FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 16, 2010
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Pennsylvania insurance
company; ZURICH AMERICAN
INSURANCE, successor in interest to
Zurich Insurance Company (U.S.
Branch),
Plaintiffs-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants,
v.
Nos. 09-1251, 09-1263
HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT 09-1264, 09-1265
PARTNERS, LTD., d/b/a O’Hara 09-1278, 09-1279
Regional Center for Rehabilitation;
ORCR, INC., d/b/a O’Hara Regional
Center for Rehabilitation; SOLOMON
HEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC,
d/b/a Solomon Health Services, LLC;
HERSCH “ARI” KRAUSZ; DAVID
SEBBAG; V. ROBERT SALAZAR,
Defendants-Appellants/
Cross-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. Nos. 1:05-CV-374-RPM and 1:05-CV-835-RPM)
Richard B. Podoll of Podoll & Podoll, P.C., Greenwood Village, Colorado
(Gregory G. Sapakoff of Podoll & Podoll, P.C., Greenwood Village, Colorado; and
T. Jeffrey Fitzgerald and Marie Elizabeth Williams of Faegre & Benson, LLP,
Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs) for Defendants-Appellants/Cross-
Appellees.
J. Robert Hall of Meckler Bulger Tilson Marick & Pearson LLP, Chicago, Illinois
(Michael M. Marick of Meckler Bulger Tilson Marick & Pearson LLP, Chicago,
Illinois; Michael L. O’Donnell and Sean D. Baker of Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell
LLP, Denver, Colorado; Patrick W. Kennison, Jr. of Kutak Rock LLP, Omaha,
Nebraska; and Kelly Sue Kilgore of Kutak Rock LLP, Denver, Colorado, with him
on the brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Before GORSUCH, McKAY, and CUDAHY *, Circuit Judges.
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
When the government sued them for allegedly engaging in Medicare and
Medicaid fraud, the appellants asked their insurance companies to provide them
with a defense. The insurers promptly and unequivocally disputed their obligation
to do so. Still, they agreed to supply a defense, subject to a reservation of rights
permitting them to challenge their duty to defend at a later stage and, if successful
in that challenge, to recoup the costs they incurred in defending the appellants.
Consistent with their reservation of rights, the insurers eventually brought
this lawsuit seeking two things: a declaratory judgment that they had no duty to
provide the appellants with a defense under the terms of the applicable insurance
policies, and reimbursement of the defense costs they had already expended. The
district court ruled that the insurers had no duty to defend, and this court affirmed.
*
Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, U.S. Senior Circuit Judge, Seventh
Circuit, sitting by designation.
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Later, on remand, the district court awarded the insurers full reimbursement of
their defense costs. Now on appeal once more, the appellants challenge the
propriety of this latest ruling. The insurers cross-appeal, submitting that the
district court erred in declining to add prejudgment interest to their awards.
Finding none of the parties’ various challenges to the district court’s judgment
persuasive, we affirm.
I
A
In approaching the case before us, a little background about its parent
lawsuit helps. Following an audit of the billing practices of O’Hara Regional
Center for Rehabilitation, a long-term care facility in Denver, federal and state
officials came to the view that various individuals and entities associated with the
Center had provided substandard care to Medicare and Medicaid patients, and had
submitted false and fraudulent claims for the care they did provide. Eventually,
the relevant governmental agencies brought suit. See United States of America, et
al. v. Health Care Mgmt. Partners, Ltd., et al., No. 04-CV-2340-REB-BNB (D.
Colo. 2004). The defendants included Health Care Management Partners, Ltd.;
ORCR, Inc.; Solomon Health Management, LLC; Hersch “Ari” Krausz; David
Sebbag; and V. Robert Salazar (collectively, the O’Hara Defendants).
