Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MARCUS A. WELLONS v. HILTON HALL, WARDEN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09–5731. Decided January 19, 2010
PER CURIAM.
From beginning to end, judicial proceedings conducted
for the purpose of deciding whether a defendant shall be
put to death must be conducted with dignity and respect.
The disturbing facts of this case raise serious questions
concerning the conduct of the trial, and this petition raises
a serious question about whether the Court of Appeals
carefully reviewed those facts before addressing peti
tioner’s constitutional claims. We know that the Court of
Appeals committed the same procedural error that we
corrected in Cone v. Bell, 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op.,
at 17–18). We do not know how the court would have
ruled if it had the benefit of our decision in that case.
Petitioner Marcus Wellons was convicted in Georgia
state court of rape and murder and sentenced to death.
Although the trial looked typical, there were unusual
events going on behind the scenes. Only after the trial did
defense counsel learn that there had been unreported ex
parte contacts between the jury and the judge, that jurors
and a bailiff had planned a reunion, and that “either
during or immediately following the penalty phase, some
jury members gave the trial judge chocolate shaped as
male genitalia and the bailiff chocolate shaped as female
breasts,” 554 F. 3d 923, 930 (CA11 2009). The judge had
not reported any of this to the defense.
Neither Wellons nor any court has ascertained exactly
what went on at this capital trial or what prompted such
“gifts.” Wellons has repeatedly tried, in both state and
federal court, to find out what occurred, but he has found
2 WELLONS v. HALL
Per Curiam
himself caught in a procedural morass: He raised the issue
on direct appeal but was constrained by the nonexistent
record, and the State Supreme Court affirmed his convic
tion and sentence. Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 88, 463
S. E. 2d 868, 880 (1995). He sought state habeas relief
and moved to develop evidence. But the court held that
the matter had been decided on appeal and thus was res
judicata. See 554 F. 3d, at 932. He raised the issue again
in his federal habeas petition, seeking discovery and an
evidentiary hearing. But the District Court “concluded
that Wellons’ claims . . . were procedurally barred, and
accordingly denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing
on these claims.” Id., at 933.1 Before the Eleventh Cir
——————
1 Although the District Court found most of petitioner’s claims to be
procedurally barred, it alternatively declined to permit an evidentiary
hearing because Wellons did not have enough evidence of bias or
misconduct. JUSTICE ALITO wrongly suggests that the District Court
reached that conclusion by reviewing a proffer that Wellons’ attorneys
assembled by “contacting all but 1 of the jurors,” many of whom “spoke
freely.” Post, at 2 (dissenting opinion). Even apart from the fact that
these interviews were informal and unsworn, they shed almost no light
on what had occurred. The juror who allegedly “gave the penis to the
judge,” App. C to Pet. for Cert. 36, was “hostile and refused to talk,” id.,
at 37; one “refused to talk about the trial,” id., at 36; another “did not
want to talk about the case,” id., at 37; and one “conferr[ed]” with his
wife who then “slammed and bolted the door,” ibid. Of those jurors who
were willing to talk at all, one admitted to being “concerned that she
might say something that would be used for a mistrial,” id., at 35, and
none admitted to knowing how or why the jury selected its “gifts,” see
id., at 35–36, 37. (Implausibly, JUSTICE ALITO suggests that Wellons’
lawyers may not have asked how or why the jury selected its “gifts,”
post, at 3, though he bases that speculation only on the fact that no
questions appeared in the proffer of facts.) Rather, the jurors discussed
other matters and did so in the briefest of terms. All told, “everything
that Petitioner . . . learned,” App. C to Pet. for Cert. 38, filled only a few
sheets of paper, see id., at 35–36, 37.
Moreover, the subjects that the jurors did discuss may very well sup
port Wellons’ view that his trial was tainted by bias or misconduct. For
example, one interviewee “was surprised” that a fellow juror had been
allowed to serve on a capital trial, given that her sister had been
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 3
Per Curiam
cuit, Wellons “argue[d] that the district court erred in
denying his motions for discovery and an evidentiary
hearing to develop his judge, juror, and bailiff misconduct
claims because they are not procedurally barred.” Id., at
935. The court disagreed, holding that Wellons’ claims
were procedurally barred. Ibid.
