Newman v. Beard

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-2652

CLIFFORD T. NEWMAN, JR.,
Appellant
v.

JEFFREY A. BEARD, Director of the Department
of Corrections; MICHAEL GREEN, Chairman of Probation
and Parole Board of Pennsylvania; DIANE L. DOMBACH,
Director of Sexual Offenders Assessment Board

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Western Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-06-cv-00214)
District Judge: Hon. Kim R. Gibson

Argued April 15, 2010

Before: SLOVITER and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges, and
POLLAK*, District Judge

(Filed August 16, 2010)

Thomas S. Jones
Jerome J. Kalina (Argued)
Jennifer G. Betts
Jones Day
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

*
Hon. Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation.
 Attorneys for Appellant

Thomas W. Corbett, Jr.
Attorney General
Kemal Alexander Mericli (Argued)
Senior Deputy Attorney General
Calvin R. Koons
Senior Deputy Attorney General
John G. Knorr, III
Chief Deputy Attorney General
Appellate Litigation Section
Office of Attorney General
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Attorneys for Appellees

_______

OPINION OF THE COURT
_______

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Clifford Newman, a convicted sex offender,
argues that the Parole Board violated his First Amendment right,
his right to due process, and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution by using his refusal to admit his guilt to adversely
affect his eligibility for parole.

I.

Background

In 1987, Newman was found guilty of committing two
rapes and related sexual offenses after a jury trial in a
Pennsylvania state court. He was sentenced in 1988 to twenty to
forty years imprisonment. Newman ultimately exhausted his
direct and post-conviction appeals after more than a decade of
litigation. He also sought federal habeas relief, which was
denied notwithstanding his persistent and consistent claim that
he is not guilty.

2
 In 2000, while Newman was serving his sentence, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 9718.1 (2001). That statute provides that certain sex offenders
“shall attend and participate in a Department of Corrections
program of counseling or therapy . . . .” Id. § 9718.1(a). A sex
offender “shall not be eligible for parole unless the offender has .
. . participated in the program . . . .” Id. § 9718.1(b)(1)(ii). The
statute gives the Department of Corrections “the sole discretion
with respect to counseling or therapy program contents and
administration . . . .” Id. § 9718.1(c). The Department of
Corrections administers a sexual offender program (“SOP”) in
accordance with § 9718.1. Prior to the enactment of § 9718.1,
there was no Pennsylvania statute or regulation that required
convicted sex offenders to attend a counseling or therapy
program as a condition of parole eligibility.

According to Newman’s complaint, the Department
“requires all inmates to admit guilt” in order “to attend the
[SOP].” App. at 25. Although an earlier version of the SOP
included a “non-admitters program,” the Department no longer
offers the program at the State Correctional Institution at
Houtzdale, where Newman is presently incarcerated. Newman
alleges that he is unable to attend the SOP because he refuses to
admit his guilt.

The parole process in Pennsylvania is administered by the
Board of Probation and Parole, generally referred to as the
“Parole Board.” See generally 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6111-
6139. Newman became eligible for parole in 2007 and met with
a parole hearing examiner for an interview. According to
Newman’s complaint, the hearing examiner “noted that
[Newman] . . . ha[d] not attended the [SOP]” and stated that his
failure to attend “put [him] in a ‘Catch 22’ since the Parole
Board required the completion of the [SOP] before parole would
be granted.” App. at 29. On April 18, 2007, the Parole Board
denied Newman’s parole application. The Parole Board issued a
written decision stating that “[y]our best interests do not justify
or require you being paroled/reparoled; and, the interests of the
Commonwealth will be injured if you were paroled/reparoled.
Therefore, you are refused parole/reparole at this time.” App. at
39.

3
 The Parole Board gave the following reasons for denying
Newman parole:

Your minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances
of the offense(s) committed.

Your refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s)
committed.

Your lack of remorse for the offense(s) committed.

The negative recommendation made by the Department of
Corrections.

Your unacceptable compliance with prescribed
institutional programs.

Your need to participate in and complete additional
institutional programs.

Your interview with the hearing examiner.

App. at 39.

The Parole Board’s written decision also stated that at
Newman’s next interview,

the Board will review your file and consider . . . whether
you have successfully completed a treatment program for
sex offender[s,] whether you have received a favorable
recommendation for parole from the Department of
Corrections[,] whether you have maintained a clear
conduct record and completed the Department of
Corrections’ prescriptive program(s)[,] [and] current
mental health evaluation to be available at time of review.

