Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09-2644

BRIAN D. KELLY,

Appellant

v.

BOROUGH OF CARLISLE;
DAVID J. ROGERS, individually and as a police
officer for the Carlisle Borough Police Department

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cv-01573)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane

Argued February 1, 2010
Before: Chief Judge McKEE, HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
and POLLAK * , District Judge.

*
The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge
for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
 (Filed: October 4, 2010)

Dennis E. Boyle [Argued]
Randall L. Wenger
Boyle, Neblett & Wenger
4660 Trindle Road
Suite 200
Camp Hill, PA 17011-0000
Attorneys for Appellant

David J. MacMain [Argued]
Timothy J. Kepner
Scot R. Withers
Lamb McErlane
24 East Market Street
P.O. Box 565
West Chester, PA 19381-0000
Attorneys for Appellees

Nancy Winkelman [Argued]
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis
1600 Market Street
Suite 3600
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Attorney for Amicus Appellant

Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

2
 OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Brian Kelly appeals the District Court’s summary
judgment in favor of police officer David Rogers and the
Borough of Carlisle. Kelly filed a civil rights action, claiming
that his First and Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
he was arrested for filming Officer Rogers during a traffic stop.
The gravamen of Kelly’s appeal—that the District Court erred
when it held that Officer Rogers’s reliance upon legal advice
before he arrested Kelly shielded him from liability—raises a
question of first impression in the Third Circuit.

I.

A.

On May 24, 2007, Kelly was riding around Carlisle,
Pennsylvania in a truck driven by his friend, Tyler Shopp. As
was his habit, Kelly brought along a small, hand-held video
camera, which he used to record people for no particular reason.
In the course of their meanderings, Shopp was pulled over by
Officer Rogers for speeding and for violating a bumper height
restriction. During the traffic stop, Kelly placed the video
camera in his lap and started recording Officer Rogers, allegedly
without Rogers’s knowledge or consent. Kelly testified that he
began recording Rogers “after I saw how he was acting,” which
conduct allegedly included Rogers yelling at Shopp. Shopp and

3
Rogers stated otherwise, testifying that Rogers acted
professionally at all times. There is no dispute that Kelly was
holding the camera in his lap during the encounter, although the
parties disagree as to whether the camera was hidden. Rogers
contends the camera was hidden by Kelly’s hands, while Kelly
claims it was in plain sight the entire time he was recording.

Toward the end of the traffic stop, Officer Rogers
informed Shopp and Kelly that he was recording the encounter.1
Rogers claims he then noticed Kelly was recording him, which
Rogers believed was a violation of the Pennsylvania
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (Wiretap
Act), 18 P A. C ONS. S TAT. §§ 5701-82. Rogers ordered Kelly to
turn over the camera and Kelly complied. Rogers then returned
to his police car and called Assistant District Attorney John
Birbeck to confirm that Kelly had violated the Wiretap Act.2 At
his deposition, Rogers explained that he thought Kelly was
violating the Wiretap Act because police must inform people
when they record traffic stops. In Rogers’s words: “as a police
officer, when we conduct traffic stops and we’re audio and

1
It was routine policy for the Carlisle Police to record all
traffic stops using a video camera mounted to the police car and
a microphone attached to the officer’s shirt. According to
Rogers, he believed he was recording the traffic stop, but later
learned the equipment had malfunctioned.
2
Rogers’s call to ADA Birbeck was consistent with
Borough policy, which was to follow the ADA’s advice “unless
it was something outlandish or outrageous.”

4
video recording, we know – I know it’s the law that I must at
some point during the stop inform the occupants that they’re
being audio and video recorded in accordance with the [A]ct.”
Because Kelly had not informed Rogers that he was recording,
Rogers believed Kelly violated the Wiretap Act.

ADA Birbeck also concluded that Kelly violated the
Wiretap Act based on the facts as described by Rogers. Rogers
stated that he had stopped a car for speeding and bumper height
violations. When he realized the passenger was videotaping
him, he had seized the camera. Rogers did not tell Birbeck that
he himself was also videotaping the stop.3 Rogers then asked
Birbeck whether Kelly’s actions constituted a violation of the
Wiretap Act. After reviewing the statute, Birbeck told Rogers
that it was appropriate to make an arrest, although he advised
Rogers not to seek bail at Kelly’s arraignment.

After hearing Birbeck’s opinion, Rogers called for a
back-up unit and at least three additional officers arrived to
assist with Kelly’s arrest. Kelly testified that while he was being
transported from the scene an officer admonished him: “when
are you guys going to learn you can’t record us.” Kelly was
arraigned before a local magistrate, who ordered bail despite
Rogers’s recommendation that Kelly be released on his own

3
The District Court stated that it was disputed whether
Rogers informed Birbeck that he was also recording. But
Birbeck testified in his deposition that he was not so informed,
and Rogers did not say otherwise, so Birbeck’s testimony
controls.

5
recognizance. Kelly could not make bail, however, so he was
held in the Cumberland County Prison for 27 hours. Several
weeks later, the Cumberland County District Attorney dropped
the charges against Kelly, but issued a memorandum opining
that Rogers had probable cause to arrest Kelly.

B.

After the charges against him were dropped, Kelly sued
Officer Rogers and the Borough of Carlisle under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging violations of the First and Fourth Amendments
to the United States Constitution as well as various state law
claims. Following discovery, Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, and Kelly sought partial summary
judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment to
Officer Rogers based on qualified immunity, and granted the
Borough summary judgment because Kelly failed to present
facts sufficient to establish municipal liability.

