FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 10, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
J.M., a minor, by and through her
parents and next friends; THOMAS and
REBECCA MORRIS,
Plaintiffs - Appellees/
Cross-Appellants, Nos. 08-7104 & 08-7105
v. (E.D. Oklahoma)
HILLDALE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL (D.C. No. 6:07-CV-00367-JHP)
DISTRICT NO. 1-29, of Muskogee
County, Oklahoma, also known as
Hilldale Public Schools,
Defendant - Appellant/
Cross-Appellee,
and
BRIAN GIACOMO,
Defendant/Cross-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges, and ARMIJO, ** District Judge.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
The Honorable M. Christina Armijo, United States District Judge for the
District of New Mexico, sitting by designation.
I. Introduction
Defendant-Appellant Hilldale Independent School District (Hilldale)
appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. It
further challenges selected evidentiary rulings, the basis for permitting certain
legal theories to go to the jury, the entry of inconsistent verdicts, and the
plaintiff’s perceived double recovery. Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
J.M. by and through her parents and next friends, Thomas and Rebecca Morris,
(J.M.) contends that the district court improperly reduced the jury’s verdict. We
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291 and AFFIRM the district court.
II. Factual Background
During the course of 2005-2006 school year and through November 2006,
Brian Giacomo, a high school band teacher, and J.M., a student, maintained an
inappropriate relationship, which included kissing, hugging, petting, and vaginal
and oral sex. The activities occurred on and off school property. In April 2006,
after the sexual relationship began, Giacomo took the Hilldale band, of which
J.M. was a member, on an out of state trip to St. Louis, Missouri. During that
trip, another band member, Mikel Pembrook, knocked on the closed door of
Giacomo’s hotel room to inquire about dinner plans. When Giacomo opened the
door, Pembrook observed J.M. lying on the bed.
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After the band trip, J.M. received an award for being the most improved
band student. Pembrook was unhappy that J.M. received the award and initiated a
confrontation. Pembrook called J.M. a “slut” and attributed the award to her
relationship with her “pedophile boyfriend.” J.M. reported the confrontation to
Giacomo, who arranged for Pembrook to meet with Assistant Principal, Darren
Riddle. Giacomo also attended the meeting. During the meeting, Pembrook told
Riddle that he thought Giacomo was a pedophile and that he saw Giacomo alone
in a hotel room with a female student. Pembrook testified, and Giacomo
corroborated, that Riddle became hostile to Pembrook during the conversation.
Riddle then arranged to meet with Pembrook’s parents, and according to J.M.,
threatened Pembrook’s parents that if the “pedophile rumors” did not stop,
Pembrook would be suspended or expelled. Following the meeting with
Pembrook’s parents, Riddle recommended to D.B. Merrill, the school
superintendent, that he deny Pembrook’s transfer, which allowed him to attend
Hilldale even though he lived in another district. According to J.M., the transfer
was denied in part because of Pembrook’s report of Giacomo’s conduct to Riddle.
Riddle testified that he also passed the information on to the principal,
Gary Pemberton. It appears that nothing further happened, however, until
November 2006, when the parents of another female student, S.R., alerted the
Hilldale officials to evidence that they had discovered, which indicated an
inappropriate relationship between their daughter and Giacomo. Hilldale
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suspended Giacomo, and he resigned the next day. At that point, Hilldale began
to investigate Giacomo. After a parent’s meeting, J.M.’s mother initiated a
discussion with J.M., who admitted to her relationship with Giacomo. J.M.’s
family moved to another school district. J.M. sought treatment with a psychiatrist
and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive
disorder. She was prescribed antidepressant and anti-anxiety medications.
On November 2, 2007, J.M. filed suit against Hilldale and Giacomo for
violations of Title IX, § 1983, and common law negligence. Hilldale filed a
motion for summary judgment, which was denied by the district court. The case
went to trial before a jury in August 2008. The jury returned verdicts in J.M.’s
favor on the Title IX claim, two § 1983 claims, and the negligence claim, and the
jury found in favor of Hilldale on a third § 1983 claim and a second negligence
claim. The jury awarded J.M. $150,000 in damages on each claim for a total of
$600,000 against Hilldale. In addition, the jury awarded damages against
Giacomo for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, for a
total of $1,900,000 and an additional $500,000 in punitive damages. After
considering a motion from Hilldale, the district court eliminated one of the
$150,000 verdicts, finding that the two § 1983 claims were duplicative, and also
reduced the state tort verdict from $150,000 to $125,000 to reflect a statutory cap
on damages. Hilldale appeals and J.M. cross appeals from the jury’s verdicts and
the district court’s rulings.
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III. Discussion
Hilldale raises four issues. First, Hilldale argues that the district court
erred by denying Hilldale’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect
to the Title IX claim, the § 1983 inaction claim, and the state tort claims. Related
to the Title IX claim, Hilldale contends that the district court improperly excluded
J.M.’s diary and evidence of her prior sexual history, and as a result of the
exclusion, Hilldale was unable to disprove one of the elements of the Title IX
claim. Second, Hilldale contends for the first time on appeal that the district
court wrongly permitted the § 1983 danger creation theory to go to the jury.
Finally, Hilldale maintains that the district court entered irreconcilably
inconsistent verdicts and fourth, that the judgment permitted double recovery. In
her cross appeal, J.M. contends that the district court improperly reduced the
jury’s award when it determined that two of the verdicts were duplicative.
In addition to the issues presented in this appeal, two motions remain
outstanding before this Court: Hilldale has moved to supplement the record and
has moved to file portions of the record under seal. Both motions were
provisionally granted and reserved for final ruling by this panel. We first address
Hilldale’s outstanding motion relating to the adequacy of the designated record.
