United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
__________________________
RAYMOND E. STAUFFER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BROOKS BROTHERS, INC.
AND RETAIL BRAND ALLIANCE, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Movant-Cross Appellant,
__________________________
2009-1428, -1430, -1453
__________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Case No. 08-CV-10369,
Judge Sidney H. Stein.
____________________________
Decided: August 31, 2010
____________________________
RAYMOND E. STAUFFER, of Chatham, New Jersey, pro
se.
STEPHEN L. BAKER, Baker & Rannells, PA, of Raritan,
New Jersey, argued for defendants-appellees. With him
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 2
on the brief were NEIL B. FRIEDMAN and RYAN A.
MCGONIGLE.
DOUGLAS N. LETTER, Appellate Litigation Counsel,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of
Washington, DC, argued for movants-cross appellants.
With him on the brief was TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney
General.
THOMAS P. STEINDLER, McDermott Will & Emery LLP,
of Washington, DC, for amicus curiae CIBA Vision Corpo-
ration. With him on the brief were M. MILLER BAKER and
JEFFREY W. MIKONI.
BRYAN P. COLLINS, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman
LLP, of McLean, Virginia, for amicus curiae Stanley
Black & Decker, Inc., et al. With him on the brief was
JACK S. BARUFKA.
__________________________
Before RADER, Chief Judge, and LOURIE and MOORE,
Circuit Judges.
LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
Raymond E. Stauffer and the government appeal from
the decision of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissing Stauffer’s false
marking qui tam action for lack of standing. Stauffer v.
Brooks Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(“Standing Op.”). The government also appeals from the
court’s denial of its motion to intervene. Stauffer v.
Brooks Bros., Inc., No. 08-cv-10369, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis
51166 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (“Intervention Op.”).
Because Stauffer had standing to bring his claim, and
because the government had a right to intervene, we
reverse on both grounds.
3 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS
BACKGROUND
Brooks Brothers, Inc. and its parent Retail Brand Al-
liance, Inc. 1 (collectively, “Brooks Brothers”) manufacture
and sell men’s bow ties. Some of the Brooks Brothers bow
ties contain an “Adjustolox” mechanism that is manufac-
tured by a third party, J.M.C. Bow Company, Inc.
(“J.M.C. Bow”), and are marked with, inter alia, U.S.
Patent Nos. 2,083,106 and 2,123,620, which expired in
1954 and 1955, respectively. Standing Op., 615 F. Supp.
2d at 251, 255.
Stauffer is a patent attorney who has purchased some
of the marked bow ties. Id. at 251. In December 2008,
Stauffer brought a qui tam action under 35 U.S.C. § 292
alleging that Brooks Brothers had falsely marked its bow
ties. Section 292, the “false marking” statute, provides
that:
(a) . . .
Whoever marks upon, or affixes to . . . any unpat-
ented article, the word “patent” or any word or
number importing that the same is patented, for
the purpose of deceiving the public
...
Shall be fined not more than $500 for every such
offense.
(b) Any person may sue for the penalty, in which
event one-half shall go to the person suing and the
other to the use of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
1 According to the parties, Brooks Brothers, Inc. has
merged into Retail Brand Alliance, Inc. and no longer
exists as a separate legal entity.
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 4
Brooks Brothers moved to dismiss Stauffer’s com-
plaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for lack of standing and pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to allege an intent to deceive the public
with sufficient specificity to meet the heightened pleading
requirements for claims of fraud. The district court
granted Brooks Brothers’ motion pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1), concluding that Stauffer lacked standing. Ac-
cording to the court, all plaintiffs, including qui tam
plaintiffs (or “relators”), must establish (1) that they have
suffered an injury in fact (2) that is causally connected to
the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by the
court. Standing Op., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 253. The court
further noted that the qui tam provision of section 292(b)
operates as a statutory “assignment” of the rights of the
United States, so Stauffer must prove that the govern-
ment, rather than he, satisfies the requirements for
standing, including that it has suffered an injury in fact.
Id.
The district court held that Stauffer had not suffi-
ciently alleged that the United States had suffered an
injury in fact from Brooks Brothers’ false marking.
According to the court, Stauffer’s allegations of Brooks
Brothers’ conduct wrongfully quelling competition were
too conjectural or hypothetical to constitute an injury in
fact. Id. at 254–55. The court added that even the hypo-
thetical harm to competitors was lessened by the fact that
J.M.C. Bow provides the marked Adjustolox mechanism
to many of Brooks Brothers’ competitors, in addition to
providing it to Brooks Brothers. Id. at 255.
