FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 19, 2010
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 09-1408
v. (D.Ct. No. 1:08-CR-00504-REB-1)
(D. Colo.)
MATTHEW LOOPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Matthew Looper pled guilty to one count of fraud in connection
with the production of identification documents in violation of 18 U.S.C.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
§ 1028(a)(1) and one count of possession of implements to counterfeit documents
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(5). The district court sentenced him to a term
of twelve months imprisonment on each count, to run consecutively. Mr. Looper
appeals the imposition of consecutive sentences, claiming they are procedurally
and substantively unreasonable. We exercise jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Our factual summary pertinent to disposition of this appeal is primarily
based on Mr. Looper’s “Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to
Sentencing,” as incorporated into his presentence report to which neither party
objected. Following a traffic violation on August 8, 2008, Mr. Looper was found
in possession of two counterfeit Colorado drivers’ licenses using his photo but in
the alias of “Matthew Gibbson Wagner.” Authorities subsequently interviewed
one of Mr. Looper’s landlords, Jan Baer, who informed them Mr. Looper and his
wife rented their home under the names “Matthew and Heather Wagner.”
Because they violated their rental agreement, Mrs. Baer changed the locks and
secured the property, where she found a stack of credit reports relating to
different individuals as well as a laminating machine and laminating materials.
Pursuant to a search warrant, authorities seized those items, finding credit
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reports pertaining to actual individuals who conducted business with a financial
mortgage company where Mr. Looper worked. They also discovered: (1) mail
showing Mr. Looper maintained a checking account as “Matthew Wagner” at a
local bank; and (2) computer hardware containing counterfeit drivers’ licenses for
different states with Mr. Looper’s photo but various other assumed names and
addresses. On September 23, 2008, United States Marshals arrested Mr. Looper
after he attempted to sell piracy computer software online.
Some of the counterfeit licenses at issue used names of identifiable
individuals, while others used names which authorities failed to identify as actual
individuals. Those containing the names of identifiable individuals included one
for Joshua William Adams and another for Daniel Charles Mattison, who obtained
a loan from the mortgage company for which Mr. Looper worked, where he had
dealings with Mr. Looper; the latter license also contained Mr. Mattison’s correct
date of birth. With regard to Mr. Looper’s wife, Heather, Mr. Looper had in his
possession a counterfeit driver’s license with her photo but the actual license
number of Rachel Vanscoy and the name “Jennifer Addison Hunter” – a
beneficiary of a loan negotiated with the mortgage company for which Mr.
Looper worked. An investigation also revealed six financial entities suffered
monetary losses due to Mr. Looper’s identification fraud. In at least two
instances, Mr. Looper used the names of Joshua Adams and Matthew Wagner to
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fraudulently obtain money for which a business suffered a monetary loss.
On May 6, 2009, Mr. Looper entered into a plea of guilty to one count of
fraud in connection with production of identification documents and one count of
possession of implements to counterfeit documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028(a)(1) and (5). In exchange for Mr. Looper’s guilty plea, the government
expressly agreed to withdraw charges for four other counts of fraud in connection
with production of documents and forgo charging him with piracy computer
software violations and identity theft under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028 and 1028A. After
the district court accepted Mr. Looper’s plea, a probation officer prepared a
presentence report calculating Mr. Looper’s United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range at six to twelve months imprisonment for each
count. 1 After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the
probation officer recommended sentencing Mr. Looper at the high end of the
Guidelines range, with the sentences to run concurrently. Neither the government
1
In the presentence report, the probation officer set Mr. Looper’s base
offense level at six under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(2) for offenses involving
counterfeit instruments. He also increased Mr. Looper’s offense level by two
levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A)(i) and (ii) and (b)(10)(C)(ii),
because his offenses involved device-making equipment, an authentication
feature, and the possession of five or more means of unlawful identification
produced or obtained by the use of another means of identification. Based on his
acceptance of responsibility for the offenses charged, the probation officer also
included a two-level reduction, for a total offense level of six. A total offense
level of six, together with his criminal history category of IV, resulted in a
Guidelines range of six to twelve months imprisonment for each count.
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nor Mr. Looper filed written objections to the presentence report.
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the district court asked for
objections to the presentence report, to which Mr. Looper stated he had none.