As our dissenting colleagues acknowledge, post, at 1
(opinion of SCALIA, J.); post, at 1 (opinion of ALITO, J.), the
Eleventh Circuit’s holding was an error under Cone, 556
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17–18). “When a state court
declines to review the merits of a petitioner’s claim on the
ground that it has done so already, it creates no bar to
federal habeas review.” Id., at __ (slip op., at 17). Both
dissenting opinions assume that “the issue on which Cone
throws light does not affect the outcome” because “the
Eleventh Circuit . . . also decided that petitioner was not
entitled to habeas relief on the merits.” Post, at 1–2 (opin
ion of SCALIA, J.). Having found a procedural bar, how
ever, the Eleventh Circuit had no need to address whether
petitioner was otherwise entitled to an evidentiary hear
ing and gave this question, at most, perfunctory considera
tion that may well have turned on the District Court’s
finding of a procedural bar.
Although Wellons appealed the denial of “his motions
for discovery and an evidentiary hearing,” 554 F. 3d, at
935, the Eleventh Circuit did not purport to address the
merits of that issue at all.2 The court stated only that
“[e]ven if we assume that Wellons’s misconduct claims are
not procedurally barred, they do not entitle Wellons to
——————
murdered by a man after he completed serving a life sentence. Id., at
36.
2 As JUSTICE ALITO explains at some length, see post, at 2–4, the Dis
trict Court did discuss the merits of that issue, but the District Court’s
analysis has little relevance on whether the Court of Appeals made an
alternative holding or rather affirmed the District Court’s decision on
the ground that petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred.
4 WELLONS v. HALL
Per Curiam
habeas relief.” Id., at 936 (emphasis added). This opaque
statement appears to address only whether petitioner was
entitled to ultimate relief in the form of a new trial, not
whether petitioner’s allegations, combined with the facts
he had learned, entitled him to the discovery and eviden
tiary hearing that he sought.
The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning does not suggest oth
erwise. The court observed that Wellons’ claims of mis
conduct were “grounded in his speculation as to the mean
ing underlying the jurors’ chocolate ‘gifts’ ” and “the
surmise attached to their passive receipt of these gifts.”
Ibid. This statement likewise indicates only that on the
existing record, habeas relief was inappropriate, not that
an evidentiary hearing should be denied. After all, had
there been discovery or an evidentiary hearing, Wellons
may have been able to present more than “speculation”
and “surmise.” The Eleventh Circuit also pointed to the
state court’s decision on direct appeal, see id., at 937, and
reviewed that decision “[i]n light of the evidence presented
before the Georgia Supreme Court,” ibid. This, too, is
typical of a court reviewing the denial of habeas relief, not
the denial of discovery or an evidentiary hearing. 3
——————
3 JUSTICE ALITO asserts that the Eleventh Circuit “stated in unequivo
cal terms that its holding on the merits of petitioner’s claim was inde
pendent of its holding on the question of procedural default.” Post, at 1.
But that does not address the question: The merits of what? The
question whether to grant habeas relief or whether to permit discovery
and an evidentiary hearing?
Contrary to our dissenting colleagues, post, at 4 (opinion of ALITO, J.),
we do not find it dispositive that the section of the Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion about judge, juror, and bailiff misconduct began with a full
page statement of the standard of review, which in turn included a
sentence about the circumstances under which an evidentiary hearing
is warranted. See 554 F. 3d, at 934–935. Immediately following the
standard of review that JUSTICE ALITO quotes, the panel explained that
“ ‘if the record . . . precludes habeas relief, a district court is not re
quired to hold an evidentiary hearing,’ ” and that “the record reveals
that [Wellons’] claims . . . are procedurally barred.” Id., at 935.