The district court further held that Stauffer’s asser-
tions that he himself was injured were not contained in
the complaint and were thus not properly alleged. Id. at
255 n.7. Moreover, according to the court, those asser-
tions would only support an injury to Stauffer, not to the
5 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS
public, and thus would not be a basis for finding standing.
Id. Because the court found a lack of standing, it did not
reach the merits of Brooks Brothers’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss for failure to allege an intent to deceive the
public with sufficient specificity. Id. at 251 n.1.
After the district court’s decision on standing, Stand-
ing Op., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, the government moved to
intervene, arguing that the court’s opinion called into
question the constitutionality of section 292 and that the
government was therefore entitled to defend the statute
pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2403. The
government also argued that its interest in seeing the
patent laws enforced gave it a right to intervene pursuant
to Rule 24(a)(2) and that it should be permitted to inter-
vene pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1)(B). The court denied the
motion, finding no basis for the government to intervene
as of right and finding the showing for permissive inter-
vention insufficient. Intervention Op., 2009 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 51166.
The district court reasoned that it had not decided
any constitutional issue that would give the government
the right to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1), as it had
only decided the case on its facts. Id. at *8–9. The court
added that, contrary to the government’s argument, it
was entitled to rule on Brooks Brothers’ motion before the
government’s deadline to decide whether it would seek to
intervene had expired, as the court had not held the
statute unconstitutional. Id. at *9–10 n.4. The court
further found that the government did not have a suffi-
cient interest in the action to have a right to intervene
pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) because the court had denied
standing only to Stauffer, not to the United States itself.
Id. at *12.
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 6
Finally, the district court denied permissive interven-
tion pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1)(B), finding that the gov-
ernment’s interest in the outcome of the case was
premised on issues and legal questions not actually
presented to or decided by the court. Id. at *13–14. The
court further reasoned that Brooks Brothers would be
prejudiced by a post-judgment intervention that would
impose needless costs and delay. Id. at *14–15.
Stauffer timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
A. Stauffer’s Standing
The government argues that the district court erred in
dismissing Stauffer’s suit for lack of standing based on a
lack of injury in fact. 2 The government asserts that
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex
rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), controls the outcome in
this case, and that decision held that a qui tam relator
has standing without an injury to the relator himself, a
proposition that, according to the government, the court
stated but did not follow. Furthermore, the government
argues that the United States’ interest in seeing its laws
enforced itself leads to an injury in fact when those laws
are not obeyed. In other words, according to the govern-
ment, in enacting the false marking statute, Congress
determined that such conduct is harmful and should be
prohibited, which is a sufficient injury in fact to confer
standing on the government and therefore on Stauffer as
2 Appeal numbers 2009-1430 and -1453 are the
government’s appeals, and we granted the government’s
motion to intervene in appeal number 2009-1428.
Stauffer v. Brooks Bros, Inc., No. 2009-1428, Dkt. No. 62
(Fed. Cir. July 16, 2010) (granting government’s motion to
intervene).
7 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS
the government’s implicit assignee of the action to recover
for injury. Finally, the government asserts that even if a
proprietary injury involving the federal treasury’s being
directly diminished were required under Vermont Agency,
as opposed to solely a sovereign injury based on the
United States’ interest in seeing its laws enforced, the
United States has a proprietary interest in receiving half
of the recovery in a suit under section 292.
Stauffer separately argues that, according to this
court’s decision in Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp.,
406 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the public is injured by
false marking, which misleads and wrongly imposes the
costs of evaluating patents on the public. Thus, he ar-
gues, the public has suffered an injury in fact sufficient to
confer standing. Stauffer adds that his complaint alleged
that Brooks Brothers had “wrongfully quelled competition
with respect to . . . bow tie products thereby causing harm
to the economy of the United States.” J.A. 66, para. 129.
That, he argues, further demonstrates an injury to the
public. Stauffer also asserts that he has individually been
injured as a member of the public, thereby demonstrating
another injury to the public.
Brooks Brothers responds that standing is not auto-
matically conferred on qui tam relators, but that they
must demonstrate standing. Brooks Brothers adds that
Stauffer’s conclusory allegations that he was personally
injured are insufficient to establish an injury, and the
court properly looked outside the pleadings to assure
itself that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Finally,
as an alternative ground for affirmance, Brooks Brothers
asserts that Stauffer has not met the other factors re-
quired for standing; the marking is not fairly traceable to
Brooks Brothers but to J.M.C. Bow, and any injury to the
United States is unlikely to be redressed by a favorable
decision.
