American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

August 18, 2010
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

AMERICAN ATHEISTS, INC., a
Texas non-profit corporation;
R. ANDREWS; S. CLARK; and
M. RIVERS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SCOTT T. DUNCAN, Colonel,
Superintendent of Utah Highway No. 08-4061
Patrol; LANCE DAVENPORT,
Superintendent, Utah Highway Patrol,
in his official capacity; JOHN
NJORD, Executive Director, Utah
Department of Transportation; and F.
KEITH STEPAN, Director Division of
Facilities Construction and
Management Department of
Administrative Services,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL
ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee.
______________

THE UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST
ASSOCIATION; THE UNION FOR
REFORM JUDAISM; THE SOCIETY
FOR HUMANISTIC JUDAISM; THE
INTERFAITH ALLIANCE; THE
HINDU AMERICAN FOUNDATION;
THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE;
EUGENE J. FISHER; AMERICANS
UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE; AMERICAN
HUMANIST ASSOCIATION;
FOUNDATION FOR MORAL LAW;
ROBERT E. MACKEY; THE
AMERICAN LEGION; STATE OF
COLORADO; STATE OF KANSAS;
STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE
OF OKLAHOMA; THE BECKET
FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY;
GREGORY BELL; CURTIS
BRAMBLE; ALLEN CHRISTENSEN;
DAVID CLARK; MARGARET
DAYTON; BRAD DEE; DAN
EASTMAN; JOHN GREINER;
WAYNE HARPER; JOHN
HICKMAN; LYLE HILLYARD;
SHELDON KILLPACK; PETER
KNUDSON; MICHAEL MORLEY;
WAYNE NIEDERHAUSER;
HOWARD STEPHENSON; DENNIS
STOWELL; AARON TILTON; JOHN
VALENTINE; KEVIN
VANTASSELL; CARLENE
WALKER; CITY OF SANTA FE;
UTAH SHERIFFS’ ASSOCIATION,

Amici Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. 2:05-CV-00994-DS)

2
Brian M. Barnard of Utah Civil Rights & Liberties Foundation, Inc., Salt Lake
City, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Thom D. Roberts, Assistant Utah Attorney General (Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney
General, with him on brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees.

Byron J. Babione of Alliance Defense Fund (Benjamin W. Bull and David R.
Sheasby of Alliance Defense Fund, Scottsdale, Arizona, Frank D. Mylar of Mylar
Law P.C., Cottonwood Heights, Utah, and Steven Fitschen of The National Legal
Foundation, Virginia Beach, Virginia, with him on brief), Scottsdale, Arizona, for
Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee.

Luke W. Goodrich of The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, D.C.
(Eric C. Rassbach of The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, D.C.,
Steve Six, Attorney General, Topeka, Kansas, Gary K. King, Attorney General,
Santa Fe, New Mexico, W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General, Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, Daniel D.
Domenico, Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, and Geoffrey N. Blue, Deputy
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief) for Amici Curiae, the
States of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, and The Becket Fund
for Religious Liberty, in support of Defendants-Appellees.

Robert V. Ritter of Appignani Humanist Legal Center, American Humanist
Association, Washington, D.C., filed an amici curiae brief for American Humanist
Association, Society for Humanistic Judaism, and Unitarian Universalist
Association, in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Evan M. Tager and David M. Gossett of Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, D.C.,
and Brian M. Willen of Mayer Brown LLP, New York, New York, Steven M.
Freeman, Steven C. Sheinberg, and Michelle N. Deutchman of Anti-Defamation
League, New York, New York, Mark J. Pelavin of Union for Reform Judaism,
Washington, D.C., Ayesha N. Khan and Richard B. Katskee of Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Washington, D.C., and Suhag A. Shukla of
Hindu American Foundation, Kensington, Maryland, filed an amici curiae brief
for Americans United for Separation of Church and State, The Anti-Defamation
League, The Hindu American Foundation, The Interfaith Alliance, The Union for
Reform Judaism, and Dr. Eugene Fisher, in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Roy S. Moore, John A. Eidsmoe, and Benjamin D. DuPrè for Foundation for
Moral Law, Montgomery, Alabama, filed an amicus curiae brief for Foundation
for Moral Law, in support of Defendants-Appellees.

3
Michael A. Sink of Perkins Coie LLP, Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae
brief for Robert E. Mackey, in support of Defendants-Appellees.

John Ansbro of Orrick, Herrington, & Sutcliffe LLP, New York, New York, filed
an amicus curiae brief for The American Legion, in support of Defendants-
Appellees.

Chad N. Boudreaux and Adam J. White of Baker Botts, LLP, Washington, D.C.,
filed an amici curiae brief on behalf of Gregory Bell, Curtis Bramble, Allen
Christensen, David Clark, Margaret Dayton, Brad Dee, Dan Eastman, John
Greiner, Wayne Harper, John Hickman, Lyle Hillyard, Sheldon Killpack, Peter
Knudson, Michael Morley, Wayne Niederhauser, Howard Stephenson, Dennis
Stowell, Aaron Tilton, John Valentine, Kevin VanTassell and Carlene Walker
(collectively “Utah Legislators”) and City of Santa Fe, in support of Defendants-
Appellees.

Kevin T. Snider of Pacific Justice Institute, Sacramento, California, filed an
amicus curiae brief for Utah Sheriffs’ Association, in support of Defendants-
Appellees.

Before TACHA, EBEL, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

The Utah Highway Patrol Association (“UHPA”), with the permission of

Utah state authorities, erected a number of twelve-foot high crosses on public

land to memorialize fallen Utah Highway Patrol (“UHP”) troopers.

