Johnson v. United States

10-3046-op
Johnson v. United States

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2010

(Submitted: August 23, 2010 Decided: October 8, 2010)

Docket No. 10-3046-op

______________________________________________________

LEONARD C. JOHNSON ,

Petitioner,
v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

Respondent.

______________________________________________________

Before: KATZMANN and HALL, Circuit Judges, GARDEPHE , District Judge.1

Petitioner applies for leave to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Petitioner’s
proposed § 2255 motion, however, would not be “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h), because it is his first § 2255 motion challenging his amended judgment of conviction.
Accordingly, we deny the successive application as unnecessary and transfer the matter to the
district court with instructions that a new § 2255 motion be accepted for filing.

LEONARD C. JOHNSON , Waymart, Pa., pro se.

KATHERINE POLK FAILLA , Assistant United States

1
The Honorable Paul G. Gardephe, of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, sitting by designation.
 Attorney, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney,
Southern District of New York, New York, N.Y.

KATZMANN , Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Leonard C. Johnson, proceeding pro se, seeks leave to file a successive 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his amended judgment of conviction for armed bank robbery

and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. We hold that Johnson’s proposed § 2255

motion would not be successive in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Magwood v.

Patterson, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2788 (2010), because it is his first § 2255 motion challenging the

amended judgment of conviction, and that Magwood partially abrogates this Court’s decision in

Galtieri v. United States, 128 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1997). We therefore deny the successive

application as unnecessary and transfer the matter to the district court with instructions that a new

§ 2255 motion be accepted for filing.

Background

In October 2000, Johnson was convicted of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2113(a), armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), and using a firearm in

connection with a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He was sentenced to

concurrent imprisonment terms of 240 months and 274 months for his bank robbery and armed

bank robbery convictions, and to a consecutive imprisonment term of 300 months for his firearm

conviction. In November 2001, we affirmed Johnson’s conviction and sentence. See United

States v. Johnson, 24 Fed. Appx. 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary order).

In November 2002, Johnson filed a pro se § 2255 motion2 arguing that, inter alia, his

2
We generally refer to a habeas request under § 2255 as a “motion,” a habeas request
under § 2254 as a “petition,” and a request for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion

2
convictions for both bank robbery and armed bank robbery constituted double jeopardy. After the

district court denied this motion, we granted a certificate of appealability with respect to Johnson’s

double jeopardy claim and appointed counsel. In September 2008, we held that the district court

erred in entering two separate convictions and concurrent sentences for both bank robbery under

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). See Johnson v. United

States, 293 Fed. Appx. 789, 790 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order). Accordingly, we modified

Johnson’s judgment of conviction by vacating his conviction and sentence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2113(a), and affirmed the judgment as modified. Id. at 790-91.

In July 2010, Johnson filed the present application for leave to file a successive § 2255

motion.3 In his successive application, Johnson argues that this Court erroneously modified his

judgment of conviction by vacating his conviction and sentence for bank robbery. Instead, he

contends, we should have vacated his conviction and sentence for both armed bank robbery and for

using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. Additionally, Johnson argues that the

indictment against him was defective and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at

various stages of his case.4

or § 2254 petition as an “application for leave to file a successive” motion or petition, or a
“successive application.” In Galtieri, however, this Court used the term “petition” to refer to a
habeas request under § 2255, and in Magwood, the Supreme Court uses the term “application” to
refer to a habeas request under § 2254. See Galtieri, 128 F.3d at 37-38; Magwood, 130 S. Ct. at
2802.
3
Because Johnson filed his successive application on July 29, 2010, the statutory
deadline for decision was August 30, 2010. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D); FED . R. APP . P.
26(a). However, we may "exceed the 30-day time limit . . . where an issue requires a published
opinion that cannot reasonably be prepared within 30 days . . . ." Galtieri, 128 F.3d at 37.
4
Johnson previously filed a successive application in this Court raising the same claims,
which we denied for failure to satisfy the criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). That
determination would normally be binding under the law of the case doctrine, which “commands
that when a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court

3
 Discussion

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a petitioner

incarcerated pursuant to a federal judgment cannot bring a “second or successive” motion for

habeas relief, unless he or she first obtains permission from a court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(h). Before determining whether to grant an application for leave to file a successive

§ 2255 motion, however, we must first determine whether the proposed motion would in fact be

successive. See Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 639 (1998).

