RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
File Name: 10a0265p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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X
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JOHN W. BABLER; VICTOR BAFFONI; JAMES
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R. CUMBY; JOHN D. FITZGERALD;
CONSTANTINO A. IANNONE, -
Plaintiffs-Appellees, -
No. 09-4455
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>
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v.
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MALCOLM B. FUTHEY, JR., Individually and
in his official capacity; EXECUTIVE BOARD OF -
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THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION; JAMES
capacity; JOHN RISCH, Individually and in his -
HUSTON, Individually and in his official
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official capacity; JOSEPH BODA, JR., -
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Individually and in his official capacity;
official capacity; KEVIN GORING, Individually -
STEPHEN T. DAWSON, Individually and in his
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and in his official capacity, -
Defendants-Appellants. -
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N
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 08-00912—John R. Adams, District Judge.
Argued: June 15, 2010
Decided and Filed: August 25, 2010
Before: SILER and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; REEVES, District Judge.*
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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Joseph Guerrieri, Jr., GUERRIERI, CLAYMAN, BARTOS & PARCELLI,
P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Joyce Goldstein, GOLDSTEIN GRAGEL,
LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Joseph Guerrieri, Jr., Elizabeth A.
*
The Honorable Danny C. Reeves, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, sitting by designation.
1
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 2
Roma, Jeffrey A. Bartos, GUERRIERI, CLAYMAN, BARTOS & PARCELLI, P.C.,
Washington, D.C., Charles R. Both, LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES R. BOTH,
Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Joyce Goldstein, Gina Fraternali, GOLDSTEIN
GRAGEL, LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees.
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OPINION
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SILER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is brought under the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (“LMRDA”). Defendants
Malcolm B. Futhey, Jr., the United Transportation Union (“UTU”) Executive Board,
James Huston, John Risch, Joseph Boda, Jr., Stephen T. Dawson, and Kevin Goring
(collectively “Defendants”) appeal the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction
in favor of Plaintiffs John W. Babler, Victor Baffoni, James R. Cumby, and Constantino
A. Iannone (collectively “Plaintiffs”).1 Because we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The UTU is a labor union representing the operating employees of freight and
passenger railways. This litigation arises out of a power struggle among UTU
international officers relating to the UTU’s proposed merger with the Sheet Metal
Workers International Association (“SMWIA”). In 2004, Paul Thompson became the
international president of the UTU. Upon taking office, Thompson explored the
possibility of merging the UTU with another labor union in an effort to bolster its
bargaining strength and political influence. The UTU ultimately entered into
negotiations with the SMWIA. In June 2007, Thompson presented a proposed merger
agreement between the UTU and the SMWIA at the UTU’s regional meeting. The
merger agreement stated that the two entities would merge to become the International
Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers (“SMART”).
1
Plaintiff John D. Fitzgerald is not a party to this appeal.
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 3
SMART would have a new constitution which would essentially be the SMWIA’s
constitution with the UTU’s constitution appended and would be governed by officers
from both of the former unions. The UTU’s board of directors listened to Thompson’s
presentation and voted to submit the merger agreement to the UTU membership for their
approval in accordance with the UTU constitution.
Pursuant to the merger agreement and the UTU’s constitution, the proposed
merger and the SMART constitution had to be approved by the UTU membership. The
UTU constitution stipulates that the membership be provided with copies, by mail, of
any agreements or merger documents that they were asked to ratify in a referendum. The
UTU membership received an initial email that summarized the merger agreement and
a later mailing that contained the merger agreement, supporting materials, and
instructions for telephone and electronic voting. The UTU constitution and the SMWIA
constitution were not included in the mailing sent to the UTU members, but both were
posted on the UTU’s website throughout the voting period. Although it was referred to
in the merger agreement, a final version of the SMART constitution was not provided
to the UTU membership before the merger was voted on. The merger was ultimately
approved on a vote of 8,625 to 3,472.