Plaintiffs-Appellants, American Atheists, Inc., a Texas non-profit organization,

and three individual members of American Atheists who reside in Utah, challenge

the legality of these memorials under the Establishment Clause of the federal

constitution and Article I of Utah’s constitution. We hold that these memorials

4
have the impermissible effect of conveying to the reasonable observer the

message that the State prefers or otherwise endorses a certain religion. They

therefore violate the Establishment Clause of the federal constitution. In light of

this conclusion, we need not reach the separate question of whether these displays

also violate Utah’s constitution.

I. Background

UHPA, a non-profit organization that supports UHP officers and their

families, initiated the memorial project in 1998. The memorials are twelve-foot

high crosses with six-foot horizontal cross-bars. The fallen trooper’s name, rank,

and badge number are printed in large letters on the horizontal cross-bar.

Immediately underneath the place where the two bars meet hangs a large

(approximately 12" high and 16" wide) depiction of the UHP’s official “beehive”

symbol. Beneath that are printed the year the trooper died and a small plaque

containing a picture of the trooper and some biographical information. 1

UHPA member and officer Lee Perry and his friend Robert Kirby came up

with the idea for these memorials and designed the crosses, which UHPA

approved. UHPA asserts that

[t]he purpose of these memorials is fourfold: (1) the memorials stand as
a lasting reminder to UHPA members and Utah highway patrol troopers
that a fellow trooper gave his life in service to this state; (2) the
memorials remind highway drivers that a trooper died in order to make
the state safe for all citizens; (3) the memorials honor the trooper and

1
Photos of some of these displays are attached to this opinion.

5
 the sacrifice he and his family made for the State of Utah; and
(4) encourage safe conduct on the highways.

(Aple. Supp. App. at 3112.) Perry and Kirby determined that “only a cross could

effectively convey these weighty messages instantaneously” to motorists driving

by a memorial. (Id. at 3165.) According to Perry, they chose a white Roman or

Latin cross because

only a white cross could effectively convey the simultaneous messages
of death, honor, remembrance, gratitude, sacrifice, and safety. I
determined this because a cross is widely recognized as a memorial for
a person’s death and especially respect to those who have given their
lives to insure the safety and protection of others.

(Aplt. App. at 420.) Moreover, a “cross, near the highway, with the inscriptions,

symbols and plaques mentioned above, conveys the unmistakable message that a

Utah Highway Patrolman died near this spot while serving the people of Utah.”

(Id. at 423.)

Because generally drivers would be passing a memorial at 55-plus miles per

hour, the UHPA determined that the cross memorials “needed to prominently

communicate all of this instantaneously.” (Aple. Supp. App. at 3165.) Further, to

“effectively communicate these messages,” the UHPA sought “to place each cross

in a location that was: (1) visible to the public; (2) safe to stop and view; and

(3) as close to the actual spot of the trooper’s death as possible.” (Id.)

Before erecting any memorial, the UHPA obtained the consent of the fallen

trooper’s family. None of these families have ever objected to the use of the

6
cross as a memorial or requested that the UHPA memorialize their loved one

using a different symbol. However, “[b]ecause [the UHPA] exist[s] to serve

family members of highway patrolmen, the UHPA would provide another

memorial symbol if requested by the family.” 2 (Aplt. App. at 1869.)

UHPA erected its first memorial cross in 1998 on private property located

approximately fifty feet from a state highway. Later, UHPA obtained permission

from the State of Utah to erect additional memorial crosses on public property,

including the rights-of-way adjacent to the State’s roads, roadside rest areas, and

the lawn outside a UHP office in Salt Lake County. 3 In permitting the memorials,

however, the State has, on at least one occasion, expressly noted that it “neither

approves or disapproves the memorial marker.” (Id. at 2303.)

Between 1998 and 2003, the UHPA erected a total of thirteen memorials.

The memorials are all privately funded; UHPA retains ownership of the

memorials and maintains them, while the State continues to own and control the

state land on which some of the memorials are located. Local businesses and Boy

Scout troops have aided the UHPA in funding, building and maintaining the

2
Notwithstanding the UHPA’s position, the State Defendants, in oral
argument before the district court and in their briefs and argument before us,
asserted that they would not allow any change in the memorial, whether to
accommodate other faiths or otherwise.
3
A photo depicting the lawn outside this UHP office, where all of one and
part of the other of these two memorial crosses are visible, is attached to this
opinion.

7
memorial crosses.

II. This litigation

Plaintiffs brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article I of the Utah

Constitution against several state employees who were responsible for authorizing

the UHPA to incorporate the UHP logo on the memorial crosses and to place of

some of these crosses on state land. 4 Although Plaintiffs initially alleged

violations of both the establishment and “free expression” clauses of these

constitutions, Plaintiffs later dismissed their “free expression” claims. Based

upon the alleged establishment clause violations, Plaintiffs seek, as relief, $1 in

nominal damages, an injunction ordering the removal of these memorial crosses

from state property, an injunction ordering that the UHP insignia be removed

from all UHPA memorial crosses, a declaration that these memorial crosses’

presence on state property violates Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, a declaration

that it is a constitutional violation to allow the UHP insignia to be placed on these

memorial crosses, and attorneys’ fees. The district court allowed UHPA to

intervene as a party-defendant.

Upon the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court

denied Plaintiffs’ motions and granted summary judgment for all Defendants,

4
UHPA asserts that federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to
consider Establishment Clause claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
court, however, has previously rejected that argument. See Green v. Haskell
County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 788 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 1687 (2010).

8
holding that these memorial crosses did not violate the federal or state

constitution. See American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D.

Utah 2007). Plaintiffs timely appealed that decision. We have jurisdiction to

consider this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 5 See Green, 568 F.3d at 788.