In the District Court’s view:

Defendant [Rogers] acted as reasonably as could
be expected. He observed Kelly videotaping the
police stop without his permission. Then, he
followed police policy in calling the ADA to
confirm that there was probable cause to make an
arrest under the Wiretap Act. . . . [T]he ADA’s
advice was reasonable, so Defendant proceeded
with the arrest. The Court agrees that any
reasonable officer in Defendant’s situation would

6
 have likewise relied on the advice given by the
ADA.

Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 2009 WL 1230309, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. May 4, 2009). In its analysis of the Fourth Amendment
issue, the District Court stated that because Rogers did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his speech, ADA Birbeck
may have incorrectly concluded there was probable cause to
arrest Kelly. Id. Nonetheless, the Court held Rogers was
entitled to qualified immunity on Kelly’s Fourth Amendment
claim because of Rogers’s “good-faith reliance on this outside
legal assessment of the situation.” Id.

As for Kelly’s First Amendment claim, the District Court
held that it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that
arresting Kelly for violating the Wiretap Act would infringe
upon his free speech rights. The Court reasoned that (1) it was
unclear whether Kelly had a right to videotape the police stop
because this Court had stated only that there “may” be a right to
videotape police performing their duties on public property, and
(2) even if the right to videotape had been clearly established, a
reasonable officer would have thought his actions were
constitutional since Rogers reasonably believed there was
probable cause to arrest. Id. at *8. Kelly timely appealed the
District Court’s judgment.4

II.

4
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

7
 Our review of the District Court’s summary judgment is
plenary, and we apply the same standards that the District Court
applied in determining whether summary judgment was
appropriate. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir.
2009). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, summary judgment is appropriate only if there is
“no genuine issue as to any material fact [such] that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “The mere existence of some evidence in
support of the nonmovant is insufficient to deny a motion for
summary judgment; enough evidence must exist to enable a jury
to reasonably find for the nonmovant on the issue.” Id. (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Thus, we ask: (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show
the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the law
was clearly established at the time of the violation. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether
a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
he confronted.” Id. at 202. This inquiry “must be undertaken in
light of the specific context of the case.” Id. at 201. Therefore,
to decide whether a right was clearly established, a court must
consider the state of the existing law at the time of the alleged

8
violation and the circumstances confronting the officer to
determine whether a reasonable state actor could have believed
his conduct was lawful. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 641 (1987); Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261,
272 (3d Cir. 2000); Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 431 (3d
Cir. 2000).

In Saucier, the Supreme Court required lower courts to
determine whether a constitutional right was violated before
deciding whether the law was clearly established. 533 U.S. at
201. This “rigid ‘order of battle,’” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 201-02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring), was short-
lived, however, as the Supreme Court overruled Saucier’s order
of operations in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 817 (2009),
holding that trial judges “should be permitted to exercise their
sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of
the circumstances in the particular case at hand,” id. at 818.

Recognizing its discretion to do so under Pearson, the
District Court bypassed the question of whether Kelly’s
constitutional rights were violated and first considered whether
the law was clearly established. Although the District Court
explicitly held that the First Amendment law was not clearly
established, its analysis of the Fourth Amendment did not
engage the relevant state court precedents interpreting the
Wiretap Act. Instead, the District Court simply concluded that
Officer Rogers acted reasonably under the circumstances.

III.

9
 A.

Kelly claims Officer Rogers violated his clearly
established Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without
probable cause. In challenging the District Court’s conclusion
that Officer Rogers acted reasonably, Kelly contends the District
Court failed to analyze the Wiretap Act and inappropriately
relied on the presence of legal advice. Conversely, Officer
Rogers argues that reliance on a prosecutor’s advice is a
permissible consideration in determining the reasonableness of
his actions, and that the District Court correctly held his reliance
was reasonable.

The Supreme Court has recognized that “it is inevitable
that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but
mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have
indicated that in such cases those officials—like other officials
who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful—should
not be held personally liable.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641. “The
qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken
judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.’” Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197,
203 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229
(1991)). On the other hand, “[i]f the law was clearly
established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since
a reasonably competent public official should know the law
governing his conduct.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.

Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has squarely
addressed the question of whether a police officer’s reliance
upon legal advice cloaks him with qualified immunity.

10
Although there is no holding directly on point, we do not write
on a blank slate. In Malley v. Briggs, the Supreme Court
considered a police officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity
when he applied for an arrest warrant that was approved by a
magistrate but later found to lack probable cause. 475 U.S. 335
(1986). The Court held the magistrate’s issuance of the warrant
did not automatically shield the officer: “[d]efendants will not
be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no
reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a
warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence
could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.”
Id. at 341. The Court acknowledged that such a standard might
cause officers to hesitate before submitting a request for a
warrant, but concluded that:

[S]uch reflection is desirable, because it reduces
the likelihood that the officer’s request for a
warrant will be premature. Premature requests for
warrants are at best a waste of judicial resources;
at worst, they lead to premature arrests, which
may injure the innocent or, by giving the basis for
a suppression motion, benefit the guilty.

Id. at 343-44.

