[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10463 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar AUGUST 27, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cr-00088-SCB-EAJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JIMMIE LEE FORD, JR.,
a.k.a. Hood,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(August 27, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
A Middle District of Florida jury convicted Jimmie Lee Ford, Jr. on three
counts of distributing at least five grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and the district court sentenced him to prison for 130 months
on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. He now appeals his convictions
raising one issue:
Whether the district court committed legal error and misled the jury
as to the Government’s burden of proof when it defined ‘reasonable
doubt’ subjectively—that is, when it described the proof required in
terms of what a juror would rely upon in his or her own affairs?
The district court instructed on reasonable doubt in accordance with the
Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, as follows:
[A] real doubt, based on your reason and common sense after you’ve
carefully and impartially considered all the evidence in the case.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof so convincing that you
would be willing to rely and act on it without hesitation in the most
important of your own affairs. If you are convinced that the
Defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, say so.
If you are not convinced, say so.
11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instructions 3. We have repeatedly approved of this
definition of reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217,
1249-50 (affirming jury instructions that defined reasonable doubt as “proof of
such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely or act upon it
without hestitation in a decision involving the most important of your affairs.”);
United States v. Daniels, 968 F.2d 451, 457-58 (11th Cir. 1993), op. readopted on
2
reh’g, 5 F.3d 495, 496 (11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that the
“willing to act” language in this Circuit’s reasonable doubt instruction
impermissibly lowers the government’s burden of proof); United States v. Clayton,
643 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (5th Cir. 1981).
Since this panel is bound by these prior decisions, United States v. Steele,
147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc), we are obliged to sustain the
challenged jury instruction and affirm.
AFFIRMED.
3