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 8
We agree with the government and Stauffer that
Stauffer had standing to sue Brooks Brothers. “The
question of standing to sue is a jurisdictional one, which
we review de novo.” Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d
1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Every plaintiff must demonstrate standing, a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite under Article III’s case-or-controversy
requirement. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771. Thus, a
plaintiff must show (1) that he has suffered an “injury in
fact,” an invasion of a legally protected interest that is “(a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical,” (2) that there is “a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct com-
plained of,” and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citations and quotations
marks omitted); see Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771. We
conclude that Stauffer has met that test and hence has
standing in this case.
As the district court noted, section 292(b) is a qui tam
provision, “i.e., a statute that authorizes someone to
pursue an action on behalf of the government as well as
himself.” Standing Op., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 253. The
Supreme Court, this court, and the Second Circuit have
repeatedly treated it as such. See Vermont Agency, 529
U.S. at 768 n.1 (listing section 292(b) as one of four qui
tam statutes currently in force); Pequignot v. Solo Cup
Co., 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (referring to section
292 as a qui tam provision); Boyd v. Schildkraut Giftware
Corp., 936 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1991) (Section 292 “is
enforceable by a qui tam remedy, enabling any person to
sue for the statutory penalty and retain one-half of the
recovery.”).
Under Vermont Agency, a qui tam plaintiff, or relator,
can establish standing based on the United States’ im-
9 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS
plicit partial assignment of its damages claim, 529 U.S. at
773, to “any person,” see 35 U.S.C. § 292(b). In other
words, even though a relator may suffer no injury himself,
a qui tam provision operates as a statutory assignment of
the United States’ rights, and “the assignee of a claim has
standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the as-
signor.” Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773. Thus, in order
to have standing, Stauffer must allege that the United
States has suffered an injury in fact causally connected to
Brooks Brothers’ conduct that is likely to be redressed by
the court.
As the government points out, Congress has, by enact-
ing section 292, defined an injury in fact to the United
States. In other words, a violation of that statute inher-
ently constitutes an injury to the United States. In
passing the statute prohibiting deceptive patent mismark-
ing, Congress determined that such conduct is harmful
and should be prohibited. The parties have not cited any
case in which the government has been denied standing to
enforce its own law. Because the government would have
standing to enforce its own law, Stauffer, as the govern-
ment’s assignee, also has standing to enforce section 292.
Brooks Brothers relies heavily on Lujan, which denied
plaintiffs standing under a citizen-suit provision. 504
U.S. 555. However, in that case, the citizen-suit provision
allowed private individuals to sue the government. Thus,
the Supreme Court reasoned that such a law would
enable courts “to become virtually continuing monitors of
the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.” Id. at
577. Hence, it was “clear that in suits against the Gov-
ernment, at least, the concrete injury [to the plaintiff]
requirement must remain.” Id. at 578. Here, in contrast,
the qui tam provision operates not to allow individuals to
sue the government, but to allow individuals to stand in
the government’s stead, as assignees of the government’s
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 10
own claims. See id. at 572–73 (emphasizing that Lujan’s
was not “the unusual case in which Congress has created
a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit against
a private party for the Government’s benefit, by providing
a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff”). Thus, Lujan
does not preclude Congress from assigning the govern-
ment’s claims to “any person,” even if that person has no
concrete injury himself.
Contrary to the district court’s decision and Brooks
Brothers’ argument, Stauffer’s standing as the United
States’ assignee does not depend upon the alleged injury
to the United States being proprietary, as opposed to
sovereign. We therefore express no view as to whether
section 292 addresses a proprietary or a sovereign injury
of the United States, or both (as does the False Claims
Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733, according to Vermont
Agency, 529 U.S. at 771). The court incorrectly read
Vermont Agency as applying only to the United States’
proprietary injury. In fact, the Supreme Court stated, “It
is beyond doubt that the complainant asserts an injury to
the United States—both the injury to its sovereignty
arising from violation of its laws (which suffices to sup-
port a criminal lawsuit by the Government) and the
proprietary injury resulting from the alleged fraud.”
Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771. The Supreme Court
considered both types of injuries and found them collec-
tively to be sufficient to confer standing on the govern-
ment and therefore on the relator. See id. at 774
(concluding, without stating which specific injury, “that
the United States’ injury in fact suffices to confer stand-
ing on respondent Stevens”). The Court made no distinc-
tion between the two, and we similarly do not do so here.
