IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
No. 98-40573
Summary Calendar
__________________________
CARL E. BECK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HARWOOD INDUSTRIES, INC.;
ALLEN WHEELER; SUE JACKSON
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(97-CV-688)
___________________________________________________
April 7, 1999
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Carl E. Beck appeals the judgment of the
district court, based on a jury verdict in favor of Defendants-
Appellees Harwood Industries, Inc. (“Harwood”), Allen Wheeler, and
Sue Jackson, rejecting Beck’s allegations of racial discrimination
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. Beck contends
that the district court erred in (1) overruling his Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co.1 challenge to the jury selection and (2)
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
1
500 U.S. 614 (1991).
allowing irrelevant and prejudicial evidence to come before the
jury. We conclude that Beck’s objections are without merit and
affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Harwood manufactures fiberglass parts for customized
automobiles at a Tyler, Texas plant. Beck is a black male who was
employed at Harwood for approximately one year, during which time
he worked in the laminating department. Defendant Allen Wheeler
was Beck’s supervisor, and Defendant Sue Jackson served as Vice
President of Harwood, overseeing day-to-day operations. Based on
the incidents described below, Beck claims that he was (1)
discriminated against in the terms and conditions of his
employment, (2) denied a promotion, and (3) unreasonably suspended
and fired, all on the basis of his race. The facts regarding each
allegation are presented in turn.
A. Hostile Work Environment
Beck states that his employment succeeded without incident
until he and three other black employees took Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s birthday as a holiday from work. Beck insists that, after
that occurrence, black employees were treated differently. He
maintains that blacks were assigned a disproportionately high share
of the menial labor assignments, such as taking out the trash,
cutting the grass, and patching holes in the floor. Beck also
contends that racial epithets were constantly uttered at work. On
one occasion, a white employee told Beck that next year he too
2
would take “nigger day” off. On another occasion, in front of
Beck, white employees discussed membership in the Ku Klux Klan to
get rid of the “niggers.”
As of result of this treatment, Beck and another black
employee spoke to Harwood’s General Manager, Mr. McLouth, who
documented Beck’s complaints and reported the matter to Jackson.
She, in turn, reviewed the memorandum prepared by McLouth and met
with the parties involved. Jackson testified that she instructed
the parties “to stop any name calling . . . that harassing one
another in whatever way, was not going to be tolerated.” Beck
testified to the contrary, stating that Ms. Jackson told him not to
worry, that “nigger” was just a meaningless word.
B. Failure to Promote
Beck was dissatisfied with his position as a laminator, so he
showed interest when he was approached about the possibility of a
promotion into the molding department, albeit no black employees
had previously worked in that department. Beck claims that (1) he
was required to take a test, even though white employees being
considered for such positions had not been required to take it, and
(2) the resin furnished for his test was inadequate to ensure peak
performance. Furthermore, maintains Beck, the outcome of the test
and possible promotion were never communicated to him until the day
he was fired.
Defendants respond that mold building requires a higher level
of skill than laminating, and promotions to mold building were
rare. According to Harwood’s production manager, even Beck’s
3
laminating work was rated “poor to fair.” The production manager
further stated that the resin used in Beck’s molding test was
satisfactory; he was simply unable to perform that test
satisfactorily.
C. Unreasonable Suspension and Termination
1. Suspension
In a heated argument with a white co-employee during regular
work hours, claims Beck, he was threatened with scissors by the
white employee who stated, “Nigger, I will run these scissors all
the way through you.” Testimony was presented, however, that Beck
charged the white employee after questioning his intention to use
the scissors to harm him. As a result of this altercation, which
Jackson termed a “severe safety violation,” both Beck and the white
employee received three day suspensions. Beck claims that he was
not at fault, and was suspended because of his race.
2. Termination
Subsequent to his suspension, Beck was terminated by his
supervisor, Wheeler, for refusing to take out the trash. Beck
counters that it was raining at the time, and he was simply waiting
for the rain to subside before venturing outside. Beck insists
that he was fired because of his race, asserting that no white
employee had ever been fired for refusing to take out the trash
while it was raining. The defendants presented contrary testimony
regarding the weather conditions at the time Beck refused to take
out the trash, as well as advancing that the real reason for his
protests was his poor attitude and work ethic.
