IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-10808
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PERRY LEE HAMMONDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
GLEN SMITH,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(2:95-CV-269)
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April 6, 1999
Before REAVLEY, POLITZ, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Perry Lee Hammonds, a Texas inmate, sued his warden, Glen
Smith, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Smith’s purported deliberate
indifference toward Hammonds's safety. We affirm the summary
judgment entered in Smith's favor.
I.
Hammonds was an inmate serving time at the Coffield Unit of
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Because of his
assistance to the correctional officers in ferreting out illegal
drug and alcohol use, Hammonds was transferred to the Clements
facility for safety reasons on June 8, 1995.
Hammonds quickly began complaining of threats and attacks by
other Clements Unit inmates. He told officials that several
inmates from the Coffield Unit were being kept in the Clements Unit
alongside him and that word had spread among the Clements inmates
that he was a “snitch.” He made several requests to be put into
protective custody, transfer, or safekeeping.
Initially, Clements Unit officials told Hammonds to “tough it
out,” but after Hammonds had filed a formal emergency status
grievance, he was interviewed by prison officials and put into
temporary protective lockup on June 22, 1995. He provided
officials with details regarding some of the alleged threats and
assaults he had suffered, including the nicknames of his alleged
assailants. Purportedly unable to substantiate Hammonds’s
allegations, prison officials returned Hammonds to the general
prison population four days later.
After further claims of threats and assaults, Hammonds filed
a second emergency status grievance on July 4, 1995, and was again
placed in protective lockup on July 6. Following two
investigations by two different prison officials, Hammonds was told
that his complaint had been resolved and was led to believe that he
was going to be kept in permanent safekeeping status. Still
“scared and unsure,” he filed a follow-up inquiry to his status on
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July 30, to which he was told that he was “housed in transient
status until the Bureau of Classification approves [his] transfer
to another unit.”
On August 7, a hearing was conducted into Hammonds’s situation
by the Unit Classification Committee (“UCC”). Again finding
Hammonds’s allegations unsubstantiated, the UCC recommended that he
be returned to the general prison population; that occurred on
August 14. Smith, a member of the UCC panel, claims that he is
unable to recall the particular recommendation he made regarding
Hammonds’s status but has stated with certainty that he would have
made a recommendation only if the other two panel members had
disagreed with one another.
Hammonds asserts that, on returning to the general prison
population, he again was assaulted. His request for help was
answered by an ambiguous letter from Acting Warden Ellenberg.
II.
Hammonds sued on October 26, 1995. An evidentiary hearing was
held on November 29 in which the district court ordered Hammonds to
supplement his complaint and provide Clements Unit officials with
additional information. Hammonds did so and was placed in
temporary protective lockup immediately thereafter.
On December 14, a UCC hearing was held to look into Hammonds’s
protective classification. Smith was not a member of this UCC
panel, however, and Ellenberg served in his place. The UCC
recommended releasing Hammonds to the general prison population,
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and he was so released on January 10, 1996. Immediately
thereafter, he again began alleging a variety of assaults. On May
5, 1996, August 15, 1996, September 11, 1996, and March 11, 1997,
Hammonds’s situation was reviewed by the UCC, which each time
declined to remove him from the general prison population.
Both sides moved for summary judgment. Hammonds contended
that Smith had evinced deliberate indifference to his need for
protection. Smith contends both that Hammonds failed to adduce any
evidence of deliberate indifference and that Smith enjoys qualified
immunity. Finding no issue of material fact regarding deliberate
indifference, the district court granted summary judgment for Smith
on this ground.
III.
The issue is whether the summary judgment record can
reasonably support a finding of deliberate indifference on the part
of Smith toward Hammonds’s safety. We review this matter de novo
and apply FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) in the same manner as did the
district court. See Melton v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of
Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, we must affirm if
there is no genuine issue of material fact and Smith is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986).
A.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
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punishment affords prisoners protection against injury at the hands
of other inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994);
Johnston v. Lucas, 786 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1986). So,
prison officials “have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from
violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833
(citation omitted). To the extent that prisoners suffer
“sufficiently serious” harms, and to the extent that prison
officials display deliberately indifference toward their well-being
and safety, these officials can be held personally liable for
violating constitutional rights. Id. at 828, 834. The state does
not contest that Hammonds’s alleged harms are “sufficiently
serious,” and so our inquiry is limited to examining the
“deliberate indifference” requirement.