Accordingly, a police officer is not entitled to qualified
immunity if “a reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner’s
position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish
probable cause and that he should not have applied for the
warrant.” Id. at 345; see also Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71
F.3d 480, 484-85 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying Malley). In rejecting

11
the notion that the officer’s act of applying for a warrant is per
se objectively reasonable, the Supreme Court held police
accountable for “creat[ing] the unnecessary danger of an
unlawful arrest.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 345. Because participants
in the justice system are fallible, there is a risk that magistrates
will make mistakes. Id. at 345-46. In light of this risk, it is
“reasonable to require the officer applying for the warrant to
minimize this danger by exercising reasonable professional
judgment.” Id. at 346.

Like the Supreme Court in Malley, we reject the notion
that a police officer’s decision to contact a prosecutor for legal
advice is per se objectively reasonable. Nevertheless, we
recognize the virtue in encouraging police, when in doubt, to
seek the advice of counsel. Considering the proliferation of
laws and their relative complexity in the context of a rapidly
changing world, we cannot fairly require police officers in the
field to be as conversant in the law as lawyers and judges who
have the benefit not only of formal legal training, but also the
advantage of deliberate study.

Consistent with these principles, the First Circuit has
stated that advice obtained from a prosecutor prior to making an
arrest “should be factored into the totality of the circumstances
and considered in determining the officer’s entitlement to
qualified immunity.” Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir.
2004) (collecting cases from other circuits); see also Stearns v.
Clarkson, --- F.3d ---, 2010 WL 3191511, at *5 (10th Cir. Aug.
13, 2010) (citing Cox and holding that receipt of favorable legal
advice prior to making arrest does not necessarily entitle officer
to qualified immunity because it is only one relevant factor). In

12
Cox, Trooper Hainey investigated a tip that Cox’s son was
dealing drugs. After searching Cox’s home and collecting
evidence, Trooper Hainey consulted with an assistant district
attorney, who agreed there was sufficient evidence to arrest Cox
on drug charges, and proceeded to make the arrest. Id. at 27-28.
Reviewing the evidence in support of the arrest, the First Circuit
concluded that “Hainey’s judgment call may walk a thin line
between probable cause and mere suspicion,” however, it was
not “plainly incompetent.” Id. at 32. The Cox court found that
the reasonableness of Hainey’s actions was “cinch[ed]” by
Hainey’s consultation with the local prosecutor. Id. Receipt of
legal advice after “mak[ing] a full presentation of the known
facts to a competent prosecutor” would provide the officer with
a “stronger reason to believe that probable cause existed.” Id.
at 35. In adopting a “totality of the circumstances” approach,
the First Circuit cited the “good sense” of a policy that
“encourage[s] officers to obtain an informed opinion before
charging ahead and making an arrest in uncertain
circumstances.” Id.

Although we agree with much of the First Circuit’s
opinion in Cox, we do not adopt its “totality of the
circumstances” approach. In our view, encouraging police to
seek legal advice serves such a salutary purpose as to constitute
a “thumb on the scale” in favor of qualified immunity.
Accordingly, we hold that a police officer who relies in good
faith on a prosecutor’s legal opinion that the arrest is warranted
under the law is presumptively entitled to qualified immunity
from Fourth Amendment claims premised on a lack of probable
cause. That reliance must itself be objectively reasonable,
however, because “a wave of the prosecutor’s wand cannot

13
magically transform an unreasonable probable cause
determination into a reasonable one.” Id. at 34. Accordingly, a
plaintiff may rebut this presumption by showing that, under all
the factual and legal circumstances surrounding the arrest, a
reasonable officer would not have relied on the prosecutor’s
advice.

B.

In granting summary judgment, the District Court
reviewed the facts of the case and concluded that Officer Rogers
acted reasonably under the circumstances. Specifically, the
District Court noted that Rogers “observed Kelly videotaping
the police stop without his permission. . . . [H]e followed police
policy in calling the ADA . . . and the ADA’s advice was
reasonable.” Kelly, 2009 WL 1230309, at *4. The District
Court also was influenced by Rogers’s “good-faith reliance on
this outside legal assessment of the situation.” Id. On the other
hand, the Court did not analyze sufficiently the state of
Pennsylvania law regarding the Wiretap Act at the time of
Kelly’s arrest. As we shall explain, this omission was
problematic.

Before turning to the District Court’s legal analysis, we
turn to factual issues that remain in dispute. First, the Court
found that Kelly recorded Officer Rogers “without his
permission.” Kelly, 2009 WL 1230309, at *4. Both Kelly and
his friend Shopp testified that the camera sat conspicuously on
Kelly’s lap, and argued that Officer Rogers’s initial failure to
order Kelly to cease recording constituted Rogers’s implied
consent thereto. Thus, while noting that “it is disputed whether

14
the camera was in plain view or was covered by Plaintiff’s
hands,” the District Court apparently rejected Kelly’s assertion
that Officer Rogers was aware of the recording when he initially
approached the car. Id. at 2. On remand, the District Court
should make clear findings of fact regarding this issue.

Second, Kelly claimed that Rogers did not call ADA
Birbeck to seek legal advice, but merely to obtain an approval
number for an arrest, which Kelly contends was required by
Cumberland County Rule of Procedure 107.1. As ADA Birbeck
testified: “Officer Rogers asked for approval [for an arrest] and
I gave him an approval number to charge.” The District Court
must make factual findings on this issue as well.

In addition to its failure to make essential factual
findings, the District Court did not analyze sufficiently the state
of the law at the time of Kelly’s arrest. See Orsatti v. N.J. State
Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484-85 (3d Cir. 1995). Instead, the District
Court relied upon the mere existence of legal advice without
considering the relative clarity or obscurity of the Pennsylvania
Wiretap Act and the cases interpreting it. This was error.