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 5
Per Curiam
Moreover, even assuming that the Eleventh Circuit
intended to address Wellons’ motions for discovery and an
evidentiary hearing, we cannot be sure that its reasoning
really was independent of the Cone error. The fact that
his claims rested on “speculation” and “surmise” was due
to the absence of a record, which was in part based on the
Cone error. And as the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning
turned on “the evidence presented before the Georgia
Supreme Court,” 554 F. 3d, at 937, there is serious doubt
about whether it necessarily relied on the very holes in the
record that Wellons was trying to fill.
Our dissenting colleagues allege that the Court is “de
grad[ing] . . . our traditional requirements for a GVR.”
Post, at 2 (opinion of SCALIA, J.); see post, at 4 (opinion of
ALITO, J.). But the standard for an order granting certio
rari, vacating the judgment below, and remanding the
case (GVR) remains as it always has been: A GVR is ap
propriate when “intervening developments . . . reveal a
reasonable probability that the decision below rests upon a
premise that the lower court would reject if given the
opportunity for further consideration, and where it ap
pears that such a redetermination may determine the
——————
Moreover, the allegedly “unequivocal” holding that JUSTICE ALITO
quotes was preceded by a discussion of the deference owed under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) to the
“Georgia Supreme Court’s judgment as to the substance and effect of
the ex parte communication.” Id., at 937. This is the classic formula
tion of a decision of whether to grant habeas relief. Indeed, it would be
bizarre if a federal court had to defer to state-court factual findings,
made without any evidentiary record, in order to decide whether it
could create an evidentiary record to decide whether the factual find
ings were erroneous. If that were the case, then almost no habeas
petitioner could ever get an evidentiary hearing: So long as the state
court found a fact that the petitioner was trying to disprove through the
presentation of evidence, then there could be no hearing. AEDPA does
not require such a crabbed and illogical approach to habeas procedures,
and there is no reason to believe that the Eleventh Circuit thought
otherwise.
6 WELLONS v. HALL
Per Curiam
ultimate outcome” of the matter. Lawrence v. Chater, 516
U. S. 163, 167 (1996) (per curiam). As already discussed,
there is, at least, a “reasonable probability,” ibid., that the
denial of discovery and an evidentiary hearing rested in
part on the Cone error. And in light of the unusual facts of
the case, a “redetermination may determine the ultimate
outcome,” 516 U. S., at 167; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529
U. S. 420, 442 (2000) (holding that several “omissions as a
whole disclose the need for an evidentiary hearing”);
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 215 (1982) (“This Court
has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror
partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has an
opportunity to prove actual bias”). The Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion is ambiguous in significant respects. It would be
highly inappropriate to assume away that ambiguity in
respondent’s favor. That is especially so in a case in which
petitioner’s allegations and the unusual facts raise a
serious question about the fairness of a capital trial.
Both dissenting opinions suggest that if there is a strong
case for discovery and an evidentiary hearing, then the
Court “should summarily reverse or set the case for argu
ment.” Post, at 2 (opinion of SCALIA, J.); see also post, at
4–5 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But as we have explained, “a
GVR order conserves the scarce resources of this Court,”
“assists the court below by flagging a particular issue that
it does not appear to have fully considered,” and “assists
this Court by procuring the benefit of the lower court’s
insight before we rule on the merits.” Lawrence, supra, at
167.
Unlike JUSTICE SCALIA, post, at 3, we do not believe that
a “self-respecting” court of appeals would or should re
spond to our remand order with a “summary reissuance”
of essentially the same opinion, absent the procedural
default discussion. To the contrary, in light of our decision
in Cone, we assume the court will consider, on the merits,
whether petitioner’s allegations, together with the undis
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 7
Per Curiam
puted facts, warrant discovery and an evidentiary hearing.
The petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are
granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is re
manded to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration
in light of Cone v. Bell, 556 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17–
18).
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 1
SCALIA, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MARCUS A. WELLONS v. HILTON HALL, WARDEN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09–5731. Decided January 19, 2010
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,
dissenting.
