FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 8, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 08-3294
v. (D. Kansas)
SANTOS ORELLANA-ALEMAN, (D.C. No.6:08-CR-10119-WEB-1)
also known as Jose Antonio Guzman-
Monge,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Santos Orellana-Aleman pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry by a
previously removed alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The district court varied upward
from the one-to-seven-month advisory Guidelines range, imposing upon Orellana-
Aleman a term of imprisonment of twenty-four months. Orellana-Aleman
appeals, contending the sentence imposed by the district court is both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the district court’s
sentence.
Following Orellana-Aleman’s guilty plea, the United States Probation
Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). See generally Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32(d). The PSR calculated an offense level of six 1 and a criminal
history category of II, 2 resulting in an advisory guideline range of one to seven
months. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. The PSR set forth the following factor potentially
warranting an upward variance 3:
[Orellana-Aleman] has a history of illegal entry and re-entry to the
United States. As noted in the [PSR], [Orellana-Aleman] has a total
of 12 prior illegal entries. [Orellana-Aleman] was prosecuted on his
second illegal entry in October 1996 and sentenced to 30 days
custody. Since 1996[,] [Orellana-Aleman] has illegally entered the
United States 10 times and been subjected to no prosecution.
Therefore, to promote respect for the law and afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct, a sentencing variance above the
advisory guideline may be warranted.
1
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) (setting base offense level at eight for violations of
§ 1326(a)); id. § 3E1.1(a) (providing for two level decrease to offense level “[i]f
the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense”).
2
Orellana-Aleman’s three criminal history points placed him in criminal
history category II. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.
3
A variance occurs when a court deviates from the sentencing range set out
in the Guidelines upon consideration of the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1101 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled in
part on other grounds by Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198, 2201 n.1
(2008). In contrast, a departure occurs “when a court reaches a sentence above or
below the recommended Guidelines range through application of Chapters Four or
Five of the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id.
-2-
Neither Orellana-Aleman nor the government filed objections to the PSR.
Specifically, Orellana-Aleman did not file any written objections to the factual
history of his numerous entries into the United States over the previous decade.
Orellana-Aleman did, however, file a sentencing memorandum, requesting
a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range. In that memorandum, Orellana-
Aleman recognized he had “returned to the United States and been deported”
“many times.” He nevertheless argued the Guidelines range appropriately
reflected the nature and circumstances of the offense and his history and
characteristics. He asserted he was a simple person with minimal understanding
of the criminal justice system, his criminal history involved minor crimes (i.e.,
two separate thefts of bicycles), and he worked hard at menial jobs for minimum
wage. He further argued that because the Guidelines did not contemplate, in
arriving at an advisory sentencing range, unprosecuted prior entries into the
United States, varying upward on such a basis would generate unwarranted
sentencing disparities.
After the issuance of the PSR, the district court issued an order notifying
the parties it was contemplating an upward variance. At the sentencing hearing,
the district announced a tentative sentence of twenty-four months imprisonment,
the statutory maximum, based upon (1) a consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors; (2) Orellana-Aleman’s history of illegal entries into the United States,
including twelve illegal reentries and eleven removals without prosecution;
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(3) respect for the seriousness of the offense and for the law; and (4) adequate
deterrence. In response, Orellana-Aleman asserted such a sentence would be both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He further argued, however, that he
had not been afforded sufficient time to develop his objections. To allow
Orellana-Aleman to fully develop his objections, the district court continued the
sentencing hearing for two weeks.
Prior to the resumption of the sentencing hearing, Orellana-Aleman filed an
objection to the district court’s proposed upward variance. He argued it was
procedurally improper for the district court to rely on his history of unprosecuted
illegal reentries for three reasons: (1) the unique structure of § 2L1.2, which ties a
defendant’s offense level directly to his prior convictions, renders prior conduct
not resulting in a conviction legally irrelevant; (2) the executive branch’s decision
not to prosecute him for his previous entries demonstrated those acts were not
serious; and (3) punishing him more harshly on the basis of his previous entries,
given that the government had declined to prosecute those acts, would improperly
invade the province of the executive branch. Orellana-Aleman further argued a
twenty-four-month sentence, a 340% increase from the high end of the applicable
advisory Guidelines range, was not substantively reasonable.