App. at 40.

Newman has remained incarcerated since the decision
and has not been granted parole. In 2007, Newman filed a pro se
civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various officials of

4
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (collectively, the
“Parole Board”) challenging, inter alia, the adverse parole
determination. He thereafter filed an amended complaint
asserting three claims relevant to this appeal.

First, Newman alleged that the Parole Board
unconstitutionally required him to admit his guilt in violation of
the First Amendment. Next, Newman alleged that “[t]he
precondition . . . of an admission of guilt and the completion of
the [SOP] made the parole process a sham where the [Parole
Board] only went through the steps but did not give actual
consideration to [Newman’s] application which violates [his]
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.” App. at 23.
Finally, Newman alleged that the Parole Board “retroactively
applied 42 Pa. [Cons. Stat. Ann.] § 9718.1 to [his parole
application]” in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution.1 Appellant’s Br. at 9. Newman sought injunctive
and declaratory relief.

The Parole Board filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and
the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that
recommended dismissal of the amended complaint. The
Magistrate Judge determined that Newman’s constitutional
claims failed because there is no federal or state right to parole.
The Magistrate Judge also determined that Newman did not have
standing to assert a due process claim based on 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 9718.1 because the statute “does not apply to him.”
App. at 9. The District Court summarily adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and dismissed the
amended complaint. Newman filed this pro se appeal, and we
appointed counsel.

II.

1
Newman’s pro se amended complaint did not explicitly
assert violation of the Ex Post Facto clause, but his appointed
counsel in this appeal has construed Newman’s claim as such
without objection by the Parole Board. We will do the same.

5
 Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
exercise plenary review of the District Court’s order granting a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Gelman v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009). We
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the amended
complaint in the light most favorable to Newman, and determine
whether, under any reasonable reading of the amended
complaint, he may be entitled to relief. See id. (quotation and
citation omitted).

III.

Discussion

A. General Principles

The opinion in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002), is of
particular relevance to the issues presented in this appeal
because the Supreme Court was presented with arguments
somewhat analogous to those made by Newman in this case.
Lile, like Newman, was a convicted sex offender who persisted
in maintaining his innocence and refused to participate in the
state’s Sexual Abuse Treatment Program which required him to
sign an admission of responsibility form. Id. at 29, 31. The
Court, in a plurality opinion, rejected Lile’s claim that the
consequential withdrawal of certain privileges violated his right
against self-incrimination. Id. at 48. His status would be
reduced from Level III to Level I, curtailing his visitation rights,
earnings, work opportunities, ability to send money to family,
canteen expenditures, access to personal television, and others.
Id. at 39. Although the discussion was focused on the
compulsion aspect of the Fifth Amendment, it is, if not directly
precedential, certainly informative for our consideration of
Newman’s claims.

The McKune opinion recognized that “[s]ex offenders are
a serious threat in this Nation.” Id. at 32. The opinion stated
that “[t]herapists and correctional officers widely agree that

6
clinical rehabilitative programs can enable sex offenders to
manage their impulses and in this way reduce recidivism. An
important component of those rehabilitation programs requires
participants to confront their past and accept responsibility for
their misconduct.” Id. at 33 (citation omitted). It quoted from
sources that state that denial is generally regarded as one of the
principal impediments to successful therapy. Id.

We proceed to review Newman’s claims in light of these
considerations.

B. First Amendment Claim

Newman argues that the Parole Board violated his First
Amendment rights by requiring him “to state a belief that he
does not hold to be true” – i.e., his guilt – in order to obtain
parole. Appellant’s Br. at 24. The Parole Board contends that
“[i]f it is not unconstitutionally compelled speech in violation of
the Fifth Amendment, neither can it be such in violation of the
First Amendment.” Appellees’ Br. at 31; see U.S. Const. amend.
V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself.”). As a threshold matter, we decline
the Parole Board’s invitation to cabin Newman’s First
Amendment claim under a Fifth Amendment “compelled
speech” framework. “[T]he touchstone of the Fifth Amendment
is compulsion . . . , ” Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801,
806 (1977), and “a violation of the First Amendment right
against compelled speech” similarly “occurs only in the context
of actual compulsion,” C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d
159, 189 (3d Cir. 2005). The two amendments serve different
purposes. The Fifth Amendment protects the right not to “be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
[one]self,” while the First Amendment protects, among other
things, “the right to refrain from speaking at all.” Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). Newman has not been
compelled to speak. If he did not seek parole voluntarily, he
would remain in prison for the remainder of his sentence without
admitting his guilt. Cf. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard,
523 U.S. 272, 286 (1998) (“It is difficult to see how a voluntary
interview [for clemency] could ‘compel’ [the inmate] to
speak.”). Thus, we reject the Parole Board’s suggestion that the

