IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-30899
Summary Calendar
JOSEPH C. JONES, d/b/a MAKEDWE PUBLISHING
COMPANY; RON PUBLISHING COMPANY; RIC
RECORDS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
JOSEPH S. RUFFINO, JR.,
Movant, Appellant,
versus
ALVIN LEE JOHNSON, SR.; CARNIVAL TIME RECORDS
INC.; LYMAN L. JONES; PAUL M. LEE,SR.; PAUL
LEE RECORD ONE STOP; UNITED RECORD PRESSING;
GARY L. EDWARDS; GARY EDWARDS MUSIC; FLOYD
SOILEAU; VILLE PLATTE RECORDING MANUFACTURER;
ALL SOUTH DISTRIBUTING CORPORATION; WARREN
HILDERBRAND; JEFFERSON JAZZ INCORPORATED;
MARSHALL E. SEHORN; JERRY C. WILSON; COSIMO V.
MATASSA; LEE RECORD DISTRIBUTOR, erroneously
named as Paul Lee Distributor; MARDI GRAS RECORDS,
Defendants-Appellees,
DALVA ONE STOP RECORDS & TAPES,
Movant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 91-CV-879
May 6, 1999
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This case is deja vu. The brief that Joseph C. Jones, d/b/a
Makedwde Publishing Company, has filed is a duplicate of a brief
that he filed in a previous appeal of the same case, a copyright
and trademark infringement action against attorney Lyman Jones and
several other defendants. The brief, a combination of grammatical
errors and stabs at legal argument, can of course succeed no more
this time than the last. It has inspired, however, a flurry of
motions, illustrating the litigation quagmire that can arise when
a pro se plaintiff understands neither the law nor even the concept
of finality. We will do our best, as we must, to keep up with the
Joneses, but we trust that our treatment of this appeal will
restrain the plaintiff Jones from further abuse of the judicial
process.
I
We first saw this case in 1992, after the district court
denied a motion by defendant Jones asserting that the claim was
time-barred. The district court certified the limitations issue
for interlocutory appeal, and we reversed. See Makedwde Publishing
Co. v. Johnson, 37 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 1994). Following the remand
of the case, the remaining defendants filed motions for summary
judgment, which the district court granted. The plaintiff Jones
then filed an appeal, using the same brief before us today. We
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
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concluded that the appeal failed to raise an issue of arguable
merit and dismissed it as frivolous.
We also granted a motion for the imposition of sanctions and
directed counsel to submit affidavits showing their time expended
in defending the appeal and in submitting motions. The district
court scheduled a sanctions hearing, giving any party an
opportunity to oppose sanctions or challenge counsel’s affidavits.
In its July 16, 1997, order, the district court indicated that it
had not received any response, and awarded attorney’s fees
accordingly. This appeal timely filed.
II
As always, we must consider our jurisdiction. A multiparty
pro se notice of appeal is not effective as to any of the pro se
parties who did not sign the notice of appeal. See Carter v.
Stalder, 60 F.3d 238, 239 (5th Cir. 1995). Joseph Ruffino did not
sign the notice of appeal, and we therefore dismiss Ruffino’s
purported appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
III
Because Jones’s brief is a duplicate of his earlier foray into
the art of legal argument, he makes no reference to the sanction
order issued by the district court in it. Therefore, he has waived
any objection to the sanctions that he might have. See Brinkmann
v. Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Moreover, a pleading
once frivolous is still frivolous when filed again, indeed more
frivolous than before because irrelevant. Plaintiff Jones has
supplemented this argument with a reply brief that is not a mere
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xerox, but, even if his arguments in that brief were nonfrivolous,
arguments cannot be brought up for the first time in a reply brief.
See Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1546 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1991). Likewise, a nonfrivolous argument in a reply brief
cannot save an otherwise frivolous appeal.
We therefore dismiss this appeal as frivolous. See 5th Cir. R.
42.2. The defendants have requested appropriate sanctions.
Recognizing that the previous imposition of attorney’s fees was
insufficient to deter frivolous filings, we impose sanctions of
double costs and attorney’s fees. See Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d
806, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1988). The district court shall make an
assessment after the filing of appropriate affidavits.
We also have the authority to enjoin litigants from continuing
to file frivolous claims against the parties in the case. See
Farguson v. Mbank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1986).
We therefore enjoin plaintiff Jones from raising again the merits
of his case, including any issues pertaining to the statute of
limitations, because any pleadings discussing such issues, no
matter how well crafted, would remain frivolous. This case is
over. Of course, plaintiff Jones may still file a nonfrivolous
appeal related to the determination of the magnitude of sanctions
yet to be imposed on him (and is welcome to seek certiorari from
the Supreme Court with respect to this ruling). Further frivolous
appeals, however, will be dealt with harshly.
IV
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We need not belabor the remaining motions before us.
Plaintiff Jones’s motion to correct the caption of his case in the
district court is denied; the caption is correct, and in any event
does not matter. We deny as moot plaintiff Jones’s motion opposing
the appellees’ right to make an oral argument in the case; this
case is an excellent illustration of the genius of the summary
calendar. We deny plaintiff Jones’s motion for leave to supplement
the record to include the docket sheet of another copyright
infringement case and to include a statement by the President of
BMI before a House subcommittee; if these were relevant to our
legal analysis, we could take judicial notice of them. We also
deny plaintiff Jones’s objection to his opponents’ consolidated
brief; such consolidation is explicitly permitted under Rule 28(i).
Finally, and emphatically, we deny plaintiff Jones’s requests for
sanctions and disbarment of counsel, his motions to supplement the
record, and his motion to file supplemental record excerpts. In
sum, all of plaintiff Jones’s motions are denied.
APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS; SANCTIONS IMPOSED; INJUNCTION
ISSUED; REMANDED FOR ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT HEARING ON
SANCTIONS; ALL OTHER MOTIONS DENIED.
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