10) separate telephone service. 446 F.3d at 1080.

5
connection with the detention, we acknowledged that while

some portion of the detention may have been justified based on the
presence of a small amount of marijuana, the district court did not reach
this argument, and thus we ha[d] no factual findings or credibility
determinations on this matter from the district court. In addition, the
parties do not address the sizeable difference between seizing a person
or property in an open area, and the seizing of property or persons
“situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise available
for the seizing officer.”

Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980)). We remanded for

further factual findings, and we asked the district court to hold additional hearings

as necessary as to the arguments regarding the Officers’ authority to detain the

plaintiffs and to the applicability of the plain view doctrine.

B. The district court’s conclusions on remand

After remand, the district court allowed additional discovery. Both parties

sought summary judgment. After concluding the searches and seizures were valid,

the district court granted the Officers’ motion for summary judgment.

First, the district court found that their “detention was a proper investigatory

detention as established by Terry v Ohio,” 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Aplts’ App. vol.

III, at 830. The court, citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981),

recognized that Terry stops do not typically take place in the home, but noted they

are not confined to momentary on the street detentions, and that they are not

subject to rigid time restrictions. Id. at 830-31 (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-

05 (“If the evidence that a citizen’s residence is harboring contraband is sufficient

6
to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the citizen’s privacy is justified, it

is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen to remain while officers of the

law execute a valid warrant to search his home.”); and United States v. Sharpe,

470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (stating that “our cases impose no rigid time limitation

on Terry stops”)).

Second, the district court concluded that the discovery of the marijuana and

pipe suggested that Plaintiffs were involved in criminal activity. The district court

noted that the Officers suspected that the main house residents used the garage

apartment to store and use drugs. The surveilling officers had seen lights on and

heard voices in the building, and knew that the suspects had children. The district

court determined that the Officers might have reasonably believed the garage

apartment was being used to keep the drugs away from the children. The court

also credited Sergeant Barnett’s conclusion that Ms. Harman’s New Mexico ties

increased the likelihood of her association with the main house’s Hispanic

suspects. And, according to the district court, the Officers detained the Plaintiffs

only as long as reasonably necessary.

Third, the district court concluded that the Officers’ discovery of marijuana

and the pipe standing alone provided reasonable suspicion to detain the Plaintiffs.

The district court also found that Agent Pollock’s search of the garage apartment

was justified by probable cause and, in the alternative, exigent circumstances. The

district court further found that Sergeant Barnett had no personal involvement in

7
the searches, and that Agent Pollock had no personal involvement in the

detentions. Finally, the court determined the Officers did not violate clearly

established law, and that the Officers’ behavior was objectively reasonable, and

that the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

While we disagree with the district court that Terry provides the appropriate

framework for analyzing the Plaintiffs’ detention, and we give no credence to

connections with the State of New Mexico, we do agree with the court’s ultimate

conclusion that the Officers’ conduct was objectively reasonable. See Lambertsen

v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 79 F.3d 1024, 1029 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that we are

“free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record

sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the

district court” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Officers’ reasonable belief

that the garage apartment served as a “crash pad,” coupled with the Officers’ plain

view sighting of the marijuana and pipe, justified the detention and searches. The

detention, the subsequent searches and the K-9 search were reasonable (although a

separate search warrant would have been preferable) because the Officers had not

confirmed the Plaintiffs were not connected to the illegal activity at the main

house until all of Sergeant Barnett’s interviews were complete, which was nearly

two hours after the initial intrusion.

II. DISCUSSION

The Plaintiffs maintain that their two-hour plus detention, Agent Pollock’s

8
search, and the K-9 search were invalid, pointing to the immediate apparency that

the garage apartment was a separate residence, and that they were clearly unrelated

to the drug-ring suspects. They also challenge the propriety of a home-based

investigatory detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Finally, they

challenge the district court’s findings that Agent Pollock, as case agent, and

Sergeant Barnett, the officer with full operational command of the scene, were

alternatively not liable because they lacked personal knowledge of the detainment

and searches.

Although the matter is close, after reviewing the additional discovery, we

hold that the undisputed material facts support the district court’s ruling that the

searches and detention were reasonable. Although we reject the district court’s

determination that Terry provides the framework for our analysis, we conclude

that the Officers acted reasonably under the rules of Maryland v. Garrison when

they detained the Plaintiffs until confirming that they had no involvement with the

main house drug ring. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the Officers.

A. Standard of Review

We review a grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity

de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue of material fact and one party is entitled to judgment

9
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “We construe the record in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d

410, 414 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). There is a genuine issue of material

fact “if the [nonmoving party] presents facts such that a reasonable jury could find

in favor of the [nonmoving party].” Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health

& Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation

omitted). “If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, we determine

whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law.” Id.