7
Fifth Amendment is implicated in this case, a claim that
Newman disavows.

We turn instead to the First Amendment which protects
the “right of freedom of thought” and “individual freedom of
mind” and encompasses “both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all.” Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714
(citations omitted). Thus, “a State may not inquire about a
man’s views or associations solely for the purpose of
withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes.”
Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971).

Nevertheless, an inmate’s constitutional rights are
“necessarily limited.” Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213
(3d Cir. 1999). “The fact of confinement and the needs of the
penal institution impose limitations on constitutional rights,
including those derived from the First Amendment, which are
implicit in incarceration.” Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977). The Supreme Court “has
repeatedly recognized the need for major restrictions on a
prisoner’s rights,” id. at 129 (citations omitted), and it is settled
law that an inmate “retains those First Amendment rights that are
not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system,” Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); see also Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen a prison regulation
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”).

Newman has not alleged that the Parole Board’s
admission of guilt requirement serves no “legitimate penological
objectives” or is not reasonably related to rehabilitation. Pell,
417 U.S. at 822. Nor could Newman have reasonably done so.
As we noted above, a plurality of the Supreme Court recognized
that “States . . . have a vital interest in rehabilitating convicted
sex offenders” and “acceptance of responsibility for past
offenses” is a “critical first step” in a prison’s rehabilitation
program for such offenders. McKune, 536 U.S. at 33. The
plurality further stated that “[a]cceptance of responsibility is the
beginning of rehabilitation.” Id. at 47. The dissenting opinion
was not to the contrary. Justice Stevens, joined by three other

8
Justices, acknowledged that a sex offender program requiring an
admission of guilt “clearly serves legitimate therapeutic
purposes.” Id. at 68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

In an apparent attempt to distinguish this authority,
Newman argues that “[r]equiring false admissions of guilt from
innocent prisoners . . . does not facilitate rehabilitation.”
Appellant’s Br. at 27 (emphasis added). However, once the
Commonwealth met its burden of proving at trial that Newman
was guilty of the offenses, Newman no longer “come[s] before
the Court as one who is ‘innocent,’ but, on the contrary, as one
who has been convicted by due process . . . .” Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1993). It follows that the prison
may structure its treatment programs and pursue legitimate
penological objectives from that standpoint.2 Newman’s First
Amendment claim was therefore properly dismissed.3

2
Under Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90, courts consider three
factors once a “rational connection” has been shown between the
policy and a legitimate penological interest. Fontroy v. Beard, 559
F.3d 173, 177-78 (3d Cir. 2009). Newman does not argue that the
SOP ran afoul of those factors, so we have no occasion to address
them.
3
Newman also argues that he stated two additional First
Amendment claims. First, Newman contends that he stated a valid
claim for First Amendment retaliation. See Appellant’s Br. at
27-28; see also Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).
Next, Newman asserts that he stated a claim under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Appellant’s Br. at 29-30;
see also Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 n.12 (3d Cir.
1997). Because we hold that the Parole Board did not violate
Newman’s First Amendment rights by requiring him to admit guilt
to participate in the SOP, his claims for First Amendment
retaliation and unconstitutional condition necessarily fail as well.
See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333 (“As a threshold matter, a
prisoner-plaintiff in a retaliation case must prove that the conduct
which led to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally
protected.”) (emphasis added); Anderson, 125 F.3d at 161 n.12
(explaining that the “government may not deny a benefit to a

9
 C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

Newman also argues that the District Court erred by
dismissing his due process claims. The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits States from depriving “any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Although Newman’s pro se
amended complaint does not distinguish procedural due process
from substantive due process, we address both claims consistent
with the parties’ briefing.

i. Substantive Due Process

“[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government
actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.’” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125
(1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
Conduct can violate substantive due process if it “‘shocks the
conscience,’ which encompasses ‘only the most egregious
official conduct.’” Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir.
2008) (quoting United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of
Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003)). The conduct
must be “intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any
government interest . . . .” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 849 (1998).