From August 13 to August 17, 2007, the UTU held its quadrennial convention,
where UTU international officers were elected and amendments to the UTU constitution
were considered. In anticipation of the merger being consummated, the UTU’s election
process was modified. Rather than electing the customary fifteen international vice
presidents, only nine international vice presidents were elected at the convention. The
UTU membership also chose a new international president, assistant president, general
secretary and treasurer, and national legislative director. These officers were to become
SMART vice presidents when the merger was consummated.
On December 3, 2007, Dale Edward Michael, John R. Hasenauer, Roy G.
Arnold, and Jimmy D. Eubanks (collectively “Michael Plaintiffs”) filed suit against
Thompson and the UTU in the Southern District of Illinois, claiming that the pending
merger with the SMWIA was unlawful because the UTU membership was not given
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 4
sufficient information with which to evaluate the implications of the merger. The
Michael Plaintiffs sought declaratory and emergency injunctive relief. The case was
later transferred to the Northern District of Ohio, where the UTU is headquartered.
Shortly after the suit was filed, the officers who were elected at the UTU
convention took office, with Futhey succeeding Thompson as international president.
The Michael Plaintiffs petitioned the district court to substitute Futhey for Thompson as
a defendant. Futhey had previously indicated that he was favorably disposed to the
Michael Plaintiffs’ position as he had submitted a declaration on their behalf and
expressed opposition to the merger process. In reaction to this motion, John W. Babler,
Victor Baffoni, Roy G. Boling, James R. Cumby, John D. Fitzgerald, Constantino A.
Iannone, and James M. Brunkenhoefer (collectively “Babler Plaintiffs”)–all of whom
supported the merger–moved to intervene in the case because they were concerned that
Futhey would not defend the merger against the Michael Plaintiffs’ claims. The district
court ultimately substituted Futhey for Thompson and granted the Babler Plaintiffs’
motion to intervene.
On June 26, 2008, the district court granted the Michael Plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction to restrain the UTU from consummating the merger with the
SMWIA. This preliminary injunction was appealed to the Sixth Circuit. On December
22, 2009, our court issued three separate opinions, with the court reaching the result of
reversing the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction and dismissing the
action.
While the appeal in the Michael litigation was pending, several union members
filed internal union charges against the Babler Plaintiffs. The charges brought against
the Babler Plaintiffs alleged violations of the UTU constitution and included a request
that the Babler Plaintiffs have their UTU membership revoked. At the time these
charges were filed, Babler, Baffoni, Boling, Cumby, Fitzgerald, and Iannone held elected
union office as international vice presidents and members of the board of directors.
Brunkenhoefer held the elected office of national legislative director and also served on
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 5
the board of directors. The Babler Plaintiffs claim that, at the time, they represented a
voting majority of the board of directors.
In response to the internal union charges and pursuant to the LMRDA, the Babler
Plaintiffs filed this suit against Futhey, the UTU Executive Board and its members, and
the UTU members who filed the internal union charges against them. On January 12,
2009, the Babler Plaintiffs filed their initial motion for injunctive relief to preclude the
UTU executive board from conducting an internal union trial, alleging that the charges
were retaliatory and would violate the LMRDA by chilling free speech and preventing
union members’ free participation in litigation. On February 2, 2009, the district court
denied the Babler Plaintiffs’ initial motion for a preliminary injunction without prejudice
to renewing the motion after the conclusion of the disciplinary trial.
The executive board held the internal union trial in February and May 2009.2 On
July 10, 2009, the executive board issued its opinion, finding that Plaintiffs, acting as
officers of the UTU, had violated Articles 16, 18, 23, and 28 of the UTU’s constitution.
Articles 16 outlines the duties of the international president. The executive board found
that Plaintiffs violated Article 16 by seeking to usurp the international president’s
authority by acting in conjunction with the SMWIA to oppose his policies with respect
to the merger. Article 18 outlines the duties of international vice presidents. The
executive board found that Plaintiffs violated Article 18 by failing to carry out
presidential directives and taking a different position than the international president in
the Michael litigation. Article 23 outlines the duties of the board of directors, which
include the power to consider and implement plans of unification, affiliation, or merger
with another labor union. The executive board found that Plaintiffs violated Article 23
by exceeding their authority to determine UTU policy in connection with the merger.