4
D. Procedural History
After he was terminated, Beck filed suit against Harwood,
Jackson, and Wheeler under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, alleging that, because of his race, he suffered
a hostile work environment, was denied a promotion, and was
unreasonably suspended and terminated. The district court
dismissed Beck’s Title VII claims against Jackson and Wheeler, but
allowed the Title VII claim against Harwood and the § 1981 claims
against all three defendants to proceed.
After a two day trial, the jury found that none of the
defendants was liable to Beck for racial discrimination. The
district court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s
verdict, and Beck timely appealed.
II.
DISCUSSION
Beck challenges the district court’s judgment on two fronts:
(1) under Edmonson,2 the district court erred in overruling Beck’s
objection and allowing defendants to strike one of only two
potential black jurors, and (2) the district court abused its
discretion in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of
Beck’s alcohol abuse and unsatisfactory job performance, and
Harwood’s increased employment of minorities following Beck’s
termination.
A. The Edmonson Claim
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that equal
2
Id.
5
protection principles prohibit a prospective juror from being
peremptorily challenged on the basis of race.3 Five years later,
the Court held that a party to a civil suit has standing to raise
the prospective juror’s equal protection claim when the opposing
party uses a peremptory strike to exclude that juror on the basis
of race.4
We conduct a three step inquiry to determine the propriety of
a Batson/Edmonson challenge. First, the complaining party —— in
this case, Beck —— must make a prima facie showing that the non-
moving party exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race.
Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to
articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Third, if
the race-neutral explanation is not sufficiently probative, the
burden shifts back to the complaining party to prove purposeful
discrimination.5 We will only reverse the district court’s
decision on a Batson/Edmonson challenge if its ruling was “clearly
erroneous.”6
During voir dire, defense counsel struck potential juror
Corine Wilson, one of two black members of the venire. Wilson’s
only statement during questioning was “I’m Corine Wilson. I’m
employed at Trane in production. My husband Louis Wilson is
3
467 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
4
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 629-30.
5
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98; U.S. v. Huey, 76 F.3d 638, 640-
41 (5th Cir. 1996).
6
Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Koch Gathering Sys., Inc., 45
F.3d 962, 964 (5th Cir. 1995).
6
retired from Trane.” Beck contends that as Wilson was one of only
two potential black jurors in the venire and defense counsel did
not ask any follow-up questions, the only reasonable explanation
for her dismissal is race.
We cannot agree that Beck’s bald, unsupported assertion
establishes a prima facie case of racial bias. In fact, we have
stated that “[w]here the only evidence proffered . . . is that a
black prospective juror was struck, a prima facie [Edmonson] claim
does not arise.”7 Beck is unable to point to any facts or
circumstances that suggest defense counsel dismissed Wilson because
she was black.8 In fact, the other potential black juror was
ultimately seated on the jury.9 As Beck can offer no corroborating
evidence to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination
in defendants’ exercise of the peremptory strike of Wilson, Beck’s
Edmonson challenge fails.10
7
United States v. Branch, 989 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 509 U.S. 931 (1993); see also United States v. Lane, 866
F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1989) (“this does not mean that a prima
facie case of discrimination arises every time a prosecutor
strikes a black prospective juror”); United States v. Lewis, 837
F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir.) (finding no Batson error when one of two
black members of the venire was struck), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
923 (1988).
8
See United States v. Moore, 895 F.2d 484, 485 (8th Cir.
1990) (stating that a prima facie case of racial discrimination
requires a party to “come forward with facts, not just numbers
alone”).
9
Cf. Ford v. State, 423 S.W.2d 245 (Ga. 1992) (noting that
the prosecutor had a heavy burden of proof when he struck 9 out
of 10 black venire members).
10
We note that even if Beck was able to establish a prima
facie case of racial bias, defense counsel has articulated
several race-neutral reasons for striking Wilson. First, she was
7
B. Admission of Evidence
In reviewing evidentiary rulings made by the district court,
we apply an abuse of discretion standard.11 If the inadmissible
evidence actually contributed to the jury’s verdict, harmful error
has occurred and the case must be reversed.12 Credibility
determinations, however, are left to the discretion of the jury.13
Beck first contends that the district court should have
excluded evidence that he suffered from alcohol-induced gastritis
and possible alcohol dependency because such evidence was
irrelevant and prejudicial. As neither party alleged that he was
terminated as a result of alcohol use, argues Beck, his condition
could only have been adduced to prejudice the jury.