Newman’s substantive due process claim was properly
dismissed because the Parole Board’s alleged conduct was not
arbitrary and does not “shock[ ] the conscience.” Chainey, 523
F.3d at 219. As noted above, the Parole Board had legitimate
penological reasons for requiring Newman to admit guilt in the
SOP, the content of which is determined by the Department of
Corrections in its “sole discretion.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
9718.1(c). The Parole Board’s conduct was therefore not
“intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government

person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
freedom of speech . . . .”) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).

10
interest.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.4

ii. Procedural Due Process

Newman also challenges the dismissal of his procedural
due process claim, arguing that the Parole Board’s “review of his
application was a sham” that was “inextricably tied to [his]
refusal to admit guilt . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 19. The Parole
Board responds that Newman “has no actual right to parole . . .
and thus no ‘liberty interest’ sufficient to claim an entitlement to
any procedural due process whatsoever.” Appellees’ Br. at 12.

“In analyzing a procedural due process claim, the first
step is to determine whether the nature of the interest is one
within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ language of
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143
(3d Cir. 2000) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)).
“Once we determine that the interest asserted is protected by the
Due Process Clause, the question then becomes what process is
due to protect it.” Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972)). The underlying liberty interest can be derived
directly from the Due Process Clause or from the state’s
statutory scheme. See Asquith v. Dep’t of Corr., 186 F.3d 407,
409 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A protected liberty interest may arise from
only one of two sources: the Due Process Clause or the laws of
a state.”).

The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does
not establish a liberty interest in parole that invokes due process
protection. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Thus, if Newman has a
protected liberty interest in some aspect of his parole, it must
derive from the Pennsylvania parole statute. See Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (recognizing that “States
may . . . create liberty interests which are protected by the Due
Process Clause”).

4
We have examined Newman’s additional substantive due
process arguments and find them unpersuasive.

11
 The relevant Pennsylvania parole statute provides that the
Parole Board “shall have the power, and it shall be its duty, to
consider applications for parole by a prisoner . . . .” 61 P.S. §
331.22 (2007), repealed by 2009 Pa. Laws 33. The statute
further provides that the Parole Board shall have “the duty” to
consider, inter alia, “[t]he general character and background of
the prisoner” and “the conduct of the person while in prison and
his physical, mental and behavior condition and history . . . .” 61
P.S. § 331.19 (2007), repealed by 2009 Pa. Laws 33.5

The Parole Board concedes that Newman is entitled to
have his parole application “fairly considered.” Appellees’ Br.
at 12. Such a right is not without support. See Mickens-Thomas
v. Vaughn, 321 F.3d 374, 393 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Mickens-Thomas
I”) (discussing Parole Board’s duty to “give [the inmate] a fair
hearing” in context of due process challenge); Jamieson v.
Commonwealth, Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 495 A.2d 623, 627
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (“[A] prisoner does have the right to
apply for parole . . . and have that application fairly considered
by the Board.”) (citations omitted); accord Banks v. Bd. of Prob.
& Parole, 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 197, 200 (1971). However, as the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained, “the Parole Board’s
decision to grant or deny parole does not affect an existing
enjoyment of liberty.” Rogers v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 724
A.2d 319, 323 (Pa. 1999); see also Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d
287, 289 (Pa. 2001) (“[T]he decision to deny parole . . . does not
implicate any constitutionally protected interest.”).

Newman’s procedural due process claim must fail
because, to the extent that Newman has a state law right to have
his application “fairly considered,” the Parole Board gave his
application all the consideration it was due. The Parole Board
was permitted to consider Newman’s “general character and
background,” his “conduct . . . while in prison,” and his “mental
and behavior condition.” 61 P.S. § 331.19 (2007). Newman’s
lack of participation in the SOP and his refusal to admit guilt for
the crimes of which he stands convicted fall within these

5
The statutes are currently codified at 61 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. §§ 6132 and 6135 (2010).

12
legitimate considerations.6

This is therefore not a case in which the Parole Board
considered factors that were foreign to the parole statute. See
Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he Board
applied standards that are divorced from the policy and purpose
of parole, . . . violating [the inmate’s] right to due process of
law.”). Nor is this a case in which the Parole Board arbitrarily
denied parole based on race, religion, political beliefs, or another
impermissible factor.7 See id. at 237; Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[T]here are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely.”). Accordingly, Newman’s
procedural due process claim was properly dismissed.

