[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10935 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar OCTOBER 8, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cr-00058-WCO-SSC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
OSCAR MEDRANO-REBOLLAR,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(October 8, 2010)
Before BLACK, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Oscar Medrano-Rebollar appeals his 46-month sentence imposed after he
pleaded guilty to illegal reentry of a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). Medrano-Rebollar argues that his sentence is procedurally
and substantively unreasonable. After a thorough review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we affirm.
I.
Medrano-Rebollar first argues that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court did not adequately explain its reasons for
imposing a 46-month sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) (“The court, at the
time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the
particular sentence . . . .”). “We review de novo the sufficiency of the district
court’s explanation under § 3553(c)(1).” United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256,
1262 (11th Cir. 2010).
The district court calculated Medrano-Rebollar’s guideline range to be 46 to
57 months, and imposed a sentence of 46 months imprisonment. The district court
explained that a sentence at the low end of the guideline range was “reasonable
and fair.” Although the district court could have provided a more lengthy
explanation for the sentence that it imposed, we conclude that no procedural error
occurred.
“Where a matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at hand and the
record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and
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arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more
extensively.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469
(2007). In Rita, the Supreme Court explained that it is not always necessary for
the judge to state
explicitly that he had heard and considered the evidence and argument;
that . . . he thought the Commission in the Guidelines had determined a
sentence that was proper in the mine run of roughly similar . . . cases;
and that he found that [the defendant’s] personal circumstances here
were simply not different enough to warrant a different sentence.
Id. In this case, as in Rita, “context and the record make clear that this, or similar,
reasoning, underlies the judge’s conclusion.” Id. We therefore conclude that
Medrano-Rebollar’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
II.
Medrano-Rebollar also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
discretion in light of the totality of the circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). “[O]rdinarily we would expect a sentence
within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d
784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the
burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both th[e]
record and the factors in section 3553(a).” Id.
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Medrano-Rebollar argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable
because it is greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). We disagree. Given Medrano-Rebollar’s criminal
history and his failure to comply with the law following his initial removal from
the United States, we cannot say that his low-end guideline sentence of 46 months
is unreasonable. See § 3553(a)(2) (requiring courts to consider the need for the
sentence “to promote respect for the law” and “to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct”).
For these reasons, Medrano-Rebollar’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
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