UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5059
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DOMINIQUE J. FIELDS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (3:09-cr-00150-RLW-1)
Submitted: September 15, 2010 Decided: September 20, 2010
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Robert J.
Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney,
Jessica A. Brumberg, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dominique J. Fields entered a conditional guilty plea
to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006), and possession of a firearm
in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). Fields preserved his right to challenge
the district court‟s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
seized as a result of an investigative stop and frisk. On
appeal, Fields argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress because the officers did not have
reasonable articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal
activity. Finding no error, we affirm.
In reviewing the district court‟s ruling on a motion
to suppress, we review the district court‟s findings of fact for
clear error and its determination of reasonable suspicion de
novo. United States v. Perry, 560 F.3d 246, 251 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 177 (2009). When the district court
has denied a motion to suppress, we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government. United States v. Black,
525 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 182
(2008).
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an officer may
conduct a brief investigatory stop when there is reasonable
suspicion based on articulable facts that criminal activity is
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afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). In
connection with such a stop, if presented with a reasonable
belief that the person may be armed and presently dangerous, an
officer may conduct a protective frisk. Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 146 (1972); United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 806-
07 (4th Cir. 2004).
Whether there is reasonable suspicion to justify the
stop depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the
information known to the officers and any reasonable inferences
to be drawn at the time of the stop. United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989). Reasonable suspicion may exist even if
“each individual factor „alone is susceptible of innocent
explanation.‟” Black, 525 F.3d at 365 (quoting United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)). The reasonable suspicion
determination is a “commonsensical proposition,” and deference
should be accorded to police officers‟ determinations based on
their practical experience. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d
776, 782 (4th Cir. 2004). Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the district court correctly found that reasonable
suspicion justified the stop and frisk of Fields. The district
court thus properly denied Fields‟ motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court‟s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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