Petitioner Marcus Wellons was convicted in Georgia
state court of capital murder and sentenced to death.
After exhausting direct appeal and state postconviction
review, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal
court under 28 U. S. C. §2254. Wellons claims, among
other things, that misconduct on the part of the trial
judge, jurors, and court bailiff deprived him of a fair trial.
The District Court denied relief, and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.
Today the Court grants Wellons’ petition for certiorari,
vacates the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, and re
mands (“GVRs”) in light of Cone v. Bell, 556 U. S. ___
(2009). The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Wellons’
claims were procedurally barred because the state post
conviction court, noting that the State Supreme Court had
rejected them on direct appeal, held the claims were res
judicata. See 554 F. 3d 923, 936, and n. 6 (2009). This
was error under Cone, see 556 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op.,
at 17–18), as respondent recognizes; indeed, the Eleventh
Circuit has already recognized the abrogation of the opin
ion below on this point, see Owen v. Secretary for Dept. of
Corrections, 568 F. 3d 894, 915, n. 23, (2009). But, as
JUSTICE ALITO’s dissent demonstrates, post, p. ___, the
Eleventh Circuit (like the District Court) also decided that
petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief on the merits.
554 F. 3d, at 936–938. Thus the Court GVRs in light of
Cone even though the issue on which Cone throws light
2 WELLONS v. HALL
SCALIA, J., dissenting
does not affect the outcome.
The Court has previously asserted a power to GVR
whenever there is “a reasonable probability that the deci
sion below rests upon a premise that the lower court
would reject if given the opportunity for further considera
tion, and where it appears that such a redetermination
may determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation.”
Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U. S. 163, 167 (1996) (per cu
riam). I have protested even that flabby standard, see id.,
at 190–191 (SCALIA, J., dissenting), but today the Court
outdoes itself. It GVRs where the decision below does not
“rest upon” the objectionable faulty premise, but is inde
pendently supported by other grounds—so that redeter
mination of the faulty ground will assuredly not “deter
mine the ultimate outcome of the litigation.” The power to
“revise and correct for error,” which the Court has already
turned into “a power to void for suspicion,” id., at 190
(same) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted),
has now become the power to send back for a re-do. We
have no authority to decree that. If the Court thinks that
the Eleventh Circuit’s merits holding is wrong, then it
should summarily reverse or set the case for argument;
otherwise, the judgment below must stand. The same is
true if (as the Court evidently believes) the Court of Ap
peals should have required an evidentiary hearing before
resolving the merits question. If they erred in that regard
their judgment should be reversed rather than remanded
“in light of Cone v. Bell”—a disposition providing no hint
that what we really want them to do (as the Court be
lieves) is to consider an evidentiary hearing.
The systematic degradation of our traditional require
ments for a GVR has spawned a series of unusual disposi
tions, including the GVR so the government can try a less
extravagant argument on remand, see Department of
Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U. S. 919, 921 (1996)
(SCALIA, J., dissenting), the GVR in light of nothing, see
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 3
SCALIA, J., dissenting
Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U. S. 867, 872 (2006)
(same), and the newly-minted Summary Remand for More
Extensive Opinion than Petitioner Requested
(SRMEOPR), see Webster v. Cooper, 558 U. S. ___, ___
(2009) (slip op., at 3). Today the Court adds another beast
to our growing menagerie: the SRIE, Summary Remand
for Inconsequential Error—or, as the Court would have it,
the SRTAEH, Summary Remand to Think About an Evi
dentiary Hearing.
It disrespects the judges of the Courts of Appeals, who
are appointed and confirmed as we are, to vacate and send
back their authorized judgments for inconsequential im
perfection of opinion—as though we were schoolmasters
grading their homework. An appropriately self-respecting
response to today’s summary vacatur would be summary
reissuance of the same opinion, minus the discussion of
Cone. That would also serve the purpose of minimizing
the delay of justice that today’s GVR achieves (Wellons
has already outlived his victim by 20 years; he committed
his murder in 1989).