Article 28 prohibits UTU officers, members, and subordinate bodies from resorting to
civil courts until all appeals have been made in accordance with the UTU constitution.
The executive board found that Plaintiffs improperly resorted to opposing the
2
Fitzgerald resigned prior to the commencement of the internal union appeal.
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 6
international president’s policy decision in court rather than first pursuing any appeal
rights they may have had within the union.
The executive board’s key findings are summarized as follows in its opinion:
On January 1, 2008, Mike Futhey took office and determined that the
Michael litigation should be settled and that the membership should have
a new ratification vote after the negotiation of the SMART
Constitution. . . . Despite the newly announced UTU policy, on January
16, 2008, you filed a Motion to Intervene in the Michael case. . . . Under
Article 28 of the UTU Constitution, you should not have resorted to the
Court in opposition to President Futhey’s policy. . . . As officers, you
were obliged to pursue your appeal rights within the Union before
proceeding to the Court. Each of you knew or should have known that
taking a position in federal court contrary to the President of our union
and dealing directly with another union without the consent of the
President went far beyond your free speech rights or ability to
dissent. . . . The crux of this matter is your incorrect interpretation of the
UTU Constitution. . . . Only the President may interpret the Constitution.
Your persistent effort to expand your role under Article 23 and to usurp
the proper prerogatives of the President make evident your failure to
faithfully carry forward the policy of the UTU. . . . Each of you violated
your oath of office in failing to carry out Presidential directives, and as
officers, not as members, taking a position different than that of the
President and the UTU both with the SMWIA and in litigation.
Moreover, by taking money from SMWIA to litigate against your own
union as officers, you are not fulfilling your fiduciary duty and oath of
undivided loyalty to the UTU.
The executive board was careful to stipulate that its decision should not be
construed as restricting a member’s right to challenge and debate a policy of the Union.
Rather, the executive board indicated that only officers were under a heightened
obligation to fully support the policies of the UTU as articulated by the international
president. Having determined that Plaintiffs had violated the UTU constitution, the
executive board removed them from their elected offices. The UTU filled Plaintiffs’
positions by elevating a number of assistant vice presidents.
On July 17, 2009, Plaintiffs renewed their motion for a preliminary injunction.
The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and ordered the UTU to restore Plaintiffs
to their union offices. Defendants then filed this timely appeal.
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 7
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court reviews a district court’s decision regarding a preliminary injunction
for an abuse of discretion. USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 98
(6th Cir. 1982). The district court considers and balances four factors in making its
decision: “(1) whether the plaintiff[s] [have] established a substantial likelihood or
probability of success on the merits; (2) whether there is a threat of irreparable harm to
the plaintiff[s]; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to
others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by granting injunctive relief.”
Hamilton’s Bogarts, Inc. v. Michigan, 501 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 2007). Under this
standard, the court reviews the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual
findings for clear error. Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke
Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir. 2007). The district court’s determination regarding
the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits is a question of law and is reviewed de
novo. Id. “However, the district court’s ultimate determination as to whether the four
preliminary injunction factors weigh in favor of granting or denying preliminary
injunctive relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
We will analyze the preliminary injunction factors to determine whether the
district court’s balancing of these factors constituted an abuse of discretion.3 See
Hamilton’s Bogarts, Inc., 501 F.3d at 649.
A. Probability of Success on the Merits
“The LMRDA was the product of congressional concern with widespread abuses
of power by union leadership.” Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Assoc. v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347,
352 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Title I of the LMRDA, the “Bill of
Rights” for union members, was “designed to guarantee every union member equal
voting rights, rights of free speech and assembly, and a right to sue.” United
3
Defendants’ argument that the district court committed legal error by applying the wrong legal
standard is not supported by the record.