III. Analysis

A. Standing

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether Plaintiffs have Article

III standing to bring this case. See O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216,

1222 (10th Cir. 2005). The district court held that Plaintiffs had standing because

they “have experienced direct and unwelcome contact with the memorial crosses

at issue in this case . . . . [and] would have to alter their commutes in order to

avoid contact with the memorials.” American Atheists, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.

5
This court delayed issuing this opinion, awaiting the Supreme Court’s
decision in Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). Buono initially involved an
Establishment Clause challenge to private citizens’ erecting a white cross on
federal land as a war memorial. See id. at 1811-12. The Ninth Circuit held that
violated the Establishment Clause, a decision the defendants did not appeal. See
id. at 1812-13. The Supreme Court, thus, did not address the merits of the
Establishment Clause claim, but instead addressed a later procedural
development, considering, instead, the plaintiff’s attempt to enforce the judgment
he obtained against the display of the cross on public land, in light of the
government’s subsequent transfer of the land at issue to private concerns. See id.
at 1811-13, 1815-16 (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J); id. at
1824-25 (Scalia, J, joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1828
(Stevens, J, joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 1842-43
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court upheld the land transfer against the plaintiff’s
challenge. See id. at 1811 (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J); id.
at 1824-25 (Scalia, J, joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

9
“We review the question of whether a plaintiff has constitutional standing de

novo.” Green, 568 F.3d at 792.

“To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must allege actual or threatened

personal injury, fairly traceable to the defendant’s unlawful conduct and likely to

be redressed by a favorable decision of the court.” Foremaster v. City of St.

George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1487 (10th Cir. 1989). In Establishment Clause cases,

“[a]llegations of personal contact with a state-sponsored image suffice to

demonstrate this kind of direct injury.” O’Connor, 416 F.3d at 1223.

Here, the individual named plaintiffs allege to have had “direct personal

and unwelcome contact with the crosses.” (Aplt. App. at 587, 596, and 682.)

Under O’Connor, 416 F.3d at 1223, these allegations establish standing. See also

Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (10th Cir. 2008). Mr.

Andrews, one of the named plaintiffs, also stated that he has “occasionally altered

[his] travel route or [has] not stopped at a particular rest stop to avoid contact

with the crosses.” (Aplt. App. at 596.) Mr. Andrews’s allegation that he was

“forced to alter [his] behavior to avoid contact with the display, although not

necessary for standing, further support[s] this conclusion.” O’Connor, 416 F.3d

at 1223. “Moreover, the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ alleged injuries stem directly from

the conduct of the [State]. . . . Lastly . . . a favorable judgment from the federal

court would redress the injuries. As such, the Plaintiffs-Appellants have standing

to pursue [this case] before this court.” Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1028-29.

10
 Because the individual named plaintiffs here have standing, this court does

not need to determine whether American Atheists would also have standing in its

own right. See Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981)

(determining that because one of the plaintiffs “has standing, we do not consider

the standing of the other plaintiffs”); see also Green, 568 F.3d at 793 n.5

(“Because we conclude that [Plaintiff-Appellant] Mr. Green has standing, . . . it is

unnecessary to address the ACLU of Oklahoma’s standing.”).

B. Whether the district court abused its discretion in striking the declarations
of O. Salah and D. Chatterjee

The district court ordered the parties, when submitting declarations, to

identify which motion those declarations supported. The court further warned the

parties that “[f]ailure to identify the declarations in this manner will result in their

being stricken and not considered by the court.” (D. Ct. doc. 132.) Subsequent to

the district court’s order, Plaintiffs submitted to the court the declarations of

O. Salah and D. Chatterjee, but failed to identify the motion Plaintiffs sought to

support with those declarations. The district court, therefore, struck them. The

court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. 6 See Jones v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d

6
In striking these declarations, the district court also noted that D.
Chatterjee’s declaration appears to be an attempt by Plaintiffs “to submit expert
testimony under the guise of lay opinion testimony. The Chatterjee declaration is
inadmissible because he was never identified as an expert and his testimony does
not fit any other admissible category.” (Aplt. App. at 2904-05.) We need not
address the propriety of this additional reason for striking Chatterjee’s declaration
because the district court was justified in striking both declarations due to
(continued...)

11
1260, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003) (reviewing decision regarding motion to strike for an

abuse of discretion).

C. Whether the Free Speech Clause Protects these Cross Memorials from
Establishment Clause Scrutiny

As an initial matter, UHPA argues that the displays at issue in this case are

UHPA’s private speech, not the expression of the state of Utah and, therefore,

that the Free Speech Clause, not the Establishment Clause, should govern our

analysis in this case. Further, UHPA asserts that Utah would violate the Free

Speech Clause by prohibiting the displays at issue in this case and, therefore, that

the Establishment Clause cannot mandate the prohibition of these displays. The

UHPA is supported in this position by amici curiae, the States of Colorado,

Kansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, and The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.

These arguments fail in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pleasant

Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).

In Pleasant Grove City, the Supreme Court held that “[j]ust as government-

commissioned and government-financed monuments speak for the government, so

do privately financed and donated monuments that the government accepts and

displays to the public on government land.” Id. at 1133. Thus, the Court

concluded, “as a general matter, [the Free Speech Clause’s] forum analysis simply

6
(...continued)
Plaintiffs’ failure to identify which motions these declarations were intended to
support.

12
does not apply to the installation of permanent monuments on public property.”

Id. at 1138.

As permanent monuments erected on public land, 7 the cross memorials at

issue in this case fall squarely within the rule pronounced by the Court in Pleasant

Grove City and, therefore, must be analyzed not as private speech, but as

government speech—the scope and content of which is restrained, inter alia, by

the Establishment Clause. See id. at 1131-32; see also Green, 568 F.3d at 797

n.8.