At the time of Kelly’s arrest, it was clearly established
that an arrest could be made only on the basis of probable cause.
Berg, 219 F.3d at 272. “Whether it would have been clear to a
reasonable officer that probable cause justified [an] arrest
requires an examination of the crime at issue,” Gilles, 427 F.3d
at 204, in this case, a violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.
Under the Wiretap Act, “a person is guilty of a felony of the
third degree if he: (1) intentionally intercepts . . . any . . . oral
communication . . . .” 18 P A. C ONS. S TAT. § 5703. The statute

15
defines “oral communication” as “[a]ny oral communication
uttered by a person possessing an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation.” 18 P A. C ONS. S TAT.
§ 5702.

In 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained the
elements of a Wiretap Act violation as follows:

[I]n order to establish a prima facie case under the
Wiretap Act for interception of an oral
communication, a claimant must demonstrate: (1)
that he engaged in a communication; (2) that he
possessed an expectation that the communication
would not be intercepted; (3) that his expectation
was justifiable under the circumstances; and (4)
that the defendant attempted to, or successfully
intercepted the communication, or encouraged
another to do so.

Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519, 522 (Pa. 1998). In Agnew, two
police officers claimed their police chief violated the Wiretap
Act when he used an intercom to eavesdrop on squadroom
conversations. Id. at 521. The court held the chief did not
violate the Wiretap Act because the officers did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in statements made in the
squadroom and “one cannot have an expectation of non-
interception absent a finding of a reasonable expectation of
privacy.” Id. at 523. This holding squelched the distinction

16
developing in some lower court cases between a reasonable
expectation of non-interception and an expectation of privacy.
See id. at 524-25 (Nigro, J. concurring) (“Contrary to the
Majority’s position, I believe that the expectation of
non-interception and the expectation of privacy involve two
distinct inquiries.”). In support of its finding of no reasonable
expectation of privacy, the court noted that anyone in the
squadroom could overhear the conversation, and the door to the
squadroom was open at the time, such that people outside the
room could also hear the conversation. Id. at 524.

Since Agnew, numerous state and federal courts have
applied the expectation of privacy requirement in cases alleging
a violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.5 Even more

5
See e.g., Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246 (3d
Cir. 2004) (claims brought under Pennsylvania Wiretap Act
were not preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act
because it was not necessary to look to the collective bargaining
agreement to determine whether the employees had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their communications); Walsh v.
Krantz, 2008 WL 2329130, at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 2008)
(alleged eavesdropping on telephone conversation adequately
stated claims under Wiretap Act); Care v. Reading Hosp. &
Med. Ctr., 2004 WL 728532, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2004)
(plaintiffs adequately asserted a reasonable expectation of
privacy in conversations with labor consultant to state claim
under Pennsylvania Wiretap Act); Schwartz v. Dana
Corp./Parish Div., 196 F.R.D. 275, 282-83 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(Wiretap Act claims not suitable for class certification because

17
significantly, almost ten years before Agnew, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that secretly recording a police officer in
the performance of his duties did not violate the Wiretap Act.
See Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d 905, 906 (Pa. 1989).
In Henlen, a theft suspect who covertly recorded a state
trooper’s interrogation did not violate the Wiretap Act because
the trooper did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the statements. Id. at 906. The factors belying a reasonable
expectation of privacy included: (1) “oral interrogations of
suspects by the police are generally recorded, albeit by the
police rather than the suspect”; (2) the trooper was taking notes
during the interview; and (3) the trooper allowed a third party to
sit in on the interview. Id.

In light of the foregoing precedents, at the time of Kelly’s
arrest, it was clearly established that a reasonable expectation of
privacy was a prerequisite for a Wiretap Act violation. Even
more to the point, two Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases—one
almost 20 years old at the time of Kelly’s arrest—had held that

of individualized inquiry into whether employee had an
expectation of privacy); Keppley v. Sch. Dist., 866 A.2d 1165,
1172 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (trial court required to examine
whether students had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
communications on school bus); Commonwealth v. Ward, 3 Pa.
D.&C. 5th 268, 273 (Pa. Com. Pl. Ct. 2007) (“In Commonwealth
v. Christopher and Agnew the Appellate Courts have made it
clear that a communication is not an ‘oral communication’ as
defined by the Wiretap[] Act unless the victim has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.” (citations omitted)).

18
covertly recording police officers was not a violation of the Act.
Finally, it was also clearly established that police officers do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy when recording
conversations with suspects.

Instead of attempting to negate the clearly established
nature of the expectation of privacy requirement or to
distinguish the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decisions in
Henlen or Agnew, counsel for Rogers and the Borough of
Carlisle failed even to mention these critical precedents among
the 56 cases cited in their otherwise comprehensive brief.
Instead, Rogers merely notes that the Wiretap Act “does not
contain the phrase ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ anywhere
within the relevant portions of the Act . . . .” This argument,
while technically correct, is insufficient to establish the
objective reasonableness of Rogers’s actions. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 687 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying qualified
immunity for arrest without probable cause based on its finding
that the Washington Privacy Act was sufficiently established
under state case law and an opinion from state Attorney General
stating that police chief should have known that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in communications over
police radio), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1048 (2005); United States
v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999) (officer’s
good-faith but erroneous belief that broken tail light was a
violation of Texas law was not objectively reasonable because,
in light of ten-year-old state court decision holding such
condition did not violate the law, “no well trained Texas police
officer could reasonably believe that white light appearing with
red light through a cracked taillight lens constituted a violation
of traffic law”).

