[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10342 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar SEPTEMBER 16, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 5:08-cr-00022-WTH-GRJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALEJO CRUZ-MEJIAS,
a.k.a. Alejo Cruz Mejias,
a.k.a. Alejo Cruz,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 16, 2010)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Alejo Cruz-Mejias appeals his 60-month sentence, which was the
statutory mandatory minimum sentence, imposed for manufacturing and
possessing with intent to distribute 100 or more marijuana plants, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(vii). On appeal, Cruz-Mejias argues that his
sentence violates the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
However, because Cruz-Mejias did not raise these arguments before the district
court, we review them for plain error. United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263,
1270 (11th Cir. 2005). Under plain-error review, a defendant must prove that
there is: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Id. at
1271. If all three of these conditions are met, we can “rectify the error only if it
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
I.
First, Cruz-Mejias argues that § 841(b)(1)’s minimum mandatory sentencing
scheme that allows for a downward departure only for those defendants who are
able to provide substantial assistance violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. Specifically, Cruz-Mejias asserts that limiting a downward
departure to only those defendants who can provide substantial assistance is not
rationally related to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and that it is illogical to say
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that a first time nonviolent offender, such as himself, cannot receive a downward
departure.
We have acknowledged that the Supreme Court has established “that the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment impliedly imposes the same
obligations on the federal government as does the Equal Protection Clause on the
states . . . .” United States v. Houston, 456 F.3d 1328, 1335 n.5 (11th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, “any alleged violations of those obligations are analyzed in the same
way as an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause by a state actor.” Id.
“The central mandate of the equal protection guarantee is that the sovereign may
not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate government objective.” Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of
Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). Thus, the Equal Protection Clause
“simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who
are in all relevant respects alike.” Id. at 818 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Unless the challenged classification burdens a fundamental right or targets a
suspect class, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id.
In Musser, we reviewed the defendants’ equal protection challenge to
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§ 841(b)(1)(B). United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir. 1988). There,
the defendants argued that § 841’s substantial-assistance provisions violated the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment because defendants without
sufficient knowledge could not receive downward departures for substantial
assistance. Id. at 1486-87. Because § 841 “does not discriminate on the basis of
race or a suspect class,” we reviewed the statute for a rational basis. Id. at 1487.
In rejecting the defendants’ challenge, we stated:
Congress’ desire to ferret out drug kingpins is obviously served
by encouraging those with information as to the identity of kingpins to
disclose such information. Hence, there is a rational relationship
between the statute and Congress’ purpose. Moreover, all “minor”
figures, are treated similarly by the statute, which belies any claim of
unequal treatment.
Id.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Cruz-Mejias has not
demonstrated that the district court plainly erred by failing to find that
§ 841(b)(1)’s mandatory minimum sentencing scheme violates the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm as to this
issue.
II.
Second, Cruz-Mejias argues that § 841(b)(1)’s mandatory minimum
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sentencing structure violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Specifically, he asserts that the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence
without the availability to receive a downward departure deprived him of
substantive due process.
After a person has been convicted of a crime, the sentencing court may
impose whatever penalty is authorized by statute so long as the penalty is not cruel
and unusual punishment “and so long as the penalty is not based on an arbitrary
distinction that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1927, 114 L. Ed.
2d 524 (1991). Overall, the Supreme Court has noted that arguments based on due
process and equal protection essentially duplicate each other because the only
review is usually whether Congress had a rational basis for choosing an offense’s
penalty. Id.; see also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 54 S. Ct. 505, 516,
78 L. Ed. 940 (1934) (holding that due process is not violated if the challenged
law has “a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose” and is “neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory”). Consequently, when reviewing both due process
and equal protection challenges to a statute, we look to whether the statute has a
rational basis. See United States v. Solomon, 848 F.2d 156, 157 (11th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Holmes, 838 F.2d 1175, 1177-78 (11th Cir. 1988).
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In Holmes, we rejected the defendant’s due process challenge to
§ 841(b)(1)’s sentencing scheme. 838 F.2d at 1177-78. There, we held that
§ 841(b)(1)’s penalties “were rationally related to the [Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986’s] objective of protecting the public health and welfare by implementing stiff
and certain penalties for those who violate federal drug laws.” Id. at 1177.
Furthermore, in Solomon, we reiterated that in passing § 841(b)(1), Congress
could have rationally concluded that a defendant’s possession of a large amount of
controlled substances “posed a particularly great risk to the welfare of society
warranting heavy sentences . . . .” 848 F.2d at 157. Consequently, we held that,
because of this rationale, § 841(b)(1)’s failure to account for other characteristics,
such as an offender’s particular position within a drug operation, was not
irrational. Id.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Cruz-Mejias has not
demonstrated that the district court plainly erred by failing to find that
§ 841(b)(1)’s mandatory minimum sentencing scheme violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
III.
Third, Cruz-Mejias argues that his 60-month sentence is disproportionate to
his offense and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
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Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Under our jurisprudence:
a reviewing court must make a threshold determination that the sentence
imposed is grossly disproportionate to the offense committed and, if it
is grossly disproportionate, the court must then consider the sentences
imposed on others convicted in the same jurisdiction and the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
United States v. Reynolds, 215 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000). “Outside the
context of capital punishment, there are few successful challenges to the
proportionality of sentences . . . because we accord substantial deference to
Congress, as it possesses broad authority to determine the types and limits of
punishments for crimes.” United States v. Johnson, 451 F.3d 1239, 1242-43 (11th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[i]n general, a sentence
within the limits imposed by statute is neither excessive nor cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1243 (quotation omitted); see also Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2701, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836
(1991) (“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the
constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout our
Nation’s history.”). Finally, we have rejected a defendant’s claim that his
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mandatory minimum sentence under § 841(b)(1)(B) violated the Eighth
Amendment. See Solomon, 848 F.2d at 157; Holmes, 838 F.2d at 1178-79.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Cruz-Mejias has failed
to demonstrate that the district court plainly erred by not finding that his 60-month
sentence was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm Cruz-Mejias’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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