Although we agree that admitting evidence adduced solely to
arouse juror sentiment against a defendant would be an abuse of
a production worker, similar to Beck, and defense counsel
expressed concern that she would identify and sympathize with
Beck. Additionally, when Beck’s counsel mentioned the use of the
word “nigger” in the workplace, Wilson —— as well as one white
juror who was also dismissed —— reacted with non-verbal
disapproval. See e.g. United States v. Perkins, 105 F.3d 976, 979
(5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Atkins, 25 F.3d 1401, 1405 (8th
Cir. 1994) (both considering a venire member’s reaction to
questioning during voir dire as a legitimate basis for a
peremptory challenge). Furthermore, defense counsel’s reasons
for exercising his peremptory strike were not challenged by Beck
in the district court; thus, Beck is precluded from arguing
pretext to us on appeal. See Branch, 989 F.2d at 755 n.2 (facts
not enunciated to district court in support of Batson objection
are waived, barring reviewing court from considering them on
appeal).
11
United States v. Skipper, 74 F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir. 1996).
12
Id.
13
United States v. Narviz-Guerra, 148 F.3d 530, 538 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 601 (1998).
8
discretion,14 in this case we recognize relevant, probative reasons
for the admission of Beck’s medical information. Beck was seeking
compensatory damages for his physical ailments, the cause of which
he ascribes to the racial discrimination he suffered and to his
ultimate termination. As correctly noted by the district court,
Beck’s symptoms —— depression, headaches, and high blood pressure
—— could have been related to his alcohol consumption. As this
information would be relevant and probative to the jury’s
assessment of Beck’s damages were the defendants to be found
liable, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence of Beck’s alcohol-induced gastritis.
Second, Beck argues that the district court committed
reversible error in admitting evidence from his personnel file.
The obvious answer to this argument lies in the rhetorical
question, how is a party to defend a failure to promote claim
without considering the work performance of the employee seeking
redress? Beck’s contention that “[t]he evidence was irrelevant to
any matter in dispute” is facially without merit. The job
performance and workmanship of an employee is directly relevant to
his qualification for promotion. The district court properly
admitted personnel file evidence of Beck’s work performance.
Third, Beck maintains that the district court improperly
admitted evidence of Harwood’s employment of minorities after
14
See Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297, 1303 (10th Cir.)
(the introduction of drug paraphernalia in a vehicle would have
improperly aroused jury sentiment against a driver in a products
liability action regarding the vehicle), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1206 (1984).
9
Beck’s termination, as anything that happened subsequent to his
firing is irrelevant to his discrimination claim. Supplying the
jury with this information, claims Beck, served no purpose in the
lawsuit and only confused the jury. Although we agree that
subsequent employment practices generally are not relevant in
determining whether the employer previously discriminated in the
workplace,15 they can complete an extended view of the racial makeup
of the workforce before, during, and after the employment action at
issue.
Beck initially submitted Harwood’s 1996 employment figures,
which indicated a low percentage of minority employees, to
demonstrate Harwood’s unfriendliness toward minorities at the time
he was fired. To rebut this snap shot’s inference of a racially-
biased workplace, defendants introduced Harwood’s employment
figures for years bracketing Beck’s 1996 termination to demonstrate
that, without any change in employment practices, the racial
composition of its workforce was only temporarily and
coincidentally low at the time that Beck was fired in 1996. The
decision to admit such evidence was well within the sound
discretion of the district court and does not constitute reversible
error.
III.
CONCLUSION
Beck’s challenges to the jury selection and the district
15
See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 341-42
(1977).
10
court’s evidentiary rulings are without merit. Not only was he
unable to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination in
the defendants’ exercise of a peremptory strike, but the defendants
were able to articulate race-neutral reasons for that juror’s
dismissal. The court’s finding of no racial animus was not clearly
erroneous. Neither did the district court abuse its discretion
when it admitted evidence of Beck’s alcohol-induced gastritis, his
prior work performance, and the minority makeup of Harwood’s
workforce after Beck’s termination. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects.
AFFIRMED.
11