[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11464 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar OCTOBER 5, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 3:08-cv-00987-HLA-MCR
MICHAEL R. KNIGHT,
llllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(October 5, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BLACK and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael R. Knight appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
Security Administration’s denial of his applications for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3). Knight contends the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence because the hypothetical question the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) posed to a Vocational Expert (VE) failed to include all of his mental
health impairments. Specifically, he claims the hypothetical question should have
included additional limitations noted by two non-examining state agency
consultants, Dr. Gary Buffone and Dr. Susan Conley. After review, we affirm the
Commissioner’s denial of benefits.1
The Social Security regulations establish a five-step sequential process for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228
(11th Cir. 1999). Under the first two steps, the claimant must demonstrate that he
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity and has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments. Id. Under the third step, if the claimant can prove
that his impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, he is automatically found
1
We review the Commissioner’s factual findings to determine whether they are supported
by substantial evidence. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir.
2007). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th
Cir. 1983). In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, we do not “decide the facts anew, reweigh
the evidence, or substitute [our own] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Id.
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to be disabled. Id. Otherwise, the claimant must move to the fourth step and
prove that he does not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform his
past relevant work. Id. If the claimant makes that showing, the burden shifts to
the Commissioner under the fifth step to demonstrate that the claimant can
perform other work available in the national economy. Id.
One means in which the ALJ may determine whether the claimant is able to
perform other work in the national economy is by posing hypothetical questions to
a VE. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002). “In order for a
vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must
pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.”
Id. The hypothetical question need not include claimed impairments that are not
supported by the medical evidence. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1270.
In this case, the ALJ’s hypothetical question included all of the impairments
the ALJ found to be supported by the record. More specifically, the ALJ asked the
VE to assume the hypothetical individual needed low-stress work involving
simple tasks and limited interaction with the public.2 Although Knight argues the
hypothetical question should have incorporated additional limitations noted by the
2
The ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE accurately described claimant’s mental
limitations consistent with the ALJ’s RFC finding and Dr. Knox’s opinion.
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state agency consultants, Drs. Buffone and Conley, the ALJ declined to accept the
opinions of those nonexamining physicians. See Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278,
280 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The opinions of nonexamining, reviewing physicians ...
when contrary to those of the examining physicians, are entitled to little weight,
and standing alone do not constitute substantial evidence.”). The ALJ’s decision
not to incorporate these additional limitations is supported by substantial evidence.
First, there were certain inconsistencies between the state agency opinions
and the findings of the examining doctor, Dr. Knox. For example, Dr. Buffone
opined that Knight would have difficulty working in coordination with others,
whereas Dr. Knox concluded Knight would have no major problems in that area.
To the extent the opinions were inconsistent, it was appropriate for the ALJ to give
more weight to the views of Dr. Knox, an examining consultant, over the views of
two non-examining consultants. See Sharfarz at 280. Second, Dr. Knox’s report
was more recent than the assessments of Drs. Conley and Buffone, and, therefore,
it was more reflective of Knight’s current activities and limitations.
Because the ALJ gave sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinions of Drs.
Conley and Buffone, he did not have to include their findings in his hypothetical
question to the VE. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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