FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH February 23, 2010
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
D.L., individually, as the next friend of
J.L., and as the Administratrix of the
Estate of R.L.; P.P,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 08-3273
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 497,
DOUGLAS COUNTY, KANSAS;
DOUGLAS EICHER, School
Administrator, individually and in his
official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 2:00-CV-02439-CM)
Gregory Goheen of McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A., Kansas City, Kansas, for
Plaintiffs - Appellants.
W. Joseph Hatley of Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, L.L.P., Kansas City, Missouri, for
Defendants - Appellees.
Before KELLY, EBEL, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs-Appellants—J.L. and the estate of R.L., along with their mother D.L.
and her boyfriend P.P.—appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendants-Appellees. Plaintiffs brought a variety of claims challenging a local school
district’s conclusion that Plaintiffs J.L. and R.L. were ineligible for special education
services. In pertinent part, these claims arose under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
(Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. Background
We have substantially recounted the facts underlying this suit in a prior opinion.
D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004). Briefly, the relevant
events began in August 1997. D.L. was renting a home in Lawrence, Kansas, and her
children, R.L. and J.L., began attending public school there in Unified School District
No. 497 (“the District”). 1 Aplt. App. 258. R.L. was autistic, while J.L. suffered from a
milder learning disability. They resided with their mother D.L. and her boyfriend P.P.,
who assisted in their care. The children were receiving special educational services at
public expense. 1 Aplt. App. 266-67. In November 1999, Defendant Eicher, the Director
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of Special Education Services for the District, determined that the children were not
residents because they did not sleep at D.L.’s Lawrence residence. 1 Aplt. App. 154,
157. The District demanded that D.L. and P.P. immediately withdraw the children,
claiming that the children were ineligible to attend school there, and threatened legal
action if D.L. and P.P. failed to comply. 1 Aplt. App. 394. D.L. and P.P. requested an
IDEA due process hearing, which the District denied. 1 Aplt. App. 397-402.
The children continued to attend school in Lawrence through the end of the
semester in January 2000. J.L. and R.L. then missed a week of school, during which time
their parents were too sick to drive them to school, and attorneys for the District and
Plaintiffs exchanged letters discussing the children’s future in the district. 3 Aplt. App.
1179; 1 Aplt. App. at 397-408. D.L. then provided an affidavit of residency stating that
R.L would now be residing within the district on a full-time basis, and the children
resumed attending school in the District. 1 Aplt. App. 282, 423. In due course, the
District discovered that the children stopped sleeping in Lawrence shortly after resuming
their education in the District. 1 Aplt. App. 280. On April 18, 2000, the District brought
suit in state court against D.L. and P.P. for fraud, seeking to recover the costs of
providing special educational services to the children while they were nonresidents. 1
Aplt. App. 424-28. Despite the filing of the lawsuit, the children remained in District
497's schools through December 2000, when D.L. withdrew them over concerns that a
teacher was being physically abusive towards R.L. 1 Aplt. App. 263. D.L. then enrolled
the children in school in Kansas City, where they received an adequate education. Id.
3
Plaintiffs responded to the District’s state-court suit by filing this federal action
against the District and Eicher on September 29, 2000. 1 Aplt. App. 1-15. Plaintiffs
alleged that (1) Defendants’ refusal to provide a due process hearing prior to terminating
the children’s educational benefits, and the subsequent state-court suit seeking to recover
the costs of providing the children such educational services, violated the children’s
IDEA rights; (2) the District’s admissions policy violated the Rehabilitation Act, the
ADA, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and equal protection; and (3)
various other actions taken by the District denied Plaintiffs their constitutional right to
substantive due process and equal protection. 1 Aplt. App. 4-12. Based on these claims,
Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as compensatory and punitive
damages. 1 Aplt. App. 14.
