FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 17, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
PETER WOODRUFF,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 09-1446
(D. Ct. No. 1:09-CV-01672-ZLW)
RON WILEY, Warden, Federal Prison (D. Colo.)
Camp-Florence,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Peter Woodruff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
We take jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we AFFIRM the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
ruling of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Woodruff is currently incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp in
Florence, Colorado (“FPC-Florence”). He is serving a 135-month sentence for
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A). His projected release date, with good-time credit, is May 13, 2014.
In July 2009, Mr. Woodruff filed a § 2241 petition in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado. In his petition, Mr. Woodruff alleges
that prison officials at FPC-Florence are categorically denying: (1) the review and
transfer of eligible “non pre-release inmates” 1 to Community Corrections Centers
(“CCC”) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); (2) a placement of more than six
months in a Residential Re-entry Center (“RRC”) for eligible “pre-release
inmates,” 2 as well as any other inmates, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b) and
(e)(2)(B), 3624(c), and 42 U.S.C. § 17541(a)(2)(A) and (c)(2); and (3) a twelve-
month reduction in sentence and a twelve-month placement in an RRC facility for
graduates of the Residential Drug and Alcohol Program in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621(e)(2)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 17541(a)(2)(A). The district court dismissed Mr.
Woodruff’s petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. He timely
1
Mr. Woodruff defines “non pre-release” inmates as inmates with more than
twelve months remaining on their sentences.
2
Mr. Woodruff defines “pre-release” inmates as inmates with twelve or
fewer months remaining on their sentences.
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filed this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
In considering a district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition, we review
legal determinations de novo and findings of fact for clear error. United States v.
Eccleston, 521 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2008). Before seeking relief under §
2241, federal prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies. Williams v.
O’Brien, 792 F.2d 986, 987 (10th Cir. 1986). Exhaustion requirements exist to
give agencies, like the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), “an opportunity to correct
[their] own mistakes . . . before [they are] haled into federal court.” Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (quotations omitted). An inmate must exhaust his
administrative remedies by “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing
so properly.” Id. at 90 (quotations and emphasis omitted).
BOP regulations establish a four-tiered administrative process to address
and resolve inmate grievances. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.10–542.16. First, an inmate
must present an issue of concern informally to prison staff in an effort to resolve
the issue. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13. If the inmate and staff cannot resolve the matter
informally, the inmate must file a formal written Administrative Remedy Request
at the institution at which the inmate is incarcerated. Id. § 542.14. If he is not
satisfied with the Warden’s response to his formal request, he may file appeals
first with the Regional Director and later with General Counsel. Id. § 542.15(a).
“Appeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal.” Id.
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Mr. Woodruff concedes that he has not followed the process outlined in the
BOP regulations and therefore has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He
argues, however, that the exhaustion requirement is inapplicable because: (1)
exhaustion would be futile; and (2) he is contesting the validity, rather than the
application, of BOP regulations.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when it would be
futile. See Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113, 1118 (10th Cir. 2005). “The futility
exception, however, is quite narrow.” Bun v. Wiley, No. 09-1289, 2009 WL
3437831, at *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2009). Mr. Woodruff argues that exhaustion
would be futile because prison officials at FPC-Florence categorically deny every
request. He cites two BOP memoranda in support of his contention. Far from
supporting his position, however, the memoranda require prison officials to make
all decisions regarding placement in a CCC or RRC on an individualized basis.
Furthermore, even if Mr. Woodruff was correct that the staff at FPC-Florence has
predetermined its response to any complaint, the regulations provide him with two
avenues of review outside the institution in which he is incarcerated. See 28
C.F.R. § 542.15. Thus, the futility exception does not excuse Mr. Woodruff’s
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, as this court has noted in a prior, unpublished decision, “a
prisoner [cannot] do away with the exhaustion requirement simply by framing his
habeas petition as an attack on a regulation’s validity rather than its application.”
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Torres-Villa v. Davis, No. 09-1366, 2009 WL 4071834, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 25,
2009) (addressing facts and arguments nearly identical to those presented in this
case). As we noted in Torres-Villa, because the regulations Mr. Woodruff is
challenging do not definitely prevent his transfer to a CCC or RRC, he was
obligated to exhaust the administrative process. Id.
III. CONCLUSION
Because Mr. Woodruff has failed to show that he exhausted his
administrative remedies or that exhaustion would be futile, we AFFIRM the
ruling of the district court. Mr. Woodruff’s motion to proceed without
prepayment of fees is DENIED. Mr. Woodruff must immediately pay the unpaid
balance of his filing fees.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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