Hilldale has challenged the evidence to support the verdict but filed only excerpts
of the trial transcript, contrary to 10th Cir. Rule 10.1.(A)(1)(a). Arguing that the
failure to file the entire transcript was a good faith error, Hilldale requests
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permission to supplement the record with the entire transcript. J.M. responds that
dismissal of the substantial evidence appeal is required because the error was not
in good faith and supplementation of the record would prejudice J.M.
The cases cited by J.M. do not suggest that a motion to supplement the
record should be automatically denied and a substantial evidence appeal should be
immediately dismissed. Instead, Quarles v. Spess Oil Co., Inc., No. 08-5058,
2009 WL 319624 (10th Cir. Feb. 10, 2009), considered an appeal where no
motion to supplement the inadequate record was filed. The Court therefore
admonished that “[o]nce again, it is incumbent upon us to remind litigants that we
regularly decline to hear claims that are premised upon record evidence that is not
included in the appendix.” Id. at *3. In Blackwell v. SKO Mgmt., Inc., 64
Fed.Appx. 725 (10th Cir. 2003), the plaintiff challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence and failed to provide a transcript. Id. at *1. He filed a motion to
supplement the appendix but only offered portions of the transcript as
supplementation. Id. The Court denied the motion to supplement and rejected the
Plaintiff’s sufficiency argument. Id. at * 1-2. Finally, in Roberts v. Roadway
Exp., Inc, 149 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 1998), the Court refused to consider a
sufficiency claim because only excerpts of the transcript were provided, but the
case did not apparently address a motion to supplement the appendix. Id. at 1004-
05.
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In the present case, Hilldale argues that it failed to provide a full transcript
in good faith and accordingly filed a motion to place the entire transcript in the
appendix. Based on the motion to supplement, Hilldale does not expect the Court
to consider its sufficiency claim without the full transcript, as did the appellant in
Quarles. Nor has Hilldale offered to supplement only with excerpts of the
transcript as was the case in Blackwell and Roberts. As a result, it appears to be a
good faith error. The motion to supplement and consider the entire transcript is
granted.
Hilldale has also filed a second motion, requesting that its briefs and
appendix be filed under seal due to references to J.M.’s prior sexual history, as
well as the excerpts from her diary. It does not appear that J.M. opposes this
motion, and it is hereby granted. We now turn to Hilldale’s appeal.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
After the jury returned its verdict, Hilldale filed a motion for judgment as a
matter of law and argued that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to find for
J.M. on the Title IX, § 1983, and state tort claims. The district court denied these
claims, simply stating that these issues were previously addressed by the Court.
Aplt.App., Vol. I, at 249. Presumably, the district court was referring to its earlier
order, which denied Hilldale summary judgment on these issues. Aplt.App., Vol.
I, at 23. We address each argument in turn.
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This Court reviews the “denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law
de novo, taking the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to . . . the non-movant.” N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Britt
Paulk Ins. Agency, Inc., 579 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2009). “Judgment as a
matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence points but one way and is
susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the nonmoving party’s
position.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further,
“[j]udgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when the evidence presented at
trial does not permit a reasonable jury to find for the non-movant.” Manzanares
v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2009). We do “not weigh evidence,
judge witness credibility, or challenge the factual conclusions of the jury.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
1. Title IX
“Title IX prohibits sex discrimination by recipients of federal education
funding[; the] statute provides that ‘[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.’” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S.
167, 173 (2005) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681I(a)). Title IX implies a private right
of action for monetary damages to enforce its prohibition of intentional sex
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discrimination “in the form of a recipient’s deliberate indifference to a teacher’s
sexual harassment of a student.” Id.
A damages remedy, however, will not lie under Title IX “unless an official
who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to
institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of
discrimination in the recipient’s programs and fails adequately to respond.”
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). The failure to
respond to discrimination, in turn, must amount to “deliberate indifference,” or
“an official decision . . . not to remedy the violation.” Id. This is because
“[u]nder a lower standard, there would be a risk that the recipient would be liable
in damages not for its own official decision but instead for its employees’
independent actions.” Id. at 290-91. In Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
526 U.S. 629 (1999), the Supreme Court further clarified the elements of a Title
IX action: (1) an official is deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment (2) of
which there was actual knowledge; (3) and the harassment “is so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Id. at
650. Hilldale argues that (1) it did not have actual knowledge of the harassment,
(2) its response was not clearly unreasonable and therefore did not amount to
deliberate indifference, and (3) it was prevented by the district court’s evidentiary
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ruling from showing that the harassment did not deprive J.M. of access to
education.
a. Actual Knowledge
Hilldale contends that the only evidence of actual knowledge was
Pembrook’s report to Riddle regarding J.M.’s presence in Giacomo’s hotel room
in St. Louis. Citing Gebser and Escue v. N. Oklahoma College, 450 F.3d 1146
(10th Cir. 2006), Hilldale argues that this evidence is insufficient to establish
actual knowledge. In Gebser, the Supreme Court concluded that a school district
did not have actual knowledge because the information available was a complaint
from the parents of a student who was not the plaintiff, charging that the teacher
in question had made inappropriate comments during class. 524 U.S. at 291. The
report was “plainly insufficient to alert the principal to the possibility that [the
teacher] was involved in a sexual relationship with a student.” Id. In Escue, a
university had information that the professor in question had dated two students
who were near his own age and that nearly a decade before the events about
which the plaintiff sued, the professor had been accused of a single incident of
inappropriate touching and a single incident of inappropriate name calling. 450
F.3d at 1154. These prior incidents, this Court concluded, did not provide the
college with “actual knowledge that [the teacher] presented a ‘substantial risk of
abuse’ to other students—indeed, one of the incidents involved no physical
contact whatsoever, the other was an isolated incident, and neither involved
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anywhere near the degree of overt and pervasive harassment that [the plaintiff]
alleges constituted a hostile educational environment.” Id.
