FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 9, 2010
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 09-6153
MARCUS RUSELL MILLER,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 94-CR-00057-D-1)
Submitted on the briefs: *
Marcus Rusell Miller, pro se.
Susan Dickerson Cox, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Robert J. Troester, Acting United
States Attorney, on the briefs), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant -
Appellant.
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The cause therefore
is ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant-Appellant Marcus R. Miller, a state inmate proceeding pro se,
appeals from the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of his petition, styled as
a petition for a writ of nunc pro tunc. Mr. Miller is currently serving a state
sentence in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC), 1
R. Doc. 28, upon the completion of which he will begin a federal sentence of 60
months in prison for conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 286. 1 R. 23-24. Mr. Miller sought to have the district court designate
his state facility as the facility where he also serves his federal sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3621(b). Because Mr. Miller is challenging the execution of his federal
sentence under § 28 U.S.C. § 2241, we do not require a certificate of
appealability. See Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2000). We
affirm.
On September 22, 1994, Mr. Miller pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the
United States. 1 R. 17. On November 30, 1994, Mr. Miller received a sentence
of 60 months in prison “to run consecutive to any prior sentences imposed.” 1 R.
24. At the time of his federal conviction and sentencing, Mr. Miller was already
serving the same state sentence for which he is still incarcerated. 2 R. 8-11. Mr.
Miller did not file a direct criminal appeal in the federal matter.
After requesting a nunc pro tunc designation from the Bureau of Prisons
and receiving no response, Aplt. Br. at 2, Mr. Miller filed his “petition for a writ
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of nunc pro tunc” as an additional proceeding in his original criminal case. 1 R.
4. Because Mr. Miller’s deadline to file a direct appeal expired years ago and he
cited 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the district court construed the petition as a habeas corpus
petition challenging the execution of his sentence. 1 R. 44. Mr. Miller claimed
that he is entitled to have the BOP designate the ODOC, in whose custody he
currently serves a state sentence, “as the facility where he is to serve his federal
sentence.” 1 R. 31. In effect, the district court noted, Mr. Miller seeks to have
his federal sentence run concurrent, instead of consecutive, to his state sentence.
1 R. 45. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the BOP cannot
designate a place of confinement because Mr. Miller is not currently serving a
federal sentence and that Mr. Miller presented no basis of relief from his
consecutive sentence. 1 R. 44-46.
On appeal, Mr. Miller argues that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his petition and that he is entitled to have the BOP designate his state
prison as the facility where he is to serve his federal sentence. Aplt. Br. at 3. He
further argues that the BOP should credit his state sentence against his federal
sentence—essentially, to have the sentences run concurrently. Id. at 5.
Like the district court, we construe Mr. Miller’s petition as a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the execution of his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Mr.
Miller satisfies the “in custody” requirement for habeas purposes because a
prisoner may “challenge a sentence that was imposed consecutively to his current
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sentence but which he ha[s] not yet begun to serve.” Mays v. Dinwiddie, 580
F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2009). We review de novo the district court’s
dismissal of a § 2241 petition, and the district court’s factual findings for clear
error. Martinez v. Flowers, 164 F.3d 1257, 1258 (10th Cir. 1998).
First, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) does not afford Mr. Miller any relief. Habeas
relief under § 2241 cannot extend to Mr. Miller unless he shows that the
execution of his sentence violates federal law or the Constitution. Rose v.
Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Section 3621(b) directs the BOP “to designate
the place of a prisoner’s imprisonment”—language that gives the executive
branch primary authority over any petition challenging a prisoner’s place of
confinement. Moresco v. United States, No. 92-1108, 1992 WL 372399, at *2
(10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1992). Therefore, to the extent that this petition asked the
court to issue a nunc pro tunc order and modify his sentence, Aplt. Br. at 2, the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. See Duval v. Willingham, 390
F.2d 203, 204 (10th Cir. 1968); Moresco, 1992 WL 372399, at *2.
Second, as the district court noted, the BOP cannot designate a place of
confinement until Mr. Miller is in federal custody. Hernandez v. United States,
689 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1982) (without custody of the defendant, “the
Attorney General was in no position to designate a place of confinement”); see
also United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d Cir. 1990) (the Attorney
General “simply will not be called upon to [designate the place of confinement]
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until the state sentence is completed and the defendant is delivered to federal
custody”).
Finally, Mr. Miller claims that the district court erred in not applying
Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1990). Barden presented similar
circumstances: a prisoner requesting that the BOP designate his state prison
facility the place of his federal confinement nunc pro tunc. Id. at 477-78. Barden
required the BOP to consider the prisoner’s nunc pro tunc request. Id. at 478.
Two critical facts distinguish Barden from Mr. Miller’s case: first, Barden
received his federal sentence before his state sentence, so that neither court could
order concurrent sentencing, see Abdul-Malik v. Hawk-Sawyer, 403 F.3d 72, 75
(2nd Cir. 2005) (discussing Barden); second, Barden’s federal sentencing court
did not order a consecutive sentence. Barden, 921 F.2d at 483. Here, Mr. Miller
was already serving his state sentence when he received his federal sentence, and
his federal sentence was expressly ordered “to run consecutive to any prior
sentences imposed.” 1 R. 24.
This court has never adopted Barden, and no published decision has
extended Barden to these circumstances. Allowing a nunc pro tunc designation
here would void the district court’s valid sentence, and undermine the court’s
statutory authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). The Bureau of Prisons’ own
Policy Statement indicates that it cannot make a nunc pro tunc designation where
the federal court has ordered that the federal sentence run consecutive to the
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earlier state sentence. BOPPS 5160.05, ¶ 7(b)-(c) (explaining that federal courts
may order consecutive sentences, but when they order concurrent sentences BOP
“implements such order or recommendation, ordinarily by designating the state
facility as the place to serve the federal sentence”); ¶ 9(b)(4)(c) (Barden-style
nunc pro tunc request for concurrent service may be “appropriate (e.g., the federal
sentence is imposed first and there is no order or recommendation regarding the
service of the sentence in relationship to the yet to be imposed state term)”).
Because Mr. Miller’s federal sentence was ordered to run consecutive to his
state sentence, the district court’s dismissing the matter with prejudice is
AFFIRMED. We GRANT Mr. Miller’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal.
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