[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10381 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar SEPTEMBER 21, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cr-00185-JSM-TBM-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAVIER HUERTA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 21, 2010)
Before BARKETT, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Javier Huerta appeals his convictions and sentence for conspiracy to possess
and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. After a thorough
review of the record, we affirm.
Huerta was indicted on one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846,
and three counts of distribution of 5 grams or more of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Manuel Camacho Barcenas was charged as a co-
conspirator and pleaded guilty; Huerta proceeded to trial.
According to the evidence at trial, Peter Strautman, a convicted drug dealer
who worked as a confidential informant with the DEA, arranged several controlled
buys with Huerta and Barcenas. The deals were captured on audio and video
recordings. In the calls and exchanges, Huerta acted as an interpreter for Barcenas
and arranged the deals. And during one of the buys, Huerta informed Strautman
that he had supplied drugs to a man named Paco, who was Strautman’s previous
supplier. Huerta said that he and Barcenas, “[w]e make a deal sometimes. Half
and half.” Strautman understood this to mean that the two men sold drugs
together. During his work for the DEA, Strautman also arranged controlled buys
with each dealer alone. The controlled buy Strautman attempted to arrange with
Huerta was unsuccessful because, as Huerta later explained to Strautman, Huerta
had seen a suspicious car and cancelled the meeting. Strautman was unable to
reschedule the buy.
2
Huerta testified in his own defense. He explained that he and Barcenas
were friends and that he had been helping tow cars to Barcenas’s mechanics shop.
He stated that he had been lying in the recorded phone calls to shield Barcenas,
that he was present at the buys only to protect Barcenas, and that he did not
receive any money from the buys. He denied that there was any conspiracy and
explained that the deals mentioned in the recordings were car deals. Huerta then
testified that he had received two letters from Barcenas while the case was
pending. The government objected to the admission of these letters on hearsay
grounds. Defense counsel responded that Barcenas was unavailable because,
when called as a witness, he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify,
and that the letters were trustworthy because Barcenas had admitted to the
government that he wrote them. The court sustained the government’s objection
and excluded the letters.
The jury convicted Huerta on all counts and the court sentenced him to 120
months’ imprisonment.1 Huerta now appeals, raising two challenges to his
convictions and sentence. First, Huerta contends that the district court abused its
1
The court determined that Huerta’s base offense level was 30, with a 2-level enhancement
for obstruction of justice and a 2-level reduction for minor role. With an adjusted offense level of
30 and a criminal history category of I, the guideline range was 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment.
Because the offense carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, 120
months became the low end of the guideline range.
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discretion by excluding the hearsay evidence. Second, he challenges the
reasonableness of his sentence. We address each in turn.
I. Admission of Hearsay Statements
We review a district court’s rulings on the admissibility of hearsay
testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1359
(11th Cir. 2006).
Here, Huerta tried to introduce two letters Barcenas wrote to Huerta while
Huerta’s case was pending. In the letters, Barcenas wrote that he was involved in
“deals” and that he acted “because of the consumption of alcohol.” He further
wrote that he would plead guilty, that he “should be responsible for it because no
one else should pay the broken plates of someone else’s,” and that he “assume[d]
the responsibility that you had nothing to do with those charges.”
The Federal Rules of Evidence permit the admission of a hearsay statement
if
at the time of its making [the statement] so far . . . tended to subject
the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person
in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless
believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.
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Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). For hearsay evidence to be admissible under this rule,
“(1) the declarant [must be] unavailable; (2) the statement so far tends to subject
the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position would
not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true; and (3) the statement
is corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.” United
States v. Westry, 524 F.3d 1198, 1214 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation
omitted).
Although both Huerta and the government agree that Barcenas was
unavailable under Rule 804(a)(1), Huerta cannot show that the letters were
admissible. The statements are vague and do not inculpate Barcenas to the extent
that he reasonably would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true. Moreover, the evidence at trial showed that Huerta and Barcenas were
working together. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the hearsay evidence, and we affirm Huerta’s convictions.
II. Reasonableness of Huerta’s Sentence
We review a final sentence for reasonableness, applying the abuse of
discretion standard. United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir.
2005). When a defendant has been given the opportunity to raise an objection and
failed to do so, we review for plain error. United States v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251,
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1256-57 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). Under plain-error review, the
defendant initially must establish that the district court committed an error, that the
error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights. United States v.
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005).
Huerta did not object to his sentence as unreasonable and he cannot show
plain error in the sentence imposed. Huerta faced a mandatory minimum sentence,
which is precisely the sentence the court imposed. Nothing permitted the court to
sentence Huerta below this mandatory minimum,2 and Huerta has offered nothing
to show that the court erred or that his sentence is unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
2
Generally, a court is bound by the mandatory minimum sentence unless the defendant
qualified for a reduction under the safety-valve provision or the government moved for a reduction
based on substantial assistance. Neither circumstance is present here.
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