19
 Police officers generally have a duty to know the basic
elements of the laws they enforce. See Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d
920, 924 (1st Cir. 1987); see, e.g., Lawrence v. Reed, 406 F.3d
1224, 1234 (10th Cir. 2005) (reliance on city attorney’s advice
did not entitle officer to qualified immunity under extraordinary
circumstances test because officer should have known,
independently, that constitution requires notice and a hearing
before depriving a citizen of property and there were no exigent
circumstances requiring that the attorney’s advice “be acted on
immediately”); Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 945 F.2d 1416,
1420-21 (8th Cir. 1991) (no qualified immunity for officer who
sought arrest warrant for theft where there was no evidence of
intent to commit theft and officer “knew or should have known”
that it was therefore not a criminal matter). The question
remains, in this case, how the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act fits into
the landscape painted by these precedents. We leave that
determination, in the first instance, to the District Court.

In sum, because the District Court did not consider the
facts in the light most favorable to Kelly, did not evaluate the
objective reasonableness of Officer Rogers’s decision to rely on
ADA Birbeck’s advice in light of those facts, and did not
evaluate sufficiently the state of Pennsylvania law at the relevant
time, we will vacate the summary judgment insofar as it granted
qualified immunity to Officer Rogers on Kelly’s Fourth
Amendment claims and remand for additional factfinding and
application of the proper legal standard.

IV.

A.

20
 Kelly also claims the District Court erred when it held his
First Amendment right to videotape matters of public concern
was not clearly established.6 Kelly contends his First

6
Before turning to Kelly’s First Amendment claims, we
will address the amicus brief submitted by the American Civil
Liberties Union. The ACLU takes issue with the District
Court’s decision to skip the “violation prong” of the qualified
immunity inquiry and proceed directly to the “clearly
established” prong. The ACLU urges us to establish a rule that
the Saucier sequence should be the default approach to qualified
immunity analysis, especially in cases alleging violations of the
First Amendment. The ACLU suggests that deviation from the
Saucier sequence is proper only in cases involving unusual
facts or uncertain state law.

We decline to adopt the rule proffered by the ACLU
because it is inconsistent with Pearson. Although the Supreme
Court acknowledged that Saucier’s two-step procedure is often
advantageous, Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 821, it also recognized that
the costs of Saucier outweigh its benefits in some cases. As the
Supreme Court explained:

[T]he rigid Saucier procedure comes with a price.
The procedure sometimes results in a substantial
expenditure of scarce judicial resources on
difficult questions that have no effect on the
outcome of the case. There are cases in which it
is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly
established but far from obvious whether in fact

21
Amendment rights were violated when Rogers seized his video
camera (prior to calling ADA Birbeck) and when Rogers
arrested him. In defense, Rogers argues that a “right to
surreptitiously videotape a police officer without an expressive
or communicative purpose” was not clearly established at the
time of the arrest.7

there is such a right.

Id. at 818. For this reason, the Court held that district courts
have wide discretion to decide which of the two prongs
established in Saucier to address first. In our view, it would be
unfaithful to Pearson if we were to require district courts to
engage in “an essentially academic exercise” by first analyzing
the purported constitutional violation in a certain category of
cases. Id. Should the Supreme Court decide that Saucier
sequencing is necessary in First Amendment cases or any other
type of case, it may establish such a rule. It is not our place to
do so in light of Pearson, and, consequently, the District Court
did not abuse its discretion when it bypassed the constitutional
question and proceeded to the clearly established prong.
7
We note that Kelly asserts that the camera was not
hidden, but was in plain view; therefore, we cannot accept
Defendants’ characterization of the recording as “surreptitious”
at the summary judgment stage. Second, it is unclear why the
“surreptitious” nature of the videotaping would be significant to
whether the videotaping implicates the existence of a First
Amendment right or its clearly established nature. The
Defendants have not cited any cases making such a distinction,

22
 In determining whether a right is clearly established, it is
not necessary that the exact set of factual circumstances has
been considered previously. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739
(2002) (being “clearly established” does not require that “the
very action in question has previously been held unlawful”).
“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates
established law even in novel factual circumstances,” id. at 741,
as long as the law gave the defendant officer “fair warning” that
his conduct was unconstitutional. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d
772, 778 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that even though neither the
Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit had addressed the issue, the
right to be free from excessive force in the course of
handcuffing was clearly established based on the case law of
other circuits).

We have not addressed directly the right to videotape
police officers. In Gilles v. Davis, we hypothesized that
“videotaping or photographing the police in the performance of
their duties on public property may be a protected activity.” 427
F.3d at 212 n.14 (citing Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d
1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)) (emphasis added). We also noted
that “[m]ore generally, photography or videography that has a
communicative or expressive purpose enjoys some First
Amendment protection.” Id. (citations omitted). Though we
have not had occasion to decide this issue, several other courts
have addressed the right to record police while they perform

and we fail to see how the covert nature of a recording would
affect its First Amendment value, which will most often be
realized upon the recording’s dissemination.

23
their duties. We turn now to these cases, as well as cases
regarding the more general right to record matters of public
concern.

1.