Both at oral argument and in a letter submitted pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.

28 (j), the state amici and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty attempt to

distinguish this case from Pleasant Grove City, arguing that even in light of the

Court’s opinion in Pleasant Grove City, the displays at issue in this case should

be treated as private speech. They argue that Pleasant Grove City can be

distinguished from our case in three ways: (1) in Pleasant Grove City, the city

took ownership of the displays at issue, while in this case, the UHPA has retained

ownership of the memorial crosses; (2) Utah has distanced itself from the message

conveyed in these displays by issuing a statement that the Utah Department of

Transportation “neither approves or disapproves the memorial marker” (Aplt.

App. at 2303); and (3) unlike the displays at issue in Pleasant Grove City, these

7
Although it appears that at least one memorial is located on private land,
the UHPA does not base its argument on that fact.

13
displays are not really permanent because both Utah and the UHPA retain the

right to remove the display at any time. These distinctions are unpersuasive.

The fact that the UHPA retains ownership over these displays does not

materially affect our analysis of whether the displays at issue in this case

constitute government speech. In Pleasant Grove City, the Supreme Court noted

that the city had taken ownership of “most of the monuments in the Park.” 129

S. Ct. at 1134 (emphasis added). However, the Court gave no indication that only

those monuments which the city actually owned constituted government speech.

To the contrary, the Court strongly implied that all the monuments in that park

were government speech, and further indicated that, in the vast majority of cases,

a permanent monument on public land will be considered government speech. Id.

at 1138. The fact that the Court thought all of the monuments in that park were

government speech is perhaps best illustrated by the Court’s choice of an example

of a permanent monument on public land that would not be government speech: a

“monument on which all the residents . . . could place the name of a person to be

honored or some other private message.” Id. The Court’s choice to use a

hypothetical example, and not just to point to some of the memorials in the park

at issue that might be privately owned in that case indicates that the Court

considered all the monuments in that park to be government speech. Thus, the

fact that the UHPA, not Utah, owns the memorial crosses does not affect our

determination of whether they are government speech.

14
 Similarly, Utah’s attempt to distance itself from the message conveyed by

these memorial crosses, by stating that it neither “approves or disapproves” them,

falls flat in light of the Supreme Court’s discussion in Pleasant Grove City. In

Pleasant Grove City, the Court explicitly rejected the respondent’s argument that,

in order for a monument to constitute government speech, the state must formally

adopt the message conveyed by the display. The Court noted that the City’s

decision to display that permanent monument on its property “provided a more

dramatic form of adoption than the sort of formal endorsement that respondent

would demand . . . .” Id. at 1134. Conversely, the government’s actions in this

case—allowing these memorial crosses to be displayed with the official UHP

insignia primarily on public land—cannot be overshadowed by its attempts to

distance itself from the message conveyed by these displays.

Finally, we reject the state amici’s contention that, because the UHPA and

Utah each retained the right to remove these displays, they are not “permanent”

and, therefore, the Court’s decision in Pleasant Grove City does not cover this

case. This project began more than ten years ago, and there is no evidence that

any of the memorial crosses erected since that time have been removed. We think

that is permanent enough to constitute government speech. See id. at 1138

(contrasting the “permanent” displays at issue in that case with the “temporary”

sixteen-day display at issue in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v.

15
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)). 8

D. Federal Establishment Clause claim

1. Standard of Review

This court reviews de novo a district court’s decision in a First Amendment

case, O’Connor, 416 F.3d at 1223; Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227,

1230 n.7 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and undertakes “an independent examination

of the whole record.” O’Connor, 416 F.3d at 1223; see also Weinbaum, 541 F.3d

at 1029 (“We review de novo a district court’s findings of constitutional fact and

its ultimate conclusions regarding a First Amendment challenge.”) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). “More specifically, in Establishment Clause

cases, we consider ‘a district court’s findings on each part of the Lemon[ v.

Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)] test’ to be ‘constitutional facts’” that we review

de novo. Green, 568 F.3d at 795-96 (quoting Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68

F.3d 1226, 1230 n.7 (10th Cir. 1995)). Where, as here, the district court granted

summary judgment for Defendants, “we must ensure that ‘there is no genuine

8
At oral argument, the state amici also argued that this case is
distinguishable from Pleasant Grove City because the memorials in this case were
erected in places like the sides of the road, where space is less scarce than in
public parks. We also find this distinction unpersuasive. Surely, the memorials
placed in front of the UHP office are on land that is no less scarce than the land in
most parks. Further, as the record in this case demonstrates, the State tightly
controls the displays placed on the rights-of-way near its roads and, although
those rights-of-way may cover a larger geographic area than the state’s parks (an
allegation we are unwilling to accept on the amici’s say so), safety concerns and
statutes like the federal Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131, severely
limit the area where memorials or other monuments could be displayed.

16
issue as to any material fact’ and that [Defendants are] ‘entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.’” Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1029 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In

so doing, this court “view[s] the evidence and draw[s] reasonable inferences

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Grace United

Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 (10th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1270 (10th

Cir. 2001)).