The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’
admissions policy challenge and on their constitutional claims. See D.L. v. Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 497, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1252-54, 1259-63 (D. Kan. 2002). The district
court held that P.P. lacked standing to maintain any claims pertaining to educational
benefits provided to the children. See id. at 1254. The district court also granted
Defendant Eicher qualified immunity. D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, No. 00-2439-
CM, 2002 WL 31296445, at *2-4 (D. Kan. Oct. 1, 2002). After a bench trial on
Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim, the district court held that Plaintiffs could not recover because
they could not show that the District’s denial of an IDEA due process hearing deprived
the children of any educational opportunities. 3 Aplt. App. at 1179-81. “Rather, the
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evidence in the record indicates plaintiffs’ lack of attendance was due to alternative
causes,” including D.L.’s and P.P.’s illness that prevented them from taking the children
to school in January 2000. 3 Aplt. App. at 1179.
On appeal, we affirmed in part and reversed in part. D.L., 392 F.3d at 1232. We
affirmed the district court’s judgment regarding the IDEA claim. Id. at 1231-32. We
also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of P.P.’s IDEA claim based on lack of
standing. Id. at 1232. We vacated the district court’s judgment on all of the remaining
claims—the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the ADA, Rehabilitation Act,
and constitutional claims, as well as the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
Dr. Eicher based on qualified immunity—based on Younger abstention. Id. at 1226,
1229-31. We remanded with instructions to stay proceedings on the claims for damages
pending resolution of the state case and to dismiss the remaining vacated claims without
prejudice. Id. at 1232.
The state case was eventually dismissed, and the federal court lifted the stay on
March 22, 2007. 3 Aplt. App. 1219. The parties stipulated that Plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation
Act, ADA, and § 1983 claims remained for resolution. 3 Aplt. App. 1225-27. The
parties disagreed about whether any of Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims remained and agreed to
provide supplemental briefing on this issue. 3 Aplt. App. 1226.
After receiving supplemental briefing, the district court disposed of the remaining
claims on summary judgment. D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, No. 00-2439-CM,
2008 WL 4148593 (D. Kan. Sept. 3, 2008). First, the district court held that Plaintiffs
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abandoned any remaining IDEA claims. Id. at *4. Second, it held that Plaintiffs’ claims
for declaratory relief were not viable because the Tenth Circuit instructed the court to
vacate and dismiss all non-damages claims. Id. at *5. Third, it dismissed Plaintiffs’
challenge to the District’s admissions policy based on the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA,
and the Fourteenth Amendment for lack of standing. Id. at *5-6. Finally, to the extent
Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment challenges were based on the state case, the district
court determined that the Defendants’ actions passed rational-basis review, and the court
granted summary judgment for Defendants on these claims. Id. at *7. The district court
did not reach the issue of Dr. Eicher’s qualified immunity nor did it specifically address
P.P.’s standing regarding any of the claims.
On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
(1) Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims; (2) the Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims; and (3) the §
1983 constitutional claims. They also challenge the district court’s conclusion that (4)
P.P. lacked standing to maintain any claims against the District; (5) Dr. Eicher was
entitled to qualified immunity; and (6) Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief.
II. Discussion
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, considering all
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Clark v. Edmunds, 513
F.3d 1219, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
A. IDEA Claims
After the district court lifted the stay, the parties disagreed about whether any
IDEA claims survived our 2004 decision. 3 Aplt. App. 1225-27. The parties’ stipulation
specified “[w]hether such claims remain, and if so, whether plaintiffs are entitled to relief
thereunder, shall be addressed through supplemental briefing.” 3 Aplt. App. 1226.
Despite the terms of the stipulation, Plaintiffs’ supplemental briefing merely stated,
“Plaintiffs’ claims under the IDEA based on the state court suit to recover the cost of
educating the children also remain for adjudication,” 3 Aplt. App. 1238, and “Plaintiffs
believe that their prior memoranda demonstrate that their claims are viable and simply
adopt and reincorporate the same by reference,” 3 Aplt. App. 1255-56. Plaintiffs did not
present any new arguments or update their briefing to incorporate references to the
resolution of the state-court suit. Aside from these two sentences, Plaintiffs’
supplemental briefing did not even mention the IDEA.
As a result, the district court found that Plaintiffs abandoned their IDEA claims by
failing to provide supplemental briefing to clarify and update the claims. D.L., 2008 WL
4148593, at *4. We agree. The stipulation specifically stated that the viability of any
IDEA claim would be addressed through supplemental briefing, 3 Aplt. App. 1226, and
we previously expressed that the nature of the IDEA claims was unclear, D.L., 392 F.3d
at 1232. Despite these cues, Plaintiffs did not provide supplemental briefing for these
claims, nor did they point the district court to prior argument that would clarify the
7
uncertainty. They also failed to update their briefing to provide references to the
resolution of the state-court suit. In contrast, they provided supplemental briefing for all
of the other stipulated claims. 3 Aplt. App. 1238-48.
