UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4220
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
THOMAS BALDWIN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00315-TDS-1)
Submitted: September 28, 2010 Decided: October 8, 2010
Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney,
Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Baldwin appeals the 262-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to one count of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2010), and one count
of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (West 2000
& Supp. 2010). On appeal, Baldwin contends that the district
court erred in declining to depart downward to account for the
period of imprisonment he had already served on an undischarged
state sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review a sentence imposed by a district court under
a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 45 (2007); see United States v. Lynn, 592
F.3d 572, 578-79 (4th Cir. 2010) (abuse of discretion standard
of review applicable when defendant properly preserves a claim
of sentencing error in district court “[b]y drawing arguments
from § 3553 for a sentence different than the one ultimately
imposed”). We begin by reviewing the sentence for significant
procedural error, including such errors as “failing to calculate
(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) [2006] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
2
sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If there are no significant
procedural errors, we then consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality
of the circumstances. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468,
473 (4th Cir. 2007). We presume reasonable a sentence imposed
within the properly calculated Guidelines range. United States
v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). Even if
we would have reached a different result, this fact alone is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court. Pauley,
511 F.3d at 474.
“When rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented.’” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). Accordingly, a
sentencing court must apply the relevant § 3553(a) factors to
the particular facts presented and must “state in open court”
the particular reasons that support its chosen sentence, showing
that it has a reasoned basis for its decision and has considered
the parties’ arguments. Id. A sentencing court need not,
however, “robotically tick through” otherwise irrelevant
subsections of § 3553(a). See United States v. Johnson, 445
F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
Here, Baldwin challenges the district court’s decision
not to depart downward to account for the time he had already
3
served on an undischarged state sentence. Under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3(c) (2009), in a case involving an
undischarged term of imprisonment that does not fit within
subsections (a) and (b), a downward departure is authorized only
under extraordinary circumstances. See USSG § 5G1.3 cmt.
n.3(E). A downward departure is warranted only if it is
necessary to “ensure that the combined punishment is not
increased unduly by the fortuity and timing of separate
prosecutions and sentencings.” Id.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that Baldwin was not entitled to a
downward departure. As it stands, Baldwin’s sentence is at the
lowest end of the applicable Guidelines range. See USSG
§ 4B1.1(c)(3). The vast majority of the sentencing hearing was
devoted to the issue of downward departure. In making its
decision, the district court determined the correct advisory
Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors and its
authority to depart downward, and explained its decision to the
parties. Its determination was individualized, taking into
account the unique treatment of Baldwin’s state and federal
charges, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and
Baldwin’s history. Reflecting upon those factors, the court
determined that the circumstances were not sufficiently
extraordinary to warrant a downward departure in light of
4
Baldwin’s extensive criminal history. See USSG § 5G1.3 cmt.
n.3(E).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5