UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4754
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RUBEN SANCHEZ-GUZMAN, a/k/a Ruben,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00010-RLV-DSC-6)
Submitted: August 12, 2010 Decided: September 8, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
D. Baker McIntyre III, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Mark A. Jones,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ruben Sanchez-Guzman was convicted by a jury of one
count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a
quantity of cocaine and methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and was sentenced to 168 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Sanchez-Guzman argues that the
district court erred in admitting certain firearm evidence and
in its application of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) (2008). We affirm.
Sanchez-Guzman challenges the district court’s
decision to admit certain photographs, taken during the course
of the conspiracy, depicting him and some of his co-conspirators
holding various firearms, as well as evidence of his arrest for
possession of a firearm, which occurred three days prior to his
arrest in the present case. We review the district court’s
admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, “which we will
not find unless the evidence was arbitrary and irrational.”
United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 346 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1104 (2010). “Evidentiary rulings are . . . subject to harmless
error analysis.” United States v. Roe, 606 F.3d 180, 185 (4th
Cir. 2010). We conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion by finding the firearm evidence at issue relevant and
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that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.
Sanchez-Guzman also contends that the district court
erred in its application of USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). The guidelines
provide that a district court is to increase a defendant’s base
offense level two levels “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a
firearm) was possessed.” USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). “The adjustment
should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is
clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
offense.” USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.3. The enhancement is proper
when “the weapon was possessed in connection with drug activity
that was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as
the offense of conviction,” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d
621, 628-29 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted),
and even in the absence of proof of “precisely concurrent acts,
for example, gun in hand while in the act of storing drugs,
drugs in hand while in the act of retrieving a gun,” United
States v. Johnson, 943 F.2d 383, 386 (4th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam). Whether the district court properly applied the USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement is reviewed for clear error. Manigan,
592 F.3d at 631-32. Our review of the transcript supports the
application of this enhancement. In addition to the
photographic evidence, the district court considered evidence
that a witness gave Sanchez-Guzman a firearm and that a search
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of a co-defendant’s home revealed a number of firearms.
Accordingly, we find no error.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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