In Smith v. City of Cumming, the Eleventh Circuit
recognized a “First Amendment right, subject to reasonable
time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape
police conduct.” 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 978 (2000). The court declared: “[t]he First
Amendment protects the right to gather information about what
public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right
to record matters of public interest.” Id. Other than noting that
“Mr. Smith had been prevented from videotaping police
actions,” id. at 1332, the Eleventh Circuit provided few details
regarding the facts of the case, making it difficult to determine
the context of the First Amendment right it recognized.
Ultimately, the court affirmed summary judgment for the
defendants, finding that Mr. Smith had not shown that the
defendants violated his right to videotape the police. Id. In the
decade since City of Cumming was decided, our decision in
Gilles is the only federal appeals court case to cite it. 427 F.3d
at 212, n.14.

District courts within the Third Circuit have also
addressed the right to record police officers. In Robinson v.
Fetterman, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, relying on City of Cumming, held there
is a free speech right to film police officers in the performance
of their public duties. 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005).

24
In that case, Robinson was concerned about the way police were
conducting truck inspections on a local road, so he decided to
document their behavior by filming them from an adjacent
property. Id. at 539. Robinson videotaped from a position
approximately 20 to 30 feet from the highway and never
interfered with police activities. Id. The police approached
Robinson and told him to leave; when he refused, they arrested
him for violating Pennsylvania’s harassment statute. Robinson
was found guilty of harassment, but the conviction was
overturned on appeal and Robinson filed a § 1983 action against
the troopers. Id. at 540.

After noting that Robinson had First Amendment rights
to receive information and ideas, and to express his concern
about the safety of the truck inspections, the district court held:
“there can be no doubt that the free speech clause of the
Constitution protected Robinson as he videotaped the
defendants.” Id. at 541. The court reasoned that a First
Amendment right existed regardless of whether Robinson had
“any particular reason for videotaping the troopers,” though in
this case he wanted to gather evidence of his safety concerns.
Id. Finally, the court held that no reasonable trooper could have
believed that the videotaping constituted harassment, and
rejected the troopers’ argument that they reasonably relied on
the statements of a district justice who, two years earlier, had
convicted Robinson for similar behavior. Id. at 542 (police
cannot “ignore or unreasonably apply a valid law in order to
arrest someone who annoys or offends them”).

In Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood, the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that

25
photographing a police officer in connection with a citizen’s
political activism was protected by the First Amendment. 438
F. Supp. 2d 504, 513 (D.N.J. 2006). In that case, Pomykacz—a
self-described “citizen-activist”—became concerned that a
romantic relationship between the mayor and a police officer
created risks of nepotism and conflict of interest. Pomykacz
began monitoring the officer and mayor, including
photographing the officer while she was on duty. The officer
and mayor initiated criminal charges against Pomykacz for
harassment. In her subsequent § 1983 action alleging First
Amendment retaliation, the district court held that Pomykacz
offered sufficient evidence that her photography was linked to
her speech about local government to be protected by the First
Amendment. Id. at 512-13. Nevertheless, the court declined to
adopt Pomykacz’s blanket assertion that “the observation and
monitoring of public officials is protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment.” Id. at 513 n.14 (alteration in original). Instead,
the court noted that “[a]n argument can be made that the act of
photographing, in the abstract, is not sufficiently expressive or
communicative and therefore not within the scope of First
Amendment protection - even when the subject of the
photography is a public servant.” Id.

2.

In an effort to show that Rogers should have been on
notice of a right to record police officers, Kelly also cites a
number of cases for the proposition that a general right to record
matters of public concern has been clearly established. Many of
these cases recognize such a right only in passing. See, e.g.,
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995)

26
(mentioning that plaintiff who tried to film demonstration on
public street had a “First Amendment right to film matters of
public interest” but ultimately granting qualified immunity to
police because it was not clearly established under what
circumstances conversations in public could be protected under
state privacy statute); Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120
(11th Cir. 1994) (prohibition on tape recording meeting of state
committee “touched on expressive conduct protected by the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment”); Demarest v.
Athol/Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94 (D.
Mass. 2002) (producers of news show on state-owned cable
channel have a First Amendment right to film matters
concerning potential conflicts of interests of local officials);
Thompson v. City of Clio, 765 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (M.D. Ala.
1991) (First Amendment right to record public town council
meetings); Lambert v. Polk County, 723 F. Supp. 128, 133-35
(S.D. Iowa 1989) (holding that individuals enjoy the same First
Amendment rights to “make and display videotapes of events”
as news organizations where individual filming downtown area
was hoping to capture images of interest so he could sell them
to a television station). We find these cases insufficiently
analogous to the facts of this case to have put Officer Rogers on
notice of a clearly established right to videotape police officers
during a traffic stop.

Moreover, even insofar as it is clearly established, the
right to record matters of public concern is not absolute; it is
subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, as
long as they are “justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, . . . are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative

27
channels for communication of the information.” Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal quotation
marks omitted). For example, we have held that the right to
record public meetings does not necessarily create a right to
videotape those meetings. In Whiteland Woods, L.P. v.
Township of West Whiteland, we held that a planning
committee’s adoption of a resolution prohibiting videotaping of
public meetings did not violate the First Amendment. 193 F.3d
177, 183 (3d Cir. 1999). We analyzed that case as one involving
the First Amendment right to access information, and declined
to apply the speech forum doctrine because it “[t]raditionally .
. . applies to ‘expressive’ or ‘speech’ activity,” and the alleged
constitutional violation “consisted of a . . . right to receive and
record information,” not “speech or other expressive activity.”
Id. Although we recognized that the right to receive information
and ideas was well established, id. at 180, we held that the
planning committee’s prohibition on videotaping was not
unconstitutional because other means of recording the
meeting—for example, note-taking—were permitted, thus
protecting the public’s right of access. Id. at 183. We
concluded that “Whiteland Woods’ right of access to Planning
Commission meetings did not create a federal constitutional
right to videotape the meetings.” Id. at 184; see also S.H.A.R.K.
v. Metro Parks Serving Summit County, 499 F.3d 553, 559-63
(6th Cir. 2007) (analyzing animal rights group’s claim that its
First Amendment right to videotape government-ordered deer
culling in state park after hours as a right to access claim instead
of free expression claim, and finding no violation of that right).

