United States v. Clay

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
___________

No. 09-3134
___________

United States of America, *
*
Plaintiff - Appellee, * Appeal from the United States
* District Court for the
v. * Eastern District of Arkansas.
*
Alvin Clay, * [PUBLISHED]
*
Defendant - Appellant. *
___________

Submitted: April 16, 2010
Filed: August 27, 2010
___________

Before LOKEN, BRIGHT, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
___________

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Alvin Clay of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371, and four counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1957. The district court1 sentenced him to five months’ imprisonment and ordered
him to pay $16,265.26 in restitution. Clay appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his convictions. He also argues the district court erred: (1) by
denying his motion for a new trial; (2) in its jury instructions; (3) in admitting

1
The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas.
evidence; (4) in excluding evidence; and (5) in denying his motion to suppress. We
affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background2

This case concerns a conspiracy to defraud purchasers of five homes in Little
Rock, Arkansas. The government charged three individuals for their roles in the
conspiracy: Clay, Raymond Nealy, and Donny McCuien (collectively referred to as
“the conspirators”). During the period of the conspiracy, Clay worked as a licensed
attorney in the State of Arkansas and also held a real estate and contractor’s license.
Nealy worked as a mortgage broker and owned a mortgage company. McCuien
managed a Burger King and owned a property management and construction
corporation.

Each of the five fraudulent home purchases proceeded in a similar manner.
Usually McCuien would find a purchaser for an inexpensive residential property. The
purchaser would be promised a no-risk transaction, wherein he or she would receive
some cash from closing. Nealy would then obtain financing in an amount
substantially greater than the asking price. Using fraudulent information and
frequently forging signatures, he would arrange for appraisals of the homes and
prepare contracts for sale. The contracts showed a sale price greater than the asking
price. The difference between the asking price and sale price would go to Clay
Construction Company for the renovation of the property.

At closing, the conspirators would fax a Clay Construction invoice to the
closing agent, even though the work claimed on the invoice had not been completed.
The invoice showed a difference between the amount loaned to the borrower and the

2
“We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts.” White
v. McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 574
F.3d 460, 465 (8th Cir. 2009)).

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amount paid to the seller. The closing agent would send Clay Construction Company
a check for the invoice amount. In total, the conspirators submitted five invoices to
title companies, and title companies subsequently issued five checks to Clay
Construction totaling $133,142.23. Clay received the checks, deposited them into
Clay Construction’s bank account, and divided the money among Nealy, McCuien,
and himself. The conspirators did not complete any work on any of the homes.

The FBI learned of this scheme when Kenny Wright, a tax preparer, became
concerned that he had unlawfully assisted the conspirators with preparing false
documents. Wright, accompanied by his attorney, approached the government,
admitting that he had falsified tax documents and participated in the fraudulent
scheme by preparing false construction invoices. Wright provided the FBI with the
conspirators’ names, the names of the conspirators’ businesses, Clay’s social security
number, and documentation of the illegal activity.

FBI agents subsequently executed a search warrant for Clay’s law office and
Nealy’s mortgage company, seizing twenty boxes of documents and seven computers.
As a result of the search, the government sought a federal grand jury indictment.

The grand jury returned an indictment in December 2004, a first superseding
indictment in November 2005, and a second superseding indictment in June 2007.
The second superseding indictment alleged that Nealy and McCuien solicited
individuals to purchase five homes and used fraudulent documentation when applying
for financing through Nealy’s mortgage company. According to the indictment, the
conspirators caused false offers to purchase and false invoices to be delivered to the
title companies. The invoices claimed that work had been completed on the homes,
even though no work had been done. It also alleged that Nealy and Clay had
defrauded the purchasers of the five homes.3

3
The second superseding indictment only named Clay and Nealy as defendants.
McCuien pled guilty before the return of the second superseding indictment.

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 Before trial, Clay moved to suppress evidence seized in the search of his office
and to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that it failed to state an offense and was
the product of prosecutorial retaliation. In support of his retaliation claim, Clay
alleged he had been involved in a contentious litigation with the same prosecutor who
initiated the criminal investigation of Clay. After Clay filed these motions, the
Western District of Arkansas assumed responsibility for the Eastern District of
Arkansas’s case. Following a hearing, the district court denied Clay’s motions.

