FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 20, 2010
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
MIGUEL HERRERA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BERNALILLO COUNTY BOARD OF No. 09-2042
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; CHRIS (D.C. No. 1:08-CV-00361-JEC-CG)
ROMERO; GERALD KOPPMAN; (D. N.M.)
CHRISTOPHER MCHUGH,
individually and in their official
capacities,
Defendants-Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Miguel Herrera brought various claims against the Bernalillo County Board
of County Commissioners and three sheriff’s deputies arising from his encounter
with those deputies late one night while walking through a residential
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
neighborhood in Albuquerque, New Mexico. At summary judgment, the district
court dismissed several of those claims but permitted others to proceed. Relevant
for purposes of this appeal, the district court denied the deputies’ assertion that
qualified immunity barred Mr. Herrera’s claim against them for excessive force
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment. Before us, the deputies
argue that this ruling is in error, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Our review of the record, however, confirms the district court’s assessment of the
deputies’ claim to qualified immunity. Accordingly, we affirm. 1
I
A
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Herrera as we must,
Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1279 (10th Cir. 2007), they reveal
that prior to his arrest in the early hours of September 30, 2007, Mr. Herrera was
attending a party at a private home in Albuquerque, New Mexico. When officers
from the Albuquerque Police Department arrived at the party in response to a
complaint about the noise and hour of the party, Mr. Herrera was ordered to leave
1
Beyond contesting the district court’s qualified immunity ruling on
Mr. Herrera’s § 1983 excessive force claim, before us the deputies also seek to
challenge the district court’s denial of summary judgment on Mr. Herrera’s state
law battery and assault claims. Because we affirm the district court’s qualified
immunity ruling, we decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law
assault and battery claims. See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1154
(10th Cir. 2008).
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and issued a citation for being a minor in possession of alcohol, though this
charge was later dismissed.
At around the same time, Darise Gallegos, who lived around the corner
from the house hosting the party, notified Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Deputies
Chris Romero, Gerald Koppman, and Christopher McHugh that a man – whose
identity remains unknown – had been hiding in the bushes on her property and
had cursed at her when she told him to leave. Ms. Gallegos indicated the
direction in which she believed the man had fled, and the deputies pursued the
man on foot. The deputies ended up running into the same field where
Mr. Herrera was walking following his departure from the party. Mr. Herrera
contends that he never hid in any bushes and was not the individual the deputies
were chasing.
When the deputies saw Mr. Herrera, they instructed him to stop.
Mr. Herrera asserts that the deputies specifically shouted “stop or we’ll shoot.”
App. at 127. It is undisputed that Mr. Herrera promptly complied with the
deputies’ order, lying face down on the ground with his hands out. At this point,
Mr. Romero, Mr. Koppman, and Mr. McHugh approached Mr. Herrera and all
three jumped on him. One deputy drove his knee into Mr. Herrera’s back. A
second deputy drove his knee into the back of Mr. Herrera’s left knee. The third
deputy grabbed Mr. Herrera’s left leg and twisted it by the ankle. Mr. Herrera
claims he told the officers they were hurting him, to which they responded “Shut
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up or you’re going to make things worse for yourself.” App. at 128. Mr. Herrera
was then handcuffed and arrested for “resisting, evading or obstructing an
officer,” though this charge was later dropped.