2. The Lemon/Endorsement Test

“The first clause of the First Amendment provides, ‘Congress shall make

no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .’ U.S. Const. amend. I. This

substantive limitation applies also to the ‘legislative power of the States and their

political subdivisions’ as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Weinbaum, 541

F.3d at 1029 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301

(2000)). The Establishment Clause “enshrines the principle that government may

not act in ways that ‘aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over

another.’” Id. (quoting Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1230); see also County of Allegheny

v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (stating that the

Establishment Clause guarantees “religious liberty and equality to ‘the infidel, the

atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism’”)

(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985)). This concept is not,

however, as simple as it may sound, and courts have struggled mightily to

17
articulate when government action has crossed the constitutional line. See

Bauchman ex. rel. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 551 (10th Cir. 1997)

(noting the Supreme Court’s failure to “prescribe a general analytic framework

within which to evaluate Establishment Clause claims,” and that “many believe

the Court’s modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray”)

(citation and quotation omitted).

Although the Supreme Court is sharply divided on the standard governing

Establishment Clause cases, see Green, 568 F.3d at 797 n.8 (discussing the

confusion generated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Van Orden v. Perry, 545

U.S. 677 (2005)), this court has recently affirmed that “the touchstone for

Establishment Clause analysis remains the tripartite test set out in Lemon.”

Green, 568 F.3d at 796 (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1030); see also Gonzales

v. N. Tp. of Lake County, 4 F.3d 1412, 1417-18 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Although the

test is much maligned, the Supreme Court recently reminded us that Lemon is

controlling precedent and should be the framework used by courts when

reviewing Establishment Clause challenges.”).

The Court in Lemon established three general tests to determine whether a

state has violated the principles protected by the Establishment Clause: “First, the

statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary

effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute

must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Lemon,

18
403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations and quotations omitted). If any of these tests are

violated, the state practice will be deemed unconstitutional. See Green, 568 F.3d

at 797-98 (“A governmental action violates the Establishment Clause if it fails to

satisfy any of three prongs of the Lemon test.”) (emphasis in original). On

appeal, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have violated the first and second Lemon

tests.

Addressing the first and second Lemon tests, “[t]his court ‘interpret[s] the

purpose and effect prongs of Lemon in light of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement

test.’” Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1030 (quoting O’Connor, 416 F.3d at 1224); see

also Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 552 (“Justice O’Connor’s ‘endorsement test’ is now

widely accepted as the controlling analytical framework for evaluating

Establishment Clause claims.”). Under that test, “[t]he purpose prong of the

Lemon test asks whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove

of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual

purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or

disapproval.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,

concurring). Justice O’Connor’s modification of the Lemon test makes our

inquiry very case-specific, as it asks this court to examine carefully the particular

context and history of these displays before concluding what effect they would

19
likely have on the reasonable observer. 9 See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at

605-08 (defending the fact-specific nature of the Court’s Establishment Clause

jurisprudence which requires that courts “examine[] the particular contexts in

which the government employs religious symbols”).

3. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish a Violation of the Purpose Prong
of the Lemon Test

The question presented by the first prong of the Lemon test, then, is

“whether the government conduct was motivated by an intent to endorse

religion.” Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1030. “In deciding whether the government’s

purpose was improper, a court must view the conduct through the eyes of an

‘objective observer,’ one who takes account of the traditional external signs that

show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, or

comparable official act.” Id. at 1031 (quotations omitted). “We will not lightly

attribute unconstitutional motives to the government, particularly where we can

discern a plausible secular purpose.” Id. (quotation, alteration omitted).

Here, we can discern a plausible secular purpose. Considering first the

evidence of the UHPA’s motivation, that organization has, throughout the course

of this project, consistently asserted that its intent in erecting these memorials is

only secular: to honor fallen troopers and to promote safety on the State’s

highways. The secular nature of the UHPA motive is bolstered by the fact that

9
We reject Plaintiffs’ argument that any time government conduct involves
the use of a Latin cross, there is an Establishment Clause violation.

20
the memorials were designed by two individuals who are members of the Mormon

faith, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Saints (“LDS Church”), a religion that

does not use the cross as a religious symbol. These men explained that they were

inspired to use the Latin cross for the fallen trooper memorials because of the

presence of such crosses in military cemeteries, which honor fallen service

members for their sacrifice, and roadside memorials found where traffic fatalities

have occurred. Plaintiffs are unable to point to any evidence suggesting that the

UHPA’s motive is other than secular.

Nevertheless, the focus of this first Lemon test is on the government’s

purpose, and not that of a private actor. See Green, 568 F.3d at 800 n.10. But in

this case the evidence supports our attributing the UHPA’s motivation to the State

Defendants. In allowing the UHPA to use the UHP insignia on the memorial

crosses and in giving UHPA permission to place some of those crosses on public

land, state officials accepted the UHPA’s assertion of its motives and further

acknowledged support for the UHPA’s intent. Plaintiffs have failed to present

any evidence that, to the contrary, suggested that the State Defendants’

motivation was different than that expressed by UHPA. 10

Furthermore, in light of this evidence, there is no reason to conclude that

10
Plaintiffs argue that the State Defendants failed to present any evidence of
their actual motive in permitting UHPA to use the UHP insignia and to place
some of the memorials on public land. But Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving
that the State Defendants have violated the Establishment Clause. See Brooks v.
City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259, 265 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000).

21
the Defendants’ proffered secular explanations were a sham. See Weinbaum, 541

F.3d at 1031 (“Unless the secular justification is a ‘sham’ or is ‘secondary’ to a

religious purpose, we defer to the government’s professed purpose for using the

symbol.”) (citation omitted). Nor can we say that the secular purpose advanced

by Defendants is so implausible that they must have actually been motivated by a

religious purpose, even if there is no direct evidence of such a purpose. Cf.

Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 930 (3rd Cir. 1980) (holding that

Philadelphia’s decision to build a massive stage adorned with a thirty-six-foot

cross in preparation for the Pope’s visit violated the purpose prong of the

Establishment Clause despite the city’s claim that its purpose in building this

structure was for public relations, not to endorse a religion). Therefore, we

uphold the district court’s determination that the State Defendants did not violate

Lemon’s first test by acting with the impermissible motive of endorsing or

favoring religion.