As we understand Plaintiffs’ IDEA argument on appeal, the District violated
IDEA’s guarantee of a “free appropriate public education,” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1); 34
C.F.R. § 300.17, which requires that special education be furnished at no cost to parents.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29); 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(b)(1). They argue that they “were forced
to incur significant fees, expenses and costs . . . for services which the district was
obligated to provide at no cost,” and the District, having accepted federal funds,
nonetheless sought to recover the cost of R.L. and J.L.’s public education. Aplt. Br. 11-
12 (citing, e.g. J.H.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 705 A.2d 766, 774 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998)). It must be remembered that Plaintiffs, who sought summary judgment and relief
on this claim, had the burden of going forward and explaining why they were entitled to
summary judgment. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). At a minimum,
resolution of this argument requires a careful look at the claims advanced by the District
in the state-court lawsuit as well as an explanation of why the costs of litigation are
tantamount to the cost of special education, particularly given the IDEA’s fee-shifting
provisions. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.517. We express no opinion on
the merits of this issue, but conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that Plaintiffs abandoned their IDEA claim by not providing the necessary
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briefing. Cf. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“Arguments inadequately briefed . . . are waived.”).
B. Rehabilitation Act and ADA Claims
The district court granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act and
ADA claims on the ground that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the nonresident
admissions policy. 3 Aplt. App. at 1265. On appeal, Plaintiffs contend, first, that their
claims were not solely based on the nonresident admission policy, and second, that they
possess standing to pursue their claims that are based on the nonresident policy.
1. Claims Not Based on the Nonresident Admission Policy
We initially consider whether Plaintiffs possess any claims under the
Rehabilitation Act or ADA other than those based on the nonresident policy. Plaintiffs
did appear to allege in their complaint that they were subjected to disability
discrimination based on their status as residents of the district, not just as nonresidents.
See 1 Aplt. App. at 9 (“Defendants’ continuing threats of denial of appropriate academic
special education programming and the refusal to recognize Plaintiffs’ residency as other
citizens of Lawrence are recognized, constitute prima facie discrimination.” (emphasis
added)). In subsequent filings, however, Plaintiffs only alleged violations of the ADA
and Rehabilitation Act based on their denial of admission under the nonresident policy.
See 2 Aplt. App. at 494; 3 Aplt. App. at 891-92. As far back as 2002, the district court
recognized that “plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims [are] based entirely upon
the nonresident admission policy.” D.L., 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1254. We confirmed this
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interpretation, noting that “Plaintiffs contend that the District’s nonresident-admission
policy violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” D.L., 392 F.3d at 1229.
Despite these clear statements construing the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
as applying only to the nonresident admission policy, Plaintiffs never argued (until their
brief in this appeal) that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims had any other basis. In
particular, the supplemental briefing filed in the district court following the lift of the stay
discusses the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims only in the context of the nonresident
policy. See 3 Aplt. App. 1239-43.1 Having only pursued a theory for recovery under the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act based on the nonresident admission policy, Plaintiffs may
not now seek to broaden their theory. See Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding
Co., 497 F.3d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 2007) (“An issue is preserved for appeal if a party
alerts the district court to the issue and seeks a ruling.”). Therefore, we consider only
whether Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs in violation of the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act by application of the nonresident admission policy.
1
The only reference made by Plaintiffs in the supplemental briefing to discrimination
against them as residents is the following statement: “It is true that throughout this
litigation plaintiffs have asserted and continue to assert that they were residents of the
defendant school district. However, assuming arguendo that they were not residents,
their rights were still violated by defendants’ conduct.” 3 Aplt. App. 1239. Nowhere in
this brief do Plaintiffs argue how the District violated their rights as residents, however.
This single reference to their claims as residents is no more elucidating than are the
references to the IDEA discussed above in Part A. Plaintiffs’ failure to clearly identify
the basis of their claim is even more critical here, where both the district court and this
court stated in published opinions that their claim was based solely on the nonresident
admission policy. See D.L., 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1254; D.L., 392 F.3d at 1229.