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 8
Steelworkers of Am. v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 109 (1982). These provisions of the
LMRDA were calculated to provide “enlarged protection for members of unions
paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.” Finnegan v. Leu, 456
U.S. 431, 435 (1982). In providing these protections, “Congress sought to further the
basic objective of the LMRDA: ‘ensuring that unions [are] democratically governed and
responsive to the will of their memberships.’” Lynn, 488 U.S. at 352 (quoting Finnegan,
456 U.S. at 436).
Plaintiffs allege that, by discharging them from their elected union offices, the
UTU executive board chilled their free speech rights, guaranteed by 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)(2), and retaliated against them for exercising their right to sue, guaranteed by
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4). Defendants counter that the disciplinary proceedings were a
reasonable exercise of the union’s authority to adopt and enforce reasonable rules,
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), and to require members to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4).4
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right . . . to
express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of
the labor organization his views, . . . upon any business properly before
the meeting, subject to the organization’s established and reasonable
rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing
herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to
adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every
member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining
4
Defendants’ argument that the executive board’s disciplinary action is entitled to judicial
deference if it is supported by “some evidence” misapplies that standard of review. In Int’l Bhd. of
Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, and Helpers v. Hardeman, the Supreme Court
concluded that the “full and fair hearing” provision of 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) requires “the charging party
to provide some evidence at the disciplinary hearing to support the charges made.” 401 U.S. 233, 246
(1971). The “some evidence” standard of review is applied when, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5), a due
process or sufficiency of the evidence challenge is made to a union disciplinary proceeding. See id.; see
also Mayle v. Laborer’s Int’l Union of N. Am., 866 F.2d 144, 146 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[U]nion discipline is
presumed lawful so long as the charging party presents ‘some evidence’ that the member has committed
the charged offense.”). This case does not present a due process challenge to the UTU disciplinary
proceedings; rather, Plaintiffs claim that the disciplinary proceedings were invalid because they violated
the free-speech and right-to-sue provisions of the LMRDA. Consequently, the “some evidence” standard
is inapplicable to this case. See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 353-55 (noting that the Supreme Court did not apply
the “some evidence” standard in that case).
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 9
from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or
contractual obligations.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) provides, in pertinent part:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court . . . irrespective of whether or not the labor
organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in
such action or proceeding . . . : Provided, That any such member may be
required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a
four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting
legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any
officer thereof: And provided further, That no interested employer or
employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or
participate in, except as a party, any such action, proceeding, appearance,
or petition.
In Finnegan, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the discharge
of appointed union officials by the union president, following his election over the
candidate supported by the appointed officials, violated the LMRDA. 456 U.S. at 432.
The Supreme Court concluded that the overriding objective of the LMRDA was to
promote union democracy and that it was not intended to address the issue of union
patronage. Id. at 442. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the discharge of a
union employee from an appointed office did not violate the LMRDA. Id.
However, in Lynn, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether removal
of an elected union official, in retaliation for statements he made at a union meeting in
opposition to a dues increase sought by the union trustee, violated the LMRDA. 488
U.S. at 349. Distinguishing Finnegan, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
consequences of removing an elected official from office are much different than the
consequences of removing an appointed official. Id. at 355.
To begin with, when an elected official . . . is removed from his post, the
union members are denied the representative of their choice. . . .
Furthermore, the potential chilling effect on Title I free speech rights is
more pronounced when elected officials are discharged. Not only is the
fired official likely to be chilled in the exercise of his own free speech
rights, but so are the members who voted for him.
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 10
Id. Moreover, the overriding objective of the LMRDA, to promote union democracy,
would be thwarted if union members “concluded that one challenged the union’s
hierarchy, if at all, at one’s peril.” Id. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the
retaliatory removal of an elected union official from office stated a cause of action under
the LMRDA. Id.
In this case, the executive board’s disciplinary opinion boils down to an
indictment of Plaintiffs for taking a different position in litigation than the international
president with respect to the merger. The factual similarity between this case and Lynn
suggests that Plaintiffs have a high probability of success on the merits. Both cases
involve elected union officers who were discharged for opposing union policies.