In short order, the O’Hara Defendants contacted their insurance carriers —
Zurich, Valley Forge, and certain underwriters at Lloyd’s of London — demanding
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that the carriers provide them with a defense. Lloyd’s refused to defend the
O’Hara Defendants, disclaiming coverage. Zurich and Valley Forge, too, took the
position that their policies didn’t afford coverage but, even so, they agreed to
provide a defense. At the same time, Valley Forge and Zurich reserved the right
to seek reimbursement for all expenses they incurred in defending the O’Hara
Defendants, should a court later agree that their policies imposed on them no duty
to defend.
To reserve its rights, Valley Forge sent the O’Hara Defendants a letter
stating that, while it “does not believe that its defense obligations have been
triggered, it has decided for now to provide a defense . . . subject to a reservation
of rights, [including] . . . the right to seek a judicial determination of its coverage
obligations in advance of the conclusion of the underlying matter, and to recover
defense costs it has spent in the event it is determined that it had no defense
obligation.” App. Vol. 11 at 2607-08. Zurich sent a similar letter, saying it
“reserves its right to deny, reject, contest or disclaim any duty to defend [the
O’Hara Defendants]”; “to withdraw from the defense of the . . . [l]awsuit in the
event it is determined there is no coverage; and to seek and obtain reimbursement
of any damages and/or defense[] costs [it] paid.” App. Vol. 11 at 2579. The
O’Hara Defendants accepted the defense the insurance companies supplied and
apparently never objected to the reservation of rights letters they received. It also
appears the O’Hara Defendants were generally aware of the expenses accrued in
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defending them because, for example, they received copies of their counsels’
litigation budgets.
B
That brings us to the case now before us. While the government’s lawsuit
against the O’Hara Defendants carried on, Zurich, Valley Forge, and Lloyd’s filed
complaints against the O’Hara Defendants, seeking declarations that they had no
duty to defend the O’Hara Defendants against the government’s claims. Zurich
and Valley Forge also sought reimbursement of the defense costs that by then they
had already expended. The district court consolidated these various cases and,
ultimately, issued a declaratory judgment holding that the government’s claims
against the O’Hara Defendants were not covered by the relevant insurance
policies, so there was no duty to defend (or indemnify). On appeal, this court
affirmed the district court’s declaratory judgment and remanded the matter back to
the district court to resolve what, if any, amounts Zurich and Valley Forge should
recoup for the defense costs they had advanced. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v.
O’Hara Reg’l Ctr. for Rehab., 529 F.3d 916 (10th Cir. 2008).
After extensive summary judgment briefing on remand, the district court
held Zurich and Valley Forge entitled to recoup all of the costs they had incurred
on behalf of the O’Hara Defendants. The district court rejected, however, Zurich
and Valley Forge’s claim that they were also entitled to prejudgment interest on
those recovered sums. The O’Hara Defendants now appeal, asking us to hold that
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the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the insurance companies.
For their part, Zurich and Valley Forge cross-appeal the district court’s denial of
prejudgment interest. We first address the O’Hara Defendants’ appeal, before
turning to Zurich and Valley Forge’s cross-appeal.
II
The O’Hara Defendants’ appeal proceeds in two essential movements. First,
they say, an insurer cannot recoup the defense costs it expended under a
reservation of rights letter unless a right of recoupment is also expressly
mentioned in the parties’ underlying insurance policy. And, they say, the
insurance policies they signed with Valley Forge and Zurich contain no language
discussing the recoupment of defense costs in these circumstances. Accordingly,
the O’Hara Defendants conclude, Zurich and Valley Forge may not, as a matter of
law, recover the defense funds they spent — even though, as the district court and
this court have already held, the insurance contracts never required them to
provide a defense in the first place. Second, assuming the insurers are lawfully
entitled to recoup something, the O’Hara Defendants argue that genuine issues of
material fact still remain over the amount the insurers are owed, thus precluding
the entry of summary judgment.
