FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 7, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PATRICK RYAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 10-2126
(D.C. No. 1:09-CV-01193-RB)
LUPE MARSHALL, Warden; GARY (D. N. Mex.)
L. KING, Attorney General of the
State of New Mexico,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, TACHA, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Patrick Ryan, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) in order to challenge the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because Ryan has failed to
satisfy the standards for the issuance of a COA, we deny his request and dismiss
this matter.
I
In July 2002, a state jury convicted Ryan of twenty counts of criminal
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
sexual penetration in the second degree, nine counts of criminal sexual contact,
one count of aggravated battery, three counts of kidnapping, and one count of
attempted criminal sexual penetration. The jury convicted Ryan based on
evidence that he drugged the victim with bear tranquilizers and performed sexual
acts on her in a rural area near Reserve, New Mexico. The evidence at trial
included testimony from the victim, medical reports indicating she had been
drugged, and videotapes of Ryan engaging in sex acts while the victim was in a
comatose-like state. At the time of these incidents, Ryan and the victim, who are
both wildlife biologists, were living near Reserve and studying the hibernation
patterns of black bears on behalf of their employer, the Hornocker Wildlife
Institute. Following Ryan’s conviction, the state court sentenced him to 33 years
of incarceration.
Ryan appealed his convictions and his sentence, alleging that the state court
erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence, his amended motion to
suppress evidence, and his motion for a new trial based on jury and prosecutorial
misconduct. In February 2006, the New Mexico Court of Appeals denied Ryan’s
appeal. Ryan subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the New
Mexico Supreme Court, which was denied. Ryan then filed a petition for writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied.
In August 2007, Ryan, acting pro se, filed a petition for habeas relief in
New Mexico state court. The state court subsequently appointed habeas counsel
2
and ordered counsel to file an amended habeas petition. In the amended petition,
Ryan alleged that (1) the prosecution violated his due process rights by
withholding exculpatory evidence; (2) the prosecution violated his due process
rights by tampering with evidence; (3) the state court violated his due process
rights by admitting unproven scientific evidence; and (4) defense counsel violated
his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. In September
2009, the state court entered an order explaining why an evidentiary hearing was
not necessary and dismissing Ryan’s amended habeas petition “for the reasons set
forth in [the State’s] Response to [Ryan’s] Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.” ROA Vol. 1, at 524. Ryan then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in
the New Mexico Supreme Court, which was denied.
In December 2009, Ryan initiated federal habeas proceedings by filing a
pro se § 2254 motion with the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico. In this petition, Ryan alleged the same four claims contained in his
habeas petition in the state court. Ryan’s petition was assigned to a magistrate
judge, who reviewed the record and recommended that the district court deny
Ryan’s request for habeas relief. Ryan filed an objection to the magistrate
judge’s findings and recommendation. The district court reviewed the magistrate
judge’s recommendations de novo and agreed with each of his conclusions.
Accordingly, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s conclusions and
denied Ryan’s petition with prejudice. The district court also denied Ryan’s later
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request for a COA, but allowed its earlier grant of Ryan’s request to proceed in
forma pauperis to continue on appeal.
Following the district court’s order, Ryan filed with this court a notice of
appeal, a request for a COA, and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
II
Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
336 (2003). In other words, a state prisoner may appeal from the denial of federal
habeas relief only if the district court or this court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A); see Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2000). A
COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order to make that
showing, a prisoner must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate
whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that
the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In addressing whether reasonable jurists could debate whether a § 2254
habeas petition should have been resolved differently, a federal court must review
the claims in the state habeas petition and make a general assessment of their
merits in light of the standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Miller-El,
537 U.S. at 336. Under this statute, a federal court may not issue a writ of habeas
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corpus unless the state court’s adjudication of the habeas petition:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the United States Supreme Court; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
III
In order to address Ryan’s request for a COA, we must first analyze the
four grounds upon which he alleged he was entitled to state habeas relief and
explain why the state court denied his petition.
Withholding of Exculpatory Evidence
Ryan alleged the prosecution violated his due process rights by withholding
two of the thirteen videotapes found on his property and by withholding a letter
written by the victim to her friend. 1 According to Ryan, this evidence indicated
that he was involved in a consensual sexual relationship with the victim, and it
contradicted the prosecution’s theory that Ryan drugged and then raped her.