The government tried Clay separately from Nealy. More than thirty witnesses
testified during the seven-day trial. The court denied Clay’s motions for judgment of
acquittal at the close of the government’s case-in-chief and at the close of the trial.
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Clay moved for a judgment of acquittal and
for a new trial. The district court held a hearing on these motions. At the hearing,
Clay argued that McCuien had perjured himself at trial. The district court denied both
motions. Clay appeals his convictions.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Clay argues the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support
the conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

This court reviews sufficiency of the evidence de novo and reverses only if no
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty. United States v. Elzahabi, 557
F.3d 879, 885 (8th Cir. 2009). “Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the government, it offers substantial support for
the verdict.” United States v. Slaughter, 128 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 1997). “It is
axiomatic that we do not pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be
given their testimony.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted).

McCuien was named as a coconspirator, along with other persons known and
unknown to the grand jury.

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 To convict Clay of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the government needed
to prove: “(1) a conspiracy with an illegal purpose existed; (2) [Clay] knew of the
conspiracy; and (3) [Clay] knowingly joined and participated in the conspiracy.”
United States v. Price, 542 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 2008).

Clay raises two arguments. We address each in turn.

A.

Clay first argues he did not participate in the delivery, nor did he know about
the fraudulent documents Nealy and McCuien sent to lenders and title companies.
Clay maintains that he was only connected to the lenders through the Clay
Construction invoices which he contends were immaterial to the lenders’ decisions to
loan money to the purchasers. Therefore, he argues, no loan proceeds were
transmitted by wire communications as a result of his involvement.

We disagree with Clay that he needed to be directly involved in the
transmission of loan proceeds from the lenders to the title companies. To be guilty of
a conspiracy, he need not have knowledge of every detail of the conspiracy. Rather,
the government needed to establish that the participants agreed to the essential nature
of the conspiracy. See Slaughter, 128 F.3d at 628 (requiring that the government
prove that the defendant knew the essential object of the conspiracy).

The government introduced evidence that Clay received $27,500 as a result of
his partnership with McCuien and Nealy, yet he did not complete any work on any of
the homes. Clay admitted at trial that he listed himself as the “supervisor” of a
construction project on one of the Clay Construction invoices that the conspirators
sent to a title company even though he was not present on any job sites, nor did he
supervise any subcontractors or workers. The evidence further established that the
title companies relied on these invoices to send a check to Clay Construction for the

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difference between the amount loaned to the borrower and the amount paid to the
seller, and Clay admitted that he bore responsibility for the invoices. Clay then
deposited the checks from the title companies into his Clay Construction Company
checking account and immediately wrote checks to himself, Nealy, and McCuien.

Clay may not have known every detail of the conspiracy. But the law does not
require such knowledge. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947)
(“[T]he law rightly gives room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon
showing sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it,
without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation of
others.”). The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that
Clay intended to assist McCuien and Nealy with defrauding others out of money, he
knew the essential object of the conspiracy, and that it was reasonably foreseeable that
interstate wire communications would be used. See Slaughter, 128 F.3d at 627
(providing for the insufficiency of the evidence standard). We reject Clay’s
sufficiency of the evidence claim.

B.

Clay next argues that the government failed to prove he conspired to commit
wire fraud because the government only proved that he defrauded the purchasers. He
asserts that the purchasers were not victims because they knowingly participated in
the fraud by falsely representing their intention to live in the homes they were
purchasing and provided false information about their finances.

But the purchasers’ testimony negates Clay’s claim. The purchasers testified
that they purchased the homes because McCuien told them they could make money
in real estate and that several of them were harmed by the conspiracy. Further,
McCuien admitted that the purchasers were never informed that the conspirators
received money from the title companies and that they split the money amongst

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themselves. McCuien testified that they did not tell the purchasers because they
wanted to keep the money for themselves. We conclude that the testimony supports
the jury’s verdict that McCuien, Nealy, and Clay engaged in a conspiracy to defraud
the purchasers and that the purchasers were harmed by the conspiracy.

Finally, Clay provides no authority for his proposition that the purchasers could
not be the victim of a conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The substantive statute for
wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, does not specify who must be the victim of the wire
fraud. The statute states:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to
be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in
interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

The government charged Clay with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and the second
superseding indictment clearly states that the conspirators engaged in a scheme to
defraud the purchasers of the homes. Because Clay has not established he must
defraud a lender to be found guilty of the conspiracy, and the evidence clearly
establishes that purchasers suffered harm as a result of the conspiracy, we reject
Clay’s argument and affirm the conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud.4

4
Clay argues in a footnote that this court should set aside the money laundering
convictions on insufficient evidence grounds, but he does not explain what elements
the government failed to prove. We have carefully reviewed the record and are
satisfied that the government proved that Clay knowingly engaged or attempted to
engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than
$10,000, and that the property was derived from unlawful activity. See 18 U.S.C. §
1957.