Although Lynn involved a violation of the LMRDA’s free-speech provision and this case
involves both alleged violations of the LMRDA’s free-speech and right-to-sue
provisions, the principles articulated in Lynn are equally applicable in both contexts. See
Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749, 759-60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Although Lynn itself involved
§ 101(a)(2), there is no reason to suspect that its principles are not equally applicable to
§ 101(a)(4).”). Moreover, the executive board’s reasoning that, as UTU officers,
Plaintiffs had a special duty to support the policies of the international president even
if they might have personally opposed those policies, contravenes the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Lynn. See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 355 (“[T]he potential chilling effect on Title
I free speech rights is more pronounced when elected officials are discharged. Not only
is the fired official likely to be chilled in the exercise of his own free speech rights, but
so are the members who voted for him.”). The LMRDA was intended to promote union
democracy, with all of its inefficiencies, and not centralized union governance, with all
of its advantages. See id. (“[D]emocracy would be assured only if union members are
free to discuss union policies and criticize leadership without fear of reprisal.” (quoting
Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 112)).
The overarching context of Plaintiffs’ removal from their elected offices is the
power struggle within the UTU international leadership set off by the district court’s
preliminary injunction of the merger in the Michael litigation. This power struggle is
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 11
essentially a constitutional crisis regarding the division of power between the
international president and the board of directors as it relates to mergers. Both sides
have reasonable arguments in this debate. Article 16 of the UTU constitution provides
the international president with broad authority to set UTU policy. However, Article 23
is the only constitutional provision that mentions mergers, and it gives the board of
directors authority to consider and implement plans of merger with another labor union.
The UTU constitutional provisions for extraordinary situations divide power between
the international president and the board of directors. Under Article 16, the international
president has authority to “interpret all laws of the organization, decide all questions
arising there from, and decide all other controversies not provided for under the existing
laws of the organization, subject to appeal to the Board of Directors.” Similarly, Article
38 states that “[t]he International President, with the approval of the Board of Directors,
may take such action as may be deemed necessary to meet situations not covered in this
Constitution.”
The executive board attempted to resolve this constitutional crisis by ruling that
it is an offense, punishable by removal from office, for international vice presidents, who
also happened to represent a voting majority of the board of directors, to take a position
different from that of the international president. It is well established that courts are
reluctant “to substitute their judgment for that of union officials in the interpretation of
the union’s constitution, and will interfere only where the official’s interpretation is not
fair or reasonable.” Vestal v. Hoffa, 451 F.2d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 1971). However, in the
novel context of a disputed merger, it is unfair and unreasonable to employ disciplinary
proceedings to resolve a fairly close question regarding the proper allocation of power
among UTU international officers. This is the type of abuse of power by union
leadership that the LMRDA was passed to remedy. See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 352.
That Plaintiffs were retaliated against for exercising their LMRDA rights is
clearly evidenced by the executive board’s justification for its disciplinary actions. For
example, the executive board cannot plausibly claim that it was simply exercising the
union’s prerogative under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) to adopt and enforce reasonable rules
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 12
governing the responsibilities of its members. Unlike Sadlowski, where a rule enacted
by a union to prohibit candidates for union office from accepting campaign contributions
from nonmembers did not violate 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), this case does not involve a
clear violation of a pre-existing union rule. See Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 104-05, 121; see
also 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (noting that “reasonable rules” must also be “established”).
Rather, the executive board removed Plaintiffs from elected offices after determining,
in a post hoc interpretation of rather vague constitutional provisions, that Plaintiffs had
unconstitutionally usurped the authority of the international president. Moreover, it was
cynical for the executive board to discipline Plaintiffs on charges of dual unionism for
accepting financial assistance for litigation expenses from the SMWIA when the UTU
was in the midst of a merger with the SMWIA, especially because there is no clear
prohibition against or definition of dual unionism in the UTU constitution. See 29
U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (noting that another union is not an “interested employer or employer
association”). Finally, it was disingenuous for the executive board to discipline
Plaintiffs for failing to pursue their internal appeal rights before proceeding to federal
court. There was nothing for Plaintiffs to internally appeal. Indeed, Plaintiffs did not
initiate the Michael litigation; rather, they intervened in the litigation to defend the
merger after other UTU members initiated a suit to enjoin the consummation of the
merger. Thus, the executive board’s disciplinary action against Plaintiffs is not entitled
to deference because it was not a fair or reasonable exercise of the union’s disciplinary
authority. See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 355; Vestal, 451 F.2d at 709.