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A
In the O’Hara Defendants’ view, Zurich and Valley Forge cannot recover
the defense costs they expended for the simple reason that no provision in the
parties’ insurance contracts contemplates that possibility. This result pertains, the
O’Hara Defendants argue, even though the insurance companies did send
“reservation of rights” letters when they agreed to provide a defense — and even
though the O’Hara Defendants do not dispute the clear import of those letters,
apparently never objected to them at the time, and accepted the defense their
insurers provided. This result pertains because, in the O’Hara Defendants’ view,
“[a]llowing an insurer to recover defense costs expended under a reservation of
rights, without a contractual basis in its insurance policy providing a right of
recoupment, would be contrary to Colorado law and public policy.” Opening Br.
23. In support of their position, the O’Hara Defendants point us to General Agents
Insurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d 1092
(Ill. 2005), where the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that an insurer’s reservation
of rights letter could only reserve the rights contained within an insurance policy
and could not create new rights. Id. at 1102-03; see also Shoshone First Bank v.
Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 510 (Wyo. 2000); Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. V.I.
Port Auth., 564 F. Supp.2d 473 (D.V.I. 2008).
Zurich and Valley Forge respond that Colorado has taken a different tack
than Illinois and the other jurisdictions cited by the O’Hara Defendants. To
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balance the interests of insureds and insurers, Zurich and Valley Forge say,
Colorado law requires an insurer to pay defense costs, but at the same time
provides the insurer with this assurance: if it pays defense costs pursuant to a
reservation of rights letter, as Zurich and Valley Forge did here, the insurer may
later seek and obtain recoupment of its defense costs if the facts at trial prove the
claim against the insured wasn’t covered by the policy. Zurich and Valley Forge
submit that this much can be discerned from a pair of Colorado Supreme Court
decisions, Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 811 P.2d 1083
(Colo. 1991), and Cotter Corp. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co.,
90 P.3d 814 (Colo. 2004). And, the insurers suggest, Hecla and Cotter are hardly
anomalies; at least some other states take the same view. See, e.g., United Nat’l
Ins. Co. v. SST Fitness Corp., 309 F.3d 914 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying Ohio law);
Colony Ins. Co. v. G & E Tires & Serv., Inc., 777 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
From all this, it can be fairly gleaned that state courts are divided on how
best to handle insurers’ recoupment claims. The O’Hara Defendants urge us to
adopt their view, and that of the Illinois courts, as the sounder one. But this case
comes to us through diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and the parties agree
Colorado’s substantive law controls its resolution. So the question we must
answer isn’t what we think to be the better rule of law, but what Colorado law says
on the subject. And on that score, Zurich and Valley Forge have the sounder view.
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Hecla and Cotter clearly indicate that the Colorado Supreme Court recognizes an
insurer’s entitlement to reimbursement of defense costs in the event it is later
determined the insurer did not have a duty to defend. And Hecla and Cotter both
premise the insurer’s entitlement to reimbursement on its having reserved that
right when it provided a defense to its insured, not on any reimbursement
provision in the insurance contract itself.
In Hecla, the Colorado Supreme Court held as a matter of state law that,
where the allegations in a complaint against an insured state a claim that
“potentially or arguably [falls] within the policy coverage,” “the insurer must
accept the defense of the claim.” 811 P.2d at 1089 (emphasis added and quotation
marks omitted). This is so, the court emphasized, even if the “duty to defend is
not apparent from the pleadings in the case against the insured.” Id. “[F]or an
insurer who believes that it is under no obligation to defend,” the court explained,
the “appropriate course of action” “is to provide a defense to the insured under a
reservation of its rights to seek reimbursement should the facts at trial prove that
the incident resulting in liability was not covered by the policy, or . . . file a
declaratory judgment action after the underlying case has been adjudicated.” Id.
Hecla thus clearly directs insurers to provide a defense under a reservation of
rights. And it gives no intimation that an insurer must also include a reservation
of rights in its underlying insurance contract.