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 III. Motion for a New Trial

Clay argues the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because
McCuien testified against him and McCuien lacked credibility. At trial, McCuien
testified he had no experience in construction. After trial, Clay presented the court
evidence that McCuien actively participated in construction and home repair.

But Clay’s post-trial attack on McCuien’s credibility merely amounts to
impeachment evidence. “[N]ewly discovered evidence which is merely impeaching
normally cannot form the basis for a new trial.” United States v. Bonadonna, 775 F.2d
949, 957 (8th Cir. 1985). Further, the district court determined that a jury could infer
that Clay participated in the conspiracy based on reasons unrelated to McCuien’s
testimony: (1) Clay had complete control over the $133,142 he deposited into the
Clay Construction account; (2) the manner in which the conspirators distributed the
proceeds indicated that no work had been done on the five houses; and (3) none of the
indicia of a legitimate construction project were present. We conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clay’s motion for a new trial. See United
States v. Huerta-Orozco, 272 F.3d 561, 566 (8th Cir. 2001).

IV. Jury Instruction

The district court instructed the jury on whether Clay acted knowingly:

You may find that Alvin Clay acted knowingly if you find beyond
a reasonable doubt that Alvin Clay was aware of a high probability that
money or property was being obtained under false or fraudulent
pretenses and that he deliberately avoided learning the truth. The
element of knowledge may be inferred if Alvin Clay deliberately closed
his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. You may
not find Alvin Clay acted “knowingly” if you find he was merely
negligent, careless, or mistaken as to whether money or property was
being obtained under false or fraudulent pretenses.

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 You may not find that Alvin Clay acted knowingly if you find that
he actually believed that money or property was not being obtained
under false or fraudulent purposes.

Clay argues this instruction requires reversal for two reasons.5

A. Reasonable Doubt

First, Clay contends the instruction undermined the reasonable doubt standard,
because the use of the phrase “aware by a high probability” misled the jury on the
definition of “reasonable doubt.”

The term reasonable doubt “defies easy explication.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511
U.S. 1, 5 (1994). The Supreme Court explained:

The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due
process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining
reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.
Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the
defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution
does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the
jury of the government’s burden of proof. Rather, “taken as a whole, the
instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt
to the jury.”

Id. (citations omitted).

We conclude Clay failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
in instructing the jury on the reasonable doubt standard as it pertained to whether Clay
acted knowingly. See United States v. Rehak, 589 F.3d 965, 972 (8th Cir. 2009)
(providing for an abuse of discretion standard of review). This instruction did not
5
Clay also briefly argues this instruction shifted the burden of proof. We find
no merit to this argument.

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merely require that the jury find a “high probability” that Clay committed the
offenses. Rather, the instruction stated that the jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt “that Alvin Clay was aware of a high probability” that money was being
fraudulently obtained.

Moreover, the district court instructed the jury on the reasonable doubt standard
in Jury Instruction #5:

A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common
sense, and not the mere possibility of innocence. A reasonable doubt is
the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a
convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely
and act upon it. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not
mean proof beyond all possible doubt.

Clay does not argue the district court erred in its reasonable doubt instruction,
nor can we discern any mistake in law on this instruction. Further, Clay has not
established that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in
an unconstitutional manner. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 6 (“The constitutional question
. . . is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions
to allow conviction based on [insufficient proof].”). We conclude that the jury
instructions, taken as a whole, correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to
the jury. See id. at 5.

B. Willful Blindness Instruction

Clay next argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that it
could infer knowledge of the conspiracy if it found Clay “deliberately closed his eyes
to what would otherwise have been obvious to him.” He maintains this willful
blindness instruction undermined the requirement for knowledge and intent.

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 “A willful blindness instruction is appropriate when the defendant asserts a lack
of guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance.”
United States v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation and quotations
omitted). “Ignorance is deliberate if the defendants were presented with facts putting
them on notice criminal activity was particularly likely and yet intentionally failed to
investigate.” United States v. Whitehill, 532 F.3d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 2008). Evidence
is sufficient to support such an instruction “if a jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt the defendants had either actual knowledge of the illegal activity or deliberately
failed to inquire about it before taking action to support the activity.” Id. “If
reasonable inferences support a finding the failure to investigate is equivalent to
‘burying one’s head in the sand,’ the jury may consider willful blindness as a basis for
knowledge.” Id. (quoting Gruenberg, 989 F.2d at 974).