In a case such as this one, when a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the

plaintiffs “must show that (1) the official violated a constitutional or statutory

right; and (2) the constitutional or statutory right was clearly established when the

alleged violation occurred.” Mimics, Inc. v. Village of Angel Fire, 394 F.3d 836,

841 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Pearson v. Callahan,

129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009), the Supreme Court held that federal courts have

discretion to determine “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular

case at hand.” Id. at 818.

“Requiring the law to be clearly established provides defendants with ‘fair

warning’ that their conduct is unconstitutional.” Mimics, 394 F.3d at 842 (quoting

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-40 (2002)). “‘The law is clearly established

when a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision is on point, or if the clearly

10
established weight of authority from other courts shows that the right must be as

plaintiff maintains.’” Id. (quoting Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1248 (10th

Cir. 2003)). To be clearly established,

[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This
is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity
unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but
it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citation omitted). Thus,

qualified immunity leaves “‘ample room for mistaken judgments,’” id. at 655 n.8

(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)), and protects “all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 638 (quoting

Malley, 475 U.S. at 341).

B. The Officers’ justifiable belief that the Plaintiffs’ apartment was
connected to illegal drug use was sufficient to render the searches
and detention reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

We begin with the Plaintiffs’ pivotal challenge: they contend that the

Officers were put on notice, upon or just after the initial entry into the apartment,

that the garage apartment was a separate and distinct residence from the main

house under investigation. At that time, Plaintiffs argue, the Officers should have

“le[ft] immediately,” Aplts’ Br. at 25, under the Supreme Court’s ruling in

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87. Because they continued the detention and

the searches, the Plaintiffs contend, the Officers violated the Fourth Amendment.

11
 In response, the Officers argue that, even after entering, they reasonably

believed that the Plaintiffs’ garage apartment was a “crash pad” that was used to

store and use drugs connected to the main residence. Importantly, in the Officers’

view, the reasonableness of the detention and search is not undermined by the

evidence that the garage apartment was a separate residence: despite that

evidence, apparent on their initial entry, they maintain that they still reasonably

believed that the Plaintiffs were connected to the illegal activity at the main

residence. The Officers further contend that the discovery of the marijuana in the

Plaintiffs’ apartment provided additional justification for the detention and

searches. Finally, the Officers argue that the detention and searches were justified

by exigent circumstances.

We are persuaded, in part, by the Officers’ arguments. We hold that the

totality of the evidence supporting the “crash pad” theory, combined with the

discovery of the marijuana upon entry, establishes that the search and detention

were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. However, we reject the Officers’

argument that the detention and searches were justified by exigent circumstances.

1. Maryland v. Garrison is the controlling authority to determine the
reasonableness of the detention and the subsequent searches.

The Plaintiffs are correct that Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87

(1987), is the controlling authority. Under Garrison, once the Officers “were put

on notice of the risk” that they entered a home that was unconnected to the illegal

12
activity described in the warrant, they had an immediate duty to retreat. See id.

Garrison’s holding is directed at searches, but in light of related precedent,

its analysis applies to detentions as well. In particular, the Supreme Court has

held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority “to

detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.”

Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 (emphasis supplied); see also Muehler v. Mena, 544

U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (observing that “[a]n officer’s authority to detain incident to a

search is categorical; it does not depend on the ‘quantum of proof justifying

detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.’”) (quoting

Summers, 452 U.S. at 705); Pray v. City of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154, 1159 (6th Cir.

1995) (applying Garrison to determine “what searches and seizures . . . took place

after the mistake [the officers were in the wrong residence] was known”). Thus,

under Summers, an officer’s authority to detain the occupant of a residence while

searching for contraband pursuant to a warrant lasts only as long as the search is

proper. 452 U.S. at 705. 2

2
As we have noted, the district court concluded in part that the entirety of
the Plaintiffs’ detention was proper under Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. We disagree.
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly and ably explained why Terry generally does not
apply within one’s home. See United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1067
(9 th Cir. 2004) (“Terry’s twin rationales for a brief investigatory detention-the
evasive nature of the activities police observe on the street and the limited nature
of the intrusion-appear to be inapplicable to an encounter at a suspect’s home.”)
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d
1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Certainly, the usual rules pertaining to Terry-stops
(continued...)

13
 2. The Officers’ “crash pad” theory finds support in the record.

On remand, the Officers put forth a “crash pad” theory, explaining that they

suspected the main home’s occupants used the garage apartment as a place to store

and use drugs. The district court found this explanation credible and further

concluded that “[t]he indicia of a dwelling [observed by the Officers after they

entered the Plaintiffs’ apartment] did not so thoroughly dispel this idea [of a crash

pad] as to dispel probable cause.” Aplts’ App. vol. III, at 840.

In support of the crash pad theory, the district court noted that Agent

Pollock knew the main home’s suspects had young children, and believed that the

suspected dealers wanted to keep the drug storage and usage away from the

children. (There was also testimony, however, that perhaps weighed against this

theory – Isabel “would bring her children along when she was selling cocaine.”

