Case: 09-10635 Document: 00511231942 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/13/2010
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
September 13, 2010
No. 09-10635 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
RICK JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CRAIG WATKINS, in his individual and official capacities; DALLAS
COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Div.
Before DeMOSS, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Rick Jackson appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on his claims that he was
discharged on account of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and § 21.051 of the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.001 et seq.
(Vernon 2006). For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I.
Prior to his termination, Rick Jackson, who is Caucasian, served in the
Dallas County District Attorney’s office for nearly seventeen years. He began
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No. 09-10635
his career at that office as a misdemeanor prosecutor in 1990, and he was
promoted in 1996 to the position of chief prosecutor of a felony court, where he
amassed over 330 jury trials and a conviction rate of ninety-four percent. In
2006, he was promoted to the position of division chief of the Organized Crime
Division (“OCD”). Throughout his career in the OCD, Jackson worked on a
number of high-level drug cases and drug-related murder cases, and he was
given responsibility for training and supervising dozens of new prosecutors.
Jackson received commendations from various community members, and he
obtained high marks in employment reviews for ethics and professionalism. His
employment records also reflect that he received strong evaluations in such
areas as fostering teamwork, creating a productive and positive work
environment, and fostering open communication. Jackson’s career at the
District Attorney’s Office ended in December 2006 when newly elected Dallas
County District Attorney Craig Watkins terminated him. It is undisputed that
Watkins, who is African-American, initially replaced Jackson with an African-
American.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Jackson sued Dallas County
and Watkins, in his personal and official capacities, for terminating him based
on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
and § 21.051 of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Labor Code
Ann. § 21.001. Defendants denied all claims, and Watkins asserted qualified
immunity as to those claims filed against him in his individual capacity. In
November 2008, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that
(1) Jackson could not recover under Title VII because he was a member of
Watkins’s personal staff, not an “employee” entitled to the protections of Title
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VII; (2) the evidence in the summary-judgment record was legally and factually
insufficient to overcome Watkins’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
terminating Jackson’s employment; (3) Watkins was entitled to qualified
immunity for claims asserted against him in his individual capacity; and (4)
Jackson’s state-law claim should be dismissed without prejudice. Jackson filed
a response disputing all of Watkins’s contentions, and he also filed a motion
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) seeking a continuance for
additional discovery.
In May 2009, the district court denied Jackson’s motion for a continuance
and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court found that,
because Jackson had submitted sufficient evidence to show that he was an
employee within the meaning of Title VII and was not a member of the District
Attorney’s personal staff, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
he was entitled to the protections of Title VII. Nevertheless, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants on Jackson’s Title VII claim because
Watkins had failed to provide summary-judgment evidence to rebut any of
Watkins’s four proffered “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons” for terminating
Jackson. The court did not reach the question whether Watkins was entitled to
qualified immunity, and it dismissed Jackson’s state-law claims without
prejudice. See McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“[W]hen all federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated from a case
prior to trial, we have stated that our ‘general rule’ is to decline to exercise
jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims.” (citation omitted)), overruled in
part on other grounds by Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 440 (5th
Cir. 2003) (en banc). This appeal followed.
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II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2007).
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the discovery and disclosure materials
on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Breaux v. Halliburton Energy Servs., 562 F.3d 358, 364 (5th Cir.
2009). This court must take all the facts and evidence in the light most
favorable to Jackson, the non-moving party. See Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231,
234 (5th Cir. 2010).
III.
Because claims brought pursuant to Title VII and § 1981 are “governed by
the same evidentiary framework,” such that the analyses under both statutes
are substantively the same, we analyze Jackson’s Title VII and § 1981 claims
together. Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 281 n.7 (5th Cir. 2004).
Pursuant to Title VII, it is a violation of federal law for an employer to discharge
an employee because of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII affords
employees the option of proving a violation through either direct or
circumstantial evidence. Because Jackson’s claim is based on circumstantial
evidence, we analyze it under the three-step, burden-shifting analysis embodied
in the “modified McDonnell Douglas approach.” Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up
Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007). Pursuant to this
framework, Jackson must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
See id. at 411-12. Second, once Jackson establishes a prima facie case, Watkins
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must then articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating
him. See id. at 412. Third, assuming that Watkins meets this burden, Jackson
must then show that Watkins’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were
pretexts for discrimination.1 See Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305,
312 (5th Cir. 2004).
As the first two steps of the modified McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis are satisfied,2 the only question on appeal is whether Jackson has met
his burden of producing evidence sufficient to show pretext with respect to
Watkins’s four proffered reasons for terminating Jackson:
(1) it was important to Watkins to bring a new image and sense of
purpose to the OCD following the “fake drug scandal” that occurred
in that division under the previous administration; (2) he believed
he could not trust Jackson to follow his policies and practices; (3)
Watkins’ own experience with Jackson was overwhelmingly
negative; and (4) Jackson’s reputation within the District Attorney’s
Office and within the legal community practicing in the felony
courts in Dallas was that Jackson was disrespectful, unnecessarily
confrontational, and uncooperative.
The district court found that Watkins was entitled to summary judgment
because Jackson failed to address, much less rebut, each of Watkins’s proffered
1
Jackson conceded at oral argument that this is solely a pretext case, not a mixed-
motive case, so we consider any mixed-motive arguments to be waived. See Saavedra v.
Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 930 F.2d 1104, 1109 (5th Cir. 1991).