4. UHPA’s Memorial Crosses Violate the Effect Prong of the
Lemon/Endorsement Test

Next, we consider whether the State Defendants violated the second Lemon

test. The Establishment Clause “mandate[s] governmental neutrality between

religion and religion, and between religion and non-religion.” Weinbaum, 541

F.3d at 1029 n.13 (quoting O’Connor, 416 F.3d at 1223). Thus, this court

recently observed that

22
 [g]overnments may not “mak[e] adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person’s standing in the political community.” County of
Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)). And actions which have the effect of communicating
governmental endorsement or disapproval, “whether intentionally or
unintentionally, . . . make religion relevant, in reality or public
perception, to status in the political community.” Lynch, 465 U.S. at
692 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

Green, 568 F.3d at 799.

When determining whether a display has the impermissible effect “of

communicating a message of governmental endorsement or disapproval” of

religion, Green, 568 F.3d at 799, we

look[] through the eyes of an objective observer who is aware of the
purpose, context, and history of the symbol. The objective or reasonable
observer is kin to the fictitious “reasonably prudent person” of tort law.
See Gaylor[v. United States], 74 F.3d [214,] 217 [(10th Cir. 1996)]. So
we presume that the court-created “objective observer” is aware of
information “not limited to ‘the information gleaned simply from
viewing the challenged display.’” O’Connor, 416 F.3d at 1228 (quoting
Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1142-43 (10th Cir.
2001).

Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031 (emphasis added). While the reasonable observer

“is presumed to know far more than most actual members of a given community,”

id. at 1031 n.16, “we do not treat the reasonable observer as omniscient.” Green,

568 F.3d at 800 (citing Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 560); see also Buono v. Norton,

371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004) (“How much information we will impute to a

reasonable observer is unclear.”).

a. Purpose

23
 Separate from Lemon’s first test, courts also consider the Government’s

purpose in undertaking the challenged conduct as illustrative of the effect that

that conduct conveys. See Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031, 1033 (noting that

“[e]ffects are most often the manifestation of a motivating purpose”). As

previously stated, in this case the UHPA’s stated purpose in erecting these

memorial crosses, and the State Defendants’ purpose in allowing the UHPA to

incorporate the UHP symbol into the memorials and to place the crosses on public

land, was secular. That fact, however, cannot be dispositive of whether the State

has violated the effect prong of the Lemon/endorsement test, or this second prong

would be rendered meaningless. Rather, the State’s secular purpose is merely one

element of the larger factual and historical context that we consider in order to

determine whether these memorial crosses would have an impermissible effect on

the reasonable observer.

b. Context and history 11

Context can determine the permissibility of displays of religious symbols

on public property. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 598 (“Under the Court’s

holding in Lynch, the effect of a crèche display turns on its setting.”); Weinbaum,

541 F.3d at 1035 (holding that the city of Las Cruces could use a three-cross

symbol as part of its city seal because the context and history of that city

11
Here we deal with context and history together because there is no
evidence of relevant historical factors apart from context information.

24
“establishe[d] that the symbolism is not religious at all. Rather, it simply reflects

the name of the City which, in turn, reflects a series of secular events that

occurred near the site of the City.”). The significance of context is perhaps best

illustrated by the Supreme Court’s two recent decisions involving displays of the

Ten Commandments on public land. In Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005),

Justice Breyer, whose concurrence provided the deciding vote, concluded that the

display of the Ten Commandments challenged in that case did not violate the

Establishment Clause based largely on his analysis of the “context of the display,”

id. at 701 (Breyer, J. concurring), and his conclusion that “the context suggests

that the State intended the display’s moral message . . . to predominate,” id. at

702 (Breyer, J., concurring). In contrast, the majority of the Court found the

Decalogue display in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union, 545

U.S. 844, 881 (2005), to be in violation of the Establishment Clause because it

was placed there with a religious purpose as evidenced, in part, by the fact that it

was initially displayed on its own. Thus, the context of a display can determine

its legality.

This case involves memorials using a Latin cross, which “is unequivocally

a symbol of the Christian faith.” Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1022. In light of that,

there is little doubt that Utah would violate the Establishment Clause if it allowed

a private group to place a permanent unadorned twelve-foot cross on public

property without any contextual or historical elements that served to secularize

25
the message conveyed by such a display. See American Civil Liberties Union v.

Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1100-01 (11th Cir.

1983) (holding that a lighted thirty-five-foot stand-alone cross could not be

displayed in a state park); see also County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 599 (using

the display of a cross in a central location in a government building on Easter as

the prototypical example of a display that would convey government

“endorsement of Christianity”); Buono, 371 F.3d at 544-45 (holding that an eight-

foot cross intended as a war memorial and located on land owned by the national

government violated the Establishment Clause); cf. Trunk v. City of San Diego,

568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that a cross that had

become a long-standing landmark of the city and was only one part of a larger

war memorial could be maintained on federal land). Thus, these displays of “the

preeminent symbol of Christianity,” Buono, 371 F.3d at 545 (citation and

quotation omitted), can only be allowed if their context or history avoid the

conveyance of a message of governmental endorsement of religion.

Here, we conclude that the cross memorials would convey to a reasonable

observer that the state of Utah is endorsing Christianity. The memorials use the

preeminent symbol of Christianity, and they do so standing alone (as opposed to it

being part of some sort of display involving other symbols). That cross

conspicuously bears the imprimatur of a state entity, the UHP, and is found

26
primarily on public land. 12

The fact that the cross includes biographical information about the fallen

trooper does not diminish the governmental message endorsing Christianity. This

is especially true because a motorist driving by one of the memorial crosses at

55-plus miles per hour may not notice, and certainly would not focus on, the

biographical information. The motorist, however, is bound to notice the

preeminent symbol of Christianity and the UHP insignia, linking the State to that

religious sign.