In Gebser, the complaint received by school officials was of a different
type than the ultimate misconduct: the parents complained of inappropriate
comments during class and the basis for the Title IX suit was a sexual relationship
with a student. Similarly, in Escue, the prior complaints were stale and of a
significantly different nature than those later made by the plaintiff. Both Gebser
and Escue concluded that from the types of complaints made, the eventual alleged
conduct could not have been anticipated—that the officials could not be deemed
to have knowledge of a risk that the teacher would sexually harass the plaintiff
who later filed suit. In the present case, the conduct that was reported as it related
to a young high school student having a sexual relationship with a teacher—if the
report was sufficient, as we discuss in subsequent paragraphs—was the same
conduct that was eventually unearthed and to which J.M. and Giacomo admitted.
We view Gebser and Escue to be of little avail to Hilldale.
At trial, the parties offered a great deal of conflicting testimony regarding
the report made by Pembrook in May 2006.
i. Riddle’s Trial Testimony
Riddle testified first. He explained that Pembrook simply reported that
during a band trip to St. Louis, Giacomo and J.M. were seen in a motel room
together, with the door propped open. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 18, 86, 88.
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According to Riddle, Pembrook stated that J.M. was sitting on the bed, Giacomo
was standing nearby, and they were talking. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 88.
Riddle further testified that he stopped his investigation of Pembrook’s report
when Pembrook recanted the story and admitted to Riddle that he had been lying.
Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 31. Specifically, Riddle stated that Pembrook made the
report because he was upset that J.M. was getting attention and favoritism in
band. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 87. Finally, Riddle testified that he discussed
Pembrook’s report with D.B. Merrill, the district superintendent, in the context of
whether to permit Pembrook to remain as a transfer student in the Hilldale
district. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 137-38.
ii. Merrill’s Trial Testimony
Merrill disputed this, stating that he was not aware of any allegations
against Giacomo until November 2006. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. 1, at 161-62.
Regarding Pembrook’s transfer request, Merrill testified that Riddle reported only
that Pembrook had made false accusations—that he had been untruthful—and not
that Pembrook had made allegations of sexual misconduct. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol.
I, at 162. Further, Merrill testified that he was under the impression, based on
Riddle’s report, that Pembrook reported to Riddle that the motel room door was
open. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 172, 184-85.
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iii. Pemberton’s Trial Testimony
Pemberton, the principal, testified to a different set of events. Pemberton
stated that in May 2006, Pembrook made a comment that “a young lady had been
in a motel room with Mr. Giacomo with the door closed.” Aplt.Supp.App., Vol.
II, at 234; see Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 509. Importantly, Pemberton testified
that Riddle informed him in May about the situation and that Pembrook was
claiming to have seen J.M. and Giacomo in a motel room, with the door closed.
Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 512. Riddle assured Pemberton that he had
investigated the situation and talked to all of the students who had gone on the
trip. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 234. In addition, Riddle told Pemberton that the
incident had been completely fabricated, that the girl was never alone in a room
with Giacomo and that a number of kids were in the room watching television and
talking. Id. Specifically, Riddle told Pemberton that “there was never a time that
he was aware of through his investigation that there was a female in the room
alone with the door open or closed.” Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 236. Later, after
Giacomo resigned, Riddle came to Pemberton’s office and told Pemberton that he
in fact had not investigated Pembrook’s allegations, that he did not talk to
everyone that was on the trip. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 254. Riddle told
Pemberton that back in May, he was “just convinced that nothing happened.” Id.
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iv. Pembrook’s Trial Testimony
Pembrook testified about what he witnessed in St. Louis and about his later
report of the incident. He explained that when he went to Giacomo’s motel room
door, it was closed, and after he knocked and Giacomo opened the door,
Pembrook saw J.M. lying on the bed. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 446. During the
trial, Pembrook admitted that he could not remember what he told Riddle in May,
but it was established that the word “pedophile” was used during the meetings and
that Pembrook told Riddle that J.M. was the student who was in the motel room
with Giacomo. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 452, 453-54, 469. Pembrook,
however, also testified that he did not tell Riddle that the motel room door was
closed. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 460. In addition, Pembrook denied having
recanted the story at any time. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 462. While
Pembrook’s testimony was confusing and at times contradictory, near the end of
his examination he explained that he was “very nervous about this” and that
“[t]he presence of people [made him] a little more nervous” than when he gave
his deposition. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 496.
v. Giacomo’s Trial Testimony
Finally, Giacomo testified. He would not explain the events that occurred
in St. Louis, Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. III, at 657, but he did state that he took
Pembrook to Riddle’s office for discipline after Pembrook called J.M. a slut and
referred to Giacomo as her “pedophile boyfriend.” Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. III, at
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656-57. Giacomo was certain the word pedophile was used during the meeting
between himself, Pembrook, and Riddle. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. III, at 657.
Giacomo also confirmed Riddle’s statement that Riddle informed Merrill about
Pembrook’s allegations. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. III, at 677. In addition, Giacomo
testified that Riddle did not question him at all about Pembrook’s
allegations—Riddle asked Giacomo no questions in May 2006. Aplt.Supp.App.,
Vol. III, at 744.
Review of the testimony demonstrates that the question of actual
knowledge in this case was truly a question of fact for the jury. The jury was
required to determine whether Pembrook, Riddle, Merrill, Giacomo, or Pemberton
testified credibly about the contents of Pembrook’s May 2006 Report. The
verdict indicates that the jury credited the principal, Pemberton: that Riddle
initially reported to him in May that Pembrook alleged that Giacomo and a
student were together in a hotel room with the door closed. 1
Although “Gebser makes clear that actual notice requires more than a
simple report of inappropriate conduct by a teacher . . . the actual notice standard
does not set the bar so high that a school district is not put on notice until it
receives a clearly credible report of sexual abuse from the plaintiff-student.”
1
Although Pembrook testified at trial that he did not tell Riddle that the
door was closed, the jury could have reasonably concluded that at the time of
trial, Pembrook either didn’t remember, he was nervous (as he stated during his
testimony), or he was distracted by the fact that he was shipping off the next day
to begin his Army career. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 443.
