UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5181
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HAROLD EUGENE PATTON, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (1:07-cr-00033-LHT-9)
Submitted: August 20, 2010 Decided: September 15, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Walter E. Daniels, III, DANIELS LAW FIRM, PC, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Edward R. Ryan, United States
Attorney, Jennifer Lynn Dillon, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Harold Eugene Patton, Jr., appeals his conviction for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006). On appeal,
Patton contends that his trial counsel was ineffective and the
district court abused its discretion in denying Patton’s motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
Patton first contends that his trial attorney was
ineffective in failing to inform him of the enhanced sentence he
faced, and failing to investigate defenses available to Patton
before advising him to plead guilty. Claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel generally are not cognizable on direct
appeal. See United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir.
1997). Rather, to allow for adequate development of the record,
a defendant must ordinarily bring his claims in a 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2255 (West Supp. 2010) motion. See id.; United States v.
Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1994). An exception to this
general rule exists when the record conclusively establishes
ineffective assistance. United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d
192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999); King, 119 F.3d at 295. Because the
record does not conclusively establish that Patton’s original
counsel was ineffective, we decline to consider this claim on
direct appeal.
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Next, Patton argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Patton asserts
that, because his attorney rendered ineffective assistance and
Patton is actually innocent, he has demonstrated a fair and just
reason for withdrawal.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). “A defendant
has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea . . . .” United
States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 413 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The defendant bears the burden of
showing a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing his guilty
plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “The most important
consideration in resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
an evaluation of the Rule 11 colloquy at which the guilty plea
was accepted.” Bowman, 348 F.3d at 414. “[A] ‘fair and just’
reason . . . is one that essentially challenges . . . the
fairness of the Rule 11 proceeding . . . .” United States v.
Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992).
In determining whether a defendant met his burden, we
consider six factors, as summarized in Ubakanma, 215 F.3d at 424
(citation omitted). After reviewing the record, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Patton’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately expressed in the materials
before the court and argument will not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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