The prosecution argued that Ryan’s claim failed for three reasons. First,
the it noted that because Ryan did not allege on direct appeal that the prosecution
1
There is some confusion on the record regarding whether the prosecution
withheld the videotapes and the letter or whether the defense simply chose not to
introduce this evidence at trial. For the purposes of its order, the district court
assumed the evidence was withheld. We will assume the same.
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withheld exculpatory evidence, he was likely barred from asserting this claim in a
petition for habeas relief. See Duncan v. Kerby, 851 P.2d 466, 468 (N.M. 1993);
State v. Gillihan, 524 P.2d 1335, 1336 (N.M. 1974). Second, the state argued that
this evidence was not material to Ryan’s defense because at the time of his trial
and conviction in 2002, lack of consent was not an essential element of the charge
of criminal sexual penetration. See State v. Jensen, 118 P.3d 762, 768 (N.M.
App. 2005). Thus, according to the prosecution, even if this evidence revealed
that the victim consented to having sex with Ryan, this fact would not have aided
his defense. See id. (“the defense of consent is not available to defendant because
lack of consent is not an element of [criminal sexual penetration]”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, the state argued that it did not wrongfully withhold this evidence
because it was cumulative of the evidence presented at trial. Ryan admitted in his
opening brief on direct appeal that certain videotapes introduced at trial showed
the victim “awake, lucid, in motor control, participating in sex, and sexually
aroused.” ROA Vol. 1, at 478. Thus, the state argued that it did not improperly
withhold evidence of the victim’s consent because the jury was presented with
evidence of the parties’ sexual relationship and nonetheless convicted Ryan of the
crimes charged.
The state court agreed with the prosecution and concluded, for the reasons
stated in the prosecution’s response, that the state did not violate Ryan’s due
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process rights by withholding the two videotapes and the letter in question.
Tampering with Evidence
Ryan also alleged that the prosecution violated his due process rights by
tampering with evidence. According to Ryan, the state wilfully omitted from the
videotape footage it showed at trial, depictions of him suffering from the effects
of the same environmental toxins he alleges caused the victim’s comatose-like
state. Ryan argued that had the prosecution shown the tapes in their entirety, the
jury would have concluded that both parties suffered from exposure to these
toxins and that Ryan therefore did not drug the victim.
The prosecution argued that Ryan’s claim failed for two reasons. First, as
with his claim for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, Ryan did not allege on
direct appeal that the prosecution wrongfully withheld certain portions of the
videotapes from the jury. See generally id. at 125-61. Thus, Ryan was likely
foreclosed from raising this argument in his habeas petition. See Duncan, 851
P.2d at 468; Gillihan, 524 P.2d at 1336.
Second, the prosecution argued that it did not unfairly prejudice Ryan by
editing the videotapes because the evidence allegedly contained in the videotapes
was cumulative of the evidence he presented at trial. This is because, at trial,
Ryan introduced evidence through which he attempted to portray himself as
having been exposed to environmental toxins. Ryan presented evidence that he
had crashed an automobile near Reserve and had to be transferred to an
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Albuquerque hospital, apparently to be treated for exposure to harmful drugs.
The prosecution argued that because Ryan introduced this evidence in order to
show that he had been impaired by environmental toxins, its decision to show
only snippets of the sexually graphic video footage did not violate Ryan’s due
process rights.
The state court agreed with the prosecution and concluded, for the reasons
stated in the state’s response, that the prosecution did not violate Ryan’s due
process rights by editing the videotapes in question.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Ryan argued that he received ineffective assistance from his
attorney in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. According to Ryan, his
counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation, failed to pursue potentially
meritorious pre-trial motions, failed to retain expert witnesses, and failed to keep
him reasonably informed regarding his defense.
1. Failure to Conduct an Adequate Investigation
Ryan alleged his attorney prejudiced his defense by failing to investigate
facts that would have revealed that the victim consented to having a sexual
relationship with him. Specifically, Ryan claims his attorney failed to adequately
investigate the two missing videotapes, the victim’s letter to her friend, her diary,
the couple’s vacation to Yellowstone National Park, and the testimonies of their
friends—all of which proved that the parties were involved in a consensual
8
relationship.
