FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 13 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In the Matter of: JAY A. DICOSTANZO, No. 08-56593
Debtor, D.C. No. 5:07-cv-01558-CAS
DEBBERA DICOSTANZO, MEMORANDUM *
Appellant,
v.
PATRICIA J. ZIMMERMAN; et al.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 6, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: HALL, FISHER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
After two hearings, the bankruptcy court entered an order granting trustee
P.J. Zimmerman’s motion to approve a compromise settling the bankruptcy
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
estate’s legal claim to a residence. Debbera DiCostanzo appeals the district court’s
affirmance of the order of the bankruptcy court. We review a bankruptcy court’s
order approving a motion to compromise for an abuse of discretion, In re A&C
Properties, 784 F.2d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir. 1986), and we affirm.
Contrary to DiCostanzo’s argument, the bankruptcy court applied the correct
legal standard to the trustee’s motion to approve a compromise under Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 9019(a). Although the bankruptcy court’s statements were general and
conclusory, the record reveals the court applied A&C Properties’s four-factor test
to determine the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed
compromise. Under this test, the bankruptcy court’s approval of the compromise
was not an abuse of discretion.
We also hold the bankruptcy court did not err by further treating the
trustee’s motion to approve the compromise as a motion to approve the sale of an
asset under 11 U.S.C. § 363. See In re Mickey Thompson Entm’t Group, Inc., 292
B.R. 415, 421–22 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). Additionally, the bankruptcy court
complied with 11 U.S.C. § 363(i) by estimating the value of the compromise to the
bankruptcy estate and by offering DiCostanzo the chance to purchase the
bankruptcy estate’s claim to the residence at this price. Nevertheless, DiCostanzo
argues the court erred by refusing to offer her an order 1) allowing her to use the
residence as collateral for a loan to obtain the necessary funds to purchase the
trustee’s legal claim; and 2) quieting title to the residence in her favor. We reject
this argument because the bankruptcy court could not offer DiCostanzo the order
she requested; the trustee was selling a legal claim to the residence and not the
residence itself.
AFFIRMED.