UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4466
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GUILLERMO ALFONSON SALAZAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00727-PMD-1)
Submitted: September 30, 2010 Decided: October 20, 2010
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ann Briks Walsh, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Alston Calhoun Badger, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina,
William Walter Wilkins, III, United States Attorney, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Guillermo Alfonson Salazar appeals the district
court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing
him to sixty months’ imprisonment. Salazar’s attorney has filed
a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
raising the issue of whether the district court’s revocation
sentence is plainly unreasonable. Salazar was notified of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so.
We affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether
the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id.
at 438. In this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
than reasonableness review for guidelines sentences. United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if
we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable
must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven
policy statements and the statutory factors applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006),
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the court need not robotically tick through every subsection,
and ultimately, the court has broad discretion to revoke the
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum. Id. at 656-57. Moreover, while a district
court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence, the
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as when imposing a post-conviction sentence.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that
Salazar’s sentence is within the prescribed statutory range and
not plainly unreasonable. At his revocation hearing, Salazar
admitted the violation alleged by the probation officer, and the
court properly considered the guidelines and applicable
statutory factors in imposing its sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform her client, in writing,
of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client. Finally, we dispense
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with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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