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 1
ALITO, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MARCUS A. WELLONS v. HILTON HALL, WARDEN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09–5731. Decided January 19, 2010
JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
dissenting.
The Court’s disposition of this case represents a misuse
of our authority to grant, vacate, and remand (GVR). The
decision of the Court of Appeals plainly rests on two inde
pendent grounds: first, that petitioner procedurally de
faulted his claim that the judge, bailiff, and jurors had an
inappropriate relationship that impaired his right to a fair
trial and, second, that petitioner’s claim failed on the
merits. See 554 F. 3d 923, 936 (CA11 2009). While it is
true that the first of these grounds is inconsistent with
Cone v. Bell, 556 U. S. ___ , ___ (2009) (slip op., at 17–18),
there is no basis for vacating the decision below unless
some recent authority or development provides a basis for
reconsideration of the second ground as well. But the per
curiam identifies no such authority. Instead, the per
curiam uses Cone as a vehicle for suggesting that the
Court of Appeals should reconsider its decision on the
merits of petitioner’s claim.
In order to defend this disposition, the per curiam re
fuses to credit the Court of Appeals’ explanation of the
basis of its decision. The Court of Appeals twice stated in
unequivocal terms that its holding on the merits of peti
tioner’s claim was independent of its holding on the ques
tion of procedural default. See 554 F. 3d, at 937–938
(“[E]ven if these claims were properly before us on habeas
review, we would not disturb the Georgia Supreme Court’s
conclusion on the merits of these claims”); id., at 936
(“Even if we assume that Wellons’s misconduct claims are
2 WELLONS v. HALL
ALITO, J., dissenting
not procedurally barred, they do not entitle Wellons to
habeas relief”). But the per curiam states that the Court
of Appeals’ consideration of the merits “may well have
turned on the District Court’s finding of a procedural bar”
and that “we cannot be sure that [the panel’s] reasoning
really was independent of the Cone error.” Ante, at 3, 5.
Even worse, the per curiam unjustifiably suggests that
the Court of Appeals gave at most only “perfunctory con
sideration” to petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing and may not have “carefully reviewed”
the relevant facts. Ante, at 3, 1. The majority may not be
satisfied with the Court of Appeals’ discussion, but the
majority has no good reason for suggesting that the lower
court did not give the issue careful consideration.
The District Court refused petitioner’s discovery request
on the ground that petitioner did not make a sufficient
showing to warrant interrogation of the jurors. As the
detailed opinion of the District Court reveals, the state
habeas judge allowed petitioner’s attorneys to contact all
of the jurors and relevant court personnel; the attorneys
succeeded in contacting all but 1 of the jurors; 6 of the 11
jurors who were contacted, as well as the bailiffs and court
reporter, were interviewed; and the attorneys made a
proffer of the information provided by these interviewees.1
There is no suggestion that the attorneys were restricted
in the questions that they were permitted to ask the inter
viewees, and it appears that the jurors who were inter
viewed spoke freely, even discussing their understanding
of the judge’s instructions on the law and the jury’s delib
——————
1 As the District Court observed, “[p]etitioner’s state habeas corpus
counsel contacted all but one of the jurors seeking their comments.”
App. C to Pet. for Cert. 34. The proffer shows that six jurors were
interviewed: DeArmond, id., at 35, Henry, ibid., Givhan, id., at 36,
Humphrey, id., at 37, Moore, ibid. and Smith, ibid. The Court’s de
scription of some of the matters that the jurors mentioned during the
interview confirms that these jurors “spoke freely.” See ante, at 2, n. 1.
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 3
ALITO, J., dissenting
erations.2 Cf. Fed. Rule Evid. 606(b). Interestingly, the
proffer does not reflect that the attorneys asked any of the
jurors what would appear to be the most critical question,
namely, why the strange gifts were given to the judge or
the bailiff.3 See App. C to Pet. for Cert. 34–38. If any such
questions had been asked and answers favorable to peti
tioner’s position had been provided, one would expect that
information to appear in the proffer.
