UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1050
RICHARD EKOW TAKYI,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: October 7, 2010 Decided: October 18, 2010
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Alexandru I. Craciunescu, Steffanie J. Lewis, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS LAW FIRM, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Tony
West, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Neiman-Kelting,
Stefanie Notarino Hennes, Office of Immigration Litigation,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Richard Ekow Takyi, a native and citizen of Ghana,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“Board”) order dismissing his appeal from the immigration
judge’s order denying his request for a third continuance of his
removal proceedings and granting voluntary departure with an
alternate order of removal. For the reasons that follow, we
deny the petition for review in part and dismiss in part.
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2010), the immigration
judge may grant a continuance for good cause shown. The
immigration judge’s refusal to grant a continuance is thus
subject to review for abuse of discretion. Lendo v. Gonzales,
493 F.3d 439, 441 (4th Cir. 2007). When deciding a motion to
continue for the purpose of allowing for a visa petition to be
adjudicated by United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services, the immigration judge’s discretion should be favorably
exercised if the alien establishes a prima facie approvable visa
petition. See In re Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 785, 790 (B.I.A.
2009). However, the immigration judge is not obligated “to
grant a continuance in every case where there is a pending visa
petition.” Id. In determining whether to grant a continuance,
the immigration judge should consider various factors including,
among others, whether other visa petitions have been previously
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denied, the reasons for the continuance, and any other relevant
procedural factors. Id. at 790-94.
We conclude the immigration judge did not abuse his
discretion in denying Takyi’s request for a third continuance of
his removal proceedings. See id. at 794 (“[A] history of
continuances being granted by the Immigration Judge for the
adjudication of a pending I-130, coupled with other relevant
factors, may support a decision to move forward with the
case.”). Accordingly, we deny in part the petition for review.
To the extent that Takyi raises issues that were not presented
in his administrative appeal to the Board, we lack jurisdiction
to consider those unexhausted claims and dismiss in part the
petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2006); Massis v.
Mukasey, 549 F.3d 631, 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 736 (2009). Finally, in light of the Board’s order
sua sponte reopening proceedings and remanding this case to the
immigration court, which was issued after the instant petition
for review was filed, we deny as moot Takyi’s request for a
remand to the Board. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
PETITION DENIED IN PART
AND DISMISSED IN PART
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