UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-6526
KEVIN SMITH, a/k/a Bar-None Royal Blackness,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JON OZMINT; GARY D. MAYNARD; ROBERT WARD; GARY A. BOYD; GENE
NOLES; JAMES SLIGH; DEBRA WISE; ALVIN GRABER; LESTER HINSON,
JR.; MS. HILL, OFC; DORIS CURENTON; MARY STEWART; DEAN DAY;
MARCIA R. FULLER; T. W. THOMAS; LAURIE F. BESSINGER; BERNARD
MCKIE; STEVENSON, Associate Warden; SAMUEL LATTA; JAMES
CHRISTENSEN; WILLIE MASON; HAROLD SCOTT; SERGEANT SHIVERS;
E. JENNINGS; E. REARDON; J. KIRCHER; S. BROWN; M. HAYES;
ROLLAND MOODY; S. HORSELY; JOEL MOORE; KENNETH JONES; NURSE
MURPHY; JOHN DOE, JR.; JANE DOE; RICHARD P. STROKER; MARY
DAVENPORT ANDERSON; LEON LOTT, JR.; DANIEL E. JOHNSON; DAVID
WILSON; CARLTON MEDLEY; DAVID MILDRED; JAMES ROBINSON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Beaufort. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (9:04-cv-01819-PMD)
Submitted: August 27, 2010 Decided: September 23, 2010
Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kevin Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Lindemann, DAVIDSON,
MORRISON & LINDEMANN, PA, Columbia, South Carolina; Sheally
Venus Poe, ALLEN, KOPET & ASSOCIATES, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Kevin Smith, a/k/a Bar-None Royal Blackness, a South
Carolina inmate, appeals a district court order adopting the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, granting the
Defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment and dismissing
his claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). Under RLUIPA:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined
to an institution . . . even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden
on that person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). In Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246 (4th
Cir. 2008), this court affirmed the dismissal of Smith’s
complaint in all respects except for his RLUIPA claim. We
remanded the case for further consideration of whether the
Defendants met their burden of establishing that the grooming
policy at issue furthered a compelling governmental interest and
whether the policy was the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest.
The Defendants filed a renewed motion for summary
judgment and submitted additional affidavits in support of the
motion. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
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finding the Defendants established both compelling governmental
interests and that the grooming policy was the least restrictive
means of furthering those interests. The district court agreed
and granted summary judgment to the Defendants.
This court reviews a district court’s order granting
summary judgment de novo. Jennings v. Univ. of North Carolina,
482 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “At the summary
judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as
to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Summary judgment “should be
rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to
return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); see also Scott, 550 U.S. at
380 (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is
no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”). “As to those elements on which
it bears the burden of proof, a government is only entitled to
summary judgment if the proffered evidence is such that a
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rational factfinder could only find for the government.” Smith,
578 F.3d at 250.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
Defendants established entitlement to summary judgment for the
reasons stated by the magistrate judge and the district court.
We have considered Smith’s arguments and find the arguments
without merit or support in the record. Accordingly, we affirm.
We deny the motion to file an amicus brief. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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