UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Summary Calendar
No. 98-50519
LULAC OF TEXAS; GAVINO FERNANDEZ, JR.; EL CONCILIO;
BLACK CITIZENS TASK FORCE; DOROTHY TURNER; SISTERS N THE ’HOOD;
VELMA ROBERTS; RACHEL SALINAS-JOHNSON; JANE PEREZ;
CHARLES PATTON; and, ANDREA LUCENA RAUSCH;
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF AUSTIN;
Defendant-Appellee,
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(A-97-CV-908-SS)
April 27, 1999
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellants ask this court to reverse the decision of a 3-
judge district court and award them attorneys’ fees in a Voting
Rights preclearance case. Finding no abuse of discretion, we
affirm.
On December 18, 1997, the City of Austin completed “a
large, ambitious, and well-publicized annexation program.”
Included within the area of the proposed annexation were several
municipal utility districts (“MUDs”). Under Texas law, the MUDs
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
would automatically dissolve ninety-one days after annexation or on
any date within ninety days of the annexation when prescribed by
ordinance of the annexing municipality. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code
§ 43.075(e). At noon on December 19, the City moved by ordinance
to dissolve the MUDs and their elected governing boards pursuant to
Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 43.075(e). That same day, the appellants
filed a complaint in the district court attempting to enjoin the
annexation of the affected territories and the dissolution of the
MUDs prior to Department of Justice preclearance under Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
Late on December 19, the district court denied the
appellants’ request for a temporary restraining order. On December
24, the City forwarded its preclearance application to the
Department of Justice. Included within the submission was a
conditional request for preclearance of the MUD dissolutions. The
City argued that the MUD dissolutions did not require preclearance
under Section 5. If, however, the Department of Justice determined
post-submission that the MUD dissolutions required preclearance,
the City requested that the application be construed as a
preclearance request.
On December 30, after the empaneling of a three-judge
court, the district court entered a preliminary injunction ordering
the City not to dissolve the MUD governing boards and to account
separately for the assets of the annexed MUDs in the event
2
preclearance was not granted for the annexations.1 The City,
however, was charged with the operation and management of the
annexed areas, and the MUDs were not otherwise permitted to
operate. On March 10, 1998, the Department of Justice precleared
the annexations and the dissolution of the affected MUDs.
Following Department of Justice preclearance, the
district court denied the appellants’ request for attorneys’ fees
and dismissed the case with prejudice. In its order denying fees,
the district court found that the filing of the appellants’
complaint had not caused the City to alter its conduct with respect
to preclearance for the annexation. The appellants timely appealed
this denial.
A district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees is reviewed
for abuse of discretion and supporting factual findings are
examined for clear error. See Wilson v. Mayor and Board of
Alderman, 135 F.3d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1998).
Under the Voting Rights Act, a “prevailing party” may
recover attorneys’ fees. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973l(e), 1988. To be
considered a prevailing party, a plaintiff must obtain relief which
materially alters the defendant’s behavior in a way that benefits
the plaintiff. See Wilson, 135 F.3d at 998. This relief may be
obtained through settlement, judgment, or the unilateral action of
the defendant. See id. If the defendant’s unilateral acts achieve
the identified goals of the litigation, then the plaintiff must
1
Only a few of the annexed MUDs were included in the December
30 order. On December 31, at the appellants’ request, the district
court amended the order to include all annexed MUDs.
3
show that the suit was a “substantial factor” or a “significant
catalyst” in motivating the defendant’s conduct. See Leroy v. City
of Houston, 831 F.2d 576, 579 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hennigan v.
Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 749 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. 1985)). A
technical victory may be so insignificant, however, that a
plaintiff might not be entitled to an award. See Wilson, 135 F.3d
at 998 (citing Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S. Ct. 1486, 1493 (1989)).
This case involves just such a technical victory. As
stated in the appellants’ complaint, the primary goal of this
litigation was to prevent both the annexation of the affected areas
and the dissolution of the MUDs prior to preclearance. The
district court found that the City clearly intended to submit the
annexation to the Department of Justice for Section 5 preclearance.
Thus, the appellants’ only argument for attorneys’ fees is that the
City intended to dissolve the MUDs without requesting preclearance
for the action. However, the district court properly considered
the chronology of the annexation and rejected this argument.
As this court stated in Posada v. Lamb County, the
appellants in this dispute “simply caught the train as it pulled
out of the station.” 716 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1983). Within
a week after the annexation and within five days after this lawsuit
was filed, the City presented a preclearance plan, which had been
substantially completed before suit was filed, to the Department of
Justice; this submission included a conditional request for
preclearance of the MUD dissolutions. The district court, better
4
situated than we to resolve this factually intensive inquiry,2
found that the plaintiffs won nothing. Its finding is not clearly
erroneous. The annexations went forward without delay, and the MUD
dissolutions were only formalistically put off. Even assuming the
MUD dissolutions were required to be submitted for Section 5
preclearance, the City intended to comply with Section 5 and agreed
not to dissolve the MUDs during the pendency of preclearance
review. Thus, the technical victory in this proceeding, if any,
was merely derived from the premature filing of the lawsuit and
failed to secure any benefit for the appellants.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the appellants’ request for attorneys’ fees.
AFFIRMED.
2
See Posada, 716 F.2d at 1072.
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