Id. vol. II, at 382; see id. at 386.) After remand, further discovery indicated that

Agent Pollock thought Ms. Harman was actually “living in the main house and had

just gone out to the garage temporarily” or perhaps she had gone “out to the

garage partying.” Id. at 372. And, although Agent Pollock did not suspect her to

be a “known character[] in the investigation” (presumably based on the seven

2
(...continued)
do not apply in homes.”).
Here, it is Garrison and Summers, not Terry, that provide the proper
framework for analyzing the Plaintiffs’ detention. In particular, the validity of
the detention of the Plaintiffs stands or falls on the validity of the ongoing search.

14
months of surveillance of the main house, where he observed only Hispanic-

appearing suspects), Harman I, 446 F.3d at 1073, 1085, after discovering that Ms.

Harman was involved, he believed she was “just somehow intertwined in this.”

Aplts’ App. vol. III, at 682. 3

Although the Officers did not previously assert the crash pad theory per se,

they did put forth a similar theory below. “It was the experience of the

Defendants that people sleep all over the place in drug homes, so a person sleeping

in the garage did not necessarily mean to the Defendants that the garage was a

separate residence from the house.” Officers’ Br. filed 4/13/2005. (We must note

that the Officers’ related assertion in this appeal that they believed Isabel and

Pawoo might utilize a crash pad for the well-being of their children is less tenable,

given that Officer Pollock’s reconnaissance team reported no sightings of these

two entering the garage over a course of seven months, and given Officer

Pollock’s earlier characterization of the garage as a “little workshop.” See

Harman I, 446 F.3d at 1085; Aplts’ App. vol. III, at 683.)

Nevertheless, Sergeant Barnett noted that “drug dealers often use garages or

back places” and “[t]hey sleep wherever.” Aplts’ App. vol. II, at 417. Sergeant

3
Although Ms. Harman’s name was mistakenly on the utility gas bill for
the main house on January 16, 2003 (long after the surveillance began), the
surveilling officers had never seen anyone resembling Ms. Harman, except
perhaps that her “features may have been consistent with purchasers of drugs”
from the main house. Harman I, 446 F.3d at 1076.

15
Barnett noted that he has “found people that have had a bed in the garage next to

their drug dealing area or next to the meth lab . . . .” Id. Other SERT officers

confirmed that in the execution of similar warrants, the discovery of outbuildings

with electricity and a sink was not uncommon. Id. at 432; see id. at 454 (“A lot of

times we go into these separate garages and things like that that have those

facilities that are cooking meth.”); id. at 425 (“[A] lot of narcotics people selling

or distributing narcotics don’t like to do it out of their home itself.”).

Sergeant Barnett also stated that it was not until he “interviewed Mr.

Overton, Ms. Harman, and the occupants of the [main] house” that he realized that

the rear building and its occupants were not part of the drug dealing operation at

the main house. Id. at 414. According to Sergeant Barnett, under department

procedures, the officers would take everyone into custody, and question them to

determine whether or not the officer was in the correct location. Id. at 260; but

see id. at 237 (Testim. of Sergeant Pollock: “They were restrained. They weren’t

taken into police custody.” (emphasis supplied)).

We agree with the district court’s analysis of this evidence. We must “defer

to trained law enforcement personnel, allowing officers to draw on their own

experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about

the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained

person.” United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 787 (10th Cir. 2007) (alteration

and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d

16
1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2009). Here, the Officers invoked their experience in

investigating drug trafficking offenses to support their theory that the garage

apartment might have been used by the suspects in the main residence. Relying

upon the Officers’ expertise, to the extent that the garage apartment reasonably

appeared to be an extension of the main residence, they acted reasonably. Under

the unique facts of this case, it was not until after the completion of Sergeant

Barnett’s interviews that they “discovered that there were two separate units. . .

and therefore were put on notice of the risk that they might be in a unit

erroneously included within the terms of the warrant.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87.

Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the Officers’ failure to realize the

overbreadth of the warrant until after the conclusion of the interviews was

objectively understandable and reasonable. 4

4
Although the dissent recognizes the “measured balance” the Supreme
Court struck in Garrison, it then suggests we have “upset[] that balance.” Dissent
at 7. But we must apply the measured directive as instructed by Garrison:
The Garrison Court’s ultimate directive remains salient: “The officers’
conduct and the limits of the search [are] based on the information available
as the search proceed[s].” Id. This principle, along with a recognition of “the
need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in
the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing search
warrants,” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87 (footnote omitted), is what must guide us
in determining if and when the execution went awry.
United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2005) (alternations supplied).
This is the exact approach we have adopted. Clearly the SERT officers
recognized the garage to be an apartment soon after their justified entry. But
Garrison teaches that is not the end of the matter. The warrant’s language
encompasses a “detached garage” and “any and all outbuildings . . . of the
(continued...)

17
 3. The Officers’ discovery of the marijuana in the Plaintiffs’
apartment provides additional support for the detentions and
searches.