When the sentencing hearing resumed, the district court recognized and
summarized Orellana-Aleman’s arguments in favor of a within-Guidelines
sentence and asked the parties whether they had any further arguments. The
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government urged the district court to impose a sentence of twenty-four months’
imprisonment based on Orellana-Aleman’s “complete disdain for the laws of this
country.” The government noted that on many occasions, Orellana-Aleman
reentered the United States within a month of a previous removal. Reiterating
and amplifying the arguments set out in both his sentencing memorandum and his
objection to upward variance, Orellana-Aleman requested that the district court
impose a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range.
The district court rejected Orellana-Aleman’s request for a sentence within
the advisory Guidelines range and imposed a sentence of twenty-four months’
imprisonment. In explaining why a substantial upward variance was appropriate,
the district court first recounted Orellana-Aleman’s extensive contacts with
immigration officials. 4 In particular, the district court noted Orellana-Aleman had
4
The district court summarized those contacts as follows:
The defendant was convicted of illegal entry in 1996. He was
convicted under the name of [Jose Antonio-Guzman]. He was
arrested one other time in 1996 for illegal entry. In that case he did
not tell the law enforcement his correct name . . . [or country of
origin].
Twice in 2000 he was found in the United States. Both times
he gave . . . law enforcement an incorrect name. Both times he told
officials he was a national of Mexico. The defendant is not a
national of Mexico. He’s a national of El Salvador. He returned to
Mexico on both occasions.
Three times in 2002 the defendant was found in the United
States. He gave two different names. He also gave a different date
of birth the third time he was arrested. He told officials he was a
national of Mexico and was allowed to voluntarily return to Mexico.
In 2003 the defendant was arrested under the name of Jose
(continued...)
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been arrested for illegally entering the United States numerous times, resulting in
one conviction under § 1326(a) and eleven removals from the United States. The
district court further noted Orellana-Aleman frequently misled law enforcement
officers as to his true name, date of birth, and country of origin. With this
background in mind, the district court concluded the factors set out in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) called for an upward variance from the range set out in the advisory
Sentencing Guidelines:
As we know[,] the Court shall impose a sentence that is
sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes
of 3553(a).
The defendant’s been removed from this country on numerous
occasions. He’s lied to . . . law enforcement regarding his correct
legal name, correct legal birth date and the country in which he is a
national.
4
(...continued)
Guzman for illegal entry. He said he was a national of Mexico. He
was allowed to voluntarily return to Mexico.
In 2004 the defendant was arrested twice for illegal entry. He
[gave] different names both times he was arrested. He said he was a
national of Mexico. He was allowed to voluntarily return to Mexico
on the first occasion. He was deported to Mexico on the second
occasion.
In 2005 the defendant was charged twice for illegal entry after
deportation. The defendant gave an incorrect name both times. He
also gave different dates of birth on each occasion. He was deported
to El Salvador on both occasions.
In 2006 the defendant was arrested one time under [a] false
name for illegal entry [after] deportation. He said he was a national
of Mexico. He was deported to El Salvador.
In the case at hand the defendant was arrested under the name
of Jose Antonio Guzman-Monge. It was not until the time of the plea
he notified the Court that his correct name was Santos Orellana-
Aleman.
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The defendant’s argument that he is a simple, uneducated man
and does not understand the criminal justice system is not supported
by the facts. He understands the system enough to lie to the law
enforcement authorities about his name, date of birth and even his
country to which he belonged. This proves he knew he would be
[removed], knows that his identification was incorrect, and by giving
a different identification and allowed to return to Mexico where it
would be easier to reenter this country.
The defendant’s argument that a [variance] is impermissible
simply because there’s no commentary under [§ 2L1.2 regarding
departures] is incorrect. Courts should consider the factors under [18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)] in every sentencing. . . . [A]s a matter of fact[,]
the Court’s never seen a case in which there were 11 reentries due to
the lying by the defendant of his birth date, his country and his name.
After considering the nature and circumstances of this offense
and the history of the defendant, the kinds of sentences in the
sentencing range under the guidelines . . . , it’s my determination that
a sentence of 24 months [will foster] respect [for] the law and afford
an adequate deterrence from further criminal behavior.
Orellana-Aleman appeals the district court’s sentence, contending the
sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. As to the question
of procedural reasonableness, Orellana-Aleman raises the following general
assertions: (1) it was improper for the district court to rely on Orellana-Aleman’s
history of illegal entries because the Sentencing Commission eliminated
departures on that ground when it overhauled U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, the Guideline
applicable to unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States; and (2) the
district court’s use of Orellana-Aleman’s unprosecuted entries into the United
States invaded the prerogative of the executive branch. As to the question of
substantive reasonableness, Orellana-Aleman asserts the twenty-four-month
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sentence imposed by the district court is simply too severe given the nature of his
crime.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005), this court reviews the reasonableness of a sentence imposed by the
district court under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This is true whether the district court’s chosen
sentence is “inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range.”