D. Ex Post Facto Claim

Finally, Newman argues that the District Court erred by
dismissing his Ex Post Facto claim.8 The Ex Post Facto Clause
“applies to a statutory or policy change that ‘alters the definition
of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is
punishable.’” Mickens-Thomas I, 321 F.3d at 383 (quoting Cal.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3 (1995)).

“The ex post facto inquiry has two prongs: (1) whether
there was a change in the law or policy which has been given
retrospective effect, and (2) whether the offender was

6
Newman’s conduct was also a legitimate consideration
under the statute in effect when he was sentenced, which contains
similar language. See 61 P.S. § 331.19 (1988) (“[T]he board . . .
shall consider . . . the general character and history of the prisoner
. . . .”).
7
As noted above, there was no underlying First Amendment
violation because of the legitimate penological interest in having
inmates admit guilt in a treatment program for convicted sex
offenders.
8
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution states that
“[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.” U.S. Const.
art. I, § 10, cl.1.

13
disadvantaged by the change.” Richardson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. &
Parole, 423 F.3d 282, 287-88 (3d Cir. 2005). The Supreme
Court has noted that “[r]etroactive changes in laws governing
parole of prisoners, in some instances, may be violative of [the
Ex Post Facto Clause].” Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250
(2000). This is because “[a]n adverse change in one’s prospects
for release [through parole] disadvantages a prisoner just as
surely as an upward change in the minimum duration of
sentence.” Mickens-Thomas I, 321 F.3d at 392.

Newman argues that he has “adequately alleged both
[prongs]” of an Ex Post Facto claim. Appellant’s Br. at 15. The
Parole Board responds that Newman’s Ex Post Facto claim
“fundamentally fails because, by its own terms, [42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 9718.1] does not apply per se to [Newman’s]
convictions . . . and there is nothing in the pertinent notice of
[the Parole Board’s] decision . . . that indicates that [§ 9718.1]
was wrongly applied to his case.” Appellees’ Br. at 10. The
Parole Board further responds that it was permitted to consider
Newman’s participation in an SOP under the statute in effect
when Newman was sentenced.

i. Retrospective Effect of Change in Law or Policy

Newman alleges that there was a change in the law or
policy which has been given retrospective effect that satisfies the
first prong of the Ex Post Facto inquiry. Newman was sentenced
in 1988. Section 9718.1 was not enacted until 2000, after
Newman had served twelve years of his sentence. Newman
alleges that when he “had his interview with the parole hearing
examiner, she noted that [he] . . . ha[d] not attended the [SOP]”
and that his failure “put [him] in a ‘Catch 22’ since the parole
board required the completion of the [SOP] before parole would
be granted.” App. at 29.

The Parole Board argues that there can be no Ex Post
Facto violation because its written decision does not mention §
9718.1. That omission cannot be dispositive. The Parole Board
stated in its decision, inter alia, that Newman was denied parole
because of his “denial of the nature and circumstances of the
offense(s) committed,” his “refusal to accept responsibility,” his

14
“unacceptable compliance with prescribed institutional
programs,” his “need to participate in and complete additional
institutional programs,” and his “interview with the hearing
examiner.” App. at 39. These reasons could be construed as
veiled references to Newman’s failure to attend the SOP. Cf.
Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 355 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“Mickens-Thomas II”) (“Even though the Board did not specify
[§ 9718.1], there is no question that the Board’s new requirement
commits . . . [an] ex post facto violation[].”). This conclusion is
bolstered by the fact that the Parole Board stated that it would
review Newman’s file at the next interview and consider, inter
alia, whether Newman “successfully completed a treatment
program for sex offender[s].” App. at 40.9

We will therefore assume arguendo that the “change in
the law” brought about by § 9718.1 was “given retrospective
effect.” Richardson, 423 F.3d at 287-88; cf. Mickens-Thomas II,
355 F.3d at 306-07 (noting that retroactive application of §
9718.1 can violate the Ex Post Facto Clause when it required the
inmate to “participate in the ‘admitter’ part of [the] sex offender
therapy program”).