As we noted in Harman I, “[t]he plain view doctrine authorizes seizure of

illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object

has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and who has probable cause to

suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity.” 446 F.3d at 1087

(quoting Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983)). “Of course, if the police

officers’ presence in the home itself entailed a violation of the Fourth Amendment,

no amount of probable cause to believe that an item in plain view constitutes

incriminating evidence will justify its seizure.” Id. (quoting Soldal v. Cook

County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 66 n.10 (1992)).

To prevent the plain view doctrine from eviscerating Fourth Amendment

4
(...continued)
property.” Aplts’ App. vol. I, at 210, 211. The dissent seems to suggest that the
conversion of this garage to a residence means that it is no longer a “detached
garage” or part of the “outbuildings.”
But the SERT officers also saw marijuana in plain view, were familiar with
crash pad type living situations, and soon learned that Melissa Harman was a
resident whose name also appeared on the Questar gas bill for the main house, all
of which suggested the quarters may have been part of the main house or its
operations as well. Given these considerations and the latitude we afford officers
and their expertise, it falls squarely within the Garrison directive to allow the
officers a reasonable amount of time to confirm that the apartment-cum-
reconfigured-detached-garage was “erroneously included within the terms of the
warrant.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87.

18
protections, we have imposed a three-prong test that the government must satisfy

to justify its application. In particular, the government must establish that: “(1)

the officer was lawfully in a position from which to view the object seized in plain

view; (2) the object’s incriminating character was immediately apparent–i.e.[,] the

officer had probable cause to believe the object was contraband or evidence of a

crime; and (3) the officer had a lawful right of access to the object itself.” United

States v. Soussi, 29 F.3d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1994).

Here, there is no dispute as to the second requirement–the incriminating

character of the marijuana was “immediately apparent.” Id. The first and third

requirements turn on a question of timing, i.e., whether, when they observed the

marijuana, the Officers were validly executing the warrant. The answer to that

question turns on the Garrison analysis, i.e., whether, at some point before they

observed the marijuana, the Officers knew or reasonably should have known that

they had entered a home that was unconnected to the illegal activity described in

the warrant, therefore triggering an immediate duty to retreat. Garrison, 480 U.S.

at 87. If so, the plain view doctrine is inapplicable.

On that issue, there was some testimony that the SERT officers had secured

the garage apartment before the pipe and marijuana were discovered. Aplts’ App.

vol. II, at 540 (SERT Officer Todd Leiendecker: “[O]nce the lights were turned

on I did a quick scan of the area . . . the lights were turned on because the building

was secured.”). Similarly, SERT Officer Kirk Christensen recalled seeing

19
marijuana and the pipe on the counter “[w]hen [he] came back in[to the

apartment].” Id. at 449. SERT Officer Daniel Fuhr testified that there was

“marijuana out in the open.” Id. at 452. Evidently, the SERT officers secured the

residence, and the only persons remaining in, or allowed to enter, the garage

apartment were State Bureau of Investigations officers, including Sergeant Barnett

and Agent Pollock.

We conclude that when the SERT officers saw the marijuana in the

Plaintiffs’ apartment, and when Sergeant Barnett and Agent Pollock entered the

apartment, they still reasonably believed that the Plaintiffs were connected to the

illegal activity at the main residence. That suspicion remained until Sergeant

Barnett had interviewed the occupants from the main house and from the garage

apartment. Accordingly, the plain view doctrine allows the marijuana to be

considered as part of the totality of evidence supporting the challenged detentions

and searches. 5

5
The dissent states that defendants “point to no facts that would provide
probable cause to search Harman and Overton’s home.” Dissent at 8. We
disagree that the officers were not lawfully in a position from which to view the
marijuana. Harman I resolved the legality of the SERT officers’ initial entry into
the garage apartment. 446 F.3d at 1082. The SERT officers discovered the
marijuana and pipe during or just after their securing of the apartment, which took
but a few minutes. Rather than suggest the SERT officers should have retreated
immediately when discovering the garage to be a dwelling without regard to the
reasonable inferences made from the unique facts of this case, the touchstone is
“sufficient probability.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Given this unique set of circumstances, the Officers were “acting on
(continued...)

20
 4. The detentions and searches were not justified by exigent
circumstances.

The Officers also argue (and the district court also found) that the searches

were supported by exigent circumstances. The Officers maintain that because they

were already aware of the Plaintiffs’ “drug involvement,” having seen the

marijuana, that releasing Ms. Harman and Mr. Overton would risk destruction of

any further evidence of criminal activity. Aple’s Br. at 42-43; see United States v.

Thomas, 372 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495

U.S. 91, 100 (1990)).

Upon the discovery of the marijuana, the Officers had at least reasonable

suspicion to detain the Plaintiffs before contemplating a full-scale search of the

garage apartment. In evaluating exigency, we consider whether the circumstances

are “‘subject to police manipulation or abuse,’” or “‘motivated by an intent to

arrest and seize evidence.’” United States v. Zogmaister, 90 F. App’x 325, 330-31

(10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268,

1272 (10th Cir. 1988); and United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir.