The state argued that defense counsel’s alleged refusal to investigate these
facts was not improper because they would not have bolstered Ryan’s defense at
trial. The prosecution again noted that evidence of the victim’s previous consent
to sexual activity would not have assisted Ryan because at the time of his trial
and conviction, lack of consent was not an essential element of the charge of
criminal sexual penetration. See Jensen, 118 P.3d at 768. Thus, according to the
prosecution, even if counsel had gathered additional evidence of the parties’
consensual relationship, it would not have negated the prejudice that Ryan
claimed he suffered. 2
Ryan also argued his attorney violated his constitutional rights when he
failed to investigate Ryan’s claim that the victim consented to being drugged
based on her belief in “secondary virginity.” According to Ryan, the victim held
strong religious beliefs that prevented her from actively consenting to sexual
relations. Nonetheless, the victim overcame the tension between her religious
convictions and her desire to have sex with Ryan by consenting to being drugged.
This way, she did not consciously choose to engage in sexual activity and could
2
The district court rejected Ryan’s assertion for a different reason. It
concluded that defense counsel’s alleged failure to investigate was not prejudicial
because Ryan introduced evidence at trial of his sexual relationship with the
victim, including the fact that they were engaged to be married at one point. The
district court reasoned that since the jury heard this evidence and nonetheless
convicted Ryan, any failure on the part of defense counsel to find more evidence
of consent was not prejudicial.
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therefore maintain her “secondary virginity.”
The prosecution addressed this argument in detail in its response, arguing
that—even if consent had been a viable defense—Ryan’s attorney acted
reasonably in choosing not to introduce evidence of the victim’s belief in
“secondary virginity.” First, the prosecution argued that this “bizarre” theory was
unlikely to persuade a jury and might even offend them. ROA Vol. 1, at 460,
464. The state further argued that presenting this defense would have obligated
Ryan to admit he drugged the victim into a comatose state and then had sex with
her. According to the prosecution, this would have essentially required counsel to
concede the elements of the crime of criminal sexual penetration, which could
have been a disastrous trial strategy. Finally, the prosecution argued that in order
to effectively present such an unusual defense, counsel would have needed to call
Ryan as a witness and subject him to cross-examination, at which point the state
would have questioned Ryan regarding his history of dishonest behavior. For
example, Ryan admitted in a pre-trial hearing that he lied in order to obtain his
job at the Hornocker Wildlife Institute and to obtain his driver’s license. Id. at
463.
The state court agreed with the prosecution and held, for the reasons stated
in the state’s response, that the state did not violate Ryan’s Sixth Amendment
rights by failing to investigate facts regarding the parties’ sexual relationship or
by choosing not to pursue Ryan’s secondary virginity theory at trial.
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2. Failure to Pursue Potentially Meritorious Pre-Trial Motions
Ryan also argued that his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment rights
when he failed to move to exclude the testimony of Dr. Middleberg, the state’s
expert witness. At trial, Middleberg testified that hair samples taken from the
victim indicated that she had been drugged with bear tranquilizers. According to
Ryan, Dr. Middleberg’s testimony was suspect because it relied on “a new
technique designed only for the present case” and because his conclusions “fell
into the category of mere speculation.” Id. at 441. Ryan further alleged his
attorney should have moved to exclude Dr. Middleberg’s testimony because Dr.
Middleberg “claimed that he received the samples from the prosecution” even
though other evidence at trial indicated that the victim sent her hair samples
directly to the lab. Id. at 440.
The prosecution argued in response that Ryan’s attorney did not have a
good faith basis upon which to move for the exclusion of Dr. Middleberg’s
testimony. First, the prosecution argued that defense counsel did not act
improperly when he failed to object to Dr. Middleberg’s testimony on the grounds
that it was based on speculation and unsubstantiated scientific analysis. The state
pointed out that defense counsel informed the court during the trial that Dr.
Walls, the defense’s expert, “sa[id] many of the same things as Dr. Middleberg . .
. and may agree with him on every point.” Id. at 469. According to the state,
because the defense’s own expert came to the same conclusions as Dr.
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Middleberg, Ryan’s attorney was justified in not moving to exclude Dr.
Middleberg’s report.
In addition, the state argued that any potential dispute regarding how Dr.
