Coy Owens v. Keith Roy

Case: 09-40984 Document: 00511219410 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/30/2010 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED August 30, 2010 No. 09-40984 Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk COY LYNN OWENS, Petitioner-Appellant, veersus KEITH ROY, Warden, Texarkana FCI, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 4:08-CV-227 Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Coy Owens, federal prisoner # 04702-078, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal from the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, * Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR . R. 47.5.4. Case: 09-40984 Document: 00511219410 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/30/2010 No. 09-40984 which challenged his convictions for various mail fraud offenses and arson. He argued that his speedy trial rights were violated and that he was actually inno- cent of the offense of conviction. Because the district court determined that Owens’s claims were challenges to his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, it dis- missed the petition for lack of jurisdiction as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion. A movant for IFP on appeal must show that he is a pauper and that he will present a nonfrivolous appellate issue. Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982). Owens argues that his claims fall within the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006), establishes his innocence and could not have been previously raised. A § 2241 petition at- tacking custody resulting from a federally-imposed sentence may be considered only where the petitioner establishes that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” § 2255(e); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 901 (5th Cir. 2001). To show that § 2255 was rendered inadequate or ineffective, Owens must show that his claim (1) “is based on a retroactively ap- plicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense” and (2) “was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in the petitioner’s trial, appeal or first § 2255 motion.” Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904. Zedner, 547 U.S. at 500-09, dealt with issues relating to the Speedy Trial Act. Because Zedner does not establish that Owens was convicted of a nonexis- tent offense, we need not determine whether Zedner is retroactive or whether Owens’s claim was foreclosed when he filed his prior § 2255 motion or direct ap- peal. Owens also argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his § 2241 petition by virtue of his transfer to Minnesota. The only district that may consider a habeas corpus challenge pursuant to § 2241 is the district in which the prisoner is confined at the time he filed his § 2241 petition. Rumsfeld v. 2 Case: 09-40984 Document: 00511219410 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/30/2010 No. 09-40984 Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442-43 (2004); Lee v. Wetzel, 244 F.3d 370, 375 n.5 (5th Cir. 2001). Because Owens was confined in the Eastern District of Texas at the time he filed the present § 2241 petition, the district court did not err by consid- ering the petition. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442-43. Owens has not established that he will raise a nonfrivolous appellate is- sue. See Carson, 689 F.2d at 586. Accordingly, we DENY the motion to proceed IFP on appeal, and we DISMISS Owens’s appeal as frivolous. See Baugh v. Tay- lor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 n.24 (5th Cir. 1997); 5 TH C IR. R. 42.2. Owens’s motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED. Owens is WARNED that future frivo- lous filings may result in the imposition of sanctions. 3