FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 21, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM HENRY SHERRATT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-4018
(D.C. No. 2:07-CV-00551-DAK)
CLINT FRIEL, Old Warden; STEVEN (D. Utah)
TURLEY, New Warden; MICHAEL
CHABRIES, Utah Department of
Corrections Director; JACK FORD,
UDC Administration; DAN LATHAM,
Associate Warden; JAMES LA
BOUNTY, Deputy Warden; LYLE
SMITH, Captain, C-Block/SOTP
Program Security, C-Block OMR;
KENT DEMILLE, LT. C-Block OMR;
GRANT BLAIR, CHS, C-Block OMR;
RANDY LONG, Captain, B-Block
OMR; FNU CAWLEG, Sergeant,
B-Block OMR; SHARON D’AMICO,
CHS, B-Block OMR; DAVID WOLF,
CHS, B-Block OMR; NANCY
MANROE, SATP Counselor, OMR;
DAVID BALLARD, SATP Counselor,
OMR; RON SANCHEZ, SOTP
Director, C-2; KARL POWELL, SOTP
Assistant Director; EMMA HEATH,
SOTP Staff; ANNETTE VALARDE,
A-Block OMR,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant William H. Sherratt was convicted in Utah state court of
two counts of first-degree rape. He was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of
five years to life under Utah’s indeterminate sentencing scheme.
Mr. Sherratt now appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 complaint against various officers and employees of the Utah Department
of Corrections. The genesis of that cause of action was a downgrading of his
prison privileges and living accommodations that occurred in August 2003.
Mr. Sherratt’s voluminous district court filings generally presented a couple of
different main theories. His first theory was that the downgrading occurred
without due process and in retaliation for his filing of a habeas corpus action.
He asserted that Utah prison employees have an unwritten policy of retaliating
against sex offenders who file legal actions attacking their convictions.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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Mr. Sherratt’s second theory was broader and attacked the reason given by
the prison for the downgrading. According to Mr. Sherratt, the prison maintained
that the downgrading was simply a recognition of the fact that previously granted
privileges were incompatible with Mr. Sherratt’s failure to participate in the
prison’s sex offender treatment program (SOTP). Mr. Sherratt claimed that he
was wrongly convicted of rape, and essentially argued that this wrongful
conviction leads to the Catch-22 of having to admit to a crime he did not commit
in order to participate in the SOTP and reap the various benefits (increased
privileges, more favorable parole consideration) associated with participation. 1
He asserted that Utah’s system of indeterminate sentencing, which allows the
parole board great control over the amount of time a prisoner will actually spend
in prison, makes the parole board essentially a sentencing court, and that the
prison and the parole board should be constitutionally required to consider
evidence of his actual innocence before using his failure to attend therapy against
him.
The district court sua sponte dismissed Mr. Sherratt’s in forma pauperis
complaint on screening for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). He asserts on appeal that the district court erred in holding
that (1) there was no constitutional liberty interest in maintaining a certain prison
1
The SOTP does not allow prisoners to attend therapy until they are ready to
admit they are sex offenders who need such therapy.
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classification or housing assignment, and thus Mr. Sherratt had failed to state a
claim that a due process violation occurred when the downgrade occurred;
(2) Mr. Sherratt had failed to assert facts sufficient to show facial plausibility that
“but for” his filing of a habeas action, he would have been allowed to keep his
increased privileges despite his non-participation in SOTP; (3) Utah’s
indeterminate sentencing scheme was not unconstitutional, parole is a privilege
and not a right, and the Utah parole statute did not create a federal constitutional
liberty interest, see Straley v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 582 F.3d 1208, 1212-15
(10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010), and (4) to the extent that
Mr. Sherratt was attacking the basis of his confinement, he was improperly
attempting to advance habeas corpus claims in a § 1983 action, see Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (explaining “that a § 1983 action will not lie
when a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks
either immediate release from prison or the shortening of his term of
confinement” (quotations and citation omitted)).
Appellant proceeds pro se, and therefore we construe his pleadings
liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Further, “[w]e review
de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss an IFP complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214,
1217 (10th Cir. 2007). “Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a
claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the
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facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.”
Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999). “In
determining whether dismissal is proper, we must accept the allegations of the
complaint as true and we must construe those allegations, and any reasonable
inferences that might be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Id. Specifically, “we look to the specific allegations in the complaint
to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay,
500 F.3d at 1218 (quotation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gallagher v.
Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1068 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). Upon
consideration of Mr. Sherratt’s brief and the contentions therein, the entire record
on appeal, and de novo review of the district court’s order, we affirm the
dismissal of Mr. Sherratt’s complaint for substantially the same reasons set forth
by the district court in its December 11, 2009, order dismissing Mr. Sherratt’s
cause of action.
Mr. Sherratt also filed two motions to supplement the record. The first
seeks to supplement the record with a audio recording of a parole board hearing
that took place three months after the district court dismissed his cause of action.
The second seeks to supplement the record with an affidavit concerning allegedly
retaliatory conduct on the part of prison officials occurring in 2010. To support
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his motions, Mr. Sherratt cites to Hayes v. Whitman, 264 F.3d 1017, 1025
(10th Cir. 2001), which observes that “it might be appropriate for a [district]
court to consider additional facts or legal theories asserted in a response brief to a
motion to dismiss if they were consistent with the facts and theories advanced in
the complaint[.]” (emphasis added). Hayes is inapposite and we decline to
supplement the record.
Mr. Sherratt also filed a motion asking us to take “Judicial Notice” of
Utah Code Ann. § 64-9b-4, which provides that rehabilitative and employment
opportunities in Utah prisons are voluntary. It appears Mr. Sherratt is attempting
to argue on appeal that defendants’ conduct violated this state law. His argument
is dismissed for not being properly raised in the district court or in his appellate
brief. See Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., ___ F.3d ___,
Nos. 08-8064, 08-8068, 2010 WL 3473382, at 16 n.20 (10th Cir. Sept. 7, 2010).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED for substantially the same
reasons set forth by the district court in its December 11, 2009, order dismissing
Mr. Sherratt’s cause of action. Mr. Sherratt’s motions to supplement the record
with additional factual information are DENIED. His argument concerning
Utah Code Ann. § 64-9b-4 is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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