Moreover, the fact that all of the fallen UHP troopers are memorialized

with a Christian symbol conveys the message that there is some connection

between the UHP and Christianity. This may lead the reasonable observer to fear

that Christians are likely to receive preferential treatment from the UHP—both in

their hiring practices and, more generally, in the treatment that people may expect

to receive on Utah’s highways. 13 The reasonable observer’s fear of unequal

treatment would likely be compounded by the fact that these memorials carry the

12
The record indicates that at least one, and perhaps several, of these
memorials are located on private land near a state highway. That fact does not
change our analysis, however, because those crosses, even though on private land,
still bear the UHP insignia, which UHPA was authorized by UHP to use.
13
The connection between the UHP and Christianity is perhaps even more
strongly conveyed by the two memorial crosses located immediately outside the
UHP office. We are deeply concerned about the message these crosses would
convey to a non-Christian walking by the UHP office or, even more troubling, to
a non-Christian walking in against his will.

27
same symbol that appears on UHP patrol vehicles. See Friedman v. Bd. of

County Comm’rs of Bernalillo County, 781 F.2d 777, 778, 782 (10th Cir. 1985)

(holding that a city’s seal “bearing, among other things, a latin cross and the

Spanish motto, ‘CON ESTA VENCEMOS’ [‘With This We Conquer’],” violated

the Establishment Clause in part because “[a] person approached by officers

leaving a patrol car emblazoned with this seal could reasonably assume that the

officers were Christian police. . . . A follower of any non-Christian religion

might well question the officers’ ability to provide even-handed treatment. A

citizen with no strong religious conviction might conclude that secular benefit

could be obtained by becoming a Christian.”). And the significant size of the

cross would only heighten this concern.

Defendants point to four contextualizing facts that, they argue, render these

cross memorials sufficiently secular to pass constitutional muster: (1) these

displays are clearly intended as memorials; (2) they are located in areas where

similar memorials have long been displayed; (3) many of the designers and

producers of these displays do not revere the cross as a symbol of their faith; and

(4) a majority of Utahns do not revere the cross as a symbol of their faith.

Although we agree that some of these contextual elements may help reduce the

message of religious endorsement conveyed by these displays, we think that these

displays nonetheless have the impermissible effect of conveying to the reasonable

observer that the State prefers or otherwise endorses Christianity.

28
 i. These Displays are Clearly Intended as Memorials

Defendants argue that the placement of these displays, in combination with

the troopers’ names emblazoned on the crosses and the biographical information

included in these displays, clearly conveys the message, instead, that these

crosses are designed as memorials and, therefore, that they do not convey a

message of religious endorsement. We agree that a reasonable observer would

recognize these memorial crosses as symbols of death. However, we do not agree

that this nullifies their religious sectarian content because a memorial cross is not

a generic symbol of death; it is a Christian symbol of death that signifies or

memorializes the death of a Christian. The parties agree that a cross was

traditionally a Christian symbol of death and, despite Defendants’ assertions to

the contrary, there is no evidence in the record that the cross has been universally

embraced as a marker for the burial sites of non-Christians or as a memorial for a

non-Christian’s death. The UHPA acknowledges that when it asserts that it would

honor the request made by a Jewish state trooper’s family to memorialize him

with a Star of David rather than a cross.

The State Defendants point to the use of crosses as markers for fallen

soldiers as evidence that the cross has become a secular symbol of death.

However, the evidence in the record shows that the military provides soldiers and

their families with a number of different religious symbols that they may use on

government-issued headstones or markers. Even in the American military

29
cemeteries overseas, which include rows and rows of white crosses, fallen Jewish

service members are memorialized instead with a Star of David. Thus, while the

cross may be a common symbol used in markers and memorials, there is no

evidence that it is widely accepted as a secular symbol.

Defendants and some of the amici urge this court to treat memorial crosses

in much the same way as the Supreme Court has treated Christmas trees and

historical displays that include depictions of the Ten Commandments. These

arguments are unpersuasive. Courts have consistently treated Christmas as both a

religious and secular holiday, and many courts have cited Justice Blackmun’s

statement that “[a]lthough Christmas trees once carried religious connotations,

today they typify the secular celebration of Christmas.” County of Allegheny,

492 U.S. at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see, e.g., Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d

471, 485 (6th Cir. 2002); American Civil Liberties Union v. Schundler, 104 F.3d

1435, 1442 (3rd Cir. 1997). Unlike Christmas, which has been widely embraced

as a secular holiday, however, there is no evidence in this case that the cross has

been widely embraced by non-Christians as a secular symbol of death. We

cannot, therefore, conclude that the cross—which has a long history as a

predominantly religious symbol—conveys in this context a secular meaning that

can be divorced from its religious significance. Compare Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at

1034 (concluding that the city of Las Cruces’s use of a three-cross symbol did not

violate the Establishment Clause at least in part because “symbols containing

30
multiple crosses identify many secular businesses with the Las Cruces

community”), with Koenik v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 266 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999)

(rejecting the argument that Easter, like Christmas, had been embraced as a

secular holiday because the “record [wa]s devoid” of evidence that there was a

significant “number of persons for whom the holiday has no religious significance

but who nonetheless celebrate the occasion in some manner”).