However, his counsel did request a more lenient sentence, explaining Mr. Looper
produced the fake licenses only because of unresolved issues in Illinois resulting
in him being unable to obtain a valid driver’s license. Mr. Looper also addressed
the court, acknowledging “[t]here are some landlords that unfortunately got the
wrong end of the deal on what I did” and expressing his regret toward them and
others.
The government provided argument in support of the recommended
sentence and also presented the testimony of Mr. David Baer – the other landlord
of Mr. Looper’s rented property. Mr. Baer testified to the trauma and many
sleepless nights his family encountered after they discovered Mr. Looper’s false
identity and the fact Mr. Looper not only committed fraud against them, but
committed it “against the community by gathering all this business information
and making these false identities and drivers’ licenses.”
In determining the appropriate sentence, the district court adopted the
presentence report facts and calculations, to which neither party had objected. It
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also discussed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors in considerable detail,
beginning with the “nature and circumstances of these respective offenses” and
stating identity theft and possession of counterfeit instruments are serious crimes
that wreak “both tangible and intangible havoc on [their] victims.” It noted such
offenses are “a scourge that is sweeping this country and this community” and
“quintessentially ... [an] assault on our system of finance and personal security in
this country ....” It further stated:
The victim that spoke today described it well. It is an assault on
your personal security. It changes your life and your lifestyle as a
victim. Never again do you enjoy the security that you had before.
It also causes you to become myopically and morbidly preoccupied
with your circumstances, until you have an answer, until you have a
resolution.
With regard to Mr. Looper’s “history and characteristics,” the district court
rejected his claim relating to his Illinois driver’s license problem, stating there
was “absolutely no excuse or explanation for the number of forged counterfeit
driver’s licenses” he possessed and determining the circumstances showed he was
“in the counterfeit identification document business.” It further noted that “at the
ripe ... old age of twenty-five or so,” Mr. Looper had a criminal history category
of IV, strongly indicating his lack of respect for the law. It also stated it had
considered all the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including, but not limited to, the
need for Mr. Looper’s sentence to be sufficient but not greater than necessary to
achieve Congressional goals and purposes of sentencing; reflect the seriousness of
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the offense; promote respect for the law; provide just punishment for the offense;
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; protect the public from future
crimes by Mr. Looper; and provide him with educational and vocational training
or other correctional treatment. It also explained it had considered the kinds of
sentences and sentencing ranges for his particular crimes, the pertinent policy
statements, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants.
Based on these sentencing factors, together with the provisions in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3584(a) and (b) and U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 regarding concurrent and/or consecutive
sentences, the district court determined Mr. Looper should be sentenced to the
maximum advisory Guidelines-range sentence of twelve months imprisonment for
each count and the sentences should run consecutively, resulting in twenty-four
months total imprisonment. The district court then gave both parties’ counsel an
opportunity to raise any concerns or objections, to which none were raised
concerning the term of imprisonment.
II. Discussion
Mr. Looper now appeals his consecutive sentences, claiming they are
procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and requests a remand to the district
court for imposition of concurrent twelve-month sentences. In arguing his
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consecutive sentences are procedurally unreasonable, he claims the district court
abused its discretion by allowing a “non-victim,” Mr. Baer, to address the court
and using Mr. Baer’s testimony as rationale for his sentence. Mr. Looper states
that while he knew Mr. Baer was merely the landlord and not a victim, his
counsel was unaware of this fact until after the hearing, when he informed him.
He also asserts the district court committed further procedural error by
erroneously concluding Mr. Looper “harm[ed] people by stealing their identities”
and, instead, argues his fraudulent conduct did not harm or injure anyone other
than corporations or businesses.
In making these arguments, Mr. Looper contends plain error review should
not apply because he “was not afforded an opportunity to object to the sentencing
problems or the reliance on identity thievery until after the sentence was
pronounced” and the court assured itself Mr. Looper knew he was getting
consecutive sentences. He contends it was “[o]nly at the very end of the hearing,
when raising an objection would have been futile,” that the district court ended
with the question, “[F]urther business by the defense?”
