CLD-302 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-2301
___________
JOSEPH DIFILIPPO,
Appellant
v.
T. R. SNIEZEK
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-00406)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 30, 2010
Before: BARRY, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 12, 2010 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
Joseph DiFilippo appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his habeas corpus
petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We will affirm.
In 2005, DiFilippo entered a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania to one count of distribution and possession with intent to
distribute in excess of 50 grams of cocaine base. Prior to sentencing, the Probation
Office determined that DiFilippo is a career offender due in part to a finding that his
prior conviction for escape constitutes a crime of violence. As a career offender,
DiFilippo’s guidelines range was determined under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b), and he faced
262 to 327 months in prison. The District Court agreed that DiFilippo is a career
offender, granted a downward adjustment for substantial assistance, and imposed a
sentence of 120 months in prison, which reflected the statutory minimum sentence.
DiFilippo did not appeal.
In 2008, he filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) seeking a reduction in
sentence in light of the Sentencing Commission’s retroactively applicable amendments
lowering the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses under § 2D1.1(c). The
District Court denied the § 3582 motion, and this Court affirmed. We explained that,
because DiFilippo’s base offense level as a career offender was determined under
§ 4B1.1(b) and was higher than the offense level calculated under § 2D1.1(c), the higher
level applied. Thus, because the crack cocaine amendments did not affect the sentencing
range, § 3582(c)(2) did not authorize a reduction for DiFilippo. See C.A. No. 08-3798
(not precedential opinion filed July 22, 2009).
2
In February 2010, DiFilippo filed a § 2241 habeas petition in the Middle District
of Pennsylvania, his district of incarceration. He argued that the sentencing court
improperly treated him as a career offender because his escape conviction can no longer
be considered a crime of violence in light of Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687,
691-92 (2009) (holding that failure to report is separate crime from escape, and that
because failure to report does not involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another, it is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal
Act). DiFilippo also relied upon United States v. Hopkins, 577 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2009),
where we noted that the crack cocaine amendments “would authorize [defendant] to file
a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) for a reduction of the sentence he is currently
serving if he has not been properly sentenced as a career offender.” Id. at 509. Because
DiFilippo believes that his escape conviction can no longer support the career offender
determination, he argued that he is now entitled to a sentence reduction under the
amended crack cocaine guidelines – the same reduction that he sought unsuccessfully
through his earlier § 3582(c) motion.
A Magistrate Judge recommended summary dismissal of the § 2241 petition for
lack of jurisdiction, concluding that DiFilippo’s recourse is to seek permission from this
Court to file “second or successive § 2255 motion” based on Chambers and Hopkins.
The Magistrate Judge found that § 2255 provides an available remedy for DiFilippo’s
claim. The Magistrate Judge appears to have assumed that DiFilippo’s prior motion for a
3
reduction in sentence was filed under § 2255, and thus concluded that DiFilippo must
seek permission under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.
The District Court conducted a de novo review of the Report and
Recommendation in light of DiFilippo’s objections. It agreed that DiFilippo’s claim
cannot be raised under § 2241 because he has not shown that the remedy under § 2255 is
inadequate or ineffective. Unlike the Magistrate Judge, however, the District Court
noted that DiFilippo’s prior post-conviction proceeding was filed under § 3582(c), not
under § 2255, and as such DiFilippo does not need to seek permission from this Court
before proceeding with his claim under § 2255. The District Court thus dismissed the
§ 2241 petition for want of jurisdiction and directed DiFilippo to seek relief in a
proceeding under § 2255.
DiFilippo timely filed this appeal from the order dismissing his § 2241 petition.
In addition, as reflected in the District Court’s publicly available docket, DiFilippo filed
a § 2255 motion after the dismissal of his § 2241 petition. See M.D. Pa. Crim.
No. 05-cr-00071. The sentencing court ordered service of the § 2255 motion, and the
government has filed a brief in opposition to the motion on the merits. Proceedings on
the § 2255 motion remain pending before the sentencing court.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the dismissal of
DiFilippo’s § 2241 petition. “We exercise plenary review over the district court’s legal
4
conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings.” Cradle v.
United States, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
DiFilippo argues on appeal that the District Court erred in dismissing his § 2241
petition insofar as it failed to “construe his petition . . . as a § 2255 motion, [once] the
Court determined his claims were those that should be brought under § 2255.” Response
re: Summary Action at 4. As mentioned, DiFilippo filed a motion under § 2255
following the dismissal of his § 2241 petition, and his § 2255 motion is now pending
before the sentencing court. We need not consider, therefore, whether the § 2241
petition should have been re-characterized as a § 2255 motion under the circumstances
presented here, as the sentencing court presently has before it a § 2255 motion raising the
same claim that DiFilippo sought to raise in this § 2241 proceeding.
Moreover, we conclude that the District Court did not err in directing DiFilippo to
seek relief under § 2255. A motion under § 2255 is the presumptive means through
which a federal prisoner must raise a post-conviction challenge to his sentence. Okereke
v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). More specifically, a habeas corpus
petition filed by a federal prisoner “shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant
has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him . . . unless it
also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). “A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective only
where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would
5
prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his
wrongful detention claim.” Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538.
DiFilippo has not made this showing. Indeed, we do not understand him to
contend on this appeal that § 2255 provides an inadequate or ineffective remedy for his
claim challenging the career offender determination. As noted, his § 2255 motion is
presently under consideration before the sentencing court, and there is no indication that
DiFilippo will not receive a full and fair adjudication in that proceeding. On this record,
the District Court properly dismissed the § 2241 petition in favor of a proceeding under
§ 2255. See Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no substantial question.”
3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
judgment.
6