Similarly, the memorial crosses at issue here cannot be meaningfully

compared to the Ten Commandments display that the Supreme Court upheld in

Van Orden. The display at issue in Van Orden was part of a historical

presentation of various legal and cultural texts and, in that context, the

“nonreligious aspects of the tablets’ message [] predominate[d]” over any

religious purpose or effect. 545 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring). In this case,

on the other hand, the crosses stand alone, adorned with the state highway patrol

insignia and some information about the trooper who died there.

ii. Roadside Memorials Often Use the Symbol of
the Cross and, in that Context, Crosses are not
Seen as Religious Symbols

Defendants argue that crosses are a fairly common symbol used in roadside

memorials and, in that context, they are seen as secular symbols. However, the

mere fact that the cross is a common symbol used in roadside memorials does not

mean it is a secular symbol. There is no evidence that non-Christians have

embraced the use of crosses as roadside memorials. Further, there is no evidence

31
that any state has allowed memorial crosses to be erected on public property that,

like the memorials at issue in this case, display the official insignia of a state

entity. Finally, even if we might consider a roadside cross generally to be a

secular symbol of death, the memorial crosses at issue in this case appear to be

much larger than the crosses typically found on the side of public roads.

Defendants provided a statement from a representative of the Montana American

Legion White Cross Highway Fatality Marker Program in support of their claim

that roadside crosses are common, recognizable symbols of highway fatalities.

The cross memorials at issue here are ten times as large as those crosses, which

are only between twelve and sixteen inches in height. The massive size of the

crosses displayed on Utah’s rights-of-way and public property unmistakably

conveys a message of endorsement, proselytization, and aggrandizement of

religion that is far different from the more humble spirit of small roadside

crosses. 14

iii. The Designers and Producers of These
Displays do not Revere the Cross as a Symbol of
their Faith

14
In fact, the massive size of these displays is such a deviation from the
normal memorials of death seen on the sides of roads that they may convey to the
reasonable observer a Christian religious symbol. Defendants assert the crosses
must be as large as they are so motorists passing by at 55-plus miles per hour can
see them. But the size far exceeds the size necessary to be seen from the
highway. And, not all of the memorials are located near a highway. For example,
several are located near a UHP office. The size of those crosses is particularly
troubling.

32
 Nor are we persuaded of the significance of the fact that many of the

designers and producers of these displays do not revere the cross as a symbol of

their faith. As the Supreme Court recently explained, “[b]y accepting a privately

donated monument and placing it on [state] property, a [state] engages in

expressive conduct, but the intended and perceived significance of that conduct

may not coincide with the thinking of the monument’s donor or creator.”

Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1136. Thus, the designers’ purpose in creating

the displays at issue in this case may not always coincide with the displays’ likely

effect on the reasonable observer. We conclude that is the case here.

iv. Christians who Revere the Cross are a
Minority in Utah

Similarly, the fact that cross-revering Christians are a minority in Utah

does not mean that it is implausible that the State’s actions would be interpreted

by the reasonable observer as endorsing that religion. In County of Allegheny,

the Supreme Court held that Pittsburgh did not violate the Establishment Clause

by placing a Channukah menorah on its property. However, in a vote-counting

exercise, Justice Blackmun explained, in a portion of the opinion which no other

Justice joined, that his conclusion that this “display cannot be interpreted as

endorsing Judaism alone does not mean, however, that it is implausible, as a

general matter, for a city like Pittsburgh to endorse a minority faith.” 492 U.S. at

616 n.64 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Similarly, in her concurrence, Justice

33
O’Connor noted that

[r]egardless of the plausibility of a putative governmental purpose, the
more important inquiry here is whether the governmental display of a
minority faith’s religious symbol could ever reasonably be understood
to convey a message of endorsement of that faith. A menorah standing
alone at city hall may well send such a message to nonadherents, just
as in this case the crèche standing alone at the Allegheny County
Courthouse sends a message of governmental endorsement of
Christianity . . . .

Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Three other Justices found that, in fact, the

menorah/Christmas tree display violated the constitution, concluding that the

city’s display of Christmas and Hanukkah symbols was “the very kind of double

establishment that the First Amendment was designed to outlaw.” Id. at 655

(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, a majority of the

Justices in County of Allegheny determined that a city could violate the

Establishment Clause by publicly displaying the symbol of a religion whose

members constituted a mere 12% of that city’s population. See id. at 616 n.64

(noting that Jews constituted 45,000 of Pittsburgh’s population of 387,000, or

approximately 12% of the population) (Blackmun, J., concurring). In this case,

the parties agree that cross-revering Christians comprise approximately 18% of

the population in Utah, which is greater than the percentage of Jews in Pittsburgh

at the time of the Court’s decision in County of Allegheny. Thus, the fact that

most Utahns do not revere the cross as a symbol of their faith does not mean that

the State cannot violate the Establishment Clause by conduct that has the effect of

34
promoting the cross and, thereby, the religious groups that revere it.

This appears to be especially true in this case because members of the

majority LDS Church “may not necessarily share the same sensitivity to the

symbol [of the cross] as a Jewish family.” American Atheists, 528 F. Supp. 2d at

1256 n.6. Although the evidence indicates that LDS Church members do not use

the cross as a symbol of their religion, they do “remember with reverence the

suffering of the Savior.” (Aplt. App. at 2241.) And, in any event, there are many

cross-revering Christians and many non-Christians for whom the Roman cross has

an unmistakable Christian meaning.

These factors that Defendants point to as secularizing the memorials do not

sufficiently diminish the crosses’s message of government’s endorsement of

Christianity that would be conveyed to a reasonable observer. Therefore, the

memorials violate the Establishment Clause.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s decision granting summary

judgment for Defendants, and REMAND the case to the district court to enter

judgment for Plaintiffs consistent with this opinion.

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