Middleberg received the hair samples was irrelevant to the substance of his expert
testimony. According to the prosecution, this is because Dr. Middleberg never
opined as to how the drugs got into the victim’s body; he only testified regarding
what those drugs were. Thus, the jury could appropriately weigh Dr.
Middleberg’s testimony regarding the toxins even if he was unsure how they got
into the victim’s body or who sent them to the laboratory.
The state court agreed with the prosecution and concluded, for the reasons
stated in the prosecution’s response, that Ryan’s attorney did not violate his Sixth
Amendment rights when he failed to move to exclude Dr. Middleberg’s
testimony.
3. Failure to Retain an Expert Witness
Ryan also alleges his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment rights by
failing to retain an independent expert witness to rebut Dr. Middleberg’s
testimony. Although defense counsel hired Dr. Walls to testify, Ryan alleges his
attorney “never requested that Dr. Walls conduct a full evaluation of the State’s
scientific/medical evidence and failed to provide [Dr. Walls] with any of the hard
data necessary for a proper analysis.” Id. at 443. According to Ryan, his attorney
attempted “in a last ditch botched effort” to have Dr. Walls testify towards the
12
end of the trial, but was unsuccessful. Thus, Ryan alleges that as a result of his
attorney’s failures, “the jury was left with the impression” based on “the State’s
voodoo science” that Ryan drugged the victim. Id.
In response, the prosecution argued that Ryan’s attorney acted reasonably
in not calling Dr. Walls to testify. The state noted the well-established rule that
“[t]he decision whether to call a witness is a matter of trial tactics and strategy
within the control of trial counsel.” State v. Harrison, 7 P.3d 478, 493 (N.M.
2000). Further, the prosecution pointed out that the record indicated that Dr.
Walls reviewed Dr. Middleberg’s testimony and informed defense counsel that he
agreed with Dr. Middleberg’s conclusions. The state argued that, given this fact,
defense counsel’s decision not to call Dr. Walls to testify was proper because his
testimony likely would have bolstered Dr. Middleberg’s conclusions.
The prosecution also argued that Ryan’s claim that his attorney should have
called a different expert witness to rebut Dr. Middleberg lacked merit. This is
because in his habeas petition, Ryan did not actually identify a potential expert
witness or scientific theory that could have effectively rebutted Dr. Middleberg’s
testimony; he simply alleged that his attorney should have found an expert that
could do so. As a result, the state argued that Ryan’s arguments on this matter
were based on pure speculation and were therefore insufficient to sustain a claim
for ineffective assistance of counsel.
The state court agreed with the prosecution and held, for the reasons stated
13
in the state’s response, that Ryan’s counsel did not violate his Sixth Amendment
rights by choosing not to call an expert witness to rebut Dr. Middleberg’s
testimony.
4. Failure to Keep Client Reasonably Informed
Finally, Ryan asserted that his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel by failing to respond to his letters, his requests
for discovery, and his phone calls. Ryan further alleged that his attorney did not
keep him reasonably informed regarding his defense because he did not allow
Ryan to make decisions regarding his “basic trial rights.” ROA Vol. 1, at 444
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The state argued that Ryan’s assertions lacked merit because he never
alleged in his habeas petition how the trial would have gone differently had his
attorney communicated with him properly. Although Ryan alleged his attorney
should have permitted him to make decisions regarding his basic trial rights, Ryan
never identified these rights or stated how his defense was prejudiced in this
regard.
The state court agreed with the prosecution and held, for the reasons stated
in the state’s response, that Ryan did not assert a valid Sixth Amendment claim
based on failure to communicate.
IV
Having thoroughly reviewed Ryan’s application for a COA and the record
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on appeal, we conclude that the district court’s denial of Ryan’s habeas petition is
not reasonably subject to debate, nor are Ryan’s arguments adequate to deserve
further proceedings. In so holding, we conclude that the district court properly
applied the standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which permits a
federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court unreasonably
applied federal law or made an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented. Given this standard, we conclude that the district court
properly reviewed the state court record and concluded Ryan was not entitled to
federal habeas relief based on his assertion that the state violated his due process
rights and that his attorney violated his right to effective assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, Ryan’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED as
moot, his request for a COA is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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