3.

28
 In light of the foregoing, we conclude there was
insufficient case law establishing a right to videotape police
officers during a traffic stop to put a reasonably competent
officer on “fair notice” that seizing a camera or arresting an
individual for videotaping police during the stop would violate
the First Amendment. Although Smith and Robinson announce
a broad right to videotape police, other cases suggest a narrower
right. Gilles and Pomykacz imply that videotaping without an
expressive purpose may not be protected, and in Whiteland
Woods we denied a right to videotape a public meeting. Thus,
the cases addressing the right of access to information and the
right of free expression do not provide a clear rule regarding
First Amendment rights to obtain information by videotaping
under the circumstances presented here.

Our decision on the First Amendment question is further
supported by the fact that none of the precedents upon which
Kelly relies involved traffic stops, which the Supreme Court has
recognized as inherently dangerous situations. See, e.g., Arizona
v. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781, 786 (2009) (“[T]raffic stops are
especially fraught with danger to police officers. The risk of
harm to both the police and the occupants [of a stopped vehicle]
is minimized . . . if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned
command of the situation.”) (alterations in original) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (recognizing “the inordinate risk
confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an
automobile”). For these reasons, we hold that the right to
videotape police officers during traffic stops was not clearly
established and Officer Rogers was entitled to qualified
immunity on Kelly’s First Amendment claim.

29
 V.

We last turn to Kelly’s appeal from the District Court’s
order dismissing his claims against the Borough of Carlisle.

Municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 based
solely upon a theory of respondeat superior; rather, the plaintiff
must identify a municipal policy or custom that caused his
injury. Langford v. City of Atlantic City, 235 F.3d 845, 847 (3d
Cir. 2000). “Policy” includes official proclamations made by a
municipal decisionmaker with final authority, and “custom” is
defined as “practices of state officials . . . so permanent and well
settled as to virtually constitute law.” Berg, 219 F.3d at 275
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To prove
liability, the plaintiff must show that the municipal action was
the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. Id. at
276.

If the identified policy or custom “does not facially
violate federal law, causation can be established only by
‘demonstrat[ing] that the municipal action was taken with
deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious consequences.
A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not
suffice.’” Id. (quoting Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).

Kelly alleges three alternative bases for municipal
liability: (1) the Borough’s policy that police consult with a
prosecutor when unsure how to proceed; (2) the approval of
Kelly’s arrest by Police Chief Margeson; and (3) inadequate

30
training of police officers regarding the Wiretap Act and the
First Amendment.8

A.

Kelly contends the Borough should be liable because
Officer Rogers acted pursuant to Borough policy at all times.
But Kelly does not proffer any evidence that the Borough’s
policies and practices were implemented with deliberate
indifference. Instead, he asserts that a showing of deliberate
indifference is required only for failure to train claims, and is
not required for imposition of liability based on policy or
custom. This assertion is incorrect.

For the proposition that deliberate indifference is not
required, Kelly selectively relies on a statement by the Supreme
Court that a municipality is liable for “all of its injurious
conduct, whether committed in good faith or not.” Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980). Kelly’s reliance on
Owen is misplaced because that case did not address
implementation of a generally applicable policy; it concerned a
city council’s censure and termination of an employee without
a hearing, and presented the question of whether municipalities

8
Kelly also argues in passing that municipal liability rests
on the Borough’s delegation of decisionmaking authority to
ADA Birbeck. We reject this argument summarily because
Kelly has presented no evidence that the police department’s
practice of consulting with a prosecutor constituted a delegation
of its final decisionmaking authority.

31
were entitled to good-faith qualified immunity from § 1983
liability. The Court rejected the proposed municipal qualified
immunity and did not address when facially valid municipal
policies constitute “injurious conduct.” Id. at 657; see Szabla v.
City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 389-90 (8th Cir. 2007).
Subsequent cases have established that, in order to be held liable
for a facially valid policy, the municipality must have acted with
deliberate indifference. In Board of County Commissioners v.
Brown, the Court explained that “it is not enough for a § 1983
plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the
municipality.” 520 U.S. at 404. Instead, the municipality is
liable only if “municipal action was taken with the requisite
degree of culpability.” Id. Finally, the Court held that:

[A] plaintiff seeking to establish municipal
liability on the theory that a facially lawful
municipal action has led an employee to violate a
plaintiff’s rights must demonstrate that the
municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate
indifference’ as to its known or obvious
consequences. A showing of simple or even
heightened negligence will not suffice.

Id. at 407 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). A
showing of deliberate indifference is thus required in this case.

Kelly argues in the alternative that the Borough’s policy
does manifest deliberate indifference because it requires police
officers to follow the ADA’s advice as long as that advice is not
“outlandish” or “outrageous” whereas the proper constitutional
standard permits reliance on legal advice only if “reasonable.”