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The O’Hara Defendants protest that Hecla spoke only of permitting an
insurer to seek reimbursement based on a reservation of rights letter. This, they
say, is different than recognizing an entitlement to reimbursement. And so, they
argue, it remains an open question whether an insurer must also reserve the right
of recoupment in its underlying insurance contract in order to recover its defense
costs. But this strikes us as an unduly parsimonious reading of Hecla. The Hecla
court expressly considered and contemplated a condition to reimbursement — a
reservation of rights letter. The fact that it did not mention any other comparable
condition — such as specific contractual language — cannot be so easily ignored.
It’s the dog that didn’t bark. Cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991)
(noting that silence on the issue can be probative evidence of legislative intent);
United States v. Lopez, 518 F.3d 790, 798 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008); Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes (1894).
More clues confirming the point appear in Hecla’s successor, Cotter. There,
the Colorado Supreme Court explained that
[I]n Hecla . . . [w]e attempted to balance the interest of both the insurers
and insureds by ensuring that the broad rule basing the duty to defend
on the complaint will not require insurers to pay defense costs if
coverage ultimately does not exist under the policies . . . . [W]e . . .
attempted to create a remedy for insurers that provided defenses to
insureds when coverage ultimately did not exist.
90 P.3d at 828 (emphasis added). Cotter thus again strongly suggests Colorado
recognizes a pair of interlocking legal entitlements. On the one hand, in an effort
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to protect insureds, Colorado law imposes a duty on insurers to advance funds
toward the defense of claims that may ultimately turn out not to be covered under
the insurance policies. Id. at 827. On the other hand, the state recognizes a
corresponding legal remedy, allowing insurers to obtain reimbursement when
coverage is found not to exist, so long as they reserve (at least by letter) the right
to do so. Id. at 828. In this way, this pair of complementary entitlements is
intended “to balance the interests of both the insurers and the insureds” by
ensuring that insureds will receive a defense and that insurers won’t be left
holding the bag if it turns out they had no duty to provide one. Id. Nothing in
these rules or their underlying rationales appears to turn on whether a reservation
of rights clause does or doesn’t appear in a particular insurance contract.
The O’Hara Defendants reply that Hecla and Cotter’s discussions about the
legal rights and remedies of insureds and insurers are, at best, no more than dicta.
But even supposing that’s a fair characterization, our task in diversity cases is to
predict how the state supreme court would rule. See Vanover v. Cook, 260 F.3d
1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2001). And when we carry out that duty, Colorado Supreme
Court dicta, which represents the court’s own comment on the development of
Colorado law, surely can be instructive. See Carl v. City of Overland Park, Kan.,
65 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 1995). This is particularly true where, as here, the
dicta is recent, clear, and repeated. Cf. Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217
(10th Cir. 1996) (discussing United States Supreme Court dicta). So it is that we
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agree with the district court that the Colorado Supreme Court’s statements in
Hecla and Cotter, even if dicta, unmistakably indicate that Colorado law would
allow an insurer to recover defense costs from its insured where it reserved the
right to do so by letter, regardless whether the insurer also reserved that right in
the underlying insurance policy itself. 1
Perhaps seeing the writing on the wall, the O’Hara Defendants reply that, at
the very least, Hecla and Cotter require an insurer to wait until after the
underlying case against the insured is resolved before seeking a declaratory
judgment that it owes no duty to defend and deserves reimbursement. And, they
add, Zurich and Valley Forge failed to do this much; instead, the insurers sought a
declaration that they had no duty to defend while the underlying Medicare-
Medicaid fraud suit against the O’Hara Defendants was still pending. This failure
to follow the procedure outlined in Hecla and Cotter, the O’Hara Defendants
submit, bars Zurich and Valley Forge from recouping their defense costs.
Again, we cannot agree. Zurich and Valley Forge emphasize that the
O’Hara Defendants didn’t raise this particular argument in the district court and
ask us to disregard it on that basis. But whether the failure to present this
1
The O’Hara Defendants ask us to certify to the Colorado Supreme Court
the reimbursement question they raise in this appeal. Because, as we explain
above, Hecla and Cotter provide clear guidance on this question, we deny that
request. See Pino v. United States, 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007) (“When
we see a reasonably clear and principled course, we will seek to follow it
ourselves.”).