B.
As explained in Farmer, deliberate indifference ”describes a
state of mind more blameworthy than negligence” but less
blameworthy than “acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing
harm.” Id. at 835. Deliberate indifference can most approximately
be equated with “recklessness.” Id. at 836.
We hold . . . that a prison official cannot be
found liable under the Eight Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.
Id. at 837.
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C.
Although Hammonds points to evidence tending to show that
Smith was “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm [to Hammonds] exist[ed],”
he did not put forth any evidence tending to show that Smith
actually “[drew] the inference.” Such subjective knowledge of risk
is essential to hold a prison official liable under a theory of
deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In fact,
the undisputed record strongly suggests that Smith, like the
several other prison officials who handled Hammonds’s case, not
only took Hammonds’s charges seriously, but also refused him
protective custody only after investigation that convinced him of
the untruthfulness of Hammonds’s allegations.
Clements Unit officials, including Smith, reviewed Hammonds’s
complaints several times. The UCC convened on multiple occasions
to investigate these matters and placed Hammonds into protective
custody while at least two of these investigations proceeded. At
the conclusion of each investigation, the UCC found Hammonds’s
allegations to be unsubstantiated. This included an investigation
conducted by at least one UCC panel on which Smith did not serve.
Medical examinations of Hammonds’s injuries were likewise
inconclusive, and Hammonds’s answers to the UCC’s questions were
found to be vague and unhelpful.
Thus, at the end of each of its inquiries, the UCC concluded
that Hammonds should not be afforded protective custody. Absent
evidence of bad faith or malfeasance, which Hammonds has not
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demonstrated, the only reasonable inference is that Smith properly
discharged his duties as warden and at no time recklessly subjected
Hammonds to substantial risk of harm. A fortiori, the district
court was correct in finding no deliberate indifference as a matter
of law.
III.
Hammonds also challenges the denial of his FED. R. CIV. P. 59
motion, on the ground that Smith’s purported failure to comply with
the court’s March 26, 1997, discovery order prejudiced him.
Whether to grant a rule 59 motion is a matter within the discretion
of the district court. Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 771 (5th
Cir. 1997). The court gave three reasons for denying rule 59
relief: (1) Incomplete disclosure did not prejudice Hammonds,
because he already possessed copies (albeit unclear ones) of the
documents he was requesting; (2) Hammonds had indicated in an
exhibit to his May 16, 1997, motion for summary judgment that he
had received the additional discovery in question; and (3) Hammonds
waived his discovery objections by filing a response to Smith's
motion for summary judgment that made no mention of the purported
lack of discovery.
Hammonds has demonstrated that the district court most likely
erred in coming to its second and third conclusions. Regarding the
second, although the exhibit in question (exhibit “A”) does mention
that Hammonds had received some additional discovery, it goes on to
explain (in the very next sentence) that the supplemental discovery
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ordered on March 26 has not been completely provided. Regarding
the third, Hammonds did indeed reiterate his discovery concerns in
his response to Smith’s motion for summary judgment. The court has
apparently confused Hammonds’s response to Smith’s motion for
summary judgment with Hammonds’s reply to Smith’s response to
Hammonds’s motion for summary judgment. The latter document did
not contain a reiteration of Hammonds’s discovery concerns, nor did
it need to.
Nonetheless, the district court’s first findingSSthat
nonreceipt of the additional discovery could not prejudice
HammondsSSis a sufficient, independent ground for denying
Hammonds’s rule 59 motion. The court found that Smith had produced
the requested documents, and the March 26 order merely instructed
him to produce a second set of the same because of certain
illegible documents contained in the first. The court also noted
Smith’s claim that the illegibility was not the result of
reproduction, but rather inherent in the original documents. The
determination that any purported violation of the March 26
discovery order would not be prejudicial is a matter firmly within
the court’s discretion: The decision regarded discovery and was
made within the context of a rule 59 motion.
AFFIRMED.
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