1986)).

While the sanctity of the home protects the occupants’ privacy interests in

the activities that take place within, the Officers could have easily secured the

5
(...continued)
facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability” of a connection with the
main house. Id. at 87 n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted).

21
residence while waiting for a proper warrant. Cf. Segura v. United States, 468

U.S. 796, 812 (1984) (upholding the securing of premises from within, and stating

that “officers who have probable cause and who are in the process of obtaining a

warrant have no reason to enter the premises before the warrant issues, absent

exigent circumstances which, of course, would justify the entry”) (emphasis

supplied). “[T]he heightened protection we accord privacy interests is simply not

implicated where a seizure of premises, not a search, is at issue.” Id. The

“securing [of] a dwelling, on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the

destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not

itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents.” Id. at 810.

We prefer “the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered

to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the

Constitution . . . over the hurried action of officers.” United States v. Lefkowitz,

285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).

As Sergeant Barnett testified, had there been no separate drug investigation

at the main house, and the Officers saw the pipe and marijuana in plain view,

before conducting a search, they “would either get a consent to search the

residence or get a search warrant for the residence.” Aplts’ App. vol. I, at 230.

We appreciate Sergeant Barnett’s candor regarding the need for consent or a

separate warrant. As noted in Harman I, however, the Officers here “at no time

considered obtaining a separate warrant.” 446 F.3d at 1088. As the Officers well

22
know, telephonic warrants (obtained pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c)) provide a

mechanism by which officers can obtain quick judicial review of search warrant

applications, and it seems obvious that such procedures may have obviated much

of this litigation. And in their brief, the Officers maintain that “[w]ere a

magistrate to reevaluate the warrant with the information [Agent] Pollock had at

the time he performed his search, the magistrate would approve the warrant to

search the garage.” Aples’ Br. at 41. This assertion only strengthens the

conclusion that the Officers would have had no trouble obtaining an independent

telephonic warrant well within the near two-hour timeframe involved here. We

thus reject the argument that the Officers acted based on the exigency of the

imminent destruction of evidence.

5. The combined weight of the “crash pad” evidence and the
marijuana discovered in the Plaintiffs’ apartment satisfies the
Garrison standard.

Standing alone, the Officers’ “crash pad” evidence and the marijuana in

plain view may not have been sufficient to justify the full extent of the detention

and searches under the Fourth Amendment. However, taken together, that

evidence establishes that the Officers reasonably believed that the Plaintiffs were

connected to the illegal activity at the main residence until they completed all of

the questioning.

In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge “‘the need to allow some

latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and

23
difficult process of making arrests and executing search warrants.’” Harman I,

446 F.3d at 1083 (quoting Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87). As such, although the

investigation was less than model work, we cannot say the Officers’ actions were

“plainly incompetent” or “knowing[] violations [of] the law.” Malley, 475 U.S. at

341. Because we hold that the Officers’ detention and searches were reasonable,

we need not address the Plaintiffs’ third argument regarding the personal

involvement of the Officers. 6

6
We also reject the Officers’ argument that Ms. Harman’s “ties to New
Mexico” (via her license plate) suggested her involvement with the main house’s
residents. Aples’ Br. at 30. According to this theory, Ms. Harman’s New Mexico
license plate (bearing the motto “Land of Enchantment”), which has a “high
Hispanic population and is a border state through which drugs from Mexico might
pass,” supported the district court’s reasonableness conclusion. Id.
Finally, in evaluating these matters, officers and policy makers might take
note that with the proliferation of the use of SWAT teams comes the concomitant
increase of mistakes a SWAT team may make, and the increased risk of accidental
death, injury and the terrorizing of innocents, including children. According to a
Cato Institute study cataloguing various flawed paramilitary raids, “at least 780
cases” “reached the appellate level between 1989 and 2001,” which marks a
significant increase from the previous decade. Radley Balko, Overkill: The Rise
of Paramilitary Police Raids 43 (Cato Inst. 2006), available at
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6476. Not only do these raids test
the Fourth Amendment rights of the often law-abiding inhabitants and their
families, but also they are conducted with substantial firepower. See id.
(cataloguing botched drug raids at the incorrect address and noting that “death,
injury, and terrorizing of innocents . . . aren’t merely a regrettable, infrequent
consequence of an otherwise effective police tactic” but instead are “the
inevitable consequence of a flawed, overbearing, and unnecessary form of drug
policing”); see also Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1197-99 (10th Cir.
2001) (expressing concern about the poor planning used by a sheriff’s department
to execute a “dynamic entry” raid involving only a misdemeanant and
endangering the residence’s several children) (Henry, J., concurring).