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argument earlier amounts to waiver or forfeiture, we need not decide. We also
don’t have to decide the question, unbriefed by the parties but surely lurking
behind the scenes, whether a state law rule purporting to prevent parties from
seeking a declaratory judgment until a specified time could bind a federal district
court and limit its congressionally-granted authority under the Declaratory
Judgment Act. See Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. v. Jones, 570 F.2d 1384, 1386
(10th Cir. 1978); Addison Ins. Co. v. Rippy, No. 08-237, 2009 WL 723322 (D.
Colo. Mar. 18, 2009) (unpublished). All this is because the argument itself rests
on a mistaken premise. Even under Colorado law, it isn’t always the case that an
insurer must wait for the underlying lawsuit to end before seeking a declaration
concerning its duty to defend. The Colorado Supreme Court has said that it is
“within the sound discretion of the trial court” whether to permit an insurer to seek
such a declaration before the underlying litigation against the insured has come to
an end. Constitution Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 556, 561 (Colo. 1997). In
making such a determination, the Colorado Supreme Court has emphasized that the
“potential prejudice” to the insured is a primary consideration. Id. at 562. For
this reason, a declaratory judgment action is permissible if it concerns issues that
are “independent of and separable from those in the underlying action,” because,
as the court explained, it then would not “unduly prejudice the insured in the
underlying action.” Id.
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Despite this clear rule, the O’Hara Defendants have not identified any
prejudice they suffered from the alleged prematurity of Zurich’s and Valley
Forge’s suits. Neither do the O’Hara Defendants dispute that the insurers’
declaratory judgment actions were “independent of and separable from” the
government’s suit against them. Id. In this light, then, we can discern no possible
error on the part of the district court in permitting the declaratory judgment actions
to proceed before resolution of the underlying suit, and then awarding Zurich and
Valley Forge reimbursement.
Finally, the parties expend considerable time and effort debating what
doctrinal label best describes Colorado’s rule permitting insurers to recoup their
costs when they reserved the right to do so by letter. Is the rule best viewed as an
equitable one, based on the fact that allowing an insured to retain the benefits of
an unbargained-for defense would constitute unjust enrichment, as some courts
elsewhere have suggested? See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Grand Pointe, LLC,
501 F. Supp.2d 1145, 1168-69 (E.D. Tenn. 2007). Or is the rule better viewed as a
legal one, based on the fact that the insurer’s reservation of rights letter and the
insured’s acceptance of the defense without objection created a new contract
between the parties, or at least an implied-in-fact contract, as courts in other states
have suggested? See, e.g., SST Fitness Corp., 309 F.3d at 919-21 (applying Ohio
law). Or might the rule simply be a matter of Colorado public policy? Or
something else still? Hecla and Cotter do not answer these questions. A future
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case might. But for our purposes, none of this matters. Regardless whether the
Colorado courts situate the rule in equity, contract, policy, rule of court, or
someplace else — whatever doctrinal pigeonhole best fits — one thing is clear:
Colorado permits insurers to recoup defense costs in the circumstances before us.
We need not venture more than that to decide this case. Judicial restraint, after
all, usually means answering only the questions we must, not those we can. See
PDK Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[I]f it is not necessary to
decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.”).
B
Having decided this much, one question in the O’Hara Defendants’ appeal
remains: how much can the insurers lawfully recoup under Hecla and Cotter’s
rule? Put differently, are they entitled to recover all of the defense costs they
actually expended? Or might the amount be limited in some way? The O’Hara
Defendants argue that Zurich and Valley Forge should, at most, be permitted to
recover “reasonably and necessarily incurred” defense costs, Response and Reply
Br. 36-37, or perhaps only the “fair value” of the defense provided, App. Vol. 11
at 2650. Zurich and Valley Forge counter they are entitled to recoup everything
they spent. See generally Century Sur. Co. v. 350 W.A., LLC, No. 05-1548, 2008
WL 4402919, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2008) (unpublished) (discussing similar
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challenge and holding that California law entitles insurer to recoup all defense
costs, without a showing of reasonableness).
