CLD-279 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
Nos. 10-1418 and 10-1701
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DAWN MARIE BALL,
Appellant
v.
COUNSELOR HARTMAN; DEPUTY SHEPLER; MR. DREBLER;
JEFFREY BEARD; MARIROSA LAMAS; LT. GRIDLEY; WENDY
NICHOLAS; MR. FRONTZ; JILL CICERO
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-00844)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 2, 2010
Before: BARRY, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 7, 2010 )
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Dawn Marie Ball appeals from an interlocutory decision of the District Court and
its final order dismissing her complaint. We will affirm. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 (2008);
3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
Ball, a Pennsylvania prisoner proceeding pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging the denial of her First Amendment right of access to the courts. In particular, she
alleges that several prison employees refused to allow her to participate in a telephonic
hearing in a paternity action pending in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of
Northampton County, in which she seeks an order against her ex-husband for child
support.
According to Ball, prison employees refused on the grounds that she is detained in
the Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”), where she believes she will be kept until her
release date of 2014. She further alleges that one of the defendants returned a call to a
court official and informed her that Ball would not be able to participate in court hearings
by telephone until her release from the RHU. She also appears to suggest that her suit
was “dismissed” as a result, though she later submitted a letter from the Court of
Common Pleas stating that her hearing merely had been canceled and would be
rescheduled in the future. In addition to the prison employees who allegedly prevented
her from calling the court, she named as defendants Jeffery Beard, Secretary of the
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Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, and Jill Cicero, Associate Court Administrator
for the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas.
Ball filed a motion for the appointment of counsel and a motion for a preliminary
injunction. The District Court denied them by order entered January 11, 2010, in which it
also granted Cicero’s motion to dismiss the claims against her under Rule 12(b)(6).1 Ball
filed a notice of appeal from that order, initiating the appeal docketed at C.A. No. 10-
1418. The District Court then granted the remaining defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion by
order entered February 16, 2010. Ball’s notice of appeal from that order is docketed at
C.A. No. 10-1701. We consolidate the appeals for disposition.2
II.
Our affirmance of each of the orders under review flows from a single dispositive
issue of law. Ball claims that the defendants have deprived her of her First Amendment
right of access to the courts. As a prisoner, however, Ball’s right of access to the courts
does not extend to the Northampton County child support action with which she claims
1
The District Court later amended the order, by order entered January 20, 2010, to
clarify that its reference to the motion filed by the remaining defendants was mistaken.
2
We review the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. See Phillips
v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). In doing so, we “‘accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the
plaintiff may be entitled to relief.’” Id. at 233 (citation omitted). We review for abuse of
discretion the District Court’s ultimate denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction, see
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010), and its denial of a motion for the
appointment of counsel, see Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993).
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defendants have interfered. Instead, “prisoners may only proceed on access-to-court
claims in two types of cases, challenges (direct or collateral) to their sentences and
conditions of confinement.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1996)). “In other words, a prisoner has no
constitutional right of access to the courts to litigate an unrelated civil claim.” Simmons
v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003). Ball’s child support
action is not related to her criminal sentence or conditions of confinement. Nor, as the
District Court noted, is it related to anything as fundamental as her parental rights. Cf.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest in parental rights). For those reasons, the District Court properly
dismissed her complaint. For the same reasons, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying her motion for a preliminary injunction or appointment of counsel.3
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The District Court also correctly explained that Ball’s claim against Beard fails
for lack of his personal involvement and that her claim against Cicero fails because
Cicero is protected by quasi-judicial immunity. The District Court further determined
that, even if Ball’s First Amendment rights were implicated by her child support action,
she failed to establish any “actual injury” because the Court of Common Pleas merely
notified her that her hearing will be rescheduled. In this regard, the District Court wrote
that Ball “offers no evidence” of actual injury. The District Court appears to refer to the
showing she made on her motion for a preliminary injunction. To the extent the District
Court may erroneously have required “evidence” in the Rule 12(b)(6) context, its error
was harmless because the complaint was subject to dismissal on the other grounds
discussed above. For those same reasons, any amendment of Ball’s complaint would
have been futile. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245.
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Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Ball’s motion for
the appointment of counsel in this Court is denied.
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