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2. Claims Based on the Nonresident Admission Policy
The district court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims with respect to the nonresident admission policy because they
never sought admission to the District as nonresidents and thus suffered no injury in fact
as a result of the policy. D.L., 2008 WL 4148593, at *5-6. In order to possess standing
to bring a suit in federal court, a plaintiff must “establish three elements: (1) injury in
fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.” Stewart v. Kempthorne, 554 F.3d 1245, 1253
(10th Cir. 2009) (citing ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (10th Cir.
2008)). An “injury in fact” is the “invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”
Stewart, 554 F.3d at 1253 (quoting ACLU of N.M., 546 F.3d at 1318). The district court
in this case concluded that R.L. and J.L. never applied for admission under the
nonresident admission policy in District 497, and therefore suffered no injury in fact as a
result of that policy.
Plaintiffs argue that they were not required to apply under the nonresident policy
because the District informed them that their application would be denied. In a letter
dated January 14, 2000, a lawyer for the District sent Plaintiffs’ attorney a letter, stating,
“Simply put, the District lacks the capacity to serve students with autism besides those
who have legal residences in the District. Accordingly, the District is not currently
accepting nonresident students with autism, and has not accepted nonresident students
with that disability for quite some time.” 2 Aplt. App. 634. Plaintiffs clearly referenced
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the letter in their supplemental briefing. See 3 Aplt. App. 1240 (“In a letter from their
attorney to plaintiffs’ attorney dated January 14, 2000, defendants advised that R.L. and
J.L. would not be admitted to the school district as non-residents because the district does
not accept non-resident students with autism.”). According to Plaintiffs, this letter
satisfies the injury in fact inquiry because it establishes that application under the
nonresident policy would have been futile. See, e.g., United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d
1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“When . . . it would have been futile for a
claimant to apply for a benefit, courts have not denied the claimant standing because of
his failure to apply.”).
Even if the letter establishes that applying for admission would have been futile,
Plaintiffs still lack standing because they cannot establish any causation between the
Defendants’ allegedly discriminatory conduct and any injury suffered by Plaintiffs. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that standing requires
establishment of a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct”). Specifically,
Plaintiffs are unable to show that any period in which the children were absent from
school can be attributed to Defendants. The only relevant period appears to be the week
in January 2000 when the children did not attend school. In the district court’s ruling on
Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims, the court made the following findings of fact regarding that
week:
(1) The court finds plaintiffs were permitted to attend school on January
13, 2000.
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(2) The court takes judicial notice that no classes were held in the
district on Monday, January 17, 2000, due to the Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. holiday.
(3) The court finds that R.L. and J.L. did not attend school on January
18 and 19 because, as stated by the attorney for plaintiffs at the time, D.L.
and P.P. were too sick to drive the children to school.
(4) The court finds that R.L. and J.L. were permitted to return to school
on January 24, 2000, the day upon which D.L. returned the affidavit of
residency. However, D.L. could have returned the letter prior to such time,
and the children could have attended school in the district as early as
January 20, 2000.
3 Aplt. App. at 1179; see also D.L., 392 F.3d at 1232 (“Plaintiffs do not contend on
appeal that expulsion of the children between January 14 and January 21, 2000,
constitutes a substantive educational harm [under the IDEA]. (Apparently, Mother and
P.P. were too ill to take the children to school.)”). After the children resumed attending
the school in January 2000, they remained enrolled in the District until D.L. withdrew
them in January 2001 for reasons unrelated to any alleged discrimination.
Based on this chronology, then, the only day that Plaintiffs may have suffered any
injury that was caused by a discriminatory application of the nonresident policy—as
opposed to being caused by a family illness or a failure to return the affidavit of
residency—was Friday, January 14, 2000. However, that was the date of the letter that
the District sent to Plaintiffs, informing them that they would not be admitted as
nonresidents; the children’s absence from school that day thus cannot be attributed to the
letter, as the letter would have been received after the parents had already decided
whether to send the children to school. In any event, Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof
on jurisdictional issues such as standing, and they have not shown that their absence from
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school between January 13 and January 24 was caused by the application of the District’s
nonresident admission policy as opposed to the other factors mentioned by the district
court. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 821 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of . . . coming forward with
evidence of specific facts which prove standing.”) Therefore, even if Plaintiffs
established that application under the nonresident policy would have been futile, they
nevertheless lack standing because they have not demonstrated any causation between the
Defendants’ actions and their own injury.