Here, the district court deemed such an instruction appropriate, reasoning:

There were at least two invoices that were shown to Mr. Clay where they
said supervised by Alvin Clay, and he admitted he had those
contemporaneously with getting paid and he knows that he didn’t
supervise any work and did not inquire about any of that. And so that’s
evidence of some misrepresentation and deliberately looking away.
The other thing that -- the other part of the evidence that bothered
-- that made me think this might be an appropriate instruction had to do
with the first transaction with Linda Jones in which Clay Construction
Company got whatever the amount of the check was, I don’t remember,
and then got three cashier’s checks for Ray Nealy’s mother and to have
that request of a general contractor from a subcontractor, don’t pay me,
don’t pay my materialmen, don’t pay my laborers, you know, write out
three cashier’s checks for my mother, that’s the sort of thing that not
inquiring about that seems to me evidence that would support giving that
instruction.

Trial Tr. 1095-96.

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 Based on these facts, we agree with the district court that a jury could
reasonably conclude that Clay either knew of the illegal activity or buried his head in
the sand. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in providing a willful
blindness instruction.6

V. Admission of Evidence

Clay argues the district court erred by admitting evidence that he had engaged
in fraud when securing his contractor’s license. He complains that the district court
should not have permitted testimony from four witnesses who testified about the
manner in which Clay obtained his contractor’s license because it violated Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b).

Gregory Crow, the administrator of the Arkansas Contractors Licensing Board,
testified that Clay applied for a contractor’s license in 2001. Crow testified that the
application required that Clay submit references from individuals for whom he had
completed work. Clay’s application listed Pat Joyner, Earl Jones, and Allan Nelson
as references and included each of their alleged signatures. Crow testified that Clay
swore on his application that his answers were true. Crow further testified that the

6
Clay also briefly argues that his convictions for money laundering should be
set aside because the jury instructions misstated an element of the money laundering
offense. He relies on United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008) (plurality
opinion), which the Supreme Court decided on the fifth day of his trial. The Court in
Santos determined ambiguous the term “proceeds,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and
that “proceeds” should be defined as “profits.” Id. at 2024-25.
Clay asserts that the district court should have instructed the jury that the term
“proceeds” meant “profits.” Because Clay did not request this instruction, we review
his claim for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Clay
has not established that the error, if any, affected the outcome of the proceedings. It
seems unlikely that this definition affected the verdict because Clay’s defense was not
that he did not “profit” at least $10,000. Rather, Clay defended the charges by arguing
that he did not knowingly participate in the money laundering scheme.

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Licensing Board would not have issued Clay a contractor’s license if he included false
information on his application.

Three other witnesses testified briefly that they were listed as references for
Clay’s application although Clay did not perform work on their homes. Pat Joyner
testified that Clay never engaged in any contracting work for her, she did not fill out
a reference form for him, and she did not remember signing a reference form. Earl
Jones testified that he did not sign Clay’s reference form, did not authorize anyone to
submit the reference form on his behalf, and did not know of Clay’s experience in
construction. Allan Nelson similarly testified.

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of crimes by the
defendant which are not charged in the indictment are generally inadmissible. See
United States v. Clemons, 503 F.2d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 1974). “However, evidence of
other crimes is admissible for the purpose of providing the context in which the crime
occurred.” United States v. Forcelle, 86 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1996). As further
explained in United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted):

We have held that where evidence of other crimes is “so blended
or connected, with the one[s] on trial as that proof of one incidentally
involves the other[s]; or explains the circumstances; or tends logically to
prove any element of the crime charged,” it is admissible as an integral
part of the immediate context of the crime charged. When the other
crimes evidence is so integrated, it is not extrinsic and therefore is not
governed by Rule 404(b).

The government argues the district court correctly admitted the evidence
because the manner in which Clay obtained his contractor’s license was intrinsic
evidence of the fraudulent scheme upon which the wire fraud charges were based.
The government asserts that Clay held himself out to be a legitimate contractor and

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allowed Nealy to use his contractor’s license to bill homeowners for repairs that were
never completed.

We agree that the government’s evidence that Clay fraudulently obtained his
contractor’s license helped “complete the story” of how he and his co-defendants
allegedly committed wire fraud. The district court had a reasonable basis to admit this
intrinsic evidence because Clay held himself out to be a legitimate contractor and used
the license as part of the conspiracy. Thus, this evidence provided context for the
charged offenses. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this
testimony. See United States v. Johnson, 463 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2006)
(reviewing a district court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion).