B
In due course, Mr. Herrera brought suit against the deputies and the
Bernalillo County Board of County Commissioners. He claimed, among other
things, that the deputies violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they used excessive
force against him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. In support of this
claim, Mr. Herrera alleged that ligaments in his left knee and his meniscus were
torn as a result of the force the deputies used in arresting him. Before the district
court, the deputies argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The
district court, however, held otherwise. Viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Mr. Herrera, the district court concluded that Mr. Herrera “was
unarmed at the time of arrest,” and that there was “no evidence to indicate he
posed any threat to the safety of” the deputies. App. at 303. The facts so viewed
further showed that at the time of his arrest the deputies suspected Mr. Herrera of
committing only a misdemeanor, and that Mr. Herrera did not attempt “to resist or
evade” the deputies. App. at 303. Based on these facts, the court held that a
reasonable jury could conclude that the deputies engaged in constitutionally
excessive force. The court then proceeded to hold that the law at the time of the
alleged incident clearly established that the deputies’ conduct was constitutionally
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excessive: “reasonable officers would have known they should not have behaved
as they did toward” Mr. Herrera, “particularly considering his compliance at the
time of arrest.” App. at 304. The deputies subsequently filed this interlocutory
appeal challenging the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.
II
While orders denying summary judgment are not normally susceptible to
appeal, those denying summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity
constitute an exception to this rule when they concern questions of law. Behrens
v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996); Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1153. This is such a
case. The deputies before us argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity as
a matter of law even under Mr. Herrera’s proffered version of the facts, and we
have explained that “[o]ur jurisdiction . . . extends to situations where a defendant
claims on appeal that accepting the plaintiff’s version of the facts as true, he is
still entitled to qualified immunity.” Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269,
1276 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted).
When, as here, the defendants assert qualified immunity at summary
judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to meet two tests. First, the plaintiff
must show that on the facts alleged the defendants violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional or statutory rights. Martinez v. Carr, 479 F.3d 1292, 1295
(10th Cir. 2007). Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the infringed right
was clearly established at the time of the defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct
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such that a reasonable law enforcement officer would have known that his
challenged conduct was illegal. Id. In assessing the district court’s disposition of
these questions on appeal, our analysis proceeds de novo. Holland ex rel.
Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2001).
A
We begin with the first prong of the qualified immunity test by asking
whether a reasonable jury could, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
Mr. Herrera, find that the deputies used excessive force in arresting him. “The
Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable seizures, including the use of excessive
force in making an arrest.” Casey, 509 F.3d at 1281. To determine whether the
force used in a particular case is excessive, we must evaluate whether the
officer’s actions were “‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
To guide this inquiry, the Supreme Court has delineated three, non-exclusive
factors: “[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396.
Before us, the deputies do not directly contest the district court’s
assessment on the second Graham factor that a jury could conclude that
Mr. Herrera posed no immediate threat to the safety of the deputies. See Reply
Br. at 6. Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, we take that factor as weighing
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in Mr. Herrera’s favor. We reach the same conclusion with respect to the first
Graham factor. At the time of his arrest, the crime Mr. Herrera was suspected of
having committed was “resisting, evading or obstructing an officer,” which in
New Mexico is treated as a misdemeanor. N.M. Stat. § 30-22-1. Thus the
deputies were not faced with someone who had committed a “severe” crime.
See Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 895 (10th Cir. 2009); Casey,
509 F.3d at 1281.
All that remains in dispute is the third Graham factor. On that score,
Mr. Herrera claims that he neither evaded the deputies nor resisted their efforts to
arrest him, yet in spite of this, as they arrested him, three deputies gang-tackled
him and applied sufficient force to tear ligaments in his knee. Mr. Herrera
emphasizes that, when the deputies instructed him to stop and threatened to shoot
him if he did not, he promptly complied, lying face down on the ground with his
arms and hands visibly extended. He adds that, at the time the deputies ordered
him to stop, he was not running but simply walking through the field. And he
claims that he never said anything to the deputies to suggest disobedience to their
commands. To the contrary, his only complaint during the course of the arrest
was that the deputies were hurting him, to which the deputies responded that
he should “[s]hut up or you’re going to make things worse for yourself.”
App. at 128. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Herrera,
we are obliged to take all of these facts as true.