24
 III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the Officers acted reasonably when they detained the

Plaintiffs, suspecting they might somehow be related to the main house’s drug

ring. Although the view of the marijuana was fairly plain, the circumstances were

not apparently exigent. While a second warrant would be the preferable route, we

hold that Agent Pollock’s subsequent search and his authorization of the K-9

search were reasonable, given the uncertainties regarding Ms. Harman’s possible

involvement and given the presence of the contraband. As stated earlier, our

holding is limited to the narrow confines of this case, involving a facially valid

warrant, with a legal description that included the detached garage; the plain view

of marijuana and a pipe; the necessity to interview the main house residents to

confirm the members of the drug ring; the presence of Ms. Harman’s name on the

gas bill for the main house; and the Officers’ reasonable application of their

expertise in sorting out the identities of and the relationships between the main

house and garage apartment residents. As such, we AFFIRM the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the Officers.

25
08-4068, Harman v. Pollock

LUCERO, J., dissenting

Because my respected colleagues fail to apply appropriate summary

judgment standards and create a circuit split by failing to adhere to Maryland v.

Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987), the established Supreme Court jurisprudence that

should govern this case, I must dissent.

I

Shortly after midnight on February 12, 2003, seven members of Utah’s

Special Emergency Response Team (“SERT”) battered down the door of an

apartment occupied by Melissa Harman and Justin Overton at 44 ½ West 2700

South, South Salt Lake City. The couple was asleep in bed—Overton unclothed

and Harman in her underwear—when SERT members entered their bedroom with

guns drawn. Both residents awoke in shock and fear and were immediately

directed into the living room, where they were handed a single bed sheet to cover

themselves and then were handcuffed to a couch. Harman was so frightened that

she lost control of a basic bodily function. Officers learned that the individuals

they had detained were named Melissa Harman and Justin Overton. Harman and

Overton were re-handcuffed, moved to a police van and then to a second vehicle,

where defendant Scott Barnett questioned them. Meanwhile, defendant Brent

Pollock directed another search of Harman and Overton’s apartment.

What the SERT team knew even before entering the Harman-Overton

residence is that they were executing a warrant directed to “44 West 2700 South,
South Salt Lake City,” the suspected home of two drug dealers named Isabelle

and Pawoo. Although the warrant also described a “detached garage,” it did so

erroneously. There was no “garage”; in fact, the only detached building was the

separate apartment, with a separate address, occupied by Harman and Overton.

II

“When applying [a summary judgment] standard, we view the evidence and

draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance

Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). With all due respect to my

colleagues, they have failed to apply this standard in their recitation of the facts.

When viewed in the light most favorable to Harman and Overton, there can be no

doubt that the officers knew immediately upon entry that the building described

in the warrant as a “detached garage” was a separate residence and that in fact,

there was no garage at all.

The officers proceeded in three waves, each supervised by the defendants 1:

Pollock was the case agent and Barnett his sergeant, and they had “control the

entire time.” First came the SERT team. Immediately upon entry, the SERT

team knew they were not in a garage. They knew that they were in an apartment.

These seven officers were followed within approximately five minutes by a team

1
Pollock and Barnett’s supervision included maintaining constant radio contact
with all law enforcement on the scene. In addition to enabling direct communication, the
radios allowed Pollock and Barnett to “overhear . . . conversations going back and forth”
among officers.
2
of investigating officers led by Barnett. These officers also immediately

observed that the garage was, in fact, an apartment. The defendant supervisors

ordered a third wave, the K-9 unit. The plaintiffs were kept in detention for an

additional hour and a half until the K-9 search was completed and the police

issued Harman and Overton a citation for possession of marijuana.

Investigating officers and SERT members executing the warrant

overwhelmingly testified that the Harman-Overton dwelling was clearly an

apartment. One officer provided the following deposition testimony:

Q. Was it obvious to you that it was an apartment, a kitchen and
things like that?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative), yeah.
Q. Was there any question in your mind that you were looking at a
residence when you walked in there?
A. No. Once I was in there, no.

A second member of the search team similarly testified:

Q. Did it look like a garage to you?
A. No, it was kind of—kind of a seedy apartment, kind of run down.
Q. Run-down, seedy apartment?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. Okay. And it was obvious to you right away when you walked
in, right?
A. From the inside, yes.

The same officer confirmed that he knew the apartment was “[s]omebody’s living

quarters” within “a few seconds of when [he] walked in.”

Testimony of other law enforcement officials on the scene corroborates the

fact that Harman and Overton’s home was “obvious[ly]” an apartment. One

3
SERT member stated it “was obvious it was an apartment. It was obvious people

were living in there as some kind of an apartment.” Daniel Fuhr, the team leader

for the search, testified, “Someone was living there. It was obvious.” Fuhr also

testified that he “w[as] concerned that it might be a residence” before the search

even began, and that he warned Pollock of his concern.

Several officers testified that they were surprised to find an apartment

rather than a garage. One stated he “was surprised that there was a living quarter

back over there because our information that we got, it was a garage.” Another

officer, when asked whether “it looked like it could be some sort of an

apartment,” responded, “Once I got in, yeah. It actually surprised me that it

was.”