As to the substantive reasonableness of his sentences, Mr. Looper suggests
that by giving him consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences, as required by
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d), he received “non-Guideline” sentences which punish him
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“not for the crimes he did commit, but for crimes he had the potential for
committing with his computer and business records.” He also reiterates his claim
the district court made a mistake when it sentenced him based on the false belief
he was an identity thief who harmed individuals by using their identities for his
own gain, when he only committed identity fraud, which did not harm real people
but only banking or check-cashing businesses. In support of this argument, Mr.
Looper points out he did not plead guilty to identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028
or § 1028A, but only identity fraud under § 1028.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, giving deference to the district
court under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d
800, 802, 805-06 (10 th Cir. 2008). “Our appellate review for reasonableness
includes both a procedural component, encompassing the method by which a
sentence was calculated, as well as a substantive component, which relates to the
length of the resulting sentence.” Id. at 803. While we look to see whether the
district court applied the applicable Guidelines in calculating a sentence to
ascertain its procedural reasonableness, “[i]n Gall, the Supreme Court identified
‘failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors’ and ‘failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence’ as forms of procedural error” as well. Id. (quoting Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
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In determining whether the district court properly applied the applicable
Guidelines in calculating the sentence, we generally review its legal conclusions
de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Kristl, 437
F.3d 1050, 1054 (10 th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). However, if a defendant fails to
object to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence before the district court,
we review his claim of procedural unreasonableness only for plain error,
including the failure to raise a contemporaneous objection. See United States v.
Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1176-77 (10 th Cir. 2007).
In contrast, a challenge to the sufficiency of the district court’s § 3553(a)
justifications, which implicates the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
does not require a prior objection to preserve it on appeal. See Smart, 518 F.3d at
804-06. In reviewing a district court’s sentence for substantive reasonableness
under the § 3553(a) factors, we employ an abuse of discretion standard. See id. at
805-06. We employ the same standard of review to the imposition of consecutive
or concurrent sentences. See United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10 th Cir.
2008). We consider “whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all
the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10 th Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a sentence is within the correctly-
calculated Guidelines range, we may apply a rebuttable presumption of
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reasonableness. See Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054-55.
Turning to the legal principles involving concurrent and consecutive
sentences on which the district court relied, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) discusses
sentencing on multiple counts of conviction and states:
If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory
maximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence
imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively,
but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence
equal to the total punishment. In all other respects, sentences on all
counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required
by law.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d). In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 3584 provides: “[i]f multiple terms of
imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, ... the terms may run
concurrently or consecutively,” and “[t]he court, in determining whether the terms
imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider, as
to each offense for which a term of imprisonment is being imposed, the factors set
forth in section 3553(a).” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) and (b).
With these legal principles in mind, we turn to Mr. Looper’s appeal. In
challenging the procedural reasonableness of his two consecutive sentences, he is
claiming, for the first time on appeal, the district court improperly considered the
testimony of his landlord and any harm caused to others by his fraudulent acts.
However, Mr. Looper did not raise any such objections before the district court,
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nor has he shown any reason why he could not have raised them at the sentencing
hearing, especially when the district court expressly provided him an opportunity
at the end of the hearing to contemporaneously voice any concerns. To now
claim it would have been “futile” to do so is simply self-serving and
disingenuous, especially when nothing in the record demonstrates the district
court would have failed to consider and address such objections or concerns.
Even when we consider Mr. Looper’s contention the district court erred in
considering the effect or harm his fraud had on Mr. Baer or any victims, it is
evident it did so under the § 3553(a) factors as a means of determining the
appropriate length of his sentence – a substantive reasonableness issue we discuss
hereafter. In so doing, it carefully considered all the § 3553(a) factors and more
than adequately explained the chosen sentences. As a result, no form of
procedural error occurred. In addition, other than his contentions concerning
§ 5G1.2 in his substantive reasonableness argument, which we also address
hereafter, Mr. Looper has not shown the district court misapplied the applicable
advisory Guidelines in calculating his sentence. As a result, we discern no
procedural error, regardless of whether we apply a plain error or abuse of
discretion standard of review.