ii. Disadvantage by the Change in Law or Policy

To proceed with his Ex Post Facto claim, Newman must
also meet the second Ex Post Facto prong and allege that he was
“disadvantaged by the change [in law or policy].” Richardson,
423 F.3d at 288. Newman “must show that as applied to his own
sentence the law created a significant risk of increasing his
punishment.” Garner, 529 U.S. at 255. “[A] ‘speculative and

9
Indeed, the Historical and Statutory notes acknowledge the
possibility that § 9718.1 could be applied retroactively in an
unconstitutional manner. See 2000 Pa. Legis. Serv. 2000-98
(West) (“The addition of . . . § 9718.1 shall not preclude
consideration of the factors set forth in that section in granting or
denying parole for offenses committed before the effective date of
this act, except to the extent that consideration of such factors is
precluded by the Constitution . . . .”), quoted in Historical and
Statutory Notes, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9718.1 (2007).

15
attenuated possibility of . . . increasing the measure of
punishment’ is not enough” for Newman to meet his burden.
Richardson, 423 F.3d at 288 (alteration in original) (quoting
Morales, 514 U.S. at 509). A comparable approach has been
followed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Cimaszewski
v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 868 A.2d 416, 427-28 (Pa. 2005).

In Richardson, we denied an evidentiary hearing where
the habeas petitioner “provided no evidence, and for that matter .
. . proffered no allegations, that a ‘significant risk’ of increased
punishment was created by the application of” new parole
guidelines. 423 F.3d at 293. We thus rejected the Ex Post Facto
claim of an inmate that he was individually disadvantaged by the
retroactive application of the new guidelines. By contrast, in
Mickens-Thomas I, we granted habeas relief to an inmate who
presented evidence that he had a significant likelihood of parole
under an old policy but was denied parole under a new law, and
that the Parole Board had paroled all other similarly situated
inmates before the change in law. 321 F.3d at 387. We have
since noted that Mickens-Thomas I “may be an exceptional case
because of the compelling nature of the evidence of prejudice,”
though “evidence of such convincing quality” is not required.
Richardson, 423 F.3d at 293.

Whereas the prejudice in Richardson and Mickens-
Thomas I arose directly from the retroactive application of the
relevant policy, in this case the potential prejudice arises from
the retroactive application of § 9718.1 in conjunction with the
prison’s admission of guilt requirement. Standing alone, §
9718.1 merely requires that convicted sexual offenders attend an
SOP in order to be eligible for parole. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 9718.1(a). It presents no potential prejudice of a
constitutional magnitude. The statute can present a potential for
disadvantage, however, if it is applied with the admission of
guilt requirement, which carries the specter of collateral
consequences. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent
Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at
Parole Hearings, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 491, 541 (2008).

Analyzing Newman’s claim in that context, Newman has
not alleged that he would have been paroled but for § 9718.1,

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nor has he alleged that similarly situated inmates were paroled
before the passage of the statute.

The Supreme Court has recognized that because “most
offenders will eventually return to society, [a] paramount
objective of the corrections system is the rehabilitation of those
committed to its custody.” Pell, 417 U.S. at 823. Inasmuch as
rehabilitation is a legitimate penological objective and the
Supreme Court is satisfied that recognition of one’s
responsibility for past offenses is a “critical first step” toward
rehabilitation, McKune, 536 U.S. at 33, Newman cannot show
that the Parole Board’s alleged retroactive application of §
9718.1 “created a significant risk of increasing his
punishment,”10 Garner, 529 U.S. at 255. Accordingly, the
District Court properly dismissed his Ex Post Facto claim.11
IV.

Conclusion

10
As noted above, the Parole Board could have legitimately
considered Newman’s “general character and history” even under
the statute in effect in 1988 when he was sentenced. See 61 P.S. §
331.19 (1988).
11
Notably, the Parole Board has not taken the position that
the SOP is a form of rehabilitation and not “punishment” for Ex
Post Facto purposes. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370-
71 (1997) (concluding that involuntary commitment statute “does
not impose punishment; thus, its application does not raise ex post
facto concerns”); Chambers v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 205 F.3d
1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding no Ex Post Facto violation
because inmate’s refusal to admit guilt in sexual offender treatment
program did not increase his punishment); Neal v. Shimoda, 131
F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that treatment program
for sex offenders in which offenders must admit their guilt “does
not criminalize conduct legal before its enactment” for purposes of
Ex Post Facto claim (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371)).
Accordingly, we express no view on the merits of such an
argument.

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 For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court.

18