VI. Exclusion of Evidence

Clay argues the government sought an indictment against him for these offenses
because of the original prosecutor’s animosity toward him, and that the district court
should have allowed him to present evidence of this vindictive prosecution to the jury.

The Eighth Circuit has not addressed whether claims of prosecutorial
vindictiveness should be addressed at trial. But other circuits have held that this issue
should be addressed before trial. See United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 579 (6th
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 446 (2006) (“[T]he district court’s motion in limine
was correct because the defense of selective prosecution is a matter that is independent
of a defendant’s guilt or innocence, so it is not a matter for the jury.”); United States
v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1973) (“By both tradition and constitutional
mandate the jury is given the responsibility of determining guilt or innocence
according to instructions of law delivered by the court. The question of
discriminatory prosecution relates not to the guilt or innocence of appellants, but
rather addresses itself to a constitutional defect in the institution of the prosecution.”).

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We agree that the selective prosecution of a criminal defendant is not an issue for the
jury to decide. Rather, the district court should consider the matter before trial.

We review the district court’s factual findings on a claim of prosecutorial
vindictiveness for clear error. See United States v. Leathers, 354 F.3d 955, 962 (8th
Cir. 2004). After holding a hearing on Clay’s selective prosecution claim, the district
court concluded the government had not engaged in selective prosecution. In reaching
this conclusion, the district court relied heavily on the testimony of the original
prosecutor and the prosecutor’s supervisor who both testified that they bore no animus
toward Clay.

The district court also found that the manner in which this case began indicated
that the prosecutor did not retaliate against Clay. This case began when Kenny
Wright, a tax preparer, became concerned that he might face criminal charges because
of his work for the conspirators. As a result of his concerns, Wright approached the
government to discuss the case and implicated all three men. These facts indicate that
the prosecutor did not “drum up” these charges against Clay; rather, a person involved
in the offense came forward to admit his wrongdoing.

The district court further found that the progression of this case also illustrated
that the prosecutor did not engage in vindictive prosecution. The FBI agent testified
that for several months he contacted this prosecutor to have the warrant reviewed, and
the prosecutor stated he did not have time to review it. The case was then reassigned
to a different prosecutor who eventually approved the affidavit. We agree with the
district court’s reasoning “[t]hat [the fact that the prosecutor] did not take the time to
review the affidavit for the search warrant is wholly inconsistent with Clay’s theory
that [the prosecutor] was hell-bent on revenge.”

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 Upon careful review, we are convinced that the district court adequately
considered Clay’s claim of selective prosecution pre-trial and its factual findings are
not clearly erroneous.

VII. Motion to Suppress

The search warrant for Clay’s offices relied on an FBI agent’s affidavit
regarding statements made by tax preparer, Kenny Wright. Clay argues that the
affidavit in support of the search warrant lacked reliable and corroborated information.
“We review the district court’s factual determinations in support of its denial of a
motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States
v. Alexander, 574 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations omitted).

The district court concluded that the warrant affidavit demonstrated Wright’s
veracity, and the magistrate judge correctly relied on Wright’s information to find
probable cause. The court found reliable Wright’s statements that Nealy and McCuien
solicited individuals to purchase homes, fraudulent construction invoices were
prepared for Clay Construction which claimed that the work had been performed, and,
at closing, checks were issued to Clay Construction even though no work had been
performed. The court found Wright sufficiently reliable because he had met with FBI
agents on three occasions, and he gave the agents Clay’s social security number, two
pay stubs, and lists of information Nealy had given him to prepare the false returns.
The court reasoned that the FBI agents had a sufficient opportunity to assess Wright’s
credibility during the three meetings, and that the warrant demonstrated Wright’s
knowledge.

The district court also found that the FBI agent corroborated Wright’s
statements. The agent requested Clay and Nealy’s tax return records for the previous
three years and learned through the Secretary of State’s website that Clay’s corporate
licenses had been revoked for failing to pay taxes. The agent then took an undercover

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agent to Nealy’s office and recorded conversations. Based on this information, the
agent prepared an affidavit in support of the search warrant, and the magistrate judge
issued the warrant.

The FBI agent’s investigation sufficiently corroborated Wright’s information.
See United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the district
court did not err in denying Clay’s motion to suppress because the issuing judge had
a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.

VIII. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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