In Galtieri v. United States, we considered whether a proposed § 2255 motion should be

considered successive where, as here, a defendant’s first § 2255 motion resulted in an amended

criminal judgment. See 128 F.3d at 37. We held that where the amended judgment altered a

portion of the sentence and did not affect the conviction,

[A] subsequent 2255 petition will be regarded as a ‘first’ petition only to the extent
that it seeks to vacate the new, amended component of the sentence, and will be
regarded as a ‘second’ petition to the extent that it challenges the underlying
conviction or seeks to vacate any component of the original sentence that was not
amended.

Id. at 37-38. We reasoned that such an approach prevented a defendant from raising claims in a

second § 2255 motion that were available to be raised in his or her first § 2255 motion. Id. at 37.

Were we to apply Galtieri here, Johnson’s proposed § 2255 motion would be successive.

Although Johnson nominally seeks to challenge the amended judgment by claiming that his

sentence was erroneously modified, he effectively seeks to relitigate his first § 2255 motion,

in subsequent stages in the same case unless cogent and compelling reasons militate otherwise.”
Johnson v. Holder, 564 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 2009)(internal quotation marks omitted). The law of
the case doctrine is not controlling, however, where there has been an intervening change in law.
See id. at 99-100. As discussed below, the relevant law has changed in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Magwood v. Patterson, 130 S. Ct. 2788 (2010).

4
contending that the original judgment should have been modified in a different way than we

decided in our September 2008 summary order. Moreover, Johnson’s present claims could have

been raised in his first § 2255 motion.

We conclude, however, that our decision in Galtieri cannot be reconciled with the Supreme

Court’s recent decision in Magwood v. Patterson. In Magwood, after a state prisoner had filed a

§ 2254 petition challenging his Alabama murder conviction and death sentence, the district court

conditionally granted his petition and vacated his death sentence. See Magwood, 130 S. Ct. at

2791-93. The trial court subsequently held new sentencing proceedings, and it again sentenced the

state prisoner to death. Id. at 2793. He then filed a § 2254 petition challenging his new sentence

on the ground that, inter alia, he did not have fair warning that his conduct would be sufficient to

warrant a death sentence under Alabama law. Id. at 2794. The district court granted the petition,

concluding that it was not successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) and that the state prisoner’s fair

warning claim was meritorious. Id. at 2794-95. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. Id. at 2795. The

Eleventh Circuit adopted an approach similar to the approach taken in Galtieri, and concluded that

the state prisoner’s fair warning claim was successive because it could have been raised in his

prior § 2254 petition. Id.

The Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)

and reversed. Id. at 2803. The Court held that “the phrase ‘second or successive’ must be

interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged[,]" and that, where “there is a new judgment

intervening between the two habeas petitions, . . . an application challenging the resulting new

judgment is not ‘second or successive’ at all.” Id. at 2797, 2802 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Additionally, the Court held that the phrase “second or successive” applies to entire

habeas petitions, and not to individual claims in those petitions. Id. at 2798. The Court relied

5
primarily on the statutory text, reasoning that “[t]he limitations imposed by § 2244(b) apply only

to a ‘habeas corpus application under § 2254,’ that is, an ‘application for a writ of habeas corpus

on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court[.]’” Id. at 2797 (quoting

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (emphasis in original). Because the state prisoner’s § 2254 petition was

his first collateral attack on the “intervening judgment” between his first and second § 2254

petitions, the Court concluded that it was not successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Id. at 2801,

2803.