C. Section 1983 Claims
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’
§ 1983 claims that Defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process
and equal protection of the law.
Plaintiffs claim on appeal that their procedural due process rights were violated.
The district court concluded that “Plaintiffs waived their procedural due process claims”
because the Stipulation Regarding Status of Claims, filed by the parties after the stay was
lifted, listed only “Substantive Due Process/Equal Protection” as § 1983 claims that
remained for resolution. D.L., 2008 WL 4148593, at *8; 3 Aplt. App. at 1226. We agree
that Plaintiffs waived any procedural due process claim they may have possessed by
failing to raise it in the Stipulation, and we decline to address that claim on appeal. See
Stewart v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 554 F.3d 1236, 1245 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that
arguments not raised in the district court are waived on appeal).
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Next, Plaintiffs contend that their substantive due process rights to travel and to
establish a residence were violated by Defendants. See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412,
418 (1981) (recognizing the “fundamental nature” of a U.S. citizen’s right “to travel from
one State to another and to take up residence in the State of his choice”); see also Zobel
v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 76-77 (1982) (“It is difficult to imagine a right more essential
to the Nation as a whole than the right to establish residence in a new State.”). These
claims must fail, however, because the constitutional rights at issue apply only to
interstate travel, and the travel that Plaintiffs claim was restricted was intrastate travel.
See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 (1993) (stating that “a
purely intrastate restriction does not implicate the right of interstate travel”). Plaintiffs’
citations to Kansas case law to support their claim that intrastate travel is a fundamental
right are unavailing, as § 1983 affords a remedy for violations of federal law and does not
“provide a basis for redressing violations of state law.” Jones v. City & County of
Denver, Colo., 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1988).
Finally, Plaintiffs also claim that they were denied their right to an education in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of equal protection and substantive
due process. The district court found that “Plaintiffs’ supplemental filings are unclear as
to what actions defendants took to violate [P]laintiffs’ rights.” D.L., 2008 WL 4148593,
at *7. The court concluded that to the extent their claims were based on the nonresident
admissions policy, Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue those claims for the same reasons
they lacked standing to bring the ADA and Rehabilitation Act challenges to that policy.
15
Id. To the extent Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment challenge was based on the District’s
filing of the state-court lawsuit, the court concluded that rational-basis review applied and
the District’s actions were rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Id. On
appeal, Plaintiffs did not advance a theory that the state-court lawsuit violated Plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment rights, so to the extent that Plaintiffs argued such a theory below,
that argument is now waived. See Green Country Food Mkt., Inc v. Bottling Group,
LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1285 n.5 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that argument not advanced on
appeal is waived). As to Plaintiffs’ claim that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated by the nonresident admissions policy, Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge that
policy for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to any of their claims under § 1983.
D. Claims for Declaratory Relief
We previously dismissed without prejudice all of Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief. D.L., 392 F.3d at 1232. Both parties acknowledged in the post-
remand stipulation that the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief had been
dismissed. 3 Aplt. App. 1225-27. Despite the stipulation, Plaintiffs argued in their post-
remand supplemental briefing that they are entitled to declaratory relief. 3 Aplt. App.
1240-43.
The district court refused to consider Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief,
explaining that the court had already dismissed these claims as directed by the Tenth
16
Circuit. D.L., 2008 WL 4148593, at *5. Given our mandate to dismiss non-damages
claims, the parties’ stipulation acknowledging that such claims had been dismissed, and
Plaintiffs’ failure to amend the pretrial order or otherwise resurrect any prior claims for
declaratory relief, the district court was correct in refusing to consider these claims, and
we refuse to consider them now.2
III. Conclusion
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
2
Because we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, we have no
need to consider Plaintiffs’ additional arguments that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment against P.P. due to a lack of standing, and in granting Defendant
Eicher qualified immunity.
17