Ignoring the obvious, the defendants tell a different tale. Pollock averred

that he saw “no indication that [the apartment] was a secondary residence.”

Instead, he testified that he believed “maybe they were just out in the garage

partying.” A jury might be free to credit this testimony; we are not. In reviewing

a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, we must apply summary

judgment jurisprudence and assume that it was “obvious” that Harman and

Overton’s home was an apartment and that this fact was clear to law enforcement

as soon as they broke down the door.

III

Although the majority fails to recite the pertinent facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiffs, its more serious mistake is in misreading Maryland v.

4
Garrison. 2 In Garrison, the Supreme Court spoke clearly and unambiguously:

Police are “required to discontinue the search . . . as soon as they discover[] that

there [a]re two separate units . . . and therefore [a]re put on notice of the risk that

they might be in a unit erroneously included within the terms of the warrant.”

480 U.S. at 87.

Instead of applying Garrison, the majority opinion stands it on its head.

What Garrison requires is for officers to “discontinue the search” once they were

“put on notice of the risk that they might be in a unit erroneously included within

the terms of the warrant,” id.; the majority instead rules that henceforth officers

may detain individuals and continue the search of a home erroneously included in

a warrant until the detainees can prove to the officers that they are “unconnected

to the illegal activity described in the warrant,” (Majority Op. 12-13 (quoting

Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87).) In other words, my colleagues require plaintiffs to

satisfy police that their separate apartment was not serving as a “crash pad” for

their drug dealing neighbors before a search and detention need be ceased. That

is simply not the standard under clearly established Fourth Amendment law. And

this is not a state of affairs that should be allowed to exist under our Constitution.

A

In Garrison, police had a valid warrant to search the “third floor apartment”

of a building. 480 U.S. at 80. In executing the warrant, police learned that the

2
I agree with the majority that Garrison, rather than Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), provides the appropriate framework for determining the constitutionality of
defendants’ actions. (Majority Op. 12-13 & n.2.)
5
third floor actually contained two separate apartments, only one of which

belonged to the person being investigated. Id. While searching the apartment

erroneously named in the warrant—under the reasonably mistaken belief that they

were searching the suspect’s apartment—police discovered and seized

contraband. Id. Police immediately discontinued their search after realizing they

were not in the suspect’s apartment. Id. at 81. The Supreme Court held that the

contraband was not obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment because it

was discovered before police would have reasonably realized their mistake. Id. at

86. Had the timing been reversed, so too would have been the outcome:

[A]s the officers recognized, they were required to discontinue the
search of [defendant’s] apartment as soon as they discovered that
there were two separate units on the third floor and therefore were
put on notice of the risk that they might be in a unit erroneously
included within the terms of the warrant. The officers’ conduct and
the limits of the search were based on the information available as
the search proceeded.

Id. at 86-87.

Once put on notice that they are searching a second apartment under a

warrant authorizing the search of only a single home, police may continue

searching the second apartment only if: (1) they procure an additional warrant or

(2) both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. See id.; United States v.

Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984) (“Searches and seizures inside a home without

a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.”). As

one circuit court has explained, upon realizing there is a second apartment, police

are “obligated to either limit the search to those areas clearly covered by the

6
warrant or to discontinue entirely their search.” United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d

256, 266 (3d Cir. 2005). Police may not, as the majority suggests, continue

searching the second apartment until they rule out the possibility that its residents

are in some way connected to the illegal activity being conducted in a nearby

home. The majority-created law enforcement right to confirm that an apartment

is unconnected to illegal activity occurring elsewhere before discontinuing a

search, (Majority Op. 17-18 n.4), is antithetical to law enforcement’s duty to

immediately discontinue searching when put on notice of a risk that an apartment

was erroneously included in the warrant, Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87.

Garrison strikes a measured balance between the sanctity of the home and

“the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in

the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing search

warrants.” 3 480 U.S. at 87. The majority upsets that balance by rejecting the

Garrison test of a “unit erroneously included within the terms of the warrant,” id.,

instead substituting a dramatically looser “unconnected to the illegal activity

described in the warrant” standard. (Majority Op. 12-13.)

B

It is not only the plain text of Garrison that contradicts the majority’s

analysis; a review of Garrison’s underlying principles leaves no doubt that the

3
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, searching Harman and Overton’s
home two additional times and detaining them for approximately two hours after
discovering the separate apartment in which they were residing was not a garage
cannot be classified as an “honest mistake.” (Majority Op. 17-18 n.4, 23.)
7
grant of summary judgment in the case before us was erroneous. Garrison is

merely a particular application of the general rule that police cannot rely on a

warrant after learning facts that vitiate probable cause. “[O]nce the mistake is

discovered, the government cannot use the authority of the warrant, or of the

order, to conduct a search or interception that they know is unsupported by

probable cause or is otherwise outside the scope of the statute or the

Constitution.” United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7th Cir. 1997)

(citing Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87); see also United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d

926, 933 (6th Cir. 1990). Consequently, the appropriate Fourth Amendment

analysis is not whether two apartments are somehow connected, as the majority

contends, but whether police knew or reasonably should have known that they

lacked probable cause to search the second apartment based on knowledge gained

during the execution of the warrant. The defendants here point to no facts that

would provide probable cause to search Harman and Overton’s home.