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Escue, 450 F.3d at 1154 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Thus, Hilldale’s assertions—that Riddle did not believe
Pembrook’s allegations—are insufficient alone to establish that the district did
not have actual notice. Rather, because Pemberton testified that he received
information from Riddle that a teacher had been in a motel room behind a closed
door with a student and that Pembrook accused Giacomo of being a pedophile, the
jury could reasonably have concluded that Pembrook’s May 2006 report was
sufficient to provide Riddle and Pemberton, and thereby Hilldale, with actual
knowledge of an inappropriate sexual relationship between J.M. and Giacomo.
See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291 (requiring sufficient information “to alert the
principal to the possibility that [the teacher] was involved in a sexual relationship
with a student”).
b. Deliberate Indifference
Turning to the next prong of the analysis, deliberate indifference exists
where the response “to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in
light of the known circumstances.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. The Supreme Court
of the United States has made clear that “[i]n an appropriate case, there is no
reason why courts, on a motion to dismiss, for summary judgment, or for a
directed verdict, could not identify a response as not clearly unreasonable as a
matter of law.” Id. at 649 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Hilldale contends that J.M. cannot establish that Riddle’s response to Pembrook’s
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report was unreasonable because Riddle and other adults did not find Pembrook to
be credible. Specifically, Hilldale asserts that both “Riddle and [Pembrook]’s
mother concluded that [Pembrook]’s statements about what he saw on the St.
Louis band trip did not support his assertion that Giacomo was a pedophile.”
Therefore, Hilldale argues, the “jury may have believed that Riddle was inept,
erroneous, or even negligent, but they could not fairly have concluded that he was
deliberately indifferent.” See Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219
(5th Cir. 1998).
Hilldale relies in part on Doe. In that case, the Fifth Circuit considered
whether a school principal—who met with a complaining student, his mother, and
the teacher and determined that the allegations of sexual harassment were not
true—was deliberately indifferent for failing to further investigate the teacher.
Id. at 219. The Court concluded that “[t]he fact that [the principal] misread the
situation and made a tragic error in judgment does not create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether she acted with deliberate indifference toward [the
student’s] constitutional rights.” Id. Hilldale likens Doe to the present case where
Riddle met with Pembrook, a student who reported allegations of a teacher
engaging in improper conduct with another student, and took no further action
after determining that Pembrook’s report was not credible. In the present case,
however, Riddle took no steps to determine the credibility of the report— there
was testimony at trial that although Pembrook identified J.M. as the student
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involved, Riddle did not speak to her or her parents, nor did he question Giacomo
about the incident. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 22 (Riddle did not call J.M.’s
parents), Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 43 (Riddle did not speak with J.M.);
Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 470 (Pembrook identified J.M.); Aplt.Supp.App., Vol.
III, at744 (Giacomo was not questioned). Unlike the principal in Doe, Riddle
took no action at all to investigate the allegations. Instead, the testimony
supported a conclusion that Riddle informed Merrill of Pembrook’s allegations
and recommended that Pembrook—who was not a resident of the Hilldale school
district and only attended Hilldale by permission—be removed from the transfer
list and thereby not permitted to attend school in the Hilldale district.
Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 137. Ultimately, Pembrook’s transfer request was
denied. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 162.
Hilldale also cites Gordon ex rel. Gordon v. Ottawa Cmty. Sch. Dist., 115
F.Supp.2d 1077 (S.D. Iowa 2000), for the proposition that a court “must examine
the adequacy of the response, in light of the seriousness and credibility of the
complaint that puts school officials on notice.” Id. at 1082-83 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Thus, Hilldale argues, “Riddle’s assessment of
[Pembrook]’s credibility is fundamental to the issue of whether [Riddle] acted
with deliberate indifference.” The Court, in Gordon, weighed a number of factors
in “assessing” the official response to a report of sexual harassment. See id. at
1083. The school official spoke with the alleged victim’s parents and the alleged
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perpetrator and the official worked out an arrangement with the victim’s mother
regarding the perpetrator’s presence on school property. Id. J.M. presented
evidence that Riddle summarily dismissed Pembrook’s report, without any
assessment of the plausibility of the circumstances and without any investigation.
While Pembrook’s credibility is certainly relevant, see Gordon, Hilldale can point
to no authority which would support a holding that Riddle’s subjective assessment
of Pembrook’s credibility, standing alone, constituted a sufficient investigation in
light of the facts reported to him by Pembrook. In other words, it is the substance
of the report, independent from the perceived lack of credibility of the informant,
that was sufficient to raise the flag that begged for an investigation of a report of
a minor student being present in a closed motel room with her teacher. Riddle’s
snap conclusion that Pembrook was not to be believed could not operate to
obviate the need for an investigation.
“Although no particular response is required, and although the school
district is not required to eradicate all sexual harassment, the school district must
respond and must do so reasonably in light of the known circumstances.” Vance
v. Spencer County Public Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 260-61 (6th Cir. 2000). As
the district court pointed out, it was undisputed that after Pembrook’s report, no
school official conducted any investigation of Giacomo. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II,
at 234-35. Riddle did not confront Giacomo or question any students apart from
Pembrook. See Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F.Supp.2d 57, 64 (D.Me.
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1999) (concluding that a jury could find unreasonable a principal’s failure to
question the teacher or other students about allegations that the teacher was
having sexual relations with a student). A reasonable jury could have concluded
that such a lack of response, given the information that Pembrook provided and
Riddle’s reaction, was not reasonable.
c. Access to Education
Hilldale’s third argument, related to whether the harassment affected J.M.’s
access to education, is tied to its evidentiary argument. Prior to trial, J.M. filed a
motion in limine to exclude evidence of her journal and her prior sexual behavior.
Hilldale filed motions pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 412(c), which outlines the
procedure for determining the admissibility of evidence relating to the victim in
sex offense cases. The district court granted J.M.’s motion and excluded the
evidence. On appeal, Hilldale argues that the evidence that was excluded was the
proof necessary to establish that the sexual harassment did not deprive J.M. of
educational opportunities.
Under Fed. R. Evid. 412(a)(1) “[e]vidence offered to prove that any alleged
victim engaged in other sexual behavior” is generally not admissible in “any civil
or criminal proceeding” unless an exception applies. In civil cases, the exception
permits the evidence if it is “otherwise admissible under these rules and its
probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party.” Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(2). Although it initially
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appears that the journal and J.M.’s history are probative, we agree with the
district court that the journal and J.M.’s prior sexual behavior is not admissible
under the current circumstances.
Hilldale relies on Chancellor v. Pottsgrove Sch. Dist., 529 F.Supp.2d 571
(E.D.Pa. 2008), in support of its theory that because J.M. consented to the sexual
relationship, Giacomo’s sexual harassment was not so severe as to deprive her of
educational opportunities. In that case, a student engaged in a sexual relationship
with her band teacher and then subsequently sued under Title IX. Id. at 574. The
district court permitted evidence that the student consented to the sexual
relationship because although there was no question that a sexual relationship
between a student and a teacher constituted harassment, the student’s “voluntary
participation in sexual activity with [the teacher was] admissible for purposes of
determining whether the harassment rose to the level of ‘severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive.’” Id. at 576 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.)
Chancellor, however, is distinguishable on two grounds. J.M. does not
dispute that the relationship was voluntary and the evidence from the journals
would therefore be cumulative. Further, Chancellor does not address the
admissibility of a student’s prior sexual history—the case speaks only to the
consensual nature of the relationship between the student and the teacher against
whom the complaint is lodged. Rule 412(b)(2) governs prior sexual history.
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The probative value of evidence concerning J.M.’s sexual history with
other partners is limited given the evidence that J.M. presented to establish that
she was denied access to education. For example, J.M. presented testimony that
she was ostracized by other students after Giacomo resigned. Aplt.Supp.App.,
Vol. III, at 580. She was placed on antidepressants and anti-anxiety medication.
Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. III, at 589. Her family felt it necessary to move to another
school district. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. III, at 574. Even in the new school, J.M.
continued to be afraid of the teachers and couldn’t motivate herself to study.
Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. III, at 637. All of these negative impacts on J.M.’s
education resulted directly from the sexual relationship with Giacomo—regardless
of any previous sexual relationships J.M. might have had and despite the fact that
Giacomo did not apply force. The journal and J.M.’s sexual history would not
have been probative on the question of access to education and would simply have
painted J.M. in a negative light.
Given the sensitive nature of the evidence and J.M.’s age, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence of J.M.’s prior sexual
history. See Curtis v. Okla. City Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1217
(10th Cir. 1998) (reviewing evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion); Saffa v.
Okla. Oncology, Inc., 405 F.Supp.2d 1280,1285 (N.D. Okla. 2005) (concluding
that the fact of a prior consensual workplace relationship was not probative of
whether the plaintiff was offended by the defendant’s advances).
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2. § 1983—Hilldale’s Investigative Policy
Hilldale contends that the district court improperly denied its motion for
judgment as a matter of law on J.M.’s § 1983 claim that Hilldale had a policy of
failing to investigate sexual harassment.
A claim of municipal liability for sexual harassment requires that the
state employee’s discriminatory conduct be representative of an
official policy or custom of the institution or are taken by an official
with final policymaking authority. In the absence of an official
policy, a municipality may still be liable for the widespread and
persistent practice of sexual harassment which constitutes a custom.
Rost v. K.C. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (10th
Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). J.M. argues that Hilldale maintained a
custom or practice of not investigating allegations of sexual harassment against
students. In order to demonstrate this, J.M. had to prove (1) that Hilldale engaged
in a “continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of misconduct;” (2) that after
notice of the conduct, policy-making officials demonstrated “deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the conduct;” and (3) that injury resulted
to J.M. as a result of the conduct. Id. at 1125. Hilldale argues that J.M. did not
provide evidence of either a pattern of misconduct or the deliberate indifference
of a policymaker. The district contends that because Giacomo and J.M. tried to
keep their activities secret, there was no evidence that any teacher or
administrator knew of a “continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of
misconduct.” J.M. responds that Hilldale had no implemented policy of
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investigating sexual harassment claims. The school’s written policy required the
superintendent, Merrill, to investigate. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. IV, at 2043. But
Merrill testified that he delegated this responsibility to the school principals.
Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 155. To complete the confusion, the principal,
Pemberton, testified that it was Riddle’s duty to investigate and Riddle testified
that it was Merrill’s obligation. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 65 (Riddle);
Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. II, at 243-44 (Pemberton). As the district court concluded
in its order denying summary judgment to Hilldale, “a trier of fact could
determine that the practice and custom was that ultimately, there was no one in
charge of investigating complaints of sexual abuse.” Aplt.App., Vol. I, at 68.
Hilldale argues that although Riddle chose not to act on Pembrook’s
allegations, because Riddle was not a policy maker, any deliberate indifference on
his part does not subject Hilldale to § 1983 liability. Regardless of Riddle’s
status as a policy maker, J.M. points to evidence that Riddle passed on
Pembrook’s intelligence to Merrill, the superintendent, who also took no action.
Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 137-38. In response, Hilldale offers authorities holding
that under Oklahoma law, only school board members are final policy makers.
For this proposition, it cites Curtis and Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir.
1992) . However, Curtis was a wrongful discharge case in which this Court noted
in passing that a school board was “the final policy-making authority under state
law.” Id., 147 F.3d at 1216; see Jantz, 974 F.2d at 630-31 (holding in a wrongful
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discharge case that only the school board possessed the authority under state law
to hire teachers). The Curtis opinion does not discuss the final policy-making
authority of a school superintendent who is authorized under the written school
policy to implement the sexual harassment policy. Merrill testified that he is the
CEO of the school district, and according to the policy itself, he had the authority
to implement the investigative rules. Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. I, at 153;
Aplt.Supp.App., Vol. IV, at 2043. It further appears from the district court’s
order that Hilldale did not challenge the “official policy maker” element of the §
1983 claim because the court did not address the issue in the order on summary
judgment or any other order in the record provided by Hilldale.
3. State Tort Claims
In its final argument relating to the district court’s denial of the motion for
judgment as a matter of law, Hilldale argues that there was insufficient evidence
to support a state law tort claim for negligent supervision. In Oklahoma, an
employer may be held liable for negligent supervision where “at the critical time
of the tortious incident[,] the employer had reason to believe that the person
would create an undue risk of harm to others.” Escue, 450 F.3d at 1156. Hilldale
essentially contends that because there was no evidence of actual knowledge to
support the Title IX claim, there is no evidence that the district would have had
reason to believe that Giacomo created an undue risk of harm to students. See id.
(“[T]his element of the Oklahoma tort of negligent supervision largely overlaps
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with the ‘actual knowledge’ prong of Title IX liability.”). Based on our earlier
analysis, Hilldale had reason to believe that Giacomo could create a risk of harm
to students after Pembrook met with Riddle and Riddle reported to Merrill.
Hilldale further claims that because it had no prior notice of Giacomo’s
“propensities,” it has no liability under state law. To support this requirement,
Hilldale cites N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 1999 OK 88, 998 P.2d 592
(Okla. 1999). N.H., however, does not require that a school district have both a
reason to believe an employee will create an undue risk of harm and prior notice
of propensities. Rather, the Oklahoma Supreme Court equates prior notice with
“reason to believe.” Id. ¶ 20, 998 P.2d at 600. Indeed, this makes sense: it is the
employer’s knowledge prior to the damage that is relevant, whether it is
knowledge of propensity or knowledge of a particular undue risk. In the present
case, there is evidence that Hilldale had a reason to believe that Giacomo was
inappropriately involved with a student prior to the time that the school began an
active investigation.
In addition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court later classified N.H. as a case in
which “recovery against the employer for an act of his servant is rested on prior
knowledge of the servant’s propensity to commit the very harm for which
damages are sought.” Schovanec v. Archdiocese of Oklahoma City, 2008 OK 70,
¶ 30, 188 P.2d 158, 167. In the present case, liability is not based on Hilldale’s
prior knowledge of Giacomo’s propensities, but instead on Hilldale’s acquired
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knowledge of an ongoing inappropriate relationship and its failure to investigate
further. Review of the district court’s order further suggests that Hilldale did not
challenge the negligent retention and supervision claim on this basis, but instead
argued below that the district did not have a duty under state tort law. Aplt.App.,
Vol. I, at 73-74.
B. § 1983—Danger Creation
Hilldale next contends that the district court improperly permitted J.M.’s
danger creation theory to go the jury. Because Hilldale did not challenge the jury
instruction on danger creation, it asserts that the instruction was plain error. See
Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1094 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“[W]hen a party does not object to an instruction before the district court . . . ,
we can review the district court’s decision to administer the instruction only for
plain error.”) In order to establish plain error, Hilldale must demonstrate clear or
obvious error, which affected Hilldale’s substantial rights. See Abuan v. Level 3
Commc’ns, Inc., 353 F.3d 1158, 1173 (10th Cir. 2003). “We may only reverse in
an exceptional circumstance, where the error was patently erroneous and
prejudicial and where fundamental injustice would otherwise occur.” Id.
Under § 1983, state-created danger is recognized as a basis for substantive
due process claims. See Vicente-Elias v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1086, 1095 (10th
Cir. 2008). State actors are liable under § 1983 only for their own actions except
where “a state actor affirmatively acts to create, or increases a plaintiff’s
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vulnerability to, or danger from private violence.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519
F.3d 1242, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008).
To state a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that (1) state
actors created the danger or increased the plaintiff’s vulnerability to
the danger in some way, (2) the plaintiff was a member of a limited
and specifically definable group, (3) the defendants’ conduct put the
plaintiff at substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate
harm, (4) the risk was obvious or known, (5) the defendants acted
recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk, and (6) the conduct,
when viewed in total, shocks the conscience.
Id. Hilldale challenges the danger creation claim on a single front and argues that
a danger creation theory applies only when the harm is caused by a private action.
In the present case, Hilldale states that Giacomo was a state actor, citing Moore v.
Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2006), which holds that the danger creation
theory does not apply when “the injury occurs due to the action of another state
actor.” Id. at 1042. 2
In Moore, a police officer sued the city under § 1983 after he was shot with
a simulation bullet by another officer during a training exercise. 438 F.3d at
1038-39. This Court concluded that no danger creation claim could lie because
the plaintiff’s injury was the result of a bullet shot “by a fellow police officer and
not a private third party.” Id. at 1042. In that case there was clearly no “private
2
J.M. argues that Giacomo was not a state actor because his actions were
outside the scope of his employment. J.M. cites no authority for the proposition
that a person acting outside the scope of his employment as a public school
teacher is not a state actor for the purposes of evaluating a § 1983 danger creation
theory.
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violence” because the circumstances involved a sponsored training exercise and
another police officer. The present case stands in stark contrast to the facts in
Moore—there was “private” activity—an inappropriate relationship with a
student. See B.T. v. Davis, 557 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1281, n.4 (D. N.M. 2007)
(considering whether the defendant in that case was “more like a third party” than
the police officer in Moore). There is no parallel between the accident that
occurred during the state-sponsored training exercise and the intentional sexual
harassment that occurred at the public school. Considering the factual
distinctions between this case and Moore, as well as Hilldale’s failure to object to
the jury instruction, we can discern no “patently erroneous” error in allowing the
jury to consider the danger creation claim. Abuan, 353 F.3d at 1173.
C. Inconsistent Verdicts
Also based on plain error, Hilldale argues that the jury’s verdicts for
Hilldale on the state failure to report claim and against Hilldale on the Title IX
and § 1983 claims were irreconcilably inconsistent. Plain error analysis in this
context—where the complaining party failed to object to a general jury verdict
before the jury was released—is conducted under a different standard than in
other contexts. Bartee v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 911. n. 2 (10th
Cir. 2004). Under these circumstances, this Court finds plain error “only when
verdicts are inconsistent on their face.” Id. at 911. “A verdict that resolves
separate and distinct causes of action in favor of both parties is not inconsistent
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on its face, [but] when several causes of action are identical and defended on the
same ground, a verdict for the plaintiff on one cause of action and for the
defendant on another is inconsistent.” Id. at 911-12 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
In considering the consistency of the verdicts, this Court examines the
relationship between the elements of the claims. See Oja v. Howmedica, Inc.,
111 F.3d 782, 791 (10th Cir. 1997) The state law failure to report claim consists
of the following elements: (1) Hilldale had reason to believe that a child under 18
was a victim of abuse; (2) Hilldale knowingly and willfully failed to report the
abuse to the Department of Human Services; (3) the failure to report the abuse
was negligent; and (4) Hilldale’s failure to report the abuse of J.M. directly
caused J.M.’s injuries. Aplt.App., Vol. I, at 121. The Title IX claim required
J.M. to establish that “(1) an appropriate person employed by the School District
had actual knowledge of, and (2) was deliberately indifferent to; (3) harassment
that was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it; (4) deprived the
victim of access to the educational benefits or opportunities provided by the
School District.” Aplt.App., Vol. I, at 116. Hilldale contends that the jury found
that Hilldale had “actual notice” as required by the federal Title IX and § 1983
claims but also concluded that Hilldale did not have a “reason to believe” that
J.M. was being abused as required for the state claim and that therefore, the
verdicts are inconsistent. Hilldale cites Oja for support.
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In Oja, the jury found for the plaintiff on a negligent failure to warn claim
and for the defendant on negligence and strict liability claims. Id. at 785. This
Court concluded that the similar elements between the failure to warn claim and
the strict liability claim were essentially the only disputed elements at trial. Id. at
791. The Court explained that in order to find for the plaintiff on the failure to
warn claim, “the jury had to find that the [product] was defective at the time of
sale and caused her injuries.” Id. At the same time, in order to find for the
defendant on the strict liability claim, “the jury had to find that the PCA hip was
either not defective at the time of sale or did not cause her injuries.” Id. As a
result, the verdicts were facially inconsistent.
There is no similar comparison here. Although the actual knowledge
element in the federal claims is similar to the reason to believe element in the
state claim, Hilldale does not contend that the knowledge component was
“essentially the only disputed element[] at trial.” Id. The jury could have
concluded J.M. did not establish that Hilldale’s failure to report the abuse to the
state department of human services directly caused J.M.’s injuries. Instead, a
reasonable jury could have concluded that Riddle’s failure to report to state
authorities did not result in J.M.’s loss, while at the same time determining that
Riddle’s failure to himself investigate the report did directly cause a portion of
J.M.’s injuries. The verdicts can be read to resolve “separate and distinct causes
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of action” and are therefore not inconsistent on their face. Bartee v, 374 F.3d at
911 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
D. Duplicative Verdicts
Also as a part of Hilldale’s motion for judgment as a matter of law was an
argument that the jury’s verdicts were duplicative. The district court ruled that
the jury’s awards on the two § 1983 claims were duplicative and reduced the
award against Hilldale by $150,000. On appeal, Hilldale maintains that the
separate damages awards for the two § 1983 claims, the Title IX claim, and the
state tort claim were duplicative of each other because they were alternate
theories for the same relief.
“Whether an award is duplicative is a question of fact,” which this Court
reviews for clear error. N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 579 F.3d at 1113. “An error is
clear only if the court’s finding is without factual support in the record or if, after
reviewing all the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Where, as here, the jury is instructed not to award duplicative damages, and the
jury returns a total damage figure that is within the range of evidence, this Court
is “generally unwilling to disturb or second guess the jury’s verdict.” Id.
Nevertheless, “double recovery is precluded when alternative theories seeking the
same relief are pled and tried together.” Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 530 (
10th Cir 1979). “If a federal claim and a state claim arise from the same
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operative facts, and seek identical relief, an award of damages under both theories
will constitute double recovery.” Mason v. Okla. Turnpike Authority, 115 F.3d
1442, 1459 (10th Cir. 1997).
These arguments require this Court to evaluate the bases for J.M.’s Title IX
, § 1983, and state tort claims. The Title IX claim is based on the fact that
Hilldale failed to investigate Pembrook’s allegations. The § 1983 inaction claim
is based on Hilldale’s failure to implement a cohesive policy for investigating
sexual harassment claims. The state claims—negligent hiring, supervision, and
retention—are based on Hilldale’s failure to supervise and continued retention of
Giacomo after Pembrook alleged that he had an inappropriate relationship with a
student. The district court already determined that the danger creation verdict and
the inaction verdict were duplicative, and the three remaining claims were based
on different operative facts, different failures by Hilldale. In addition, the district
court found that the claims represent different injuries: the § 1983 causes of
action redressed the loss of personal security and bodily integrity, the Title IX
claim redressed the deprivation of access to educational opportunities, and the
state tort claim redressed J.M.’s right as a student to be safe from danger.
Hilldale further contends that the only way to reconcile the double recovery
instruction with the amount awarded is to read the verdict to award J.M. a total of
$150,000. The double recovery instruction contained the following language:
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You must not award damages more than once for the same injury.
For example, if plaintiff prevails on two claims, and establishes a
dollar amount for her injuries, you must not award her any additional
damages on each claim. The plaintiff is only entitled to be made
whole once, and may not recover more than she has lost. Of course,
if different injuries are attributed to the separate claims, then you
must compensate the plaintiff fully for all such damages.
Aplt.App., Vol. I, at 144. Hilldale argues that the only way to reconcile the jury’s
verdict with this instruction is to understand the verdict forms to convey the total
recovery at the bottom of each. This argument fails for two reasons. First, each
verdict form stated specifically that the jury found for the Plaintiff, on a
particular claim, and awarded a specific amount of damages for that claim. As an
example, the verdict form relating to J.M.’s inaction theory appears in the record
as follows:
We, the jury find the issues in favor of the Plaintiff on her
claim under 42 U.S.C., § 1983—Inaction Theory, and assess Plaintiff
recovery in the amount of
Compensatory Damages $ 150,000.
or
Nominal Damages $ .
Aplt.App., Vol. I, at 155. Each claim corresponded to a similar verdict form. In
the instances where the jury found for Hilldale, it left both dollar amounts blank.
Considering the structure of the jury forms, we conclude that Hilldale’s suggested
analysis is unreasonable. In addition, Hilldale’s interpretation of the instruction
does not permit the jury to conclude that plaintiff had different injuries for more
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than one claim, as the instruction indicates is permissible and as the district court
ultimately found for three of J.M.’s claims.
Thus, we are not persuaded by Hilldale’s attempt to read the jury’s verdict
as a single award of $150,000. Further, although Hilldale’s actions and J.M.’s
injuries are based on a single underlying occurrence—Giacomo’s sexual
harassment—the jury’s separate awards are supported by different conduct on the
part of Hilldale and by J.M.’s different injuries. Accordingly, there is no clear
error by the district court in awarding three separate awards for these separate
deprivations. See Berry v. City of Muskogee, Okla., 900 F.2d 1489, 1507 (10th
Cir. 1990) (noting that § 1983 damages are based on common law tort remedies,
which compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant’s breach of
duty); see also Clappier, 605 F.2d at 529 (considering the interest protected, as
well as the relief afforded, by the arguably alternative claims).
E. J.M.’s Cross Appeal
In her cross appeal, J.M. argues that the district court improperly reduced
the jury’s verdict in its Amended Judgment. After considering Hilldale’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law, the district court reduced two of the damages
awards. Aplt.App., Vol. I, at 246, 250. First, the court determined that the two §
1983 claims were duplicative and reduced the verdict accordingly. Aplt.App.,
Vol. I, at 246, n. 2. Second, the district court reduced the damages on the state
negligence claim from the $150,000 awarded by the jury to the $125,000 that is
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permissible under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, 51 Okla. Stat.
Ann.§ 154(A)(2). Aplt.App., Vol. I, at 249, 250. As set forth earlier, this Court
reviews the district court’s finding that an award is duplicative for clear error. N.
Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 579 F.3d at 1113.
J.M.’s theory on cross appeal is that because the jury was instructed to
avoid double recovery and because this Court presumes that juries follow
instructions, the only way to explain the award is that the jury intended to award a
total of $600,000. Hilldale maintains that it was the responsibility of the district
court to reduce the verdict because the two § 1983 claims arose from the same
injury. The district court agreed with Hilldale, concluding that, despite its
instruction stating that “[y]ou must not award damages more than once for the
same injury,” Aplt.App., Vol. I, at 144, the jury awarded damages for both § 1983
claims, which addressed the same injury: the right to personal security and bodily
integrity as protected by the substantive due process. See Aplt.App., Vol. I, at
247-48.
J.M. cites Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142 (2nd Cir. 1991) and
Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 2003) for support. In
Gentile, the plaintiffs provided substantial evidence that supported different
damages for their § 1983 claims and their state claims. Id., 926 F.2d at 153-54.
In addition, a jury poll demonstrated that the jury intended to award
“independent” damages for each claim. Id. at 154. J.M. has not articulated
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independent bases for the separate § 1983 actions—that either separate duties
were breached or separate injuries resulted. In Youren, this Court was persuaded
by the district court’s instruction to the jury prohibiting duplicative verdicts. In
addition, the plaintiff offered the Youren Court an explanation for the division of
the damages award between the school district and the school district’s agent,
sued in her official capacity. 343 F.3d at 1306. Apparently, the court permitted
an award against the agent separately in order to “publicly sanction” the agent for
violations of the Whistleblower Act. Id. There is no such explanation in the
present case.
As stated earlier, J.M. contends that the jury intended to award $600,000
total and that any incompatibility between the awards should not result in a
reduction of the total amount, but rather a shifting so that the permissible awards
are simply increased to compensate for reduction of improper awards. We are not
persuaded. The jury specifically awarded J.M. $150,000 for a state law claim that
carried a statutory damages cap of $125,000. The district court reasonably
reduced the single award by $25,000—J.M. suggests that the $25,000 should
simply be imputed to another claim. There is no support for such a transfer of a
damages award, and we decline to do so.
The district court read the verdicts as four individual $150,000 awards and
after determining that two of those $150,000 awards were based on identical
injuries, eliminated one $150,000 award. Review of the instructions and the
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verdict forms satisfies us that the district court’s order vacating one of the § 1983
awards demonstrates no clear error. Further, the district court’s reduction of the
state tort award to match the statutory damages cap is also not clear error—or any
error at all under 51 Okla. St. Ann. § 154(A)(2) (“The total liability of the state
and its political subdivisions on claims within the scope of The Governmental
Tort Claims Act, arising out of an accident or occurrence happening after the
effective date of this act, Section 151 et seq. of this title, shall not exceed . . . One
Hundred Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00) to any claimant for a claim
for any other loss arising out of a single act, accident, or occurrence.” (internal
footnote omitted)).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Hilldale’s motions before this Court are
granted, and we AFFIRM the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
M. Christina Armijo
District Judge Sitting by Designation
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