After examining the proffer made by petitioner’s attor
neys, the District Court concluded that this submission
did not justify formal discovery. With respect to what the
per curiam describes as the “unreported ex parte contacts
between the jury and the judge,” ante, at 1—which appar
ently consisted of a brief exchange of words that occurred
——————
2 The per curiam assumes that the jurors who were interviewed must
have spoken only “in the briefest of terms” because “ ‘everything that
Petitioner. . . learned’ ” “filled only a few sheets of paper.” Ibid. The
mere fact that the unsworn proffer submitted by petitioner’s state
habeas counsel consisted of four pages, see App. C to Pet. for Cert. 35–
38, does not seem to me to provide a sufficient basis for concluding that
the jurors interviewed spoke only “in the briefest of terms.” The length
of the proffer is equally consistent with the possibility that the jurors
interviewed spoke at length but did not supply information that peti
tioner’s counsel deemed helpful to his case.
3 The main reason for the interviews was to inquire about the gifts,
and the proffer shows that the jurors who were interviewed discussed
this matter. See, e.g., App. C to Pet. for Cert. 35 (a juror “stated that
‘we,’ the jurors gave a pair of chocolate breasts to the bailiff and the
chocolate penis just followed”); ibid. (a juror “stated that some of the
jurors decided to send a pair of edible chocolate breasts to one of the
female bailiffs and an edible chocolate penis to the trial judge”); id., at
37 (a juror “remembered discussion about giving a chocolate penis to
the judge”). Nevertheless, petitioner’s proffer includes no information
as to why the gifts were given—not even a statement to the effect that
the jurors interviewed were asked this question and said that they did
not know. Cf. id., at 35 (noting that a particular juror “did not know
whose idea it was to send the chocolate penis to the judge,” but not
including any representation as to her understanding of why the gifts
may have been given (emphasis added)).
4 WELLONS v. HALL
ALITO, J., dissenting
when the judge entered the room in a restaurant where
the jurors were dining—the District Court concluded that
“nothing that Petitioner has presented provides even the
slightest indication that anything more than a simple
greeting occurred,” App. C to Pet. for Cert. 43.
With respect to the gifts that were given to the judge
and a bailiff after the trial ended, the District Court
stressed that they were “inappropriate” and represented
“an unusual display of poor taste in the context of a pro
ceeding so grave as a capital trial,” ibid., but the Court
noted that petitioner had not proffered any evidence that
any of the jurors or court personnel who were interviewed
had said anything that substantiated the assertion that
“an inappropriate relationship existed between the judge,
the bailiff, and the jury,” id., at 44.
A fair reading of the Court of Appeals’ opinion is that
that court likewise held that petitioner was not entitled to
the discovery he sought because that discovery was
unlikely to yield evidence substantiating his claim. See
554 F. 3d, at 935 (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U. S.
465, 474 (2007) (“When deciding whether to grant a fed
eral habeas petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hear
ing, ‘a federal court must consider whether such a hearing
could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual
allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to
federal habeas relief’ ”)).
I agree with the Court that the strange and tasteless
gifts that were given to the trial judge and bailiff are
facially troubling, and I am certainly not prepared at this
point to say that the decision below on the discovery issue
was correct. But unlike the Court, I do not think it is
proper for us to use a GVR to address this matter. The
lower courts have decided the discovery issue, and now
this Court has two options. First, if we wish to review the
question whether petitioner made a sufficient showing to
justify interrogation of the jurors, we should grant the
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 5
ALITO, J., dissenting
petition for a writ of certiorari and decide that question.
Second, if we do not wish to tackle that fact-bound ques
tion, we should deny review or GVR in light of a recent
authority or development that casts doubt on the judg
ment of the court below. What the Court has done—using
a GVR as a vehicle for urging the Court of Appeals to
reconsider its holding on a question that is entirely inde
pendent of the ground for the GVR—is extraordinary and,
in my view, improper.