Id. “A district court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v.
Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1146 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted).
Reasonableness review encompasses both a procedural and a substantive
component. United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 895 (10th Cir. 2008).
The procedural component addresses whether the district court miscalculated or
failed to calculate the Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as mandatory,
failed to consider the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), relied on clearly
erroneous facts, or failed to adequately explain the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. The substantive component addresses “whether the length of the sentence is
reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth
in [§ 3553(a)].” Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d at 895 (quotations omitted). When a
district court varies from the range set out in the Guidelines, this court
“consider[s] the extent of the deviation” as part of its analysis of substantive
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reasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Nevertheless, we must give “due deference
to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the
extent of the variance.” Id. That is, this court “may not examine the weight a
district court assigns to various § 3553(a) factors, and its ultimate assessment of
the balance between them, as a legal conclusion to be reviewed de novo.” United
States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 808 (10th Cir. 2008). Although sentences within a
correctly calculated Guidelines range may be presumed reasonable on appeal,
sentences outside the Guidelines range may not be presumed unreasonable. Id.
Having set out the background and governing legal standards, Orellana-
Aleman’s sentencing appeal can be resolved in short order. Orellana-Aleman
asserts the district court committed procedural sentencing error when it relied on
Orellana-Aleman’s history of unprosecuted illegal entries into the United States to
support an upward variance from the advisory Guidelines range. Orellana-
Aleman asserts the district court’s reliance on those unprosecuted entries into the
United States is procedurally improper because such reliance: (1) is inconsistent
with the sentencing scheme set out in the Guidelines; and (2) improperly invades
the province of the executive branch. These contentions are entirely without
merit.
Orellana-Aleman asserts it was improper for the district court to consider
his history of unprosecuted entries into the United States because § 2L1.2
narrowly focuses on prior convictions in arriving at an appropriate offense level.
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Orellana-Aleman further notes that when the Sentencing Commission
substantially revised § 2L1.2 in 2001 to focus on specified types of pre-
deportation convictions, it specifically rewrote the commentary to § 2L1.2 to
delete any references to departures. See U.S.S.G. amend. 632 (setting out revised
commentary and reasons for rewriting § 2L1.2). Thus, according to Orellana-
Aleman, a prior history of unprosecuted entries into the United States is simply
irrelevant for purposes of arriving at a Guidelines sentence. Finally, Orellana-
Aleman asserts that in imposing a sentence significantly above the range set out
in the Guidelines by reference to matters not contemplated by the Guideline, the
district court simply abandoned any consideration of § 2L1.2. 5
Orellana-Aleman’s argument is inconsistent with this court’s precedents. It
is absolutely clear that in arriving at an appropriate sentence in this particular
case, the district court correctly calculated and considered Orellana-Aleman’s
advisory Guidelines range. The mere fact the district court chose to vary from
that range does not mean it ignored the Guidelines. United States v. Smart, 518
5
For the first time on appeal, Orellana-Aleman asserts the district court
failed to adequately explain the method it employed in settling on a sentence
significantly above the range set out in the Guidelines. Because Orellana-Aleman
did not raise this procedural-reasonableness challenge before the district court, it
is forfeited. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (holding that a claim
the district court failed to “adequately explain the sentence” is a challenge to the
procedural reasonableness of the sentence); United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d
1173, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2007) (this court reviews forfeited challenges to the
procedural reasonableness of a sentence only for plain error). Because Orellana-
Aleman fails to address whether this forfeited “error” is plain, we do not consider
the issue further.
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F.3d 800, 809 (10th Cir. 2008) (“We may not conclude that simply by diverging
from the Guidelines, a district court has disregarded the policy considerations
which led the Commission to create a particular Guideline.”). Instead, the district
court correctly recognized that in arriving at an appropriate sentence under
§ 3553(a), it is free to consider a broad range of “individual characteristics, like
age, employment, and criminal history . . . , even when disfavored under the
Guidelines or already accounted for in another part of the calculation.” United
States v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008). Appellate courts have
uniformly held that a history of illegally entering or reentering the United States
is a relevant sentencing characteristic district courts can consider in arriving at an
appropriate sentence under § 3553(a). See, e.g., United States v. Herrera-Zuniga,
571 F.3d 568, 590 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding defendant’s history of illegally
reentering the United States “provide[d] a reasonable basis for imposing a harsher
sentence”); United States v. Ruvalcava-Perez, 561 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2009)
(same); United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 2008)
(same); see also United States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir.