While Hecla and Cotter do not appear to address this question, at least
squarely, its answer makes no difference to the outcome of the case before us and
so (once again) we need not and will not decide it. Even assuming (without
deciding) that the O’Hara Defendants are entitled to contest the reasonableness, or
the fair value, of the expenses incurred in their defense, this case comes to us on
summary judgment and, reviewing the record de novo as we must, we discern no
genuine dispute of fact suggesting that the fees the insurers actually incurred in
this case shouldn’t be repaid.
The O’Hara Defendants seek to suggest otherwise by pointing to an affidavit
submitted by their expert witness. Having considered that summary judgment
affidavit de novo, however, we do not see how it raises any material dispute of
fact. To be sure, a party can oppose summary judgment by submitting an affidavit
that “set[s] out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(2). But the affidavit before us simply identifies various materials one might
consider and questions one might ask when assessing the reasonableness of an
attorney’s bills. So, for example, the affidavit notes that Zurich and Valley Forge
separated the O’Hara Defendants into different groups and appointed different
attorneys for each group; the affidavit then proceeds to state that discovery could
reveal whether work was duplicated. But the affidavit does not opine that any
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work was actually and unreasonably duplicated, nor does it provide any facts to
support such a conclusion. Most tellingly, in the final paragraph of the affidavit,
the O’Hara Defendants’ expert states that “the above described discovery must be
undertaken before I will be able to . . . prepare an expert report setting forth my
opinion as to the overall reasonableness and necessity of the fees charged.” App.
Vol. 11 at 2651 (emphasis added). 2
Perhaps recognizing this infirmity, the O’Hara Defendants submit that their
expert’s affidavit, at the very least, complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) and thus
required the district court to defer decision on summary judgment to allow for the
2
In their reply brief, the O’Hara Defendants argue for the first time that
the declaration of Mr. Salazar, one of the individual defendants, creates a genuine
issue of fact over the reasonableness of Zurich and Valley Forge’s decision to
engage three different law firms to represent the O’Hara Defendants. Reply Br. at
35. In that declaration, Mr. Salazar submits that he “believe[s] . . . a single
lawyer could have represented all of the Defendants in the Underlying Action.”
Vol. 12 at 2680. Even assuming this argument hasn’t been waived by its tardy
appearance in these proceedings, see Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1250-51 (10th
Cir. 2007), such a “conclusory and self-serving” affidavit is insufficient to create
a factual dispute, Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991); Murray
v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir. 1995). On appeal, the O’Hara
Defendants also assert that Mr. Salazar did not receive a copy of either Zurich’s
or Valley Forge’s reservation of rights letter, and so argue he shouldn’t be bound
by them. Opening Br. at 44, 53. Though Mr. Salazar presented that fact to the
district court, he didn’t argue its purported legal consequence before that court,
thus forfeiting the argument. And we decline to exercise our discretion to review
that issue because the O’Hara Defendants do not suggest, and we do not see, how
the error alleged “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of [these] judicial proceedings.” Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Cas. Co., 358 F.3d 757, 769-70 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted)
(describing plain error test).
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discovery the expert sought. Zurich and Valley Forge disagree; the affidavit, they
argue, did not comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f).