The factual similarities between this case and Lynn are compelling. The
executive board’s decision to remove Plaintiffs from their elected offices for intervening
in the Michael litigation and opposing the international president’s policies is the type
of anti-democratic action the LMRDA was intended to remedy. Thus, Plaintiffs have
a high probability of success on the merits of their LMRDA claims.
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 13
B. Threat of Irreparable Harm to Plaintiffs
The district court identified the following threats of harm to Plaintiffs caused by
their removal from office by the executive board: (1) monetary loss; (2) loss of
reputation and goodwill within the union; and (3) the chilling effect on Plaintiffs’
willingness to exercise their LMRDA rights. “The key word in this consideration is
irreparable. Mere injuries, however substantial in terms of money, time and energy
necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that
adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the
ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Lost wages are readily compensable and do not constitute irreparable harm. Id.
at 90-91. The threat of irreparable harm as a result of loss of reputation and goodwill
appears genuine, but it is difficult to assess based on the record. See id. at 91.
Nevertheless, the potential chilling effect on the guarantees of free speech and the right
to sue provided in the LMRDA constitutes a clear threat of irreparable harm to the
Plaintiffs. See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 353-55. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in
finding that Plaintiffs face a threat of irreparable harm.
C. Substantial Harm to Others
The district court determined that the preliminary injunction would not constitute
a hardship to those individuals who filled Plaintiffs’ offices after they were discharged,
because they would not have had a reasonable expectancy of holding the office of
international vice president. It also determined that preliminarily enjoining the executive
board’s actions would undermine the UTU’s right to govern itself and protect its
membership. Nevertheless, the district court ultimately concluded that the harm to
Defendants was outweighed by the threat of substantial harm to UTU members caused
by the potential chilling effect on their willingness to exercise their LMRDA rights. See
id.
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 14
The harm to the UTU’s governing institutions is real. A preliminary injunction
tends to undermine the legitimacy of the executive board; it calls into question the
division of authority among the UTU’s international leaders, and it highlights the
deficiencies of the UTU’s governing bodies to effectively deal with an organizational
crisis. With that said, the harm to the legitimacy of the executive board appears to be
well deserved. Moreover, the identified harms to the UTU organization are of the
variety that carry the potential of being a precursor of constructive organizational
change. At any rate, the district court did not clearly err in determining that the harm to
Defendants and others is outweighed by the threat of substantial harm to UTU members
caused by the potential chilling effect on their willingness to exercise their LMRDA
rights. See id. at 355.
D. The Public Interest
The district court did not making any clear factual findings regarding whether the
public interest would be served by granting injunctive relief, but it did conclude a risk
of harm to the union, or to the public, pales in comparison with the risk to Plaintiffs’
individual rights. The overarching public interests at stake in this dispute are the policies
that the courts should: (1) abstain from interfering with the internal management of labor
unions, and (2) protect fundamental rights of individual labor union members as set forth
in the LMRDA. See Sewell v. Grand Lodge of the Int’l Assoc. of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 445 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1971). Based on the facts of this case,
the public interest weighs in favor of protecting Plaintiffs’ individual rights as set forth
in the LMRDA.
E. Balancing Preliminary Injunction Factors
Plaintiffs have a high probability of success on the merits of their LMRDA
claims. The threat of irreparable harm to Plaintiffs, including the potential chilling effect
on the guarantees of free speech and the right to sue provided in the LMRDA, is clear
cut and strongly weighs in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief. The harm to
Defendants and others is outweighed by the threat of substantial harm caused by the
No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 15
potential chilling effect on UTU members’ willingness to exercise their LMRDA rights.
The public interest weighs in favor of protecting Plaintiffs’ individual rights over
noninterference with the internal management of the UTU. Thus, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
AFFIRMED.