2006) (noting in dicta that a demonstrated propensity, through multiple illegal
reentries, to return to the United States would justify greater punishment).
Orellana-Aleman attempts to distinguish his case by asserting the record
reveals he was merely “arrested” on immigration charges, not that he was actually
guilty of being in the United States illegally. The record does not bear out this
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assertion. The PSR indicates that in addition to a single conviction for illegally
entering the United States, Orellana-Aleman either voluntarily departed or was
deported from the United States on eleven instances. As to the four entries
resulting in deportation, the civil adjudicative process attendant to deportation
determinations conclusively establishes Orellana-Aleman was in the United States
illegally. United States v. Monjaraz-Reyes, 285 F. App’x 146, 147 (5th Cir.
2008) (unpublished). Under the particular facts of this case, it was likewise
appropriate for the district court to consider the seven post-1996 entries into the
United States identified in the PSR that resulted in a voluntary departure on the
part of Orellana-Aleman. The use of a signature modus operandi by Orellana-
Aleman in his interactions with immigration authorities (i.e., false names, birth
dates, and nationality), together with his history of deportations, reliably indicates
that during each of Orellana-Aleman’s arrests he was in the United States
illegally. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d at 807 (“[Defendant’s] eleven prior arrests
by immigration officials do not ‘stand alone’—here they are corroborated by more
than half a dozen deportations. These arrests are sufficiently ‘supported by
evidence’ to constitute reliable grounds for a variance in this case.”). Thus, the
uncontested facts set out in the PSR demonstrate much more than that Orellana-
Aleman was “arrested” for illegally reentering the United States; they
demonstrate Orellana-Aleman is, in fact, an unrepentant violator of the
immigration laws of the United States.
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Orellana-Aleman asserts the district court’s reliance on his prior
unprosecuted entries into the United States invades the province of the Executive
Branch. He asserts that because the Attorney General declined to prosecute him
for the past entries, and because the decision whether to prosecute is within the
sole discretion of the Executive Branch, the district court’s consideration of that
conduct usurped the role of the prosecutor. A necessary predicate of this
allegation of error, however, is that consideration of those unprosecuted entries
amounts to the district court punishing him for that conduct. The Supreme Court
has made clear, however, that “consideration of information about the defendant’s
character and conduct at sentencing does not result in ‘punishment’ for any
offense other than the one of which the defendant was convicted.” Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 401 (1995) (approving consideration of uncharged
criminal conduct in arriving at appropriate offense level under the Guidelines).
The district court did not punish Orellana-Aleman for his unprosecuted entries
into the United States, but instead merely considered them as part of Orellana-
Aleman’s history and characteristics for purposes of arriving at a proper sentence
for the instant crime under § 3553(a). Thus, the district court did not invade the
province of the Executive Branch and did not commit procedural error in
considering Orellana-Aleman’s prior entries in arriving at a sentence in this case. 6
6
Orellana-Aleman likewise asserts that the district court’s consideration of
his unprosecuted entries violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
(continued...)
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Finally, Orellana-Aleman asserts that the twenty-four month sentence
imposed by the district court is substantively unreasonable. In that regard, he
notes the sentence is more than three times greater than the top of the advisory
Guidelines range. He argues such a lengthy sentence is longer than necessary to
comply with the purposes of § 3553(a)(2), especially given his limited criminal
history.
The district court’s chosen sentence is not arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly unreasonable. Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d at 1146. Orellana-Aleman’s
history of illegally reentering the United States is extensive. More importantly,
Orellana-Aleman’s use of aliases and false birth dates, especially when
accompanied by falsification of his country of origin, demonstrates a
sophisticated understanding of this country’s immigration laws and a dogged
determination to disregard those laws and continue returning to the United States
in violation of law. The district court’s determination that only a particularly
lengthy sentence had the potential to dissuade Orellana-Aleman from further
attempts to enter the country illegally is strongly supported by the record. This
weighty justification is more than sufficient to justify the substantial upward
6
(...continued)
Amendment. As was true of his separation-of-powers claim, this claim is
dependent on Orellana-Aleman’s erroneous assertion that consideration of his
unprosecuted conduct amounts to punishing him for that conduct. Accordingly,
for the same reason set out above in rejecting Orellana-Aleman’s separation-of-
powers claim, this claim also fails.
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variance adopted by the district court in this case. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 (“We find
it uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more
significant justification than a minor one.”).
For those reasons set out above, the sentence imposed by the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas is hereby AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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