32
Semantics are insufficient to satisfy Kelly’s burden. Kelly has
not presented any evidence that the Borough ignored obvious
unconstitutional consequences in adopting the policy, nor has he
shown that the Borough’s implementation of the policy varied
from constitutional standards. In fact, the adoption of such a
policy tends to negate deliberate indifference because a policy
of consulting with a lawyer in uncertain cases usually prevents
unlawful arrests. See Cox, 391 F.3d at 34-35 (observing the
“good sense” policy of “encourag[ing] officers to obtain an
informed opinion before charging ahead and making an arrest in
uncertain circumstances”). Thus, Kelly has fallen well short of
meeting his burden of proving that the Borough’s policy
amounted to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

B.

An employee who lacks policymaking authority can still
bind the municipality if a municipal policymaker delegated
power to the employee or ratified his decision. LaVerdure v.
County of Montgomery, 324 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2003). But
ratification occurs only “when a subordinate’s decision is
subject to review by the municipality’s authorized policymakers
[because] they have retained the authority to measure the
official’s conduct for conformance with their policies.” City of
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality
opinion). “Simply going along with discretionary decisions
made by one’s subordinates, however, is not a delegation to
them of the authority to make policy.” Id. at 130.

Kelly claims the Borough is liable because Chief
Margeson ratified Rogers’s actions. This argument is without

33
merit as Kelly has presented no evidence that Chief Margeson
was a final policymaker for the Borough. “The question of who
is a ‘policymaker’ is a question of state law.” Andrews v. City
of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1481 (3d Cir. 1990). “In looking to
state law, a court must determine which official has final,
unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take an action.”
Id.; see also Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245
(3d Cir. 2006) (“In order to ascertain if an official has final
policy-making authority, and can thus bind the municipality by
his conduct, a court must determine (1) whether, as a matter of
state law, the official is responsible for making policy in the
particular area of municipal business in question, and (2)
whether the official's authority to make policy in that area is
final and unreviewable.” (internal citations omitted)).

Kelly cites two cases in which we previously found that
a police chief was a municipal policymaker. See Keenan v. City
of Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 468-69 (3d Cir. 1992) (relying upon
analysis in Andrews, 895 F.2d 1469, to hold commissioner of
police was policymaker for City of Philadelphia) and Black v.
Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding that police
chief was policymaker for City of Allentown). In both cases,
however, the determination that the chief of police was a
policymaker was made only after examining the chief’s
responsibilities and decisionmaking authority with respect to the
conduct at issue. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481 (commissioner
promulgated and disseminated police training manual and
courses on sexual harassment, and established an Equal
Employment Office to handle complaints of discrimination);
Black, 662 F.2d at 191 (chief wrote and implemented official
policy at issue, was a member of the Mayor’s cabinet, and

34
established policies and procedures for entire police
department). Kelly has not presented any similar evidence in
this case; his perfunctory attempt to establish a record by citing
a handful of Pennsylvania statutes concerning the authority of
police chiefs in his reply brief is insufficient to meet his burden
of proof in this regard.

Moreover, Kelly has presented no evidence that Officer
Rogers’s decision to arrest him was subject to final review by
Chief Margeson. Chief Margeson testified at his deposition that
he was informed of the arrest by a third officer a day or two
after it occurred (after Kelly had been released from prison).
While there was certainly evidence that Margeson agreed with
Rogers’s decision to arrest Kelly, in the absence of evidence that
Chief Margeson “retained the authority to measure [Rogers’s]
conduct for conformance with [municipal] policies,”
Margeson’s mere agreement is insufficient to show ratification.
Praprotnick, 485 U.S. at 127.

C.

Finally, Kelly claims the Borough failed to adequately
train Rogers regarding the elements of the Wiretap Act and the
requirements of the First Amendment. He contends that
constitutional violations were “extremely likely” to result from
the Borough’s failure.

Failure to adequately train municipal employees “can
ordinarily be considered deliberate indifference only where the
failure has caused a pattern of violations.” Berg, 219 F.3d at
276 (citation omitted). While it is theoretically possible to show

35
a deliberately indifferent failure to train in the absence of an
underlying pattern of violations, “the burden on the plaintiff in
such a case is high,” because he must show that “a violation of
federal rights [was] a highly predictable consequence of a
failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to
handle recurring situations.” Id. (quoting Board of County
Commissioners, 520 U.S. at 409).

Kelly concedes that he has not presented a pattern of
violations. Kelly also fails to present any evidence that the
situation is likely to recur or that false arrest was highly
predictable. Instead, he argues that “the plethora of
Pennsylvania cases reiterating that the statute does not apply
unless the speaker has a [sic] expectation of non-interception
(i.e. privacy)” shows that the likelihood of a recurring violation
is high. This argument is unpersuasive. Although there are a
number of cases addressing the Wiretap Act, these cases do not
concern the improper enforcement of the Act by the police. Cf.
Johnson, 388 F.3d at 686 (finding that, “[i]n light of the many
Washington cases addressing enforcement of the Privacy Act by
public officers performing official duties,” there was a genuine
issue as to whether a lack of training on the Privacy Act
constituted deliberate indifference). Therefore, Kelly has failed
to satisfy his burden on the failure to train claim.

VI.

For the reasons stated herein, we will affirm the District
Court’s summary judgment in favor of the Borough of Carlisle.
We will also affirm summary judgment in favor of Officer
Rogers on Kelly’s First Amendment claim. Finally, we will

36
vacate the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of
Officer Rogers on Kelly’s Fourth Amendment claims and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

37