Consequently, the search was unconstitutional.

Moreover, defendants clearly lacked probable cause to search Harman and

Overton’s home once they discovered it was an apartment. It has long been the

rule that “[p]robable cause must be shown for searching each house or, in this

case, each apartment.” United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 325-26 (7th Cir.

1955); see also United States v. Perez, 484 F.3d 735, 741 (5th Cir. 2007);

Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 552-53 (6th Cir. 2003); Mena v. City of

Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d

8
1335, 1347 (10th Cir. 1979), disapproved on other grounds in United States v.

Young, 470 U.S. 1, 14 n.11 (1985). An apartment is entitled to the heightened

Fourth Amendment protections afforded to any home. Once law enforcement

discover that a unit is an apartment, they are no longer free to treat it as an

outbuilding or garage, no matter the wording of the warrant. To reiterate, on

summary judgment, we must credit testimony from law enforcement that the

building did not look like a garage, but appeared to be an apartment.

To determine whether probable cause existed to search the plaintiffs’

residence, one need simply consider whether the magistrate would have issued a

warrant to search the apartment if provided the information that police

immediately discovered upon entering Harman and Overton’s home. Obviously,

the magistrate would not have done so. If the affidavit had accurately described

Harman and Overton’s home as an “apartment” rather than a “detached garage,”

then the magistrate would have required distinct probable cause to search the

apartment. But nothing in the affidavit suggests that evidence of illegal activity

would be found in the apartment. 4 The belief that the building was a garage was

in error, and proximity is insufficient to create probable cause. See Ybarra v.

Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“[M]ere propinquity to others independently

4
The fact that Harman’s name was listed on the gas utility statement for
the main residence may be relevant to whether the warrant was overbroad when
issued. But it assuredly is not relevant to the inquiry of whether probable cause
continued to exist after officers discovered the detached garage was a separate
residence.

9
suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause

. . . .”).

The majority dodges the foregoing analysis. Rather than considering

whether police knew they lacked probable cause to search the subject apartment,

the majority holds that Pollock’s inchoate suspicion that Harman was “just

somehow intertwined with this” justified what amounts to the warrantless search

of a home. No officer could reasonably believe that such a hunch provides

probable cause. See United States v. Concepcion-Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1316

(10th Cir. 2006) (probable cause requires “a particularized and objective basis for

suspecting legal wrongdoing” (quotation omitted)). 5

A reasonable jury could determine defendants directed the detention of

Harman and Overton and two searches of their home long after being put on

notice that they lacked any legal basis to do so. Therefore I would hold that

5
In addition to Pollock’s hunch, the majority relies on the discovery of a
small amount of marijuana to justify defendants’ actions. The majority does
recognize the evidence showing that the contraband was not discovered until after
SERT members secured the home, but fails to legally credit the consequence of
these facts in its analysis. (Majority Op. 19-20.) Viewing this evidence in the
light most favorable to plaintiffs, the discovery occurred after defendants knew
the “detached garage” was actually an apartment, which was immediate. Because
police were obligated to withdraw as soon as they discovered the fact that they
had entered an apartment, they were not “lawfully in a position from which the
[marijuana] was in plain view”; thus the marijuana may not be considered.
United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 748 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations
omitted). Only by holding that the officers could continue their search until
Harman and Overton proved that they were not “connected to the illegal activity”
at the nearby home can the majority bring the seizure of the marijuana within the
plain view exception. (Majority Op. 20.)

10
plaintiffs met their summary judgment burden of showing a Fourth Amendment

violation.

IV

Because the majority opinion holds Harman and Overton failed to create a

genuine dispute as to whether defendants violated the Fourth Amendment, it does

not address whether plaintiffs’ claims are grounded in clearly established law. I

would hold that they are. Prior to the majority’s decision in this case, the law

was well settled that police are “required to discontinue the search” immediately

upon being “put on notice of the risk that they might be in a unit erroneously

included within the terms of the warrant.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87. When

defendants executed the warrant in this case, Garrison had been the law for more

than fifteen years. This Supreme Court precedent should have made the contours

of the Fourth Amendment “sufficiently clear” to the defendants. Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Indeed, in an earlier appeal of this case, the

parties did not dispute that “the law in this area was well-established at the time

of the search in question.” Harman v. Pollock, 446 F.3d 1069, 1077 (10th Cir.

2006) (quotation omitted).

V

Viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the non-

moving parties, the plaintiffs have demonstrated: (1) that a reasonable jury could

determine that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment; and (2) that the rights

11
at issue were clearly established at the time of defendants’ unlawful conduct.

Consequently, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment.

12