[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-16405 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 30, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 09-00017-CR-ORL-28KRS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEVEN JAMES BUSSARD, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(September 30, 2010)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Steven James Bussard, Jr. appeals his conviction for attempted receipt of
child pornography. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(B), (b)(1). Bussard challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the denial of his motion
for a new trial. We affirm.
The district court did not err by denying Bussard’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal. The government proved that Bussard attempted to receive knowingly
child pornography that had been transported in interstate commerce. Id. Bussard
admitted to agents that he had “purchased . . . access . . . and viewed child
pornography,” and his confession was corroborated by evidence on Bussard’s
computer of at least one image of child pornography and receipts for subscriptions
to two websites titled “Excited Angels” and “Pedoland-Kidz Porn.” See United
States v. Micieli, 594 F.2d 102, 109 (5th Cir. 1979). Bussard argues that the
government failed to prove he accessed the websites with knowledge they
contained child pornography, but we disagree. See United States v. Deverso, 518
F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008). Federal agents obtained Bussard’s contact
information from PayPal in response to a request for persons who had purchased
access to websites containing child pornography. The “Excited Angels” website
contained child pornography and, three hours after Bussard subscribed to that
website, PayPal limited Bussard’s account permanently for violating the
“Acceptable Use Policy” by “send[ing] or receiv[ing] payments or donations for
2
obscene or sexually oriented goods or services.” The receipt for Bussard’s
subscription to the “Kidz Porn” website listed an internet address of
“http://paymembers.biz/members/ pedoland,” and Bussard had downloaded to his
computer an advertisement for a Pedoland website that promised its subscribers
access to pictures and videos of girls between one and ten years old masturbating
and engaging in oral sex. Bussard argues that the government failed to prove that
the “Pedoland” advertisement was connected to the “Pedoland-Kidz Porn” website,
but the advertisement and website share the same name, the amount Bussard paid
for a subscription to “Kidz Porn” matched the advertised cost for access to
Pedoland, and the title “Kidz Porn” references explicitly the type of pornography
promised in the Pedoland advertisement. There was ample evidence to support
Bussard’s conviction.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by denying Bussard’s
motion for a new trial based on the cumulative effect of the insufficiency of the
evidence, evidentiary rulings, and prosecutorial misconduct. Bussard argues about
the sufficiency of the evidence, but the verdict “was not contrary to the weight of
the evidence.” United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1313 (11th Cir. 1985).
Bussard complains about the admission of Exhibit 24 under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), but Bussard knew of and was prepared to defend against the
3
exhibit, and the district court eradicated any possible prejudice by instructing the
jury that the evidence could be used only to determine Bussard’s intent or
knowledge. See United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1346 (11th Cir. 2007).
Bussard argues, for the first time on appeal, about the jury viewing seven exhibits
that were later removed from evidence, but Bussard fails to establish that the
exhibits had a substantial effect on the jury’s verdict. See United States v.
Tenorio-Angel, 756 F.2d 1505, 1512 (11th Cir. 1985). The district court instructed
the jury to disregard the exhibits and, in the light of the evidence against Bussard
and his defense that he accessed websites containing child pornography
inadvertently, it is unlikely that the jury would have reached a different verdict.
See United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827, 838–39 (11th Cir. 1985); Tenorio-
Angel, 756 F.2d at 1512.
Bussard also failed to establish the prosecution committed any reversible
error. Bussard argues the government twice violated the Jencks Act, but he
admitted in his post-trial motion that the alleged violations did not prejudice him.
See United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1327 (11th Cir. 2006). Bussard also
argues the government committed misconduct by referencing an organization that
operated websites containing child pornography and classifying images as child
pornography that Bussard did not receive, but any error did not harm Bussard’s
4
substantial rights. Bussard was not part of the organization and the district court
gave an instruction to that effect, see Tenorio-Angel, 756 F.2d at 1512, and the jury
was required to determine whether the materials Bussard attempted to receive
contained child pornography. Because Bussard has failed to establish any
reversible error, he cannot establish that cumulative error entitled him to a new
trial. United States v. Culver, 598 F.3d 740, 751 (11th Cir. 2010).
We AFFIRM Bussard’s conviction.
5