Having concluded Mr. Looper’s sentence is within the correctly-calculated
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Guidelines range, we apply a presumption of reasonableness which Mr. Looper
must rebut by demonstrating his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of
the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). In attempting to meet his burden, Mr. Looper
asserts the district court imposed a “non-Guideline” sentence by giving him
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences, as required by U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.2(d). 2 However, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d), which recommends consecutive
sentences for certain multiple-count convictions and concurrent sentences for
others, is merely advisory, establishing a sentencing structure for multiple-count
convictions from which the district court may deviate under 18 U.S.C. § 3584
after applying the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Thus, while the probation officer
recommended concurrent sentences based on his assessment of the § 3553(a)
factors, the district court used its discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3584 to impose
consecutive sentences based on its own consideration and assessment of those
factors. In so doing, it provided a thorough and individualized analysis of those
factors and why it believed they warranted consecutive sentences. As a result, we
reject Mr. Looper’s contention that imposition of consecutive sentences somehow
resulted in a “non-Guideline” sentence.
2
Even though a challenge to the district court’s consideration of a
Guideline is a challenge to the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, Mr.
Looper raises his argument regarding § 5G1.2(d) as a challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence.
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Mr. Looper also argues the district court impermissibly imposed
consecutive sentences to punish him “not for the crimes he did commit, but for
crimes he had the potential for committing with his computer and business
records.” However, in this case, the district court performed an exhaustive
analysis of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the need for the sentence
imposed to afford adequate deterrence and protect the public. To the extent the
district court considered any potential crimes Mr. Looper might commit, it did so
for the purpose of deterring such crimes and protecting the public, as
contemplated by § 3553(a), and therefore, no abuse of discretion occurred.
Like his procedural reasonableness claim, Mr. Looper also asserts
substantive error on grounds the district court sentenced him based on the false
belief he was an identity thief who harmed individuals by using their identities for
his own gain, when in fact the only victims who experienced losses were
corporations or businesses. However, Mr. Looper fails to provide any authority,
nor are we aware of any, establishing it is an abuse of discretion to consider the
intangible or tangible harm caused to direct or indirect victims under a § 3553(a)
analysis when assessing the seriousness of an offense. Moreover, when the
district court discussed the tangible and intangible harm caused victims, it
expressly mentioned the instant crime of possession of counterfeit instruments,
regardless of whether it also mentioned “identity theft,” for which Mr. Looper
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was not formally charged. When the hearing transcript is read in its entirety and
context, it is clear the district court was discussing the serious nature and
circumstances of the instant offense in which Mr. Looper possessed multiple
credit reports of actual individuals and possessed and produced counterfeit
drivers’ licenses using their or other individuals’ names and, in at least one
instance, used a real person’s name, Joshua William Adams, to fraudulently
obtain money. While nothing in the record suggests these individuals experienced
actual financial losses or direct harm, Mr. Looper nevertheless impermissibly
used their names, and even one person’s birth date, to produce and possess
counterfeit drivers’ licenses or fraudulently obtain money. Moreover, the fact
that only corporations or businesses lost money through Mr. Looper’s fraudulent
acts does not mean the district court was required to discount their losses in
assessing the serious nature of Mr. Looper’s offenses.
Finally, with regard to the district court’s consideration and discussion of
Mr. Baer’s testimony, the record is unclear as to the total extent of fraud or
victimization he experienced, but Mr. Looper explicitly expressed his regret for
such victimization at the sentencing hearing. At the very least, the record on
appeal establishes Mr. Looper used a false identity to obtain rental property from
Mr. Baer and his wife, where he stored other individuals’ credit reports and
fraudulently produced counterfeit drivers’ licenses. Thus, regardless whether Mr.
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Baer is considered a direct or an indirect victim of the instant offenses, we
perceive no abuse of discretion by the district court in considering Mr. Baer’s
testimony, including his feeling of being victimized or traumatized by Mr.
Looper’s fraudulent conduct, when it performed its analysis of all the § 3553(a)
factors to determine the length of Mr. Looper’s sentences, including its decision
to impose consecutive sentences. We further note that victim testimony is
explicitly authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which state that
“[b]efore imposing sentence, the court must address any victim of the crime who
is present at sentencing and must permit the victim to be reasonably heard.” See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(B). 3
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Looper’s consecutive sentences.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
3
We also note that under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act “[a] crime victim
has ... [t]he right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district
court involving ... sentencing,” and the government has an obligation to ensure
any witnesses’ views pertinent to the sentencing process are presented at hearing.
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a), (a)(4), (c)(1).
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