We review a district court’s decision denying a Rule 56(f) discovery request
for abuse of discretion. Price ex rel. Price v. W. Res., Inc., 232 F.3d 779, 783
(10th Cir. 2000). As Judge Kane has noted, the abuse of discretion standard
implies a degree of “[d]iscretion invested in judges [to render] a decision based
upon what is fair in the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of
law.” In re Bueno, 248 B.R. 581, 582 (D. Colo. 2000). And whatever decision we
might’ve made ourselves were we behind the district court’s bench, we can’t say
that the district court’s decision to deny discovery in the face of the O’Hara
Defendants’ Rule 56(f) affidavit constituted such an abuse by “exceed[ing] the
bounds of the rationally available choices given the facts and the applicable law in
the case at hand.” Shook v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of County of El Paso, 543
F.3d 597, 603 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
In this circuit, a party seeking to defer a ruling on summary judgment under
Rule 56(f) must provide an affidavit “explain[ing] why facts precluding summary
judgment cannot be presented.” Comm. for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962
F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). This includes identifying (1)
“the probable facts not available,” (2) why those facts cannot be presented
currently, (3) “what steps have been taken to obtain these facts,” and (4) “how
additional time will enable [the party] to” obtain those facts and rebut the motion
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for summary judgment. Id.; see also Price, 232 F.3d at 783 (“Rule 56(f) does not
operate automatically. Its protections . . . can be applied only if a party satisfies
certain requirements.”).
The affidavit before us falls short against this yardstick. The affidavit lists
various additional materials and information the O’Hara Defendants seek. But the
affidavit fails to identify what efforts the O’Hara Defendants had made already to
obtain the information they sought, or why at least some of that information
wasn’t already available to them. The affidavit, for example, requests additional
time to study the “nature and length of the professional relationship” between the
O’Hara Defendants and the attorneys who represented them. App. Vol. 11 at
2651. And the affidavit seeks the engagement letters between the O’Hara
Defendants and their retained counsel. Yet the affidavit makes no attempt to
explain why the O’Hara Defendants lack this evidence or how they’ve tried but so
far failed to obtain it.
The affidavit doesn’t explain, for example, why the O’Hara Defendants were
themselves unable to provide the expert with evidence about the nature and length
of their relationship with their attorneys, or to supply copies of their engagement
letters. Neither does it explain what, if anything, prevented the O’Hara
Defendants from asking their defense attorneys, who owe them certain duties of
communication and candor, to supply the information they sought. Though the
O’Hara Defendants believe they could have unearthed persuasive evidence had the
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district court granted their Rule 56(f) request, we simply cannot say in these
circumstances that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to deny their request.
See, e.g., Garcia v. U.S. Air Force, 533 F.3d 1170, 1180 (10th Cir. 2008);
Hackworth v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 468 F.3d 722, 732 (10th Cir. 2006).
III
Having resolved the O’Hara Defendants’ appeal, we still face Zurich and
Valley Forge’s cross-appeal. There, the insurers contend the district court erred as
a matter of law when it denied their request for prejudgment interest on the
amounts it awarded in reimbursement. Zurich and Valley Forge submit that
Section 5-12-102(1) of the Colorado Revised Statutes expressly authorizes
prejudgment interest in these circumstances. That section provides, in relevant
part, that “creditors shall receive [prejudgment] interest” at eight percent “[w]hen
money . . . has been wrongfully withheld.” C.R.S. § 5-12-102(1). Because the
O’Hara Defendants had no right to the defense funds expended on their behalf,
Zurich and Valley Forge argue, the defense costs they (the insurers) spent were
effectively and “wrongfully withheld” from them since the time those costs were
incurred.
In support of their argument, Zurich and Valley Forge emphasize that money
can be “wrongfully withheld,” and so subject to prejudgment interest, even if the
withholding party did nothing tortious or otherwise opprobrious in taking it. In
this vein, the insurers point us to Mesa Sand & Gravel Co. v. Landfill, Inc., where
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the Colorado Supreme Court directed that Section 5-12-102(1) should be given a
“liberal construction,” and held that the phrase “wrongfully withheld” does not
require proof of “tortious conduct” on the part of the withholding party. 776 P.2d
362, 364-66 (Colo. 1989). The insurers also rely on Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Holmes, where the Colorado Supreme Court clarified that “wrongfully withheld”
means simply that “the aggrieved party lost or was deprived of something to which
she was otherwise entitled.” 193 P.3d 821, 825 (Colo. 2008). Finally, Zurich and
Valley Forge draw our attention to the facts of Rodgers v. Colorado Department of
Human Services. There, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Section
5-12-102(1) entitled an employer to prejudgment interest on back pay and benefits
it had paid to an employee pursuant to an administrative agency’s order that was
later reversed — thus requiring the employee to reimburse the employer. 39 P.3d
1232, 1238 (Colo. App. 2001). The court rejected the employee’s argument that
“he could not have been wrongfully withholding the money because he received”
the back pay and benefits “pursuant to the [administrative agency’s] order.” Id.