To support the contrary proposition that sovereign in-
jury is not assignable, the district court cited Fed. Election
Comm. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998), which stated that
11 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS
an “abstract” harm, “for example, injury to the interest in
seeing that the law is obeyed—deprives the case of the
concrete specificity” necessary for standing. However,
that statement referred to a private individual’s abstract
interest in seeing that the law is obeyed, not the govern-
ment’s interest in seeing that its own law is obeyed. From
the government’s perspective, a harm arises from an
“injury to its sovereignty arising from violation of its
laws.” Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771.
Indeed, the Court in Vermont Agency recognized and
found conclusive the historical precedent of informer
statutes enacted by the First Congress, which assigned
certain sovereign interests of the United States to private
parties. Id. at 776–77. For example, the Court relied
upon statutes allowing an informer to sue for, and receive
half the fine for, failure to file a census return, carriage of
seamen without contract or illegal harboring of runaway
seamen, and unlicensed trading with Indian tribes. Id. at
777 n.6. Those fines were not based on harms to the
United States’ proprietary interest, as the federal treas-
ury was not directly diminished because of the violations.
The fines were instead based only on harms to the sover-
eign interest of the United States, viz., the interest in
seeing the harms, as defined in the statutes, redressed.
One statute noted by the Court even allowed informers to
conduct a criminal prosecution and receive half the fine,
id., which would redress an injury that the Court explic-
itly found to be sovereign, id. at 771 (stating that a sover-
eign, as opposed to proprietary, injury “suffices to support
a criminal lawsuit”). Thus, under Vermont Agency, the
United States’ sovereign injury is sufficient to confer
standing upon it and therefore upon Stauffer, its implicit
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 12
partial assignee. 3 We therefore take no view as to
whether section 292 addresses a proprietary or a sover-
eign injury of the United States, or both, as either one
would confer standing on the government, and therefore
Stauffer.
Amicus Ciba asserts that the government cannot con-
stitutionally assign any claim without retaining control
over the relator’s actions, arguing that such assignment
violates the “take Care” clause of Article II, § 3 of the
Constitution. According to Ciba, in enacting section
292(b), Congress has stripped the executive branch of its
duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”
by giving such power to the public. In support of that
position, Ciba contrasts section 292 with the False Claims
Act, which provides the government with, inter alia, the
right to be notified of a case before the defendant is
served, the right to intervene, and the right to seek dis-
missal or settlement over the objection of the relator or to
prevent dismissal of the action by the relator. While Ciba
raises relevant points, the district court did not decide,
and the parties did not appeal, the constitutionality of
section 292. Thus, we will not decide its constitutionality
without the issue having been raised or argued by the
parties. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 778 n.8 (ex-
3 Amicus curiae Ciba Vision Corporation (“Ciba”)
argues that the United States cannot assign its sovereign
interest to “any person,” asserting that sovereign inter-
ests are analogous to personal interests and are not
assignable at common law. Even if the interest of the
United States here were purely sovereign, however, it is
clear that the United States has partially assigned it, as
the United States did in the statutes relied upon by the
Supreme Court in Vermont Agency. See id. Given the
Court’s heavy reliance upon that historical underpinning,
we consider the question decided, that the United States
may assign even a purely sovereign interest.
13 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS
pressing no view on whether qui tam suits violate the
“take Care” clause of Article II, as the parties did not
raise it, “nor is the validity of qui tam suits . . . a jurisdic-
tional issue that we must resolve here”).
We also need not address whether Stauffer’s alleged
injuries to himself or his asserted injuries to competition
give him standing, either individually or as a member of
the public. Stauffer’s standing arises from his status as
“any person,” and he need not allege more for jurisdic-
tional purposes. The district court conflated its jurisdic-
tion with the merits of the case when it stated that
Stauffer had failed to sufficiently allege a “purpose of
deceiving the public.” Standing Op., 615 F. Supp. 2d at
254 n.5. Brooks Brothers similarly conflates jurisdiction
and merits in asserting that Stauffer must show that the
marking is fairly traceable to Brooks Brothers, rather
than to J.M.C. Bow, the third party Adjustolox manufac-
turer. Neither of those points is jurisdictional in nature,
nor do they fall under the standing inquiry. The standing
doctrine is intended to require that the plaintiff is a
proper person to bring the suit; it does not require that
the plaintiff properly allege all of the elements of his
claim. Thus, “standing does not depend on the merits of
the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is ille-
gal”; it instead requires a claim to an injury of a legally
cognizable right. 15 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s
Federal Practice—Civil ¶ 101.40[5][a]. By allowing any
person to sue, Congress granted individuals a legally
cognizable right to half of the penalty defined in section
292(a). Thus, Stauffer has sufficiently alleged (1) an
injury in fact to the United States that (2) is caused by
Brooks Brothers’ alleged conduct, attaching the markings
to its bow ties, and (3) is likely to be redressed, with a
statutory fine, by a favorable decision. See Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560–61.
