NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AUG 18 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
LEE V. QUILLAR, No. 08-15414 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. CV-04-01203-FCD/KJM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Frank C. Damrell, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 10, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: TROTT and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and MAHAN, **
District Judge.
While in state custody in California, Lee Quillar received several
disciplinary citations for wearing a beard. Quillar has consistently maintained that
he wears the beard for religious reasons. The prison regulations Quillar violated
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable James C. Mahan, United States District Judge for the
District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
have since been amended such that Quillar’s beard is no longer a violation. The
disciplinary citations remain in Quillar’s file. His primary claim before this court
is for injunctive relief to expunge references to those citations from his file, based
on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). The
district court dismissed that claim for want of Article III jurisdiction. Quillar also
appeals the district court’s denials of his motion to appoint counsel and his motion
to obtain limited discovery.
We hold that the district court has Article III jurisdiction over Quillar’s
claim for injunctive relief to expunge the disciplinary records. The government
does not argue that Quillar’s rights under RLUIPA were not violated when the
discipline occurred. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005)
(granting preliminary injunction of similar grooming regulation because of
substantial likelihood of success on RLUIPA claim). That violation was an injury-
in-fact sufficient for Article III standing. Quillar’s claim is ripe because the
potentially harmful references to his disciplinary citations are already in his file.
Quillar’s claim is not mooted by the change in prison regulations because the
existence of the disciplinary records is “an ongoing ‘effect’” of the RLUIPA
violation. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d
1260, 1275 (9th Cir. 1998).
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We also hold that Quillar’s claim for injunctive relief is not barred by Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Quillar alleges that the prison violated his
RLUIPA rights when it disciplined him. This is not a challenge to “the fact or
duration of his confinement.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005).
We remand Quillar’s RLUIPA claim for expungement to the district court
for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Quillar’s
motion for appointment of counsel. However, we suggest that the district court
consider appointing counsel on remand, given the nature of the legal questions
presented.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Quillar’s
motion for limited discovery.
In sum, we reverse and remand as to the district court’s dismissal, for lack of
jurisdiction, of Quillar’s RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief. We affirm the district
court as to the motion to appoint counsel and as to the motion for limited
discovery. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
REVERSED, in part, AFFIRMED, in part, and REMANDED.
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