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In reply, the deputies argue that they reasonably, even if perhaps
mistakenly, believed that Mr. Herrera was the person who had been hiding in
Ms. Gallegos’ bushes and who they had been chasing. For this reason, the
deputies say they had reason to believe Mr. Herrera would continue to flee if they
did not restrain him using some force. At the same time, the deputies
acknowledge that, whatever apprehensions of possible flight might have existed
when they first saw Mr. Herrera, by the time they allegedly gang-tackled
Mr. Herrera further flight was no more than “certainly possible” and was “perhaps
unlikely.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 23.
We agree with the district court that this record is insufficient for us to hold
as a matter of law, at this stage in the case, that the deputies are entitled to
qualified immunity. The first two Graham factors weigh in favor of Mr. Herrera
and so weigh in favor of a trial in this matter. The parties offer competing
arguments from the undisputed facts concerning the third Graham factor.
Ultimately, though, even the deputies concede flight was no more than possible
and perhaps unlikely. In reaching the conclusion we do on the deputies’ current
appeal, we do not mean to suggest that the deputies will not ultimately be entitled
to immunity. After trial, for example, a jury might choose to discredit certain of
Mr. Herrera’s factual assertions that we must take as true in this appeal. At this
point, we simply hold that, on the record as it currently exists, we cannot say, as
we must to grant summary judgment, that no reasonable jury could find that the
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deputies’ use of force was excessive. Our result in this matter is compelled by
and finds parallels in the precedents of this and our sister circuits. See, e.g.,
Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1458-59, 1463 (10th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Mattox,
127 F.3d 1416, 1419-20 (11th Cir. 1997). 2
B
Turning to the second prong of the qualified immunity test, we must ask
whether, at the time of Mr. Herrera’s arrest, the law clearly established that the
gratuitous use of force against a person who is not resisting arrest violates the
Fourth Amendment. We have stated that, “[o]rdinarily, in order for the law to be
clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on
point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have
found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” See Medina v. City & County of
Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds
by Williams v. City & County of Denver, 99 F.3d 1009, 1014-15 (10th Cir. 1996).
As we have already suggested, this requirement is satisfied here. In the
Dixon case, for example, a plaintiff alleged that during an investigative stop, two
deputies kicked him, struck him with a flashlight, and choked and beat him, even
2
In a recent decision, this court suggested that when a plaintiff claims that
officers used excessive force in the course of applying handcuffs, the plaintiff
must demonstrate some non-de minimis injury in order to state a Fourth
Amendment claim. See Fisher, 584 F.3d at 897. Mr. Herrera can easily satisfy
this injury requirement as he sustained torn ligaments in his knee and a torn
meniscus as a result of the force used to restrain and handcuff him.
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though he had his hands up and was not making any aggressive moves or threats.
922 F.2d at 1463. Under these facts, we held that the deputies were not entitled
to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s excessive force claim, because “the alleged
conduct is not objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. We
discern no basis for reaching a different result here.
Cases from other jurisdictions, handed down prior to Mr. Herrera’s arrest,
confirm the point. For example, in Mattox, the plaintiff initially threatened a
police officer with a baseball bat and then fled from him. 127 F.3d at 1418. But
once the officer caught up to the plaintiff and ordered him to “get down,” the
plaintiff “docilely submitted to arrest.” Id. When the officer put his knee on the
plaintiff’s lower back and pulled the plaintiff’s left arm to handcuff him, the
plaintiff complained, and in response, the officer grunted and broke the plaintiff’s
arm. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that the officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity on plaintiff’s excessive force claim, because “assuming as we must that
[the plaintiff] was offering no resistance at all, the considerable effort and force
inferable from the grunt, [the plaintiff’s] sensation of a blow, and the broken arm
[were] obviously unnecessary to restrain even a previously fractious arrestee.”
Id. at 1420; cf. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“[G]ang-tackling without first attempting a less violent means of arresting a
relatively calm trespass suspect – especially one who had been cooperative in the
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past and was at the moment not actively resisting arrest – was a violation of that
person’s Fourth Amendment rights.”).
Affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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