As the court reasoned, the employee had “demanded and received money from” his
employer that a court ultimately held he “was never entitled to” “as a matter of
law” and, thus, the employee had “been wrongfully withholding [that money] since
the time he received it.” Id.
We do not question that Zurich and Valley Forge’s view, that Section
5-12-102 applies equally in the circumstances now before us, is at least a plausible
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reading of the statute. But neither can we dispute that it lacks a meaningful
rejoinder. The O’Hara Defendants point out that Zurich and Valley Forge have not
cited us a single Colorado case that has awarded prejudgment interest to an insurer
recovering defense costs. What’s more, awarding prejudgment interest in such
cases might, at least arguably, conflict with the rationale underlying the Colorado
Supreme Court’s Hecla and Cotter rule. Those cases, after all, impose on insurers
a broad duty to defend in order to protect, even in questionable cases, an insured’s
“legitimate expectation of a defense.” Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1090. As the Hecla
court reasoned, “[r]equiring the average auto accident victim, or the average home
owner to bear the onerous financial burden of proving that they are entitled to a
defense from liability claims asserted against them would deny the insured the
protection afforded by a liability policy.” Id. at 1090 n.11. The reading of
Section 5-12-102(1) that Zurich and Valley Forge urge on us would increase the
costs to insureds of seeking the defense coverage Hecla and Cotter guarantee
them. It would require an insured, when submitting a claim to his or her insurer,
to assume the risk of having to repay not only any defense costs advanced but also
eight percent interest on that money in the event a court later holds there was no
duty to defend. This would, at least to a certain degree, disincentivize insureds
from exercising their rights under Hecla and Cotter, and instead push them to
shoulder their own defense costs. And that result is seemingly at odds with the
purpose animating those cases — namely, the protection of an insured’s
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“reasonabl[e] expectat[ion] that he will not be required to furnish the cost of
defending actions that facially fall within the terms of his policy.” Cotter, 90 P.3d
at 828. It is at least possible then, as the O’Hara Defendants stress, that
prejudgment interest has not yet been awarded in a recoupment case like this one
because Section 5-12-102(1) is inapplicable in light of Hecla and Cotter.
It is notable, too, that Rodgers, on which Zurich and Valley Forge heavily
rely, may be distinguishable from this case – or at least arguably so. Rodgers
dealt with an employer’s payment of money to its employee pursuant to an
administrative order that was later reversed, and the court’s award of prejudgment
interest was premised on the fact that the employee “was never entitled to” that
money. 39 P.3d at 1238 (emphasis added). Here, by comparison, Zurich and
Valley Forge made defense payments for the O’Hara Defendants pursuant to the
Colorado Supreme Court’s command in Hecla and Cotter that they provide a
defense in the first instance. This command remains good law. One could argue,
then, that the O’Hara Defendants were entitled to the defense payments under
Hecla and Cotter, at least until the moment a court held there was no duty to
defend.
In the absence of any Colorado authority applying Section 5-12-102(1) to an
insurer’s recoupment claim, and in light of the parties’ plausible conflicting
arguments about the statute’s applicability, we are unable to conclude that the
insurers have met their burden of establishing that Colorado law requires an award
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of prejudgment interest in these circumstances. This isn’t to prejudge how the
Colorado courts or legislature may decide the question. It is to say only that, in
these murky circumstances, “we believe it proper to leave any further development
of [state] law on this point to” state authorities. Russo v. Ballard Med. Prods., 550
F.3d 1004, 1023 (10th Cir. 2008).
***
The judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
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