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 14
We therefore reverse the district court’s decision con-
cluding that Stauffer did not have standing. We remand
for the court to address the merits of the case, including
Brooks Brothers’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) “on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a
plausible claim to relief because it fails to allege an ‘intent
to deceive’ the public—a critical element of a section 292
claim—with sufficient specificity to meet the heightened
pleading requirements for claims of fraud imposed by”
Rule 9(b). Standing Op., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 251 n.1.
B. The Government’s Intervention
The government argues that the district court abused
its discretion in denying the government’s motion to
intervene. According to the government, the court should
have granted its motion to intervene as of right under
Rule 24(a)(1) or (a)(2), or alternatively the government
should have been permitted to intervene under Rule
24(b)(1)(B). Rule 24(a)(2) requires the court to allow
anyone to intervene who “claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction that is the subject of the
action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s
ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties
adequately represent that interest.” With regard to that
subpart, the government specifically argues that it has an
interest in seeing the patent statute enforced, in prevent-
ing the distribution of falsely marked items, and in receiv-
ing half the statutory damages. Without intervention,
according to the government, the disposition of this action
might prejudice the government’s ability to protect its
interests, which have not been adequately represented by
Stauffer.
15 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS
Brooks Brothers responds that Rule 24(a)(2) does not
apply because the district court’s decision would not
prevent the United States from bringing its own action.
We review the district court’s denial of intervention
under Rule 24 under regional circuit law, in this case that
of the Second Circuit. Ericsson Inc. v. InterDigital
Commc’ns. Corp., 418 F.3d 1217, 1220–21 (Fed. Cir.
2005). The Second Circuit reviews denials of motions to
intervene under Rule 24 for an abuse of discretion.
Mastercard Int’l, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 471 F.3d
377, 389 (2d Cir. 2006). However, a court “by definition
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”
Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
502 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). We agree with the gov-
ernment that the district court made an error of law in
denying the government’s motion to intervene under Rule
24(a)(2). Because we decide the issue on that basis, we
need not address the government’s arguments with re-
spect to subparts (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).
Contrary to Brooks Brothers’ position, the govern-
ment has an interest in enforcement of its laws and in one
half the fine that Stauffer claims, disposing of the action
would “as a practical matter impair or impede the [gov-
ernment’s] ability to protect its interest,” and Stauffer
may not adequately represent that interest. Rule
24(a)(2). As an initial matter, Brooks Brothers does not
contest the government’s assertion that Stauffer does not
adequately represent the United States’ interest in this
case.
Furthermore, the government would not be able to re-
cover a fine from Brooks Brothers if Stauffer loses, as res
judicata would attach to claims against Brooks Brothers
for the particular markings at issue. See United States ex
rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir.
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 16
2008) (“[T]he United States might become bound by res
judicata or collateral estoppel as a result of the actions of
a pro se in bringing and losing a qui tam action.”) (citing
Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of Educ., 502 F.3d
1116, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[Q]ui tam relators are not
prosecuting only their ‘own case’ but also representing the
United States and binding it to any adverse judgment the
relators may obtain.”)). Thus, even though, as the district
court noted, “the issue of the government’s ability to bring
an action pursuant to section 292” in general was not
presented, Intervention Op., 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 51166,
at *12, the United States’ ability to protect its interest in
this particular case would be impaired by disposing of this
action without the government’s intervention. We there-
fore reverse the district court’s decision denying the
government’s motion to intervene.
CONCLUSION
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
and do not find them persuasive. 4 Accordingly, the judg-
ment of the district court is
REVERSED and REMANDED
4 In his brief, Stauffer also requests that the case be
reassigned to a different judge on remand. He has not
presented any argument as to why he requests reassign-
ment, nor have the district court’s decisions shown any
basis for doing so. We therefore deny Stauffer’s request.