We are called upon to decide whether the rule set out in Magwood applies to the case

before us.5 To do so, we must first determine whether the holding in Magwood, which concerned

a § 2254 petition, also applies to § 2255 motions. The Supreme Court’s decision was based

primarily on language in § 2254 that refers to a habeas petition filed “on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Id. at 2792; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (emphasis

in original). Section 2255 does not contain a similar reference to the judgment of a federal court,

referring only to “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of

Congress[,]" and permitting such a prisoner to move “to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added).

The term “sentence” in § 2255(a), however, does not have a materially different meaning

than the term “judgment” in § 2254(b). These two terms are often used interchangeably. See

5
In Wall v. United States, the defendant’s first § 2255 motion was filed and decided on the
merits prior to his direct criminal appeal; in fact, the § 2255 relief granted by the district court
reopened the time to take a direct appeal by entering a new judgment. See __ F.3d __, 2010 WL
3440869, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 2, 2010). In those circumstances, we held that the claims in the
§ 2255 motion were incorporated into the direct appeal, and, as a result, the defendant’s
subsequent § 2255 motion was not successive. Id. at *2-3. Although the subsequent § 2255
motion at issue in Wall was attacking an amended judgment of conviction for the first time, that
fact did not play a significant role in our decision. See id. Here, by contrast, Johnson’s only
direct appeal was perfected prior to his filing a § 2255 motion, and thus Wall is distinguishable.
6
Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007) (“Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence.

The sentence is the judgment.”) (quoting Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937));

Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining “sentence” as “[t]he judgment that a court

formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty[,]” and noting that “sentence” is

“[a]lso termed judgment of conviction[]”). As a practical matter, courts routinely allow federal

prisoners to challenge their conviction, in addition to their sentence, under § 2255(a). For that

purpose, the word “sentence” in § 2255(a) is understood to encompass both the conviction and the

sentence. More generally, we have noted that "nothing in the AEDPA indicates that Congress

intended the ‘second or successive’ rules to operate differently with regard to state and federal

prisoners." Urinyi v. United States, 607 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, we conclude

that the rule stated in Magwood applies to § 2255 motions.

We must also determine whether Magwood applies in a situation where, as here, a prisoner

who successfully challenged his judgment of conviction in a prior § 2255 motion files a

subsequent § 2255 motion challenging unamended portions of his underlying conviction and

sentence. Because the petitioner in Magwood challenged only his sentence in the § 2254 petition

he filed after his amended judgment, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to address the question

of whether its reading of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) “would allow a petitioner who obtains a conditional

writ as to his sentence to file a subsequent application challenging not only his resulting, new

sentence, but also his original, undisturbed conviction.” Magwood, 130 S. Ct. at 2802. Under

Magwood, however, where “there is a new judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions,

. . . an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not ‘second or successive' at all." Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). And the Supreme Court has previously stated that “[a]

judgment of conviction includes both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence.” Deal v. United

7
States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). It follows that, where a first habeas petition results in an

amended judgment, a subsequent petition is not successive regardless of whether it challenges the

conviction, the sentence, or both.

Applying Magwood, Johnson’s proposed § 2255 motion would not be successive because

it is his first § 2255 motion challenging the amended judgment of conviction.6 A different result is

not warranted by the fact that Johnson’s claims could have been raised in his prior § 2255 motion

or the fact that he effectively challenges an unamended component of the judgment. In light of

Magwood, we must interpret successive applications with respect to the judgment challenged and

not with respect to particular components of that judgment. See Magwood, 130 S. Ct. at 2797,

2802. To the extent that our decision in Galtieri is inconsistent with Magwood, it is no longer

good law.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Johnson’s application for leave to file a successive § 2255

motion is DENIED as unnecessary and the matter is transferred to the district court with

instructions that a new § 2255 motion be accepted for filing.

6
The government agrees. As it stated in its letter brief dated September 22, 2010, “[i]n
light of Magwood, Johnson’s Third Petition should be treated as a first Section 2255 petition.”
Br. at 4.
8