2
Watkins originally conceded that Jackson could show the prima facie discrimination
case. On appeal, Watkins contends for the first time that, since September of 2007, nine
months after Jackson’s termination, another Caucasian attorney held his position. Because
Jackson was initially replaced by an African-American and Watkins conceded in the district
court that Jackson had established his prima facie case, we proceed to the third step of the
analysis.
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reasons for terminating Jackson. It also found that Jackson’s summary-
judgment evidence was insufficient to rebut two of Watkins’s proffered reasons.
On appeal, Jackson asserts that (1) Fifth Circuit precedent does not
require him to rebut all of Watkins’s proffered reasons to preclude summary
judgment and (2) even if he were required to rebut all of Watkins’s reasons, he
submitted sufficient evidence to do so. We address these arguments in turn.
Because our precedent is clear that a plaintiff asserting a Title VII claim
must rebut each of the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons in order to survive
summary judgment, Jackson’s contention that he is required to rebut only some
of Watkins’s reasons is without merit. We have long recognized that to satisfy
step three of the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff “must put forward
evidence rebutting each of the nondiscriminatory reasons the employer
articulates.” Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001);
see Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003). Where a plaintiff
“falls short of [his] burden of presenting evidence rebutting each of the legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons produced by [the employer],” summary judgment is
appropriate. Wallace, 271 F.3d at 222 (emphasis in original); see also Rutherford
v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 184 (5th Cir. 1999); accord Rubinstein v.
Admins. of Tulane Edu. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming
grant of summary judgment on behalf of the employer where the plaintiff
produced evidence of pretext as to some, but not all, of the employer’s
nondiscriminatory reasons). Accordingly, Jackson cannot withstand summary
judgment without providing sufficient evidence to rebut each of Watkins’s
nondiscriminatory reasons. He has not done so.
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Jackson failed to bring forth summary-judgment evidence to rebut
Watkins’s contention that his own experience with Jackson was overwhelmingly
negative. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment on behalf of defendants.3
Before the district court, Jackson did not respond specifically to Watkins’s
contention that he had experienced negative personal interactions with him, but
instead argued generally that “[t]he reasons given by Defendant Watkins for
firing Mr. Jackson are nothing more than a pretext for discrimination.” He then
sought to rebut all four reasons with statistical evidence of Watkins’s alleged
replacement of Caucasian division chiefs with African-Americans. The district
court rejected Jackson’s statistical evidence as unreliable because it was not
“assembled or compiled so as to present any statistically significant or
meaningful information about Watkins’s employment decisions.” But even
assuming arguendo that his statistics were reliable, we agree with the district
court that such evidence is not sufficient here to raise a genuine issue of
material fact in the absence of evidence tailored to rebut Watkins’s specific
reason of terminating Jackson—negative personal interactions.4 See E.E.O.C. v.
3
We note, however, that the district court applied the incorrect analysis in evaluating
the sufficiency of Jackson’s proffered evidence presented to rebut two of Watkins’s other
proffered reasons—that Watkins believed Jackson had a bad reputation in the District
Attorney’s office, and that Jackson would refuse to follow his policies and procedures. The
district court should have followed Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 580 (5th Cir. 2003),
which provides that an employee’s burden of demonstrating pretext is satisfied where he
brings evidence “challenging the substance” of the employer’s reason together with “evidence
that undermines the overall credibility of [the employer’s] proffered justification.” Laxton, 333
F.3d at 580.
4
Jackson faults Watkins for failing to provide any “examples, experiences, or facts” to
support his reason that his interactions with Jackson were negative. Watkins was not required
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Tex. Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1184 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[S]tatistical
evidence usually cannot rebut the employer’s articulated nondiscriminatory
reasons.”); accord Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that, although statistical data may occasionally establish pretext
where it is combined with additional evidence, it is generally insufficient to raise
a genuine issue of material fact in cases where a plaintiff puts forward no
additional evidence that a specific nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual).
Our review of the record confirms that Jackson put forward no additional
evidence sufficient to refute this specific nondiscriminatory reason articulated
by Watkins. Jackson contends that his numerous positive reviews, performance
evaluations, and letters from community members prove that he was well
respected in the community, but this evidence in no way undercuts Watkins’s
claim to have experienced negative interactions with Jackson such that he would
not wish to retain Jackson as an employee. Jackson could have deposed Watkins
in an effort to obtain contradictory testimony that could raise a genuine issue of
material fact, but Jackson conceded at oral argument that the district court
denied his Rule 56(f) motion for continuance to depose Watkins, and he has not
appealed that ruling. Without additional evidence, Jackson cannot rebut
Watkins’s contention that he terminated Jackson not because of race, but
because they had a history of negative personal interactions.5
to produce such evidence at this stage; rather, he “need only produce admissible evidence
which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had
not been motivated by racial animus” to avoid summary judgment. Tex. Dept. of Comm. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981).
5
Our holding that Jackson has not met his summary-judgment burden is not an
endorsement of Watkins’s decision to terminate Jackson, a veteran prosecutor with seventeen
years of experience. But it is not our place to second-guess the business decisions of an
employer, so long as those decisions are not the result of discrimination. See Walton v. Bisco
Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 1997)
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Because we find that Jackson has failed to rebut one of Watkins’s four
proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for firing him, we need not address
Watkins’s remaining reasons for terminating Jackson,6 nor do we reach the
argument that Watkins is entitled to qualified immunity for those claims filed
against him in his personal capacity. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on Jackson’s Title VII and § 1981 claims.
6
Watkins proffered, as his first nondiscriminatory reason, his desire to create a “new
image” for the District Attorney’s Office. We do not address the